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MURAT  HALSTEAD, 


General  Emilio  Aguinaldo. 

(His  Latest  Photograph.) 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2017  with  funding  from 
Boston  Library  Consortium  Member  Libraries 


https://archive.org/details/aguinaldohiscaptOOhals 


Aguinaldo  and  His  Cafior 

« I I 

■ -'S  ‘ 

THE  LIFE  MYSTERIES  OF  EMILIO  AGUINALDO  AND  . 
ADVENTURES  AND  ACHIEVEMENTS  OF  " ' 
GENERAL  FUNSTON. 

Historical  Stories  of  Two  Memorable  Men. 

By  MURAT  HALSTEAD, 

Historian  of  the  New  Possessions  of  the  United  States. 


WRITTEN  ON  THE  DIRECT  EVIDENCE  OF  ALL  THE  OFFICIAL 
REPORTS  AND  PRIVATE  PAPERS  CAPTURED  IN  THE  CAPI- 
TALS AND  HIDING-PLACES  OF  THE  INSURGENTS  OF 
THE  PHILIPPINES,  INCLUDING  AGUINALDO’ S PER- 
SONAL CORRESPONDENCE  AND  MINUTES  OF 
CONFIDENTIAL  CONFERENCES  ON  THE 
BIAC-NA-BATO  TREATY  OF  DECEMBER 
19,  1897,  AND  OF  THE  HONG  KONG 
CONSPIRACY  OF  MAY  4,  1898. 


The  Insurgents'  Club  Resolved  that  Itself  was  the 
Philippine  Country,  and  Aguinaldo  Prophet  and 
Tycoon  of  a Thousand  South  Sea  Islands. 


• 

THE  EARLY  FORESHADOWING  THAT  AGUINALDO  WAS  THE 
AGTUAL  ALLY  OF  SPAIN,  AND  THAT  ALL  HIS  STEPS  WHEN 
PERMITTED  TO  GO  TO  HIS  BIRTHPLACE,  CAVITE,  UN- 
DER THE  PROTECTION  AND  PRESTIGE  OF  THE 
AMERICAN  FLAG,  WERE  GUIDED  BY  THE 
FIXED  PURPOSE  OF  WAR  WITH  US ; AND 
THIS,  DOCUMENTS  OF  AUTHENTI-  , 

CATED  VERITY  DEMONSTRATE. 


CINCINNATI: 

THE  HALSTEAD  PUBLISHING  COMPANY, 
1901, 


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./J3 

H34 

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Copyright,  1901,  by 
The  Halstead  Publishing  Company 


O'NEiaUBfWRV 


JAN  2 T 199* 


INTRODUCTORY. 


ENERAL  EMILIO  AGUINALDO  is  the  mys- 


tery  of  the  modern  Orient.  He  has  been  the 
specter  of  Old  Asia,  haunting  us  in  the  Philippines. 
The  truth  about  himis  a strange  story.  Only  now,  that 
he  is  a captive,  have  all  the  facts  been  accessible.  His 
history  will  always  be  an  illustration  that  “truth  is 
stranger  than  fiction.”  No  novelist,  not  Hawthorne, 
Bulwer,  Kipling,  Haggard,  Hugo,  or  Eugene  Sue, 
would  risk  founding  a romance  on  the  facts  of  the  in- 
credible record  of  Aguinaldo,  though  it  is  not  a fable, 
but  history. 

There  have  been  a thousand  speeches  in  Congress 
that  have  named  him,  but  in  no  one  has  there  been  a 
study  of  the  man’s  life  and  character  presented,  that 
commanded  and  was  candid  with  it,  the  truth,  the  whole 
truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  of  the  sinister  but  fas- 
cinating theme.  Some  have  been  restrained  from  the 
work  of  elucidation  and  full,  fair  statement,  by  perver- 
sity. Others  have  been  limited  by  unacquaintance  with 
the  exact  tendency  of  the  facts;  and  still  others,  includ- 
ing the  most  frank,  serious,  and  able  of  our  public  men, 


4 Introductory. 

have  had  too  many  cares  and  labors  to  give  time  for 
investigation  and  annotation,  to  collect  the  mass  of  mat- 
ter known  to  exist  and  to  be  pertinent,  to  discriminate 
as  to  the  details  and  explanation  of  narratives  with  col- 
lateral incidents — to  collate  circumstances,  and  make 
consecutive  and  symmetrical  the  authentic  absolute  his- 
tory of  the  mystery — associating  dates  with  develop- 
ments, giving  room  and  form  to  the  influences  easily 
traced,  and  yet  readily  lost  in  their  relations  to  the  finer 
points  of  the  contentions. 

It  may  be  substantiated,  if  questioning  is  ventured, 
that  Mr.  Halstead’s  Life  and  Character  Sketches  of 
Aguinaldo,  present  the  first  full-length,  front-face  por- 
traiture of  the  man,  the  curvatures  of  whose  career  are 
so  many,  that  they  are  only  traceable  by  experts  in  the 
facts  and  in  fixing  them  in  their  right  places,  and  giving 
the  touches  of  color  indispensable  to  the  comprehensmn 
of  the  biography  that  is  full  of  the  curious,  and  inces- 
santly approaches  the  sensational. 

Mr.  Halstead’s  advantages  in  the  improvement  of 
opportunities  to  equip  himself  for  the  execution  of  this 
work  upon  clear  lines  and  with  painstaking  care,  have 
surpassed  those  of  any  other  man.  In  the  first  place, 
he  made  the  acquaintance  of  the  dramatis  personae  of 
the  tragedy  of  the  Philippines.  He  accompanied  Gen- 
eral Merritt  from  San  Francisco  to  Honolulu,  and  Gen- 
eral Otis  from  Honolulu  to  Manila,  and  became  in  that 
city  familiar  with  the  best-informed  men,  eye-witnesses 


Introductory. 


5 


of  the  truth  on  the  spot,  including  General  Bell,  then 
head  of  the  Bureau  of  Information  of  the  American 
Army;  General  Merritt,  the  Commander-in-chief;  Gen- 
eral Babcock,  his  Chief-of-stafI;  General  Anderson,  the 
first  American  soldier  to  set  foot  on  Philippine  soil;  and 
General  Frank  Green,  an  army  officer,  and  an  author  of 
the  highest  distinction  for  dignity  and  brilliancy;  and  he 
had  the  pleasure  of  meeting  Admiral  Dewey  repeatedly, 
and  of  conversing  with  the  most  intelligent  and  leading 
Filipinos,  who  gave  him  their  confidence  freely.  He 
interviewed  Aguinaldo  at  his  headquarters  in  Bacoor, 
and  the  Archbishop  at  his  Palace  in  the  Walled  City — 
had  a correspondence  with  Aguinaldo,  advised  him  to 
have  the  Philippines  represented  by  accredited  agents 
at  W ashington  and  Paris — introduced  a deputation  from 
Aguinaldo,  requesting  permission  for  his  ^‘Secretary  of 
State’'  to  cross  the  Pacific  on  the  steamer  China,  to 
General  Merritt;  then  the  General  consulted  the  Ad- 
miral, permitted  the  Filipinos  to  take  the  voyage,  and 
Mr.  Halstead  had  the  benefit  of  the  presence  of  Agon- 
cillo,  Aguinaldo’s  ^‘Secretary  of  State”  and  Represent- 
ative in  Europe,  as  a fellow-passenger  across  the  Pacific; 
and  his  presumed  Secretary  and  interpreter,  Sixto 
Lopez,  who  resides  in  Boston,  has  recently  confided  a 
good  many  of  his  opinions  to  the  American  people,  and 
pleads  for  Aguinaldo  to  come  to  this  country,  and  have 
a general  debate  on  the  relations  of  the  United  States 
with  the  Philippines. 


6 


Introductory. 


This  experience,  by  the  Author  of  this  Book,  was 
succeeded  by  studies  and  the  writing  of  “The  Story  of 
^ the  Philippines;”  “The  New  Possessions;”  “The  Official 
History  of  the  War  with  Spain;”  and  the  “Life  and 
Achievements  of  Admiral  Dewey.”  The  production  of 
these  works  was  valuable  in  the  orderly  arrangement  of 
earlier  observations  and  investigations,  and  later  con- 
sultations of  that  which  has  only  recently  become 
known,  which  are  the  better  understood  for  the  careful 
work  of  preparation.  This  was  followed  by  the  immense 
interest  excited  in  the  Presidential  Campaign  of  1900, 
in  the  history,  military  and  civil,  of  the  Philippines. 
Some  of  the  most  important  issues  of  the  national  con- 
test, which  absorbed  the  attention  of  our  own  people 
and  was  studiously  and  anxiously  followed  in  all  parts 
of  the  world,  were  a part  of  the  Philippine  situation. 
The  Life  and  Character  of  Aguinaldo  was  debated  on 
every  stump,  and  there  were  constant  controversies 
as  to  the  line  dividing  fact  from  fiction;  thus,  the 
sense  of  public  perplexity  as  to  the  elements  of 
our  history  in  the  Orient,  was  increased  rather  than 
diminished. 

There  are  millions  of  Americans  who  do  not,  to  this 
day,  feel  sure  what  manner  of  man  Aguinaldo  is; 
whether  it  is  well  to  condemn  or  to  applaud  him; 
whether  he  is  to  be  celebrated  as  a patriot  or  condemned 
as  an  ingrate;  whether  he  most  resembles  George  Wash- 
ington or  Benedict  Arnold.  These  questions  are  all 


Introductory. 


7 


open,  and  still  liable  to  be  intrusive  and  absorbing  in  the 
debating  societies. 

We  declare  that  the  volume  we  place  before  the 
public  about  Aguinaldo  and  Funston,  the  Captive  and 
the  Captor,  and  the  other  mysterious  Philippine  persons 
and  problems,  is  full  of  news,  and  that  we  act  upon  the 
principle  of  publishing  the  news  and  telling  the  truth 
about  it.  The  capture  of  Aguinaldo  by  Funston  guar- 
antees to  all  the  people  what,  indeed,  the  greater  number 
of  them  did  not  doubt,  though  some  of  them  had  mis- 
givings, that  the  “Captured  Documents,”  giving  the 
inside  official  Filipino  accounts  of  the  intrigues  that 
caused  the  war,  and  the  shifting  conditions  that  were 
surprises — were  the  rude  revelations  of  the  inner  secrets 
of  conspirators. 

The  light  that  events  placed  at  the  correct  angle 
thrown  upon  each  other,  fixed  in  accurate  relationship 
with  our  own  records,  may  be  accepted  absolutely  sun 
light.  Many  papers  of  the  greatest  historical  value  have 
been  printed  and  circulated,  authenticated  as  United 
States  documents,  and  there  are  others  of  like  character, 
the  substance  of  which  is  attainable.  Altogether  that 
which  is  new  about  the  news  of  current  history  clears 
up  many  muddled  and  irritating  questions,  that  have 
raised  in  discussion  issues  of  veracity,  and  a flood  of 
truth  is  thrown  upon  the  substance  of  the  subjects  that, 
in  public  opinion,  are  momentous.  That  which  is  thus 
presented,  must  make  its  way  in  convincing  the  people 


8 


Introductory. 


of  this  country  of  the  essential  truths  that  will  assist 
them  with  the  testimony  of  the  reliance  upon  which  they 
must  accept  the  responsibilities  of  their  governing  ca- 
pacity. 

Mr.  Halstead  has  been  hard  at  work  in  this  ample 
field  of  inquiry,  and  found  abundant  stores  of  testimony 
that  must  prevail.  We  may  say  he  is  exceptionally 
equipped  for  this  historical  examination,  and  to  give  the 
results  full  and  fair  expression, 


THE  PUBLISHERS. 


PREFACE 


T T would  be  a hard  task,  indeed,  to  find  for  the  reading 
^ of  the  youth  of  the  enlightened  nations  of  the  earth 
two  young  men  more  vividly  contrasted  in  the  stories  of 
their  lives  and  the  creation  of  their  characters — more  re- 
markable in  their  unlikeness  and  instructive  in  their 
careers — than  Frederick  Funston,  who  has  gloriously 
won  the  star  he  wears,  and  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  who  con- 
founded unveracity  with  diplomacy,  and  lost  his  liberty 
in  fighting  against  the  liberators  of  his  race. 

Only  an  Archipelago  of  Asia,  ancient  in  superstition, 
could  have  produced  an  Aguinaldo,  or  a free  State  of 
Western  North  America  a Funston.  One  is  of  the  dis- 
tinct Asiatic,  and  the  other  of  the  decisive  American 
type.  They  are  nearly  the  same  age  and  size.  One  is  a 
Captive,  the  other  the  Captor.  The  American  is  an  hon- 
est man,  a white  man,  and  a hero  ; and  the  Asiatic  is  in- 
sincere, subtle,  illusive,  and  of  a mixture  of  colors.  This 
measurement  and  characterization  is  according  to  the 
standards  in  their  respective  continents  and  countries. 
They  are  not  similar  in  conscience  or  component  parts — 
blood  or  brain.  Their  ancestors  lived  and  moved  and 

9 


lO 


Preface. 


had  their  being  in  channels  remote  from  each  other, 
where^  the  land,  the  airs,  and  the  waters  vary  in  the  in- 
fluences that  impress  all  under  the  skies,  and  men  differ 
with  the  phenomena  of  Fatherly  and  Motherly  Nature. 
The  hemispheres  and  the  atmospheres  are  not  the  same, 
but  the  same  sun  and  moon  rule  the  day  and  the  night, 
and  the  winds  blow  as  they  feel  the  infinite  forces.  Both 
are  of  the  family  of  man,  and  inherit  the  rights  of  man. 
The  broader  differences  are  those  of  opportunities. 

The  two  young  men  find  irt  the  experiences  of  hu- 
manity, no  matter  on  what  zone  they  dwell,  or  what  their 
activities  are,  common  problems  to  solve,  and  in  all  races 
and  climes  youth  meets  work  to  do,  and  age  looks  back 
upon  the  progress  of  the  great  Brotherhood  of  Man 
with  more  or  less  consciousness  of  loss  or  gain.  War 
has  its  heroes,  and  so  have  all  peaceful  duties,  however  ' 
humble,  and  there  are  brave  men  in  the  fields  and  shops 
who  rank  in  the  grandeurs  of  the  Universe  as  high  as 
the  wearers  of  plumes  and  swords.  The  answer  some 
day  to  the  old  question,  “Shall  the  sword  devour  for- 
ever?” must  be  “No,”  but  Justice  is  to  be  done,  and 
Valor  is  summoned  to  make  sure  that  it  is  accomplished, 
and  as  the  world  is  wired  and  railed  and  steamed  over, 
and  new  powers  are  revealed,  we  see  that  more  and  more 
the  ends  of  the  earth  approach  each  other — that  the 
oceans  become  in  the  service  of  man  as  lakes,  the  far 
countries  draw  near,  and  a Great  Power,  based  upon  the 
breadth  of  a great  continent,  between  the  greater  seas 


Preface. 


II 


of  the  globe,  has  its  mission  to  promote  the  Mighty 
Destiny  that  is  competent  for  the  loftier  and  broader 
labors  that  are  for  all  and  the  good  of  all. 

The  American  Soldier  has  never  fought  to  oppress, 
but  to  set  free — to  open  the  chances  for  all  men  to  get 
their  share  of  that  which  is  set  before  them  by  The 
Author  of  their  Being,  and  their  environments  upon  this 
planet.  The  Flag  of  the  Fathers  is  stainless,-  and  the 
Republic  safe  and  strong  in  righteousness,  as  in  the 
masterful  majesty  of  the  Forces  that  Freedom  yields — 
and 

“ Like  some  tall  cliff  that  lifts  its  awful  form, 

Swells  from  the  vale,  and  midway  leaves  the  storm. 
Though  round  its  breast  the  rolling  clouds  are  spread. 
Eternal  sunshine  settles  on  its  head.” 

That  the  Victory  of  American  Arms  in  the  Philip- 
pines means  there,  as  here  and  everywhere,  freedom 
with  order,  honor  with  splendor,  can  not  be  doubted  by 
those  who  make  up  with  the  Americanism  of  our  age 
and  country.  It  was  the  cause  of  the  Filipinos  that 
triumphed  when  the  American  Soldiers  dispersed  or  de- 
stroyed those  representing  falsehood  and  treachery,  who 
confronted  them;  and  the  Capture  of  Aguinaldo  by 
Funston  will  hasten  the  day  when  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Philippines  will  realize  that  the  Flag  of  Stars  that 
streams  in  Victory  is  the  same  that  was  of  good  report 
and  happy  omen  in  other  days  and  generations — that 
there  are  more  stars  and  brighter  ones,  and  stripes  shin- 


12 


Preface. 


ing  in  original  luster,  than  Daniel  Webster  saw  in  his 
dreams,  or  when  he  last  turned  his  eyes  to  see  the  Flag 
and  the  sun  in  heaven.  There  has  been  no  event  that 
has  dimmed  a star  or  marred  a stripe.  It  is  the  special 
glory  of  the  stars  of  our  Flag,  that  they  do  not  differ  in 
their  glories  like  the  stars  of  the  skies,  but  their  radiance 
is  serene  and  equal.  We  lose  nothing  precious  to  our- 
selves in  doing  good  to  others,  sword  in  hand;  and  when 
Americans  stand  shoulder  to  shoulder,  with  rifle  to 
shoulder.  There  always  has  been  help,  not  harm,  when 
we  have  expanded  our  dominions,  adding  new  posses- 
sions until  we  are  at  home  beyond  the  seas.  There  are 
no  people  under  the  Flag  who  do  not  have  reason  to 
rejoice  when  it  flies  over  them,  and  interprets  the  Con- 
stitution for  them.  No  blow  has  been  struck  by  us  since 
we  ended  the  Colonial  despotisms  of  Spain  and  drew  the 
line  on  European  aggression,  that  was  not  well  aimed 
and  for  Good  Cause.  In  the  language  of  the  capitula- 
tions to  our  military  forces  of  the  City  of  Mexico  and 
of  the  City  of  Manila  the  words  are  identical  in  the  two 
Conventions,  and  have  the  beauty  of  truth  and  the  vin- 
dication of  history,  proclaiming  that  the  people  over 
whom  our  Flag  has  been  raised  in  triumph  may  forever 
confide  in  the  '‘Faith  and  Honor  of  the  Army  of  the 
United  States” — the  Army  that  holds  Captive  the  latest 
leader  of  the  enemies  of  our  country — the  Army  in  which 
Frederick  Funston  is  a Brigadier-General,  appointed  by 
the  President  of  the  United  States  for  distinguished 


Preface. 


13 


heroic  service,  an  appointment  that  has  the  proud  appre- 
ciation and  confirmation  of  the  people  of  the  re-united 
and  glorified  States  that,  crediting  the  phrase  to  the 
Filipinos,  are  “The  Great  Republic  of  North  America.” 

MURAT  HALSTEAD. 

Cincinnati,  Ohio,  643  West  Fourth  Street. 

April  j,  jgoi. 


' ’ .-V  - ' ' ‘T>-' ' ‘"'-H  ‘‘  ‘ '-  ^ 

■ •■  ■'•  .'  ■>  ■■'■.'%-■> 


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CONTENTS 


Page. 

Introductory 
Preface  . . . 


CHAPTER  I. 

AGUINALDO  AT  HOME. 

His  Name  is  Written  to  Remain  on  the  Scroll  of  Fame — The 
Mystery  of  Asia  made  a Home  of  his  Headquarters  at  Ba- 
coor — His  Dress  and  Ways  and  Ladies  and  Music — He  was 
not  Impressive,  but  his  Surroundings  were  Attractive.....  23 

CHAPTER  H. 

HERO  FUNSTON’S  BOYHOOD. 

He  was  an  Ohio  Baby  Boy — On  Stump  for  his  Father — West 
Point  Disappointment — Short  Spell  at  University — Independ- 
ent Journalist  One  Day — Railroad  Conductor — Explores  Des- 
erts— Tried  Klondike — Lost  Canoe  in  the  Yukon — With 
Gomez  in  Cuba — Twentieth  Kansas  Infantry 27 

CHAPTER  III. 

TRANSFORMATION  SCENE. 

Aguinaldo  Arrived  at  Cavity  was  the  Deformed  Transformed 
— The  American  Flag  Restored  Him  to  Filipino  Confidence — 

An  Army  was  Handed  to  Him — The  True  Story  of  his  Start 
and  the  Strange  Fortune  that  followed — Obscurity  gave  Op- 
portunity   33 

CHAPTER  IV. 

AGUINALDO’S  VAIN  GLORY. 

How  he  Posed  as  a Caesar  a Fortnight  after  he  was  a Suppliant — 

His  Swollen  Conceits  and  Vanities — Small  Beggar  on  a Big 

Horse 43 

15 


CO  CO 


i6 


Contents. 


CHAPTER  V. 

AGUINALDO’S  POWER  CENTRALIZED. 

Page. 

How  he  Held  the  Center  of  the  Islands — He  had  the  Spanish 
Machine  of  the  Philippines  before  we  Signed  the  Treaty, 
and  we  did  not  Fight  for  it — The  Sacrifice  we  made  for 
Peace  caused  him  to  Fight  us  before  the  Treaty  was  Rati- 
fied— Our  Mischievous  Uncertainties 48 


CHAPTER  VI. 

EVOLUTION  OP  AGUINALDO. 

Uncertainties  of  His  Boyhood — He  Found  a Kind  Master— The 
Traditions  of  Youth  are  Evidence  of  Fancy — Early  and 
Late  Hong  Kong  Experiences — The  Story  of  the  Silver- 
plated  Treaty — The  History  and  Romance  of  a Man  of  Mys- 
tery— What  the  Romantic  Biographers  Say 53 


CHAPTER  VII. 

AGUINALDO  AS  OUR  ALLY. 

The  Filipino  Exaggeration  of  Themselves — Aguinaldo  Quoted  and 
Contradicted — American  Officers  Stamp  Out  a Falsehood 
about  our  Troops — The  Filipino  “Allies”  Falsified  and  were 
“Nuisances” — The  Proof — Aguinaldo  was  Helping  the  Span- 
iards to  Beef — The  Siege  was  in  August,  and  he  was  our 
Enemy  in  June — A Slander  on  American  Soldiers  Hunted 
Down_  and  Stamped  Out — The  Alleged  Ally  Convicted  of 
Treachery  on  his  Own  Testimony 66 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  FIELDS  OF  FUNSTON’S  GLORY. 

The  Way  he  Won  his  Star — Deception  of  the  Enemy  as  to  Amer- 
ican Soldiers— The  First  of  the  Fighting — Fame  of  the  Twen- 
tieth Kansas — Bloody  Road  to  Mololos  and  Beyond — Luzon 
as  a Hiding-place — Consul  Wildman’s  Hard  Fate — Battle- 
field Telegrams,  Official  Reports  by  and  about  Funston — 

His  Prodigies  of  Valor — Lawton  Wanted  Him — At  the  First 
of  the  Fighting  the  American  Soldiers  ran  at  Full  Speed  to 
get  into  the  Fight — The  Sick  Fled  from  their  Beds  to  Avenge 
Insults— The  Battle  Feats  of  the  Brave 77 


GENERAL  FREDERICK  FUNSTON, 


Contents. 


^7 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  CAPTURE  OF  AGUINALDO. 

Page. 

To  Hunt  Down  Aguinaldo  in  -the  Jungles  was  a Well-matured 
Scheme  of  Funston — He  had  under  Otis’s  Orders  Scouted 
the  Province  where  it  was  done — Some  Silly  Army  Gossip 
Squelched — Aguinaldo  Admits  the  Audacity  of  his  Captor — 
Kansas  Rises  up  for  Anything  for  Funston — His  Mother 
thought  Frank’s  Luck  would  be  Bad  this  Time — The  Story 
of  the  Raid — A Wonderful  Adventure — The  Sharp  Turns 
and  Critical  Escapes — The  Future  of  Funston 93 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  HERO  AND  HIS  CAPTIVE. 

The  Maccabebes,  the  Native  Assistants  of  Funston — Native 
Cruelty  to  Natives — Collateral  Circumstances  of  the  Capture 
of  Aguinaldo — Mystery  of  the  Orient — Whole  Truth 
Wanted  105 


CHAPTER  XI. 

OUR  FEROCIOUS  FILIPINO  FRIENDS. 

Funston’s  Guard — The  Hereditary  Foes  of  the  Tagalos — Their 
Savage  Character — They  are  Faithful  to  Spain  and  to  Us — 

They  Pursued  Aguinaldo  more  than  Once — The  Lamented 
Lawton’s  Good  Opinion  of  Them 109 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  THEODORO  SANDICO  POLICY. 

The  Intrigues  and  Theories  of  the  Filipino  Hong  Kong  Junta 
before  the  War — Prearranged  Scheme  to  Play  an  lago  Part 
— The  Terms  on  which  Aguinaldo  W’ould  have  been  Our 
Ally — Suggestion  of  Percentages  in  Business  Matters,  and 
the  Logic  of  it  as  Applied  to  the  Offer  of  Two  Provinces 
and  the  Customs  Duties  of  Manila  for  Recognition  by  the 
United  States  of  the  Hong  Kong  Junta  as  the  Philippine 
Republic — Letter  by  Aguinaldo  to  Sandico,  written  in  Tag- 
alog,  Confessing  he  Hardly  Understands  Spanish — The  Let- 
ter seems  to  make  Certain  that  the  Dictator  only  well 
Understands  the  Language  of  his  Own  Tribe 117 

2 


i8 


Contents. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

AGUINALDO’S  SPLIT  ROCK  TREATY. 

Page. 

The  OfiScial  Filipino  Story  of  the  Negotiations  at  Biac-na-Bato— 

It  is  an  Exposure  of  False  Pretense,  Treachery,  and  Brib- 
ery— Copied  from  the  Hong  Kong  “Book  of  Acts” — Agui- 
naldo’s  Plea  not  to  go  to  See  Dewey — Schedule  of  Property 
Surrendered,  “225  Fire-arms”— The  Place  where  the  Treaty 
was  made 134 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

AGUINALDO’S  FIRST  OFFICIAL  APPEARANCE. 

First  Reports  of  Him  by  American  Consuls  in  Asia — The  Peace 
Bribe  Increased  the  War — There  were  Others  wanted  Mex- 
ican Silver — The  Offer  of  Two  Provinces — General  Whit- 
tier’s Official  Interview — State  Department  Heard  from — 
Analysis  of  Early  Situation 149 


CHAPTER  XV. 

FIRST  PROOF  OF  AGUINALDO’S  TREACHERY. 

He  says  he  Made  Cash  Treaty  on  Account  Scant  Resources— 

His  People  to  be  Free  had  to  Submit  to  Him — Make  Him 
a Despot,  and  he  would  be  a'  Republican — His  Letter  to 
General  Rios,  of  Iloilo,  Proves  Him  Traitor 160 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE  TRUE  STORY  OF  THE  BRIBE. 

Complaint  by  Paterno  and  Others  that  Spanish  Bribe  was  not 
Justly  Divided — The  Matter  Considered  by  the  Hong  Kong 
Junta,  and  the  Facts  Made  Known — Aguinaldo  Drew  $50,- 
000  for  Current  Expenses— Official  Filipino  Statements ....  167 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

AGUINALDO  A STRANGE  COMPOUND,  HIS  NA- 
TURE AS  MIXED  AS  HIS  BLOOD. 

His  Personal  Instructions  for  Assassination  of  Americans,  min- 
gled with  Mockeries  of  Professed  Good-feeling — His  Style 
of  Regard  for  his  Oaths,  and  Artful  Duplicity — His  False- 
hoods and  Contradiction  of  Himself — He  Perjures  Himself 
Cheerfully — He  is  Cruel,  Revengeful,  and  Gloats  over  Hor- 
rors that  Might  have  Appalled  a Pirate 174 


Contents. 


19 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

AGUINALDO’S  TRUE  INWARDNESS  OUT. 

Page. 

When  and  Why  He  First  Hated  Us — He  Declared  War  on  Us 
Secretly  in  Hong  Kong,  May  4,  1898 — What  His  Friend- 
ship would  have  Cost — Wanted  Contract  with  Dewey  to 
Divide  Armament — He  to  Furnish  Army,  We  to  Protect — 
Official  Minutes  Cited — Wanted  us  to  Furnish  Arms  to  be 
Used  against  Us — The  Part  the  Bribe  Money  Played — 
Forced  Return  to  Dewey — His  Money  in  Bank  and  in 
Pocket  188 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

THE  TAI^S  NOT  TRUE. 

Told  by  Aguinaldo’s  Agoncillo — Specifications  of  Falsification — 
Attempt  to  Entrap  Admiral  Dewey,  in  order  to  get  Him 
to  make  a Contract — The  Biac-na-Bato  Bleeders  of  Spain — 
Aguinaldo  never  Forgave  the  Snub  from  Our  State  Depart- 
ment when  He  Attempted  to  Introduce  International  Brib- 
ery as  a Patriotic  Duty 204 


CHAPTER  XX. 

THE  PARTING  OP  THE  WAYS. 

The  Methods  of  Aguinaldo  to  Appeal  to  the  Vanity  and  Ambition 
of  His  Followers — They  Stimulated  and  Expanded  Him  in 
Turn — He  took  the  Measure  of  the  Amount  of  Impertinence 
an  American  would  Stand,  and  when  he  Found  he  Crossed 
the  Line  he  Flinched,  Apologized,  and  Promised — How  he 
Repeated  at  Cavite  the  Hong  Kong  Anxiety  for  Divided 
Armament — He  Grew  from  Tentative  to  Pompous  Inso- 
lence, and  Declared  War  in  Principle  in  July,  ’98 — After 
that  the  Logic  and  Intent  of  every  Step  of  the  Tagalog  was 
War  with  Us 219 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

MADRID  SCHOOL  OF  ASSASSINATION. 

Aguinaldo’s  Identification  by  Proclamation  with  the  Madrid 
Revolutionary  Committee’s  Book  of  Tactics  and  Strategy 
to  Systematize  Guerrilla  Warfare — The  School  of  Murder  is 
Devoted  to  Killing  “Yankees” — But  the  “Yanks”  beat  the 
Tagals  at  that  Game,  Killing  12  to  1— General  MacArthur 
on  this  Aguinaldoism 237 


20 


Contents. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

AGUINALDO’S  ZENITH  AND  DECLINE. 

Page. 

His  Wonderful  Influence  and  Power  when  he  Opened  War  on 
the  Americans — His  Rabid  Selfishness  when  he  Knew  he 
Could  Not  Win,  and  Forced  his  People  to  go  on  with  a 
Hopeless  Fight — His  Cruelty — A Craze  for  Revenge  and 
Path  of  Ruin — Sorrows  he  Brought  Upon  his  Countrymen — 
Himself  a Fugitive 261 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

EXTRAORDINARY  MARCHES  OP  TROOPS. 

Very  Remarkable  Scouting — Our  Troops  Storm  Ambuscades  and 
Rush  Exploiting  Expeditions — Affairs  in  Northeastern 
Luzon,  the  Corner  of  the  Country  in  which  Aguinaldo  was 
Run  Down  and  Taken — The  Brilliant  Runaway  of  Major 
Batchelor — Orders  could  not  Overtake  Him,  and  well  they 
Could  Not 277 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

HISTORY  OF  WAR  WRITTEN  ON  THE  FIELD. 

How  the  Telegraphic  Dispatches  Tell  the  Tale — It  is  History 
Writing  by.  Instantaneous  Photography — Scenes  and  Inci- 
dents— The  Personalities  of  Actual  Active  Service — The 
Strenuous  Life  of  Lawton — The  American  Soldier  a War 
Wonder 303 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

HIDE-AND-SEEK  OF  AGUINALDO. 

Increase  of  His  Fury  as  Fortune  Faded — The  Pursuit  of  Him  so 
Swift  and  Fierce,  and  His  Flight  Adroit  and  Furtive — Mac- 
Arthur  Reports  Eighteen  Boxes  of  Records  in  One  Capture — 

The  Rehearsal  in  the  Mountains  by  Funston  of  His  Cap- 
ture of  Aguinaldo — How  He  Happened  to  Know  the  Country 
so  Well 320 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

CHARACTER  SKETCH  OF  AGUINALDO. 

A Study  of  his  Motives  and  Men — His  Style  and  the  Tagal 
Tongue — Aguinaldo  Remote  from  the  People — His  Environ- 
ment and  Ambition  Despotic — The  Caprices  of  his  Fortunes 
— Has  he  a Chance  Yet  to  Repair  Ruins? — The  Destiny 
We  Face > 331 


Contents. 


21 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

AGUINALDO’S  PARENTAGE  AND  EARLY  DAYS. 

Page. 

What  His  Friends  Say,  and  the  First  Adventure  as  an  Insurgent 
— The  Singapore  Incident — The  Captured  Documents  Destroy 
Filipino  Fables 343 

CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

MANILA  AS  AN  EXTINCT  VOLCANO. 

The  Ancient  City  the  World’s  Storm-center — Three  Armies  and 
Three  Fleets  Assembled — The  Conflict  of  Races  and  Ages — 
Aguinaldo’s  Representative  Character — The  First  American 
Blood  Shed — The  Monroe  Doctrine  Beyond  Seas — Contrast 
between  Cuban  and  Philippine  Questions — Key  to  the  Career 
of  the  Tagal  Tyrant — An  Astonishing  Personification — The 
Burning  Mountain  in  the  Lake — Dewey’s  Candor  a War 
Declaration,  but  his  Duty — Doom  of  Defeat  Visited — Pris- 
oner in  a Palace  a Lesson  for  Tyrants 348 

CHAPTER  XXIX.  . 

MR.  AGUINALDO. 

What  Shall  His  Harvest  be? — Policy  for  our  Colonies  and  Con- 
stitution— Aguinaldo  an  Advertisement  with  Millions  in  it — 

Let  Him  Quit  Business  and  go  into  Opulent  Private  Life — 

Can  He  be  Trusted? — Let  Him  take  an  Office  in  Wall 
Street 370 

CHAPTER  XXX. 

THE  CAPTIVE  IN  THE  PALACE. 

The  Pathos  of  Aguinaldo’s  Case — The  Part  He  Played  was  Ac- 
cording to  His  Make-up — He  was  Not  a Napoleon:  Not  a 
Corsican,  but  a Tagalo — He  Knew  what  Superior  Force 
was  before  he  was  a Prisoner — His  Guerrilla  War  Respon- 
sibility— His  Address  of  Surrender  to  the  United  States, 
and  its  Construction — He  had  Rented  a House — Fitzhugh 
Lee  on  Fred  Funston — Beautiful  Speech  of  Fred’s  Father — 

Put  it  in  the  Schoolbooks 377 

CHAPTER  XXXI. 

CAPTURED  DOCUMENTS  HIGHEST  AUTHORITY. 

Inner  Light  on  Disputed  History— What  the  Captured  Docu- 
ments Say,  and  What  They  Prove  about  Aguinaldo — Them- 
selves Conclusive — They  are  Corroborated  by  Environment 
and  .Coincident — Tagalo  Treachery  and  Spanish  Co-opera- 
tion— The  Truth  of  the  Insurrection  comes  to  us  with  the 
End  of  it — There  is  One  Record  of  a Ballot  in  the  Junta 
with  Thirteen  Votes — The  Attitude  and  Evidence  of  Amer- 
ican Consuls — The  Outlook  of  Our  Orient 393 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


Murat  Halstead,  the  Author. 

General  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  from  his  Latest  Photograph. 

General  Frederick  Funston. 

Judge  Wm.  H.  Taft,  President  Philippine  Commission. 

General  MacArthur,  Commander-in-chief  United  States  Troops  in  the 
Philippines. 

Aguinaldo  as  a Chinese  Sailor. 

Where  Aguinaldo  is  confined — His  Wife  and  Mother. 

General  Funston,  his  Parents  and  Wife. 

Aguinaldo’s  Headquarters  at  Tarlac. 

Rebel  Chiefs  in  Railroad  Car  on  the  Road  to  Manila.  (Aguinaldo 
appears  in  tFe  middle  window.) 

Railroad  Station,  Tarlac. 

First  Military  Train  made  up  North  of  Tarlac,  at  Paniqui. 

The  Luneta,  Manila,  where  Insurgents  are  executed. 

Supply-train  fording  Parao  River,  near  Bamban. 

General  MacArthur’s  Private  Car. 

Map  Showing  Location  of  Palanan,  where  Aguinaldo  was  captured. 
Map  of  the  Philippine  Islands. 

Aguinaldo  and  a Group  of  his  Chiefs.  (Aguina’do  is  the  Central 
Figure.) 

Army  Supply-train,  near  Bamban. 

On  the  Trail  of  Aguinaldo. 

The  Pursuit  in  the  Mountains. 


22 


Aguinaldo  an'd  His  Captor. 


CHAPTER  1. 

AGUINAEDO  AT  HOME. 

His  Name  is  Written  to  Remain  on  the  Scroll  of  Eame — ' 
The  Mystery  of  Asia  made  a Home  of  his  Head- 
quarters at  Bacoor — His  Dress  and  Ways  and 
Ladies  and  Music — He  was  not  Impressive,  but 
his  Surroundings  were  Attractive. 

WHATEVER  happens  Aguinaldo,  prisoner  of  war, 
his  name  is  one  that  will  not  perish.  His  face 
and  figure  will  live  in  the  history  of  this  country.  It 
is  not  likely  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  will 
ever  yield  to  any  persor^,  tribe,  potentate,  or  power, 
the  fast  hold  they  have  beyond  the  greatest  of  the 
oceans.  We  are  settled  to  remain  masters  of  the 
eastern  shore  of  the  sea  of  China.  Beyond  is  the  oldest 
of  empires.  It  is  puerile  to  decry  our  titles  or  deny 
our  destiny.  As  a Malay  leader  whose  ambition  crossed 
our  path  and  disturbed  our  way,  the  truth  about  Agui- 
naldo is  ineffaceably  written  in  our  stories  of  enterprise 
and  triumphs  of  arms.  He  is  in  the  record  as  one  of 
our  history  makers.  His  character  is  the  key  to  many 
tales  of  the  Philippines.  He  will  have  forever  the  dis- 
tinction of  causing  a war  in  which  the  United  States 

23 


24  Aguinaldo  at  Home. 

was  involved  in  the  tropical  islands,  of  one  of  the  most 
extensive^  and  opulent  Archipelagoes  of  the  Oriental 
oceans. 

Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  y Eamy,  who  declared  him- 
self in  August,  1898,  President  of  the  Revolutionary 
Government  of  the  Philippines,  and  general-in-chief  of 
its  army,  and  the  first  in  distinction  of  the  Philippine 
insurgents  at  this  time,  was,  at  the  close  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  thirty-three  years  of  age;  small,  both 
short  and  slender,  as  unmilitary  in  appearance  as  pos- 
sible, dressing  habitually  in  a single-breasted  white 
coat  and  white  trousers,  showing  thinness  of  limbs, 
often  wearing  a badge  and  carrying  a little  stick — 
articles  of  decoration  of  which  he  is  said  to  be  fond  and 
vain.  His  eye  is  cunning  and  his  best  feature.  There 
is  a light  of  the  unusual  in  it — a glance  that  changes 
' quickly  from  docility  to  a sharp  glare  and  wild  animal 
alertness.  His  feet  are  slender,  his  hands  like  birds' 
feet,  delicate,  with  knotty  joints  and  prominent  nails, 
hair  black,  thick,  coarse,  and  perpendicular,  with  a fine 
gloss  of  vitality.  His  voice  is  low,  with  a softness  so 
modulated  that  it  is  almost  feminine,  but  that  swiftly 
between  words  changes  and  has  a subtle  tone,  that  one 
personally  interested  in  what  he  says  and  seeks  favor, 
would  feel  was  negativing  whatever  was  asked — the 
words  uttered  by  him  blurred  slightly,  from  a habit  of 
protruding  the  tongue,  a little  but  distinctly,  shading 
the  low-spoken  tones  into  indistinctness.  The  hands 
are  moved  about  as  he  speaks,  not  in  a shaky,  nervous 
style,  but  with  a flutter.  In  his  own  apartments  he 
moves  in  a gliding  way,  and  is  treated  with  deference. 
There  is  no  question  that  he  fully  believes  in  himself, 


Aguinaldo  at  Home. 


25 


and  that  he  has  a tendency  to  exact  ceremony.  As 
the  door  of  his  private  room  opens  for  him  to  enter  the 
reception  room,  he  is  announced,  “General  Aguinaldo.’' 
It  is  altogether  agreeable  to  him  to  be  addressed  as 
“Your  Excellency.”  At  Bacoor,  ladies  of  his  family, 
passing  from  room  to  room,  were  well  looking,  and 
dressed  in  highly-colored  and  pleasing  robes  of  silk, 
with  touches  of  lace  and  a flash  of  jewels.  They  were 
not  seeking  attention  or  inviting  observation,  but  had 
composure.  There  was  the  tinkle  of  music  in  the  house, 
not  obtrusive,  rather  distant,  a hint  of  the  musical 
character  of  the  people.  The  house  was  pointed  out 
as  the  one  with  a conspicuous  roof  of  reddish  tile,  like 
the  roofs  in  the  villages  of  France.  It  was  of  two 
stories,  and  there  must  have  been  four  rooms  and  a 
broad  hall  on  each.  The  street  ran  north  and  south, 
and  the  house  was  on  the  west  side,  with  another  habi- 
tation directly  adjoining.  There  were  trees  about  it 
profuse  in  greenery.  The  day  was  August  27th,  and 
sultry.  The  power  of  the  sun  was  trying.  There  was 
no  air  stirring.  The  hour  was  half-past  one  in  the 
afternoon.  There  was  but  one  street  in  the  village. 
There  were  three  rooms  on  the  side  of  the  house  front- 
in  the  street,  in  the  second  story.  The  general’s  room 
of  retirement  was  the  northern  one.  The  reception 
room  was  central.  The  ladies  had  the  southern  room, 
and  it  seemed  to  be  the  place  of  other  treasures  of  the 
home.  The  entrance  to  the  house  was  at  the  center 
of  the  structure,  and  there  was  a turn  of  the  stairs  at 
the  half-way  place  of  the  second  story,  and  two  military 
guards — one  at  the  outer  door,  and  the  other  at  the  turn 
of  the  stairway.  There  were  perhaps  twenty-five  armed 


26  Aguinaldo  at  Home. 

men  in  sight.  The  arm  was  the  famous  Mauser.  The 
swords  seemed  too  large  for  the  men,  who  resembled, 
though  with  a plain  difference,  Japanese.  They  were 
not  as  large  as  the  Japs,  but  of  the  same  small  makeup 
and  getup  and  style,  with  the  ‘Tocky”  air  that  the  Jap 
military  men  refuse  to  part  with,  and  there  was  an  at- 
mosphere of  the  enjoyment  of  importance  and  of  great 
expectations.  The  village  was  Bacoor,  and  it  seemed 
was  chosen  because  the  water  of  the  Bay  of  Manila, 
spreading  eastward,  was  too  shallow  for  launches  for  a 
considerable  distance,  indeed  not  deep  enough  a hun- 
dred yards  from  the  shore  to  float  a canoe  with  a man 
in  it.  The  landing  was  also  difficult.  It  was  a spot 
sure  to  be  free  from  visitations  of  surprise.  An  ocean 
boat  could  not  get  within  half  a mile.  The  church 
standing  near  the  shore  was  large,  stone  built,  and 
almost  stately,  but  marked  in  many  places  by  the  shells 
from  the  Spanish  fleet  before  the  Americans  came,  be- 
cause the  insurgents  had  a way  of  appearing  there  and* 
taking  a peep  at  misty  Manila  'across  the  bay,  nearly 
ten  miles  away,  the  outlines  of  the  city  showing  the 
churches  and  other  structures  of  prominence,  with  a 
background  of  the  faint  blue  mountains,  too  distant  to 
give  the  green  tint  that  reminded  Admiral  Dewey  of 
the  knobs  that  name  his  native  State,  and  the  scenery 
about  his  native  city,  Montpelier. 


CHAPTER  II. 


HERO  EUNSTON’S  BOYHOOD. 


He  was  an  Ohio  Baby  Boy — On  Stump  for  his  Father — 
West  Point  Disappointment — Short  Spell  at  Uni- 
versity— Independent  Journalist  One  Day — Rail- 
road Conductor — Explores  Deserts — Tried  Klon- 
dike— Lost  Canoe  in  the  Yukon — With  Gomez  in 
Cuba — Twentieth  Kansas  Infantry. 

HE  first  fond  ambition  of  the  boy  Eunston  was  to 


1 go  to  West  Point,  and  his  father,  a member  of 
Congress,  could  have  controlled  it,  but  subjected  it  to 
competition,  and  the  youth  was  not  the  first  of  the  com- 
petitors. The  son  of  another  Kansas  farmer  got  the 
coveted 'cadetship.  His  name  was  Crawford.  A news- 
paper that  uses  a large  quantity  of  smoky  powder  in 
lighting  up  the  world,  says : “The  disappointment  nearly 
broke  Funston’s  heart,  and  he  was  as  savage  as  a bull- 
dog for  months  afterward.” 

He  was  a student  in  the  University  of  Kansas,  and 
a classmate  says  of  him,  “Although  one  of  the  smallest 
men  in  the  university,  he  was  one  of  the  pluckiest.” 
This  was  after  West  Point  faded.  Deficiency  in 
“classics”  is  given  as  the  reason  for  not  graduating  at 
the  university.  A Kansas  journal  yields  the  General  the 
name  of  seeking  adventures  and  facing  dangers,  always 
a fighter,  and  condenses  much  in  a few  lines  this : 

“He  was  born  in  Ohio  in  1866,  but  his  father,  E.  H. 


27 


28 


Hero  Funston’s  Boyhood. 


Funston,  soon  moved  to  Kansas,  where  he  became  a 
congressman,  and  was  known  as  Foghorn  Funston. 
His  first  public  appearance  was  made  when  he  was  about 
sixteen  years  old,  at  a 'political  meeting  at  Fort  Scott, 
Kansas.  The  political  meeting  happened  to  be  op- 
posed to  his  father’s  candidacy,  but  that  made  no  differ- 
ence to  young  Fred.  In  fact,  it  was  the  reason  for  his 
being  there.  After  all  the  speaking  was  over,  and  Fog- 
horn Funston  had  been  pretty  well  torn  to  pieces,  the 
young  fellow  got  up,  took  the  stage,  and  said  that  he 
had  a few  remarks  to  make.  He  proceeded  to  make 
them  in  the  face  of  strenuous  opposition;  but  when  the 
audience  presently  discovered  that  he  was  telling  a good 
story  on  his  father  it  quieted  down.  He  finished  that 
story  and  then  another,  and  then  began  to  tell  what 
kind  of  a man  Foghorn  Funston,  who  had  been  the 
butt  of  so  much  ridicule,  really  was.  In  vain  did  the 
organizers  of  the  meeting  howl  for  adjournment;  the 
boy  now  had  his  audience  with  him,  and  by  the  time 
he  had  finished  a brief  but  well-put  statement  of  the 
political  situation  it  was  a Funston  audience,  and  the 
effect  of  his  oratory  was  evident  on  election  day.” 

- This  was  two  years  before  the  university  experience. 
His  classmate  White,  who  asked  “What ’s  the  matter 
with  Kansas?”  tells  this  story  of  his  young  chum’s  col- 
lege career: 

“He  is  not  afraid  of  anything  that  can  walk.  Once 
the  town’s  ‘bad  coon’  tried  to  run  over  Funston.  The 
darky  weighed  pretty  nearly  two  hundred  pounds,  and 
was  a ‘scrapper’  with  a razor  record.  Funston  was  five 
feet  three,  and  weighed  about  ninety-five.  He  ‘bluffed’ 


Hero  Kunston’s  Boyhood. 


29 


the  colored  brother  to  a ^stand-still/  and  went  for  a 
warrant  and  marched  the  boss  bully  through  the  main 
streets  of  Lawrence  at  the  point  of  a gun. 

‘‘Owing  to  difficulties  which  he  experienced  with 
some  of  the  text-books,  he  did  not  graduate,  but  in 
1887  became  city  editor  of  the  Fort  Smith  Tribune,  a 
stanch  upholder  of  the  local  Democracy.  A few  days 
before  the  election  the  editor-in-chief  went  away,  leav- 
ing the  paper  in  Funston’s  hands.  He  had  been  getting 
pretty  weary  of  the  Democrats,  who  had  been  conduct- 
ing their  campaign  on  a basis  of  bribery  and  intimida- 
tion, and  his  first  act  when  he  was  put  in  control  was 
to  write  an  editorial  stating  his  opinions  with  a degree 
of  frankness  which  left  no  room  for  misunderstanding. 

“This  engaging  open-mindedness  did  not  appeal  to 
the  worthy  citizens  of  Fort  Smith,  who  set  about  show- 
ing the  young  editor  the  error  of  his  ways  by  burning 
down  the  Tribune  building.  Funston  gathered  his  staff 
about  him  and  prepared  to  defend  the  place;  but  the 
editor-in-chief  hastily  returned  in  answer  to  telegraphic 
summons  from  his  friends,  and  appeased  the  wrath  of 
the  Democrats  by  a hasty  issue,  explaining  editorially 
what  had  happened.  Naturally,  young  Funston  did  not 
retain  his  job.  There  was  talk  of  tarring  and  feathering 
him  before  he  could  get  away  from  town;  but  he  did  n’t 
evince  any  haste  in  leaving.  Instead,  he  wandered 
around  the  place  with  nose  in  the  air,  looking  for  some 
of  the  alleged  ringleaders  in  the  proposed  scheme. 
When  he  did  finally  leave  there  were  no  feathers  attached 
to  him  except  the  feather  in  the  cap  at  having  bluffed 
practically  the  whole  town.  When  a friend  asked  him 


30 


Hero  Funston’s  Boyhood. 


why  he  had  so  foolishly  thrown  away  his  situation  by 
printing  such  an  editorial  the  young  man  said  briefly: 

'‘I  was  tired  of  the  rotten  politics,  and  tired  of  the 
rotten  town,  and  tired  of  the  rotten  sheet,  and  ready  to 
go  anyway,  so  I thought  I might  just  as  well  wake  the 
place  up  and  let  ’em  know  I was  alive  before  I left.” 

The  internal  evidence  is  that  General  Funston  had 
read  the  story  of  John  Phoenix,  of  California,  of  an 
assitant  editor  who  changed  the  politics  of  the  paper 
while  the  senior  was  taking  a day  off  buggy-riding. 
The  calculation  of  the  length  of  time  before  the  editor- 
in-chief  had  read  the  revolutionary  article,  and  the  speed 
of  his  horse  returning,  was  nicely  made  by  the  respon- 
sible man,  and  he  looked  out  of  an  open  window  and 
saw  on  the  road  “a  cloud  of  dust,”  and  '‘over  it  waved 
a whiplash;”  and  the  spectator  said  to  himself,  “Lo,  he 
cometh,  and  like  Jehu  he  driveth  furiously.”  The  able 
assistant  removed  his  coat,  likewise  his  cravat,  just  in 
time,  and  found  himself,  after  an  exchange  of  attentions, 
holding  the  edior-in- chief  down  “with  my  nose,  which 
I had  inserted  in  his  mouth  for  that  purpose.”  But  Fun- 
ston was  not  that  kind  of  a fighter.  He  got  out  of  a 
job,  aired  his  views,  and  became  a conductor  on  the 
Santa  Fe  line.  The  story-tellers  proceed  in  this  way: 

“One  day  a cowboy  full  of  rum  became  rampageous 
in  his  car,  and,  lying  down  on  his  back  in  the  aisle, 
began  to  shoot  holes  in  the  ceiling.  The  little  conductor 
kicked  the  revolver  out  of  his  hand,  yanked  him  along 
the  aisle,  and  threw  him  off  the  back  platform.  The 
cowboy  got  up  and  hurled  a piece  of  ballast,  which 
broke  an  end  window,  then  started  and  ran  down  the 
track,  with  Funston  in  hot  pursuit,  flinging  ballast  as 


Hero  Funston’s  Boyhood. 


31 


he  ran,  until  the  fugitive  distanced  him.  By  the  time  he 
got  back  to  his  train,  sweating  and  breathless,  half  an 
hour  had  been  dropped  on  the  schedule.  The  super- 
intendent made  an  inquiry  about  it,  and  the  conductor 
explained. 

“ Tt  was  all  right  to  throw  him  off,’  said  the  super- 
intendent, ‘but  what  did  you  go  and  chase  him  for?’ 

“ T suppose  I was  mad,’  said  Funston.  ‘Would  n’t 
you  be  mad  if  a man  threw  a rock  through  your 
window?’ 

“ ‘Probably,  but  do  n’t  do  it  again,’  said  the  super- 
intendent. 

“Whether  because  of  this  restriction  or  for  other 
causes  the  young  man  soon  left  the  railroad’s  employ, 
and  cast  about  him  for  something  else  to  do.  The 
chances  came  in  an  expedition  to  Dakota,  followed  by 
one  to  Death  Valley.  From  this  latter  half  of  the  trav- 
elers came  back  permanently  disabled,  but  it  seemed  to 
agree  with  Funston,  and  he  liked  so  well  the  explor- 
ing of  unknown  countries  that  he  looked  around  for 
something  else  in  the  same  line.  The  Agricultural  De- 
partment wanted  some  one  to  collect  botanical  speci- 
mens in  the  interior  of  Alaska,  and  a friend  got  an  offer 
of  the  place  for  Funston,  at  the  same  time  warning  him 
that  it  was  a perilous  job. 

“ ‘That ’s  all  right,’  said  the  young  man,  ‘but  as  my 
botanical  knowledge  does  n’t  extend  much  further  than 
knowing  a violet  from  a sunflower,  I do  n’t  think  I ’d 
be  a valuable  collector.’  Nevertheless  the  prospect  was 
so  alluring  that  he  set  to  work  to  learn  practical  botany, 
and  in  1892  was  in  Alaska.  He  went  over  Chilkoot 
Pass  in  a late  blizzard,  struck  for  the  interior,  reached 


3a 


Hero  Punston*s  Boyhood. 


the  spot  where  Dawson  City  now  is,  and  started  down 
the  Yukon  alone  in  a canoe  which  he  had  built.  His 
canoe  was  caught  in  rapids,  split  on  a rock,  and  that 
would  have  been  the  end  of  Fred  Funston  but  for  a 
missionary  who  chanced  to  be  going  along  with  some 
Indians,  and  saved  him.  That  winter  he  spent  with 
Indians,  hunting  and  exploring,  and  when  he  returned 
it  was  with  a store  of  highly  comprehensive  and  valu- 
able botanical  material.  His  one  criticism  of  Alaska  was 
that  it  was  a magnificent  country,  but  pretty  lonely. 

^‘His  next  venture  was  in  Cuba,  where  he  went  fili- 
bustering. Gomez  gave  him  a commission,  and  he  be- 
came second  in  command  of  artillery  under  Osgood, 
the  famous  Cornell  football  half-back.  He  made  a 
record  for  bravery  at  Guimaro,  in  October,  1896,  where 
His  chief  was  killed,  and  he  took  command.  At  the 
head  of  his  artillerymen  and  with  a dynamite  bomb  in 
his  hand  he  charged  the  Spanish  works  in  the  assault 
which  terminated  in  their  surrender.  At  Bayamo  he 
became  a cavalry  officer  temporarily,  because  there  was 
more  for  cavalry  than  for  artillery  to  do  there,  and  was- 
shot  three  times;  but  such  was  his  endurance  and  phy- 
sique that  he  was  ready  for  more  fighting  in  a short  time. 
At  Fas  Tunas  he  managed  the  Cuban  dynamite  guns 
which  wrought  such  havoc  among  the  Spanish  troops, 
and  was  again  wounded.  At  the  same  time  his  horse 
was  shot  and  fell  upon  him,  injuring  his  hips.’’ 

He  quarreled  with  the  Cubans  because  they  mas- 
sacred a squad  of  guerrilla  prisoners,  and  left  the  serv- 
ice, and  his  military  education  in  Cuba,  and  his  courage, 
and  his  popular  qualities,  easily  gave  him  the  colonel’s 
commission  of  the  Twentieth  Kansas  Infantry. 


JUDGE  WILEIAM  H.  TAFT, 


President  Philippine  Commission. 


CHAPTER  III. 


transeormation  scene. 


Aguinaldo  arrived  at  Cavite,  he  was  the  Deformed 
Transformed — The  American  Flag  Restored  Him 
to  Filipino  Confidence — An  Army  was  Handed  to 
Him — The  True  Story  of  his  Start  and  the  Strange 
Fortune  that  followed — Obscurity  gave  Oppor- 
tunity. 

jUINALDO  was  quite  shrewd  enough  to  under- 


IV  stand  that  whatever  his  engagements  with  the  Span- 
iards were,  no  matter  what  his  sentiments  might  be  as 
an  individual,  or  how  far  he  had  planned  to  take  his 
chances  against  the  Americans,  it  was  necessary  that  he 
should  bow  to  the  strong  storm  of  favor  that  his  tribe 
and  all  the  Filipinos  in  sight  had  for  the  North  Amer- 
icans, with  whom  they  associated  victory  and  liberty. 
There  was  a change  of  air  between  Singapore  and  Hong 
Kong.  The  cause  of  it  was  the  smashing  of  the  Span- 
iards at  Manila.  Aguinaldo  became  immediately  an 
enthusiastic  American,  and  it  was  his  favorite  way  of 
putting  it  that  all  his  friends  were  in  favor  of  annex- 
ation to  the  United  States.  The  word  ‘‘annexation” 
he  did  not  personally  use.  It  is  to  be  taken  into  ac- 
count, and  is  an  indication  of  the  reserve  forces  of  the 
young  man,  that  he  omitted  to  say  that  he  was  him- 
self in  favor  of  annexation.  He  merely  floated  with  the 
irresistible  current,  He  had  something  to  be  forgiven 


33 


3 


34 


Transformation  Scene. 


for.  It  was  his  friendly  relationship  with  the  Span- 
iards— his  lucrative  treaty  with  them — and  he  knew  he 
was  on  slippery  ground.  That  was  why  he  feared  to 
go  to  Dewey.  There  was  acute  discrimination  in  his 
use  of  language.  He  promised  everything  asked  by  the 
consuls,  whose  zeal  had  in  it  something  of  the  effusive- 
ness of  inexperience.  They  were  absolute  about  one 
thing.  Each  required  the  future  Dictator  to  make  a 
solemn  promise  that  he  would  not  be  a savage  in  war; 
that  he  would  proceed  according  to  the  usages  of  civil- 
ized nations;  and  more,  that  he  would  be  obedient  to 
Admiral  Dewey,  at  the  time  the  personification  of  Amer- 
ican authority.  Dewey  did  not  make  any  objection  to 
Aguinaldo  agreeing  to  be  submissive.  On  those  terms 
only  was  the  Dictator  allowed  to  go  to  Cavite. 

There  is  a long  list  of  fortuitous  conditions  in  the 
environment  of  the  American  admiral  and  the  Tagalo 
President,  for  the  aggrandizement  of  the  latter,  on  and 
after  the  19th  of  May,  1898,  the  day  they  first  saw  each 
other.  The  native  province  of  Cavite,  every  path  in 
which  was  familiar  to  Aguinaldo,  contained  some  thou- 
sands of  Spanish  troops  in  garrisons.  It  is  in  that  prov- 
ince richdands,  owned  by  the  friars,  are  located.  The 
way  to  reach  it  from  Manila  is  to  cross  the  bay,  or 
make  a long  and  difficult  journey  around  that  spacious 
sheet  of  water.  The  Spanish  fleet  destroyed,  their 
troops  holding  the  province  were  in  a hopeless  condi- 
tion. A feature  of  the  garrisons  was,  they  included  the 
Spanish  regular  regiments,  the  greater  proportion  of 
the  ranks  filled  with  natives  trained  as  Spanish  soldiers. 
If  it  had  been  practicable  for  the  garrisons  to  go  to 
Manila,  it  would  have  been  a serious  error  to  have  added 


Transformation  Scene. 


35 


to  the  crowd  in  the  city  the  fugitives  from  Cavite  and 
the  provincial  towns  and  villages.  The  Spaniards  had 
been  surprised  and  overwhelmed  to  find  themselves  cut 
off  from  Spain.  Those  in  the  Cavite  posts  were  actually ' 
helpless  and  disheartened.  In  Manila  itself  the  Amer- 
ican victory  simply  paralyzed  them.  The  garrisons  had 
to  shift  for  themselves.  They  rejoiced  over  finding 
somebody  in  the  province  of  Cavite  with  the  appear- 
ance of  authority,  who  would  consent  to  accept  their 
surrender.  They  wanted  anybody  who  could  find  them 
in  food.  There  was  not  a Spaniard  in  the  Philippines 
who  did  not  know  it  was  beyond  the  power  of  their 
country  to  send  another  fleet  to  dispute  the  Asiatic 
waters  with  America.  The  situation  was  soon  clear  to 
Aguinaldo  and  those  identified  with  him.  The  only 
hope  the  Spaniards  had  was  alliance  with  the  natives 
for  the  expulsion  of  the  Americans.  There  is  reason 
and  evidence  that  this  was  what  Aguinaldo  hoped  for, 
and  this  volume  contains  it.  This  fact  is  the  key  to 
his  correspondence  with  both  the  Spanish  and  Amer- 
ican generals.  He  may  have  wavered  somewhat  in 
judgment  as  to  which  side  offered  him  the  greater  ad- 
vantages, but,  before  the  war  began,  made  up  his  mind 
that  the  course  for  him  to  become  the  Tycoon  of  the 
Philippines  was  to  take  part  with  the  Spaniards,  and 
by  treachery  gain  advantages  over  the  Americans  that 
would  be  decisive.  He  was  a man  of  decided  intelli- 
gence; but  the  United  States  was  a new  country  to  him, 
as  the  Philippines  were  to  the  United  States.  Neither 
side  was. accurate  in  its  estimation  of  the  capacity  of 
the  other  for  war.  The  greater  miscalculation  was  on 
the  side  of  the  Spaniards  and  Aguinaldo.  Obviously 


36 


Transformation  Scene. 


he  was  urged,  when  arriving  at  Cavite,  by  his  confiden- 
tial staff,  to  make  the  most  for  himself  and  them  of  the 
wonderful  revelations  of  opportunity  that  seemed  spread 
out  before  him. 

The  native  soldiers  in  Spanish  regiments  recognized, 
within  a few  days  after  the  decisive  battle,  that  they 
were  liberated,  and  there  was  nothing  to  alarm  them  in 
their  allegiance  to  Spain.  The  comparatively  small  num- 
ber of  Spaniards  in  the  Cavite  posts  wanted  to  sur- 
render at  once.  They  were  in  the  midst  of  a dense  popu- 
lation of  natives,  and  no  serious  dependence  could  be 
placed  upon  the  loyalty  of  Filipino  soldiers.  Agui- 
naldo  was  the  man  they  wanted.  It  pleased  everybody 
in  the  Spanish  regiments  to  meet  him.  He  knew  the 
jungles  and  the  paddy  fields,  the  creeks,  towns,  and  vil- 
lages, and  went  out  calling  along  familiar  paths,  accept- 
ing happy  prisoners.  He  hadn’t  any  fighting  to  do; 
but  as  he  held  all  the  secrets  of  his  party,  and  the  Fili- 
pinos were  not  in  personal  contact  with  the  American 
Admiral,  the  representations  of  the  '‘President,”  fresh, 
with  his  staff,  from  Hong  Kong,  were  held  indisputable. 
The  transactions  of  surrender  were  peaceful  ceremonies, 
their  quietude  disturbed  by  felicitations.  It  had  been  a 
precaution  of  Aguinaldo’s  to  take  no  one  with  him  in 
going  to  see  Dewey  not  chosen  by  himself.  He  had 
secrets  to  guard,  and  managed  to  deceive  the  Admiral 
as  to  his  operations,  which  he  was  pleased  to  consider 
of  a military  character.  It  was  claimed  by  the  Tagalo 
leader  that  his  exploits  were  "brilliant.”  They  were 
simply  the  acceptance  of  the  submission  of  unresisting 
and  unassailed  garrisons,  whose  solicitude  was  merely 
to  find  a friend  who  would  consent  to  take  them 


Transformation  Scene. 


37 


where  they  could  get  rations.  These  pacific  affairs 
were  described  as  “combats,”  and  suddenly  Aguinaldo 
was  advertised  the  world  around  as  a hero  of  striking 
exploits,  one  of  the  Masters  of  War.  He  managed  to 
deceive  Dewey  about  that.  His  proceedings  had  rather 
less  military  risk  and  physical  exertion  in  them  than 
the  driving  of  flocks  of  sheep  or  swine;  for  even  pigs 
and  lambs  have  been  known  to  run  away  after  some 
foolish  leader,  and  not  move  with  placidity  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  pens  where  they  were  to  be  collected  until 
they  were  wanted  to  furnish  men  meat.  Aguinaldo's 
reports  of  his  triumphs  invariably  mentioned  that  the 
Spaniards  surrendered  “when  they  were  out  of  ammu- 
nition.” It  was  the  prudent  and  thoughtful  part  of  the 
Tagalo  chieftain  and  staff  to  take  care  of  the  cartridges, 
and  lo,  there  was  an  army  of  Filipinos,  drilled  men,  with 
arms  and  ammunition  that  had  been  served  to  them 
by  the  Spaniards,  and  there  was  not  a hostile  gun  fired 
in  the  province  after  Dewey’s  signal  in  the  afternoon 
of  May-day  to  his  fleet,  to  “cease  firing” — not  a gun 
fired  to  kill  until  two  Americans  were  murdered  on  the 
picket-line  between  Bacoor  and  Cavite  by  Filipinos 
about  the  middle  of  the  month  of  August. 

Thus  Aguinaldo  was  scooped  into  the  command  of 
the  Spanish  veterans  of  Philippine  birth,  to  become  the 
great  man  of  his  race,  and  had  a harvest  of  glory  gath- 
ered for  him  and  passed  over  to  him  at  Cavite;  and  the 
command  of  the  troops  who  gave  themselves  to  him, 
with  the  consent  both  of  Spain  and  the  United  States, 
was  a call  to  the  command  in  chief,  and  so  there  was 
another  army  ready  made,  and,  in  a shabby  sense, 
equipped  for  him,  in  the  jungles  and  high  grass  round 


38 


Transformation  Scene. 


about  Manila,  who  gave  him  the  salute,  “Hail  to  the 
chief!''  and  all  the  snipers  on.  the  Manila  side  of  the 
bay,  who  thought  they  were  besieging  Manila,  were 
joyful  to  be  enrolled  as  the  followers  of  Aguinaldo  rather 
than  of  Gonzales,  who,  during  the  absence  of  the  hero 
of  the  Mexican-dollar  capitulation  from  home  for  eight 
months,  had  taken  care  to  break  the  peace  so  far  as 
he  could  around  Manila,  and  reported  that  he  had  just 
“thirty-seven  thousand  men,"  probably  about  five  times 
the  actual  number.  Presently  the  word  went  forth, 
near  and  far,  that  Manila  was  to  be  captured  by  the 
Philippine  army  and  plundered  by  patriots,  who  were 
to  .pay  themselves  out  of  the  shops  of  their  enemies; 
and  this  cheerful  information  caused  considerable  re- 
enforcements to  come  in.  Even  so  Aguinaldo  was 
more  and  more  the  master  of  the  Filipinos,  and  his  name 
rang  through  all  the  continents  of  the  earth  and  the 
islands  of  the  seas. 

The  strangest  of  all  Philippine  stories  is  what  fol- 
lowed the  arrival  of  Aguinaldo  in  the  province  of 
Cavite — an  expedition  sorely  against  his  will  under 
the  conditions  that  he  undertook  it.  He  was  forced 
to  this  by  the  vehement  enthusiasm  of  the  Hong  Kong 
Filipinos,  to  only  a small  portion  of  whom  Aguinaldo 
had  given  his  confidence;  and  a series  of  accidents 
made  for  the  adventurer  a marvelous  success.  He 
is  a reminder  of  the  legend  of  one  of  the  ancient  _ 
countries  of  Central  Europe,  of  a man  tied  upon  a 
horse  in  order  that  he  might  be  carried  out  of  the  lines* 
of  the  army  to  which  he  belonged  because  he  was  be- 
lieved incapable  and  timid,  and  was  whipped  into  a 
charge  upon  the  foe.  In  his  terror  the  hero  of  this 


Transformation  Scene. 


39 


feat  tore  branches  from  overhanging  boughs  as  his  horse 
dashed  toward  the  enemj^,  and  lo ! there  was  a panic  in 
the  ranks  of  the  foe.  The  opposing  force  exercised 
imagination,  and  beheld  a giant  tearing  up  trees  to 
sweep  them  to  destruction,  and  fled  in  dismay.  There 
was  a conversion  at  once  of  the  poor  creature,  helpless 
on  his  horse,  into  a mighty  conqueror;  and  he  was  the 
founder  of  an  imperial  dynasty. 

If  Aguinaldo  had  not  been  overruled  by  the  com- 
mittee at  Hong  Kong,  by  whom  he  was  chosen  for  a 
second  term  of  the  Presidency  by  a vote  of  i6  voices, 
and  compelled  to  go  to  Dewey,  though  protesting  it 
was  dangerous  to  do  so,  there  could  have  been  no  chance 
for  him  to  become  important,  except,  perhaps,  as  the 
leader  of  a Spanish  faction;  and  even  that  he  would  have 
been  obliged  to  undertake  with  extreme  caution  and 
on  the  losing  side.  It  was  a help  to  the  turning  of  his 
fortunes  from  an  abject  and  corrupt  secondary  part  in 
a rascally  negotiation  with  the  Spaniards,  that  the  scene 
of  the  annihilation  of  the  Spanish  fleet  was  very  near 
his  birthplace.  Famous  as  he  is,  however,  the  village 
where  he  was  born  has  not  been  identified  with  pre- 
cision. It  is  only  certain  that  Cavite,  where  Dewey 
awaited  American  reinforcements  after  his  victory,  was 
the  home  of  his  boyhood.  We  may  not  deny  him 
the  title  of  chief;  for  he  did  become  the  ruler  of  his 
tribe.  It  is  one  of  the  tales  of  his  life  that  he  held  a 
clerkship  in  the  arsenal  of  the  Spaniards  at  Cavite,  just 
where  he  arrived  under  the  American  flag  with  a staff 
of  seventeen  followers.  He  had  no  considerable  military 
success  or  reputation  up  to  that  time,  but  was  distin- 
guished because  a Filipino  who  had  largely  the  confi- 


40 


Transformation  Scene. 


dence  of  the  natives — Paterno — selected  him  as  a suit- 
able person  to  carry  on  the  negotiation  of  a fake  treaty, 
looking  to  a fraudulent  peace.  The  core  and  bark  of 
this  was  a division  of  Spanish  money  between  alleged 
belligerents,  who  played  into  each  others’  hands  a game 
of  exaggerated  warfare  and  inadequate  pacification  for 
, the  purpose  of  bleeding  the  mother  country  and  sharing 
the  usufruct  of  the  swindle. 

The  arrival  at  Cavite  of  Aguinaldo  was  during 
the  popular  fervor  of  admiration  for  our  sailors  by  the 
natives,  who  swarmed  to  that  place  because  the 
Americans  were  there,  and  their  great  victory  had 
broken  the  Spaniards  and  liberated  the  Filipinos. 
Their  enthusiasm  had  just  expanded  to  its  greatest 
extent,  and  reached  its  highest  temperature.  The 
United  States  consul,  who  was  with  Dewey  in  the 
battle,  and  remained  with  the  squadron,  with  quarters 
on  the  Baltimore,  having  been  pointed  out  before 
Aguinaldo’s  arrival  at  Cavite  as  an  American  and  an 
officer,  was  surrounded  by  an  enormous  crowd  of  ex- 
travagant Filipinos,  who  cheered  him  incessantly,  and 
crowded  him,  to  express  their  joy,  to  such  an  extent 
that  he  had  hard  work  to  get  into  his  boat  and  off 
to  the  warship,  where  he  was  sheltered.  In  the  midst 
of  this  inflammable  material,  ready  for  organization, 
Aguinaldo  landed  under  the  American  flag,  no  army 
whatsoever  but  a uniformed  staff,  and  the  fact  that  he 
shared  in  the  American  prestige  regained  for  him  the 
lost  confidence  of  the  Filipinos!  It  must  not  be  for- 
gotten that  Aguinaldo  was  fortunate  in  not  having 
been  named  in  the  first  dispatches  concerning  him  from 


Transformation  Scene.  41 

the  consuls  at  Manila  and  Hong  Kong.  Mr,  Williams, 
at  Manila,  had  referred  to  the  “cash  bribe,”  by  which 
some  Filipino  insurgent  officers  had  consented  to  sur- 
render, give  up  their  arms,  and  go  into  exile,  and  had 
added  to  this  statement  that  the  object  of  the  Spanish 
Captain-General  in  making  the  negotiation  and  paying 
the  money  was  to  gain  the  reputation  of  pacifying  the 
Filipinos,  but  that  the  result  had  not  been  favorable. 
When  the  news  spread  among  the  insurgents  that 
some  of  them  had  sold  out  for  a large  supply  of  Mex- 
ican dollars,  and  had  gone  to  live  abroad  with  the 
cash,  there  was  great  emulation  among  the  belligerent 
patriots  to  follow  the  illustrious  example,  and  there  was 
more  “sniping”  of  Spanish  soldiers  in  the  underbrush 
than  before  the  proclamation  of  peace  was  made.  Both 
sides  were  warranted  in  proclaiming  that  the  treaty 
was  not,  in  terms,  complied  with  beyond  the  delivery 
of  the  arms  (seven  hundred  shotguns)  on  one  side  and 
the  payment  of  four  hundred  thousand  dollars  (silver) 
on  the  other.  Each  insisted  the  other  had  disregarded 
the  stipulations.  Both  told  the  truth;  but  the  parties  to 
the  negotiation  were  aware,  from  the  beginning,  that 
the  transaction  was  dishonorable.  Aguinaldo  escaped  ' 
naming  by  Consul  Williams.  He  was  simply  one  of  the 
generals,  and  the  consular  report  had  the  merit  of  an 
impersonal  expression  of  public  opinion.  Equally  fortu- 
nate he  had  been  when  Consul  Wildman  related  the 
celebrated  visit  of  Agoncillo,  five  months  before  the 
declaration  of  war  with  Spain,  speaking  of  the  Presi- 
dent and  the  dishonorable  proposition  then  made  to  — 
the  American  consul,  which  he  submitted,  with  due  dis- 


42 


Transformation  Scene. 


cretion,  to  the  State  Department,  where  it  was  con- 
temptuously resented,  and  the  secretary  and  his  assist- 
ants were  not  made  acquainted  with  the  personality  of 
Aguinaldo — an  obscuration  of  his  record  that  turned 
out  to  give  him  the  opportunities  of  his  life. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


AGUINALDO’S  VAIN  GLORY. 

How  he  Posed  as  a Caesar  a Fortnight  after  he  was  a 
Suppliant — His  Swollen  Conceits  and  Vanities — 
Small  Beggar  on  a Big  Horse. 

HAT  Aguinaldo  had  the  advantage  of  a series  of 


1 incidental  good  fortunes  that  he  was  not  influential 
in  bringing  about,  with  a personal  purpose,  or  intelli- 
gent comprehension,  in  his  early  presentations  to  the 
American  public,  there  can  be  no  hesitation  in  saying. 
That  he  was  ‘flucky,”  all  well-informed  people  know. 
But  there  is  no  occasion  to  question  that  he  had  bright- 
ness of  mind  and"  energy  of  character  to  begin  with. 
That  he  had  half  a dozen  men  of  ability  about  him  who 
were  not  savages,  but  possessed  with  Malayism  as  a 
basis,  a Spanish  education,  those  who  have  come  in 
contact  with  them  are  well  aware.  The  most  notable 
personal  peculiarity  of  Aguinaldo  is  a passion  for  dis- 
tinction in  his  clothing,  especially  in  the  line  of  decora- 
tions, not  tawdry,  but  conspicuous.  He  is  scrupulously 
cleanly,  anxious  about  that  as  any  Chinaman;  and  it  is 
his  happiness  to  be  dressed  entirely  in  immaculate  white 
linen.  Wildman,  consul  at  Hong  Kong,  who  so  unhap- 
pily perished  in  the  Rio  Janeiro  on  the  way  home  from 
long,  arduous,  and,  upon  the  whole,  very  useful  service 
at  Hong  Kong,  knew  as  much  of  Aguinaldo  as  any  one, 
and  had  the  confidence  of  the  Tagalo  chief  to  as  great 


43 


44 


Aguinaldo’s  Vain  Glory. 


an  extent  as  he  gave  anybody.  This  President  of  the 
Philippines,  who  is  said  to  have  been  self-appointed,  and 
really  only  received  the  votes  of  a Committee  that  he 
controlled,  there  were  sixteen,  when  he  was  reinstated 
President  after  the  Singapore  trip  by  the  Committee  that 
shared  with  him  the  delightful  burden  of  Spanish  spoils. 
Consul  Wildman  described  as  a man  who  cared  more  for 
the  little  stick  that  he  carried  and  the  badge  he  wore 
than  for  the  place  he  was  to  hold  in  history;  and  there 
is  the  same  authority  for  the  statement  that  he  was 
childish,  full  of  caprice,  and  had  a great  gift  of  vanity. 
Admiral  Dewey  was  disgusted  with  the  Tagalo  chief 
for  his  sudden  accession  of  excessive  dignity  and  pre- 
sumption that  he  was  the  really  important  feature  of 
human  affairs  in  that  part  of  the  world.  But  a few 
weeks  before,  this  curious  evolution  was  extremely  anx- 
ious for  what  seemed  small  favors,  and  affected  to  be 
grateful  for  whatever  he  got.  It  was  a case  of  “beg- 
gar on  horseback,’'  though  the  beggar  and  the  horse 
were  both  small.  The  admiral  repeatedly  referred  to 
his  transformation  as  a matter  of  “swell-head.”  Others 
referred  to  the  phenomenon  as  a demand  for  “enlarged 
hat-blocks.”  Certainly  Aguinaldo  had  one  Napoleonic 
characteristic — that  of  asserting  himself.  He  assumed 
absolute  confidence  that  he  was  master  of  the  Archi- 
pelago. He  gave  no  indication  of  diffidence  when 
speaking  in  the  possessive  case  of  the  city  of  Manila, 
called  it  habitually  “My  capital,”  and  resented  as  in- 
formal a call  upon  him  by  Admiral  Dewey  and  General 
Anderson.  The  offense  was  because  they  did  not  make 
an  official  “function”  of  their  call.  He  fancied  he  was 
a potentate.  This  was  on  the  30th  of  April,  and  he 


Aguinaldo’s  Vain  Glory. 


45 


had  arrived  at  Cavite  on  the  19th  of  May.  He  thought 
himself  the  very  man  when  Manila  was  taken,  August 
13th, -to  occupy  the  palace  of  the  captain-generals,  and 
was  shocked,  amazed,  and  indignant  because  the  Amer- 
ican commanding  general  proposed  to  use  the  palace 
for  his  own  headquarters.  He  thought  it  a concession 
on  his  part  when  he  allowed  Anderson’s  tro'ops  to  go 
ashore  without  contesting  the  ground  they  presumed 
to  occupy  without  his  leave  with  armed  force;  and  he 
claimed  it  was  benevolence  on  his  part  that  he  allowed 
the  American  soldiers  to  get  a good  supply  of  pure 
water  in  Manila  from  the  water-works  that  are  supplied 
by  a mountain  stream.  The  alternative  was  unclean 
cistern-water. 

Aguinaldo  posed  as  if  conscious  of  gigantic  propor- 
tions, and  never  consented  by  a gesture  or  attitude  that 
he  felt  small,  or  even  slightly  suggested  suspecting  him- 
self of  insignificance.  Doubtless  those  about  him  played 
their  parts  in  carefully  yielding  to  him  “the  center  of 
the  stage,”  and  saluting  him  even  in  his  small  begin- 
nings as  an  imperious,  if  not  potential,  personage. 
They  knew  he  was  the  head  of  the  group  in -position, 
and  that,  the  more  they  made  of  him,  the  greater  the 
increase  of  their  own  magnitude.  A keen  conscious- 
ness of  humor  is  not  one  of  the  endowments  of  the 
Filipino.  His  levity  is  frivolous  and  playful  in  a child- 
ish way,  and  it  has  been  vividly  described  as  like  unto 
the  capricious  and  fantastical  conduct  of  monkeys,  even 
to  “taking  a nip”  at  each  other,  as  something  indicative 
of  affectionate  hilarity.  The  remark  has  been  made 
disrespectful,  but  there  is  a point  of  vraisemblance  in  it. 
If  we  are  all  monkeys  in  some  degree,  there  is  less 


46 


Aguinaldo’s  Vain  Glory. 


remoteness  from  the  original  progenitor  in  some  of  the 
Filipino  tribes  than  in  the  races  that  have  had  the  ad- 
vantage of  pausing  a long  time  in  Europe  on  the  way 
from  Western  to  Eastern  Asia,  if  that  has  been  the 
course  of  the  movements  of  mankind  from  primeval 
habitations. 

Three  days  after  tlje  return  of  the  ^‘President”  from 
the  Singapore  expedition  to  Hong  Kong  he  appeared 
before  the  Junta  in  that  city,  and  made  a strenuous  plea 
not  to  be  sent  to  Cavite,  and  did  not  get  there  until 
two  weeks  later.  Commodore  Dewey  was  not  im- 
pressed with  his  possible  utilities  as  the  American  con- 
suls were,  and  needed  ten  days’  persuasion  to  give  the 
word  that  the  exile  might  go  to  his  own  home  under 
the  American  flag.  After  all  the  telegraphic  adulation, 
from  Singapore,  of  Aguinaldo,  the  future  admiral  was 
not  in  the  least  sure  that  he  had  any  use  for  him;  and 
if  it  had  not  been  for  the  zeal  of  the  new  consuls  at 
Hong  Kong  and  Manila  and  the  survival  of  the  Cleve- 
land appointee  at  Singapore,  the  complication  with 
Aguinaldo  might  have  been  spared  us.  There  will  al- 
ways be  a dispute  as  to  the  amount  of  good  service 
the  Filipino  insurgents  actually  gave  the  Americans 
before  and  during  the  investment  of  Manila,  up  to  its 
fall  into  the  hands  of  the  American  army  and  navy  on 
the  13th  of  August,  1898.  Making  the  greatest  conces- 
sions, it  is  certain  that  if  Aguinaldo  and  his  staff  had 
been  sent  back  to  Hong  Kong  without  landing,  and  a 
few  of  our  naval  officers  had  been  detailed  to  take  com- 
mand of  the  Filipino  Spanish  soldiers  who  were  anxious 
to  join  the  American  army,  they  could  have  been  of 
much  greater  utility  than  can,  with  any  sort  of  reason, 


Aguinaldo’s  Vain  Glory. 


47 


be  claimed  for  them  as  affairs  turned.  We  know  now 
that  Aguinaldo  was  not  at  any  time  our  friend.  He 
had  to  pretend  to  be  so  after  the  American  victory  in 
order  to  get  hold  of  his  own  people.  They  had  lost 
confidence  in  him.  A word  of  disdain  from  Dewey 
would  have  cleared  the  decks  of  Aguinaldo  and  his  al- 
leged republican  form  of  Government,  in  which  nine 
men  prepared  a free  Government,  and  called  it  a New 
Republic  for  nine  millions  of  people  without  communi- 
cating with  them. 


CHAPTER  V. 


AGUINAEDO’S  POWER  CENTRALIZED. 

How  he  Held  the  Center  of  the  Islands — He  had  the 
Spanish  Machine  of  the  Philippines  before  we 
Signed  the  Treaty,  and  we  did  not  Fight  for  it — 
The  Sacrifice  we  made  for  Peace  caused  him  to 
Fight  us  before  the  Treaty  was  Ratified — Our 
Mischievous  Uncertainties. 


There  has  not  been  much  of  what  we  call  public 
opinion  in  the  Philippines,  because  it  has  not  been 
possible  in  the  three  hundred  years  of  Spanish  admin- 
istration and  leadership  to  develop  it.  New  fashions 
come  slowly  in  the  Orient.  If  the  Filipinos  were  as  the 
Cubans  are- — one  people,  however  mixed,  and  one 
island,  though  extensive  and  variegated — they  would 
be  in  a position  to  be  rapidly  educated  and  become* 
politically  intelligent.  The  Filipinos  are  composed  of 
so  many  tribes  and  races,  and  scattered  among  so  many 
islands  and  in  places  difficult  of  access,  there  can  be  no 
community  of  thought  and  no  common  opinion  or  pur- 
pose, no  concert,  no  initiative  of  the  populace,  because 
they  have  no  sufficient  mechanism  of  representation, 
even  to  give  expression  to  su%:h  scraps  of  enlightenment 
-as  they  possess. 

Aguinaldo’s  advantage  after  his  leadership  appeared 
most  largely  due  to  the  fact  he  was  allowed  to  draw 
lines  around  the  United  States  troops,  and,  as  the  tribes 

48 


ON  THE  TRAIL  OF  AGUINALDO. 


THE  PURSUIT  IN  THE  MOUNTAINS. 


Aguinaldo's  Power  Centralized.  49 

saw  and  heard,  for  they  were  observers  from  the  out- 
side, possess  the  one  center  that  had  been  the  seat  of 
authority  known  to  the  various  tribes  in  the  islands  for 
centuries.  He  was  in  accordance  with  the  native  un- 
derstanding, in  command  in  the  capital  of  the  Philip- 
pines, and  was  respected,  feared,  and  obeyed  accord- 
ingly. 

General  Merritt  would  not  consent  to  the  Filipino 
army  surrounding  the  Americans  in  Manila,  and  his 
language  on  the  subject  was  unmistakable  as  when  he 
demanded  pure  water,  and  when  he  ordered  the  Fili- 
pinos to  get  out  of  the  way  where  they  were  not  wanted. 
As  the  Aguinaldo  array  of  military  forces  became  ag- 
gressive, insolent,  and  threatening,  and  it  was  apparent 
there  was  an  idea  among  them  they  could  conquer  the 
Americans,  there  were  extraordinary  concessions  made 
for  the  sake  of  gaining  time  for  peace.  Things  that 
would  never  have  been  tolerated  by  any  other  army 
were  endured  by  the  Americans  for  weeks,  rather  than 
be  in  any  degree  responsible  for  striking  first.  The  suf- 
ferings of  the  American  army  under  the  domineering 
viciousness  of  the  surrounding  Filipinos  was  something 
almost  intolerable.  There  has  been,  nothing  like  it,  and 
it  has  not  been  appreciated  by  their  countrymen.  On 
the  contrary,  they  have  been  accused  of  misdemeanors 
and  cruelties,  and  finally  of  assaulting  the  lines  that 
were  drawn  about  them  with  every  circumstance  of 
contumely,  and  insolence  positively  barbarous,  in- 
decent, and  expressive  of  derision,  contempt,  and  medi- 
- tated  vengeance.  Our  own  red  Indians  were  never 
more  artful  and  obscene  in  provocation.  The  central 
position  of  Aguinaldo,  spreading  an  army  around  Ma- 
4 


50  Aguinaldo’s  Power  Centralized. 

nila,  gave  him  an  immense  ability  for  mischief.  It 
placed  himjn  direct  intercourse  with  all  the  provinces 
the  Spaniards  had  governed,  because  all  the  roads  ran 
to  and  from  Manila,,  and  he  held  them,  and  the  creeks 
and  rivers  swarmed  with  boats  that  were  capable  of 
making  voyages  along  the  shores,  so  that  the  surround- 
ing islands  and  distant  provinces  found  themselves  in 
communication  with  Aguinaldo  and  no  one  else,  and 
he  domineered  over  them  to  all  appearances  with  the 
consent  of  the  Americans. 

Beyond  this  was  the  want  of  definition  in  the  Amer- 
ican policy.  There  was  a clause  of  uncertainty  as  to 
the  Philippines  in  the  protocol;  a question  pending  for 
a long  time  whether  the  treaty  with  Spain  would  be 
ratified;  still  another  question,  whether,  if  it  was  not 
ratified,  the  Americans  would  leave  the  islands;  and, 
of  course,  the  inhabitants  who  had  substantial  interests, 
and  intelligent  as  to  the  affairs  of  the  world,  knew  that 
'if  the  American  army  abandoned  the  islands  the  despot- 
ism of  Aguinaldo  would  take  its  turn;  and  all  who 
had  not  taken  part  with  him  would  be  under  suspicion 
and  subject  to  assessments;  and  those  who  had  taken 
part  with  the  Americans,  would  be  liable  to  confiscation 
and  every  form  of  tyranny  after  the  Spanish  fashion. 
Months  passed,  from  August  to  February,  during  which 
this  condition  of  things  lasted.  There  was  even  a clause 
in  the  capitulation  of  Manila  that  would  restore  to  the 
Spaniards  their  guns  and  ammunition — 22,000  stand 
of  arms  and  10,000,000  cartridges,  were  two  of  the 
items.  These  things  were  played  against  the  Amer- 
icans both  ways.  There  is  no  purpose  of  going  into 


Aguinaldo’s  Power  Centralized.  51 

controversy  as  to  the  detail  of  circumstances  immedi- 
ately preceding  the  first  combat  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Manila,  between  the  Americans  and  the  Aguinaldo 
army.  Aguinaldo  was  only  present  by  wire.  His  per- 
son was  in  Mololos.  He  was  not  personally  involved, 
except  through  orders  wired — his  customary  method, 
however,  of  conducting  battles.  There  is  to  be  re- 
marked a coincidence  throwing  strong  lights  upon  the 
subject.  When  the  battle  began  at  Manila,  the  Amer- 
ican army  had  lost  strength  in  the  disbandment  and 
disability  of  soldiers,  and  six  thousand  re-enforcements 
were  on  the  way.  The  ratification  crisis  was  just  on  in 
the  Senate  of  the  United  States.  It  was  the  belief  of 
the  Filipinos  in  Washington  that  if  there  was  war  in 
the  islands  the  treaty  would  not  be  ratified,  and  the  fact 
of  the  re-enforcements  crossing  the  Pacific  was  well 
known  to  the  Washington  agent  of  Aguinaldo,  and 
doubtless  communicated.  The  great  length  of  time 
spent  in  debating  the  treaty  at  Paris  and  ratifying  it  at 
Washington,  and  the  Spanish  and  Filipino  secret  influ- 
ences were  substantially  united  against  us. 

The  anxiety  of  the  President  of  the  United  States 
that  there  should  not  be  war  between  the  liberated  and 
the  liberators  m the  Philippines  was  very  great.  No 
man  was  more  sensible  of  the  horror  of  having  to  turn 
our  arms  against  those  we  had  set  free  than  he  was; 
but  the  evidence  of  his  solicitude  was  Asiatically  inter- 
preted to  be  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  were 
unwarlike,  and  that  our  troops  could  be  swept  out  of 
the  way  by  the  superior  numbers  Aguinaldo  had 
gathered.  In  the  city  of  Manila  itself  there  were  power- 


52 


Aguinaldo’s  Power  Centralized. 


ful  organizations  hostile  to  the  Americans,  and  the 
overbearing  insurgents  levied  at  their  pleasure  assess- 
ments upon  property-holders.  There  were  clubs  of 
known  conspirators,  thousands  strong,  prepared  to  stab 
the  American  army  in  the  back  when  it  was  assaulted 
in  front. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

EVOLUTION  OF  AGUINALDO. 


Uncertainties  of  His  Boyhood — He  Found  a Kind 
Master — The  Traditions  of  Youth  and  Evidence  of 
Fancy — Early  and  Late  Hong  Kong  Experi- 
ences— The  Story  of  the  Silver-plated  Treaty — The 
History  and  Romance  of  a Man  of  Mystery — What 
the  Romantic  Biographers  Say. 

WHEN  Aguinaldo  was  first  making  himself  inter- 
esting to  our  officers,  and  the  soldiers  generally, 
waiting  for  the  drift  of  events,  he  was  not  taken  very 
seriously  by  Americans,  but  known  to  have  a startling 
conceit  of  himself.  There  was  much  more  gossip  than 
information  about  him;  differences  of  opinion  as  to 
what  blood  of  man  he  had  other  than  Tagalo.  He  was 
accused  of  a partially  Chinese  ancestry,  and  that  not 
regarded  a complimentary  speculation.  There  is  un- 
derstood his  mother  was  living,  and  nothing  improb- 
able in  that,  for  he  was  about  thirty  years  of  age.  If 
he  had  a fixed  birthday,  it  was  not  referred  to  with 
specification.  It  seemed  to  be  known  that  he  was  a 
native  of  the  province  of  Cavite,  and  had  been  in  a 
small  way  identified  with  the  arsenal.  Some  said  he  had 
been  a clerk  in  the  Custom  House,  and,  again,  he  was 
charged  with  being  a school-teacher.  The  contradic- 
tion was  that  he  was  not  well  enough  educated.'  It  was 
stated  that  he  had  been  in  attendance  at  a Jesuit  school, 
and  had  their  praise  for  diligence  and  proficiency.  So 

53 


54 


Evolution  of  Aguinaldo. 


much  was  said  of  his  Jesuit  education  and  alleged  sym- 
pathies with  that  order,  that  when  in  conversation  with 
him  he  denounced  the  friars,  and  said  they  should  go 
home  to  Spain,  and  ought  to  know  enough  to  go,  I 
asked  him  whether  he  included  the  Jesuits,  and  after  a 
brief  delay  he  said,  “They  also  should  go.”  It  was 
asserted  often,  and  with  confidence,  that  he  had  been 
educated  as  a priest,  and  had  first  quarreled  with  the 
Church  by  becoming  a Mason.  One  of  the  high  crimes 
under  the  rule  of  the  Spaniards  in  the  Philippines  was 
joining  the  Masons.  Another  story  was  afloat,  and  had 
credence,  that  he  had  been  a Spanish  soldier  and  petty 
officer,  and  started  the  riotous  disorganization  of  a regi- 
ment by  assassinating  an  officer,  carrying  out  a scheme 
of  revenge.  After  his  celebrity  was  pronounced,  the 
rumor  of  his  service  as  a soldier  had  much  countenance, 
and  there  was  added  to  it,  as  it  first  circulated,  that  he 
entered  the  army  so  as  to  fit  himself  to  become  an  insur- 
gent leader,  and  served  with  the  Chinese  also. 

There  was  habitually  intruded  into  accounts  of  him, 
and  no  other  man  was  so  much  talked  of,  or  curiously 
regarded,  that  he  had  a charm.  That  meant  his  fol- 
lowers, of  the  baser  sort  at  least,  believed  he  was  under 
Divine  protection — had  a charmed  life.  The  form  this 
folly  took  was  that  he  could  not  be  harmed  by  Spanish 
poisons,  as  they  had  often  been  administered  to  him 
by  his  deadly  foes;  more  than  that,  he  could  not  be 
perforated  by  Spanish  bullets,  for  he  had  stood  un- 
harmed when  a shower  of  them  were  fired  point  blank 
at  him,  and  they  must  have  glanced  from  him,  or  he  be- 
came a phantom  and  was  not  disturbed  by  missiles.  One 
of  the  most  persistently  related  personal  accounts  was 


Evolution  of  Aguinaldo. 


55 


that  he  had  been  glad  for  a while  to  encourage  the  pre- 
tense he  could  not  be  slain  by  his  foes,  owing  to  a mirac- 
ulous token  fastened  about  his  neck,  until  a sudden  fear 
possessed  him  that  those  who  believed  in  him  might  be 
disposed  to  prove  their  faith  by  private  experiments, 
and  he  became  abjectly  alarmed.  There  is  a widespread 
weakness- among  the  Filipinos  that  causes  them  to  have 
faith  in  the  vulgarisms  of  superstition  of  all  sorts. 

In  February,  1899,  the  Review  of  Reviews  collected 
all  the  information  then  attainable  touching  the  parent- 
age and  youth  of  Aguinaldo,  and  sought  to  treat  him 
with  respect  and  have  scrupulous  regard  for  facts. 
There  was  this  correct  statement  as  to  the. evidences  in 
his  person  of  his  race: 

“His  complexion  is  about  half-way  between  the  red- 
dish-brown of  the  Malay  and  the  olive  of  the  Spaniard. 
There  is  a yellowish  tinge  about  it  which,  taken  in  con- 
nection with  his  forehead,  would  lead  one  to  infer  that 
a modicum  of  Chinese  blood  flowed  in  his  veins,  and 
that  in  his  pedigree  was  some  individual  of  Igorrote- 
Chinese  or  of  Tagalo-Chinese  or  of  Tagalo-Chinese 
characteristics.” 

This  exhausted  the  authenticities,  and,  as  to  his 
parentage,  it  was  confessed  it  would  be  dififlcult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  learn  the  truth,  and  though  not  consid- 
ered a Spaniard,  the  blame  for  his  appearance  in  the 
world  was  fixed  upon  Spaniards  in  this  entertaining 
style : 

“So  deep  has  been  the  moral  mire  of  the  Philippines 
under  Spanish  rule,  so  universal  the  immorality  of  the 
dominant  race,  that  neither  the  civil  nor  religious  au- 
thorities have  ever  cared  to  keep  any  record  of  the 


56  ^ Evolution  of  Aguinaldo. 

alliances  and  misalliances,  the  births  legitimate  and  ille- 
gitimate, the  wives,  concubines  and  mistresses,  slaves 
and  abducted  women,  who  have  filled  the  long  years  of 
Spanish  rule.  It  is  only  of  late  years  that  the  Tagals, 
both  pure  and  half-breed,  have  been  permitted  to  use 
Castilian  names,  and  then,  as  though  the  spirit  of  grim 
Gothic  humor  had  permeated  the  official  mind  at  Ma- 
nila, the  brown  men  and  the  brown-white  men  were 
allowed  to  take  the  best  names  in  Spanish  history  and 
literature.  No  bureaucrat  and  no  parish  priest  saw  the 
sardonic  irony  of  a half-breed  calling  himself  Aguinaldo, 
Cervantes,  De  Vega,  Agramonte,  Calderon,  Eegaspi, 
De  Leon,  and  De  Soto.  For  humor  the  practice  sur- 
passed that  which  prevailed  in  our  own  country  before 
the  war,  when  every  plantation  saw  in  living  bronze 
Julius  Caesar,  Pompey,  Scipio  Africanus,  Cleopatra,  and 
Epaminondas.’’ 

There  followed  this  correct  study  of  the  points  of 
the  man,  giving  him  credit  and  stating  his  weaknesses, 
after  the  fashion  of  the  traveling  phrenologists,  a long 
time  ago  held  in  request: 

“In  his  features,  face,  and  skull,  Aguinaldo  looks 
more  like  a European  than  a Malay.  He  is  what  would 
be  called  a handsome  man,  and  might  be  compared  with 
many  young  men  in  the  province  of  Andalusia,  Spain. 
If  there  be  truth  in  phrenology,  he  is  a man  above  the 
common.  The  zone  of  the  skull,  which  indicates  men- 
tality, is  well  developed  for  a European — abnormally 
large  for  a Malay.  The  moral  zone  is  of  medium  de- 
velopment, and  the  animal  or  cerebellar  zone  is  com- 
paratively small,  with  the  exception  of  the  reach  over 
th^  ears,  indicating  destructiveness  and  cruelty.” 


Evolution  of  Aguinaldo. 


57 


A holder  of  a pen  of  free  flow,  dipped  in  red  paint, 
contributed — we  assume  upon  a sudden  call  for  a life  of 
Aguinaldo,  that  would  cover  all  reasonable  demands  for 
particulars — a versatile  sketch  that  “will  go  down  the 
corridors  of  the  ages,”  we  presume,  his  pen-picture  of 
• the  father  of  Aguinaldo,  the  only  answer  attempted, 
ought  to  serve  all  purposes — and  reminds  one  of  an  old 
comedian  hailed  by  a young  man  determined  to  be 
married,  and  successful  in  his  courtship,  until  the  lady 
in  the  case  demanding  his  father’s  presence  at  the  wed- 
ding, and  the  expectant  lover  never  had  a father,  so 
far  as  he  knew,  or  knew  the  want  of  him  until  this  matri- 
monial emergency  arose.  “Will  you  be  my  father?” 
said  the  orphan  to  the  comedian,  and  the  reply  was 
gracious,  “Yes,  certainly,  I am  your  father;  what  kind 
of  an  old  father  do  you  want?”  The  article  was  fur- 
nished to  order. 

This  is  the  sort  of  father  Aguinaldo  got  after  Eun- 
ston  “brought  him  up  by  hand,”  as  they  say — it  was 
the  father  furnished  out  of  the  revelations  of  the  inner 
consciousness  of  an  able,  erudite,  and  dashing  space- 
writer  : 

“Like  himself,  his  father  was  a native  of  the  Philip- 
pines, of  full  Malay  blood. 

“When,  a quarter  of  a century  ago,  the  hatred  of 
the  natives  of  the  islands  for  the  Power  that  held  them 
under  misrule  and  oppression  began  to  take  form  in 
slumbering  revolt,  the  Tagalo  boy  was  toddling  about 
the  hut  which  was  his  birthplace,  and  none  knew  that 
he  was  destined  to  make  the  name  of  Aguinaldo  known 
as  that  of  the  leader  of  his  people. 

“The  ordinary  Tagalo  boy’s  life  is  devoid  of  incident 


58 


Evolution  of  Aguinaldo. 


from  the  time  he  can  walk  until  he  marries,  which  may 
be  as  early  as  sixteen,  when  he  is  regarded  as  a man. 
Not  so  with  Aguinaldo.  His  father  was  a native  chief — 
an  Orang  Adalayu — that  is,  a Malay  with  literary  knowl- 
edge, and  having  a religion  and  a form  of  culture.  In 
this  way  he  was  distinguished  from  the  Orang  Beuna, 
the  Malay  of  the  soil,  and  from  the  Orang  Eaut,  the 
Malay  of  the  sea.’’ 

Now  this  literally  romantic  chief  was  an  ambitious 
creature,  and  had  his  gifted  son  educated;  and  so  the 
grand  and  fond  old  aristocrat,  his  father,  gave  him 
away  to  the  priests,  and  they  were  glad  to  get  him,  as 
they  saw  genius  just  glowing  in  him,  and  wanted  him 
to  be  one  of  themselves  of  course.  But  the  boy  Emilio 
would  go  for  a soldier.  He  was  sent  to  Madrid,  which 
is  quite  of  the  nature  of  fresh  news,  for  he  was  never 
there,  and  for  two  years  he  studied  Latin,  then  drifted, 
and  was  drafted  into  the  Spanish  regiment,  where  he 
organized  a revolt,  and  entered  on  a career  as  a profes- 
sional killer 'of  Spaniards.  The  way  he  did  it  in  a case 
where  a reward  was  offered  for  his  head  is  thus  set  forth 
in  the  “life  history,”  that  yields  otherwise  unknown 
details : 

“Bassillio  August!  y Davila  was  the  political  gov- 
ernor of  the  Philippine  Islands  at  that  time.  Rivera 
was  captain-general.  August!  offered  $20,000  for  the 
head  of  Aguinaldo.  The  answer  he  received  to  this 
tender  was  a note  from  the  rebel  leader  himself : 

“ T need  the  sum  you  offer  much,  and  will  deliver 
the  head  myself.’ 

“August!  laughed.  Ten  days  later  he  met  Aguinaldo. 
He  paid  him  $20,000,  but  did  not  receive  the  head. 


Evolution  of  Aguinaldo.  59 

“The  time  for  the  meeting  was  a stormy  night — a 
typhoon  raging.  Augusti  sat  in  his  palace  engaged  on 
a report  of  the  condition  of  the  island.  A priest  passed 
the  sentinels  at  the  entrance  to  the  palace,  and  undis- 
turbed entered  Augusti’s  room.  He  stopped  just  back 
of  that  official’s  chair  with  the  words,  ‘Peace  be  with 
you,  my  son.’ 

“When  Augusti,  surprised,  had  turned  his  head  the 
priest’s  mantle  was  dropped,  and  there  stood  Aguinaldo, 
in  his  hand  a twenty-inch  bolo,  the  terrible  knife  of  the 
Malay. 

“ T have  brought  the  head  of  Aguinaldo,’  said  the 
rebel,  thumbing  the  edge  of  his  blade,  ‘and  I claim 
the  reward.  Hasten,  else  I shall  have  to  expedite 
matters.’ 

“Augusti  had  no  alternative.  He  opened  his  desk, 
and  from  it  took  $20,000  in  gold,  which  he  gave  to 
Aguinaldo.  The  latter  in  turn  handed  him  a receipt, 
counted  the  money,  walked  backward  to  the  door,  and 
bolted.  A pistol  bullet  from  the  weapon  of  the  enraged 
Augusti  cut  the  hair  over  Aguinaldo’s  temple,  but  he 
escaped  unscathed.” 

It  has  been  a long  time  since  there  was  a stroke  of 
biography  accomplished  equal  to  this.  The  young  man 
who  did  it  should  make  himself  known.  He  would  be 
delightful  if  he  could  be  induced  not  to  impart  quite 
such  a lurid  gloss  of  truth  to  confer  brilliancy  upon  the 
cold,  sad  facts;  but  the  moderation  that  understates  a 
truth  so  as  to  give  it  emphasis  is  not  appreciated,  and 
men  of  lofty  talent  have  not  inducements  to  under- 
studies for  the  sake  of  literary  finish.  We  regret  to 
have  heard  doubts  raised  as  to  the  strict  research  for 


6o 


Evolution  of  Aguinaldo. 


intelligence  made  by  the  author  we  quote,  for  the  reason 
that  we  have  caught  him  in  some  slight  inaccuracies. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  it  was  with  General  Rivera 
that  Aguinaldo  made' the  treaty  with  the  silver  lining; 
and  Augustin  is  the  man  to  whom  Aguinaldo  wrote  on 
the  9th  of  June,  1898,  to  save  the  sovereignty  of  Spain. 
According  to  the  writer  of  the  Life  Story,  there  have 
been  thrilling  attempts  to  bribe  the  heroic  Tagalo  that 
failed.  We  clip  one  more  extract: 

‘‘Captain-General  Polavieja  offered  Aguinaldo  and 
Alexandro  $200,000  each  if  they  would  leave  Luzon  for- 
ever. Each  was  to  have  a free  pardon,  also,  for  past 
offenses.  The  two  accepted  tli^  offer,  only  to  learn 
after  they  received  the  money  that  they  were  to  be  assas- 
sinated the  following  night  at  a festa.  The  next  night 
came,  but  the  two  men  engaged  to  kill  the  insurgents 
were  found  dead  in  their  beds  with  knives  driven 
through  their  hearts,  and  attached  to  the  handle  of  each 
was  a bit  of  paper  bearing  the  inscription,  ‘Beware  of 
the  Malay’s  vengeance.’  ” 

We  are  forced  to  infer  that  each  of  the  nimble  pa- 
triots carried  off  two  hundred  thousand  Mexican  dollars. 
They  must  have  been  athletes. 

Aguinaldo  claims  his  birthplace  was  in  Cavite,  and 
no  one  knows  enough  to  contradict  him.  The  first  cer- 
tainty is  that  he  was  known  as  a little  boy  in  the  pleasant 
town  adjacent  to  the  arsenal;  and  the  Review  sketch 
mentioned  as  uncertain  in  some  particulars  and  inaccu- 
rate in  others,  but  not  careless  or  reckless,  says : 

“His  friends  say  that  he  was  the  son  of  a Spanish 
general;  his  enemies  in  Manila  that  he  was  the  offspring 
of  a dissolute  but  learned  Jesuit.  At  the  age  of  four  he 


Evolution  of  Aguinaldo. 


6i 


was  a house-boy  in  the  home  of  a Jesuit  priest  in  Cavite. 
Aguinaldo's  master  was  a very  kind  man,  and  took  a 
deep  interest  in  the  welfare  of  his  protege.  He 

dressed  him  well,  so  much  so  as  to  excite  the  notice 
and  even  the  wrath  of  some  neighbors.  More  important 
still,  he  gave  the  boy  an  education,  which,  though  un- 
equal to  what  every  child  receives  in  the  United  States, 
was  a hundred-fold  better  than  what  is  bestowed  upon 
the  little-  Tagals  of  Luzon. 

‘'When  he  was  fourteen  or  fifteen  he  was  enrolled  in 
the  Medical  Department  of  the  Pontifical  University  of 
Manila,  under  Professors  Nalda  and  Buitrago.  He  was 
a bright  student,  but  nothing  is  known  of  his  college 
career.  Shortly  after  this  time  he  committed  what  is 
an  unpardonable  sin,  both  secular  and  religious,  in  the 
Philippines,  by.  joining  a Masonic  order.  Masonry  was 
a prohibited  thing  in  the  Philippines  under  Spanish  rule, 
and  any  man  joining  the  organization  might  under  an 
ancient  law  be  tortured  and  executed.  About  this  time 
(in  1898)  he  had  some  trouble  with  the  authorities,  and 
went  to  Hong  Kong,  where  there  was  a fair-sized  colony 
of  Philippine  exiles,  and  also  of  Filipinos  who  had 
crossed  the  China  Sea  in  business  enterprises.’’ 

The  claim  of  friends  of  Aguinaldo,  that  he  is  a 
Spaniard’s  son,  is  not  sustained  by  his  appearance,  which 
is  Japanese.  It  is  reported  that  he  served  in  the  Chinese 
army,  with  the  thought  of  becoming  expert  in  war,  and 
artfully  shifted  himself  to  a Chinese  warship  that  had 
European  instructors,  serving  under  the  American  hero. 
Captain  McGiffin.  This  seems  to  be  an  adornment 
thought  desirable;  but  as  Hong  Kong  was  a practical 
school  in  which  the  young  Filipino  gained  valuable 


62 


Evolution  of  Aguinaldo. 


instruction,  and  picked  up  general  knowledge  of  the 
world.  These  were  considerable  advantages.  The  story 
that  he  learned  a good  deal  of  English  during  his  jour- 
neys is  a mistake,  or  he  was  such  a strategist  he  never 
was  found  out  understanding  the  language.  His  knowl- 
edge of  tongues  is  closely  associated  with  the  accom- 
plishments of  his  interpreter.  After  his  earlier  Hong 
Kong  experience — there  were  ten  years  between  the 
first  and  last — he  is  said  to  have  been  an  office-holder  . 
in  a small  way  in  a provincial  town,  and  on  bad  terms 
with  the  Franciscan  and  Dominican  friars,  and  at  enmity 
with  the  Church  at  large  because  he  was  a Mason.  He 
was  early  and  active  as  an  insurgent  in  the  time  when 
the  most  distinguished  of  Philippine  literary  men — Dr. 
Jose  Rizal — was  persecuted  and  shot,  for,  it  is  said,  con- 
testing land  titles  in  the  province  of  Cavite.  Agui- 
naldo’s  personal  part  in  the  skirmishes,  before  he  was 
a figure  in  negotiation  with  Rivera,  in  which  the  Span- 
ish Government  and  the  Filipino  insurgents,  whp  were 
honest  and  meant  business,  were  both  basely  deceived, 
has  not  been  made  available  to  historians. 

The  record  of  the  terms  of  surrender  given  by  the 
Filipinos  engaged  in  it,  and  in  possession  of  our  War 
Department,  shows  less  than  three  hundred  guns  were 
given  up,  the  greater  number  shotguns,  and  the  whole 
outfit  worthless  for  military  purposes.  This  is  another 
indication  the  magnitude  of  the  Philippine  rising  against 
Spain  did  not  amount  to  more  than  a small,  fractional 
proportion  of  that  in  Cuba,  and  the  Cubans’  Eiterary 
Bureau  did  the  greater  part  of  the  fighting  for  a year 
before  the  American  fleet  and  army  appeared.  Still 
there  were  a dozen  Cuban  generals  who  surpassed  any 


Evolution  of  Aguinaldo.  63 

developed  in  the  Philippines,  where  Gomez  and  Maceo 
ranked  as  world  heroes. 

It  is  said  by  the  believers  in  the  fighting  capacity  of 
Aguinaldo — we  quote  from  a very  respectable  utter- 
ance— that  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain  he  showed  remarkable  fore- 
sight, and  “told  his  colleagues  and  followers  that  the 
opportunity  had  come.  He  made  contracts  with  adven- 
turers to  deliver  arms  in  the  Philippines,  and  he  displayed 
extraordinary  activity  in  personally  visiting  American 
naval  officers,  consular  representatives,  merchants,  sea-  ^ 
captains,  and  private  citizens.  The  man’s  whole  soul 
was  in  the  work,  and  he  set  an  example  which  may  be 
regarded  with  considerable  admiration.  He  also  called 
upon  the  leading  English  papers  there,  and  tried  in 
every  way  to  arouse  sympathy  for  his  people  and  his 
cause.  In  this  work  he  displayed  a patriotism  unmixed 
with  selfishness.” 

This  was  published  before  the  treaty  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain  was  signed,  and  that  Agui- 
naldo was  nearly  eight  months  absent  from  the  Philip- 
pines before  the  war,  reposing  in  possession  of  Spanish 
money  in  Hong  Kong,  the  city  in  which  he  had  spent 
some  years  of  his  youth,  and  that  was  to  him  the  most 
agreeable  place  in  the  world.  We  know  that  he  pro- 
ceeded to  Hong  Kong  with  a group  of  those  associated 
with  him  as  insurgents;  that  two-thirds  of  the  active 
negotiators  with  the  Spaniards,  arranging  the  Mexican 
money  treaty,  departed  with  the  money  to  Hong  Kong, 
one-third  remaining  in  a state  of  poverty  waiting  for 
more  Spanish  money;  that  a bitter  quarrel  sprang  up 
between  those  who  consented  to  exile  for  cash  and  those 


64 


Evolution  of  Aguinaldo. 


who  originated  the  scheme,  but  were  left  at  home  to 
confront  the  indignation  of  the  actual  enemies  of  Spain. 
We  know,  too,  that  this  treaty  was  a corrupt  affair,  not 
only  on  the  part  of  the  Filipinos,  but  of  the  Spanish 
engaged  in  it;  that  the  command  of  Aguinaldo,  of  which 
the  Spaniards  told  such  astounding  tales,  was  an  insig- 
nificant force,  not  all  told  exceeding  five  hundred  men; 
such  an  army  as  one  company  of  American  troops  put 
to  flight  in  any  possible  position  with  a rush  of  five 
minutes  and  a few  well-directed  rifle-shots;  that  the 
Spanish  officers  obtained  from  their  home  Government 
a large  sum  of  money,  and  that  the  Filipinos  who  ac- 
cepted the  cash,  as  compensation  for  pacification,  did 
not  get  half  as  much  as  the  Spanish  warriors  and  states- 
men personally  engaged  appropriated  to  their  own  use; 
and  we  do  not  know  that  after  the  hegira  to  Hong 
Kong  there  was  any  other  activity  shown  by  those  who 
accepted  deportation  from  the  country  in  which  the  civil 
war  was  going  on  as  the  equivalent  of  patriotism,  than 
calling  upon  the  American  consul  at  Hong  Kong,  Mr. 
Wildman,  infesting  his  office,  and  the  alleged  organiza- 
tion in  exile  of  a new  Republic  officered  by  the  heroes 
who  had  accepted  cash  for  their  country — or  rather  a 
bribe  in  common — with  Aguinaldo  to  hold  the  check- 
book. We  know  the  only  demonstration  of  great  pur- 
poses, was  in  making  a proposition  to  buy  guns  from 
the  United  States  for  an  unknown  destination,  and  the 
promise  by  the  Hong  Kong  Committee,  eight  hundred 
and  twenty-three  miles  away  from  Manila,  and  con- 
sisting, when  they  received  Aguinaldo  as  President, 
after  he  was  at  Singapore,  of  sixteen  men  only,  of  the 
customs  revenues  of  Manila  and  two  provinces  to  be 


AGUINALDO  AND  A GROUP  OF  HIS  CHIEFS. 
( Aguinaldo  is  the  Central  Figure.) 


ARMY  SUPPLY  TRAIN,  NEAR  BAMBAN. 


Evolution  of  Aguinaldo. 


65 


handed  over  to  the  United  States  if  this  country  would 
recognize  that  committee  as  a Philipino  Nation.  An 
opinion  widely  different  from  this  was  generally  held  by 
the  people  of  the  United  States  for  a considerable  time; 
but  now  we  have  the  proof  in  official  documents  that  the 
state  of  facts  is  exactly  that  here  related.  It  cuts  down 
the  proportions  of  the  self-sacrificing  Filipino  Junta 
men,  who  made  the  loudest  professions  of  patriotism. 
They  deceived  Consul  Wildman,  Admiral  Dewey,  and 
others  for  a short  time,  but  imposed  on  very  many  of 
the  American  people  for  a considerable  period.  Happily 
now  the  light  is  so  clear  that  no  further  harm  will  be 
done  by  the  Spanish  Oriental  eloquence  in  the  forms  of 
falsification  that  seem  to  them  diplomatic  and  dignified. 


CHAPTER  VIL 


AGUINALDO  AS  OUR  ALLY. 

The  Filipino  Exaggeration  of  Themselves — Aguinaldo 
Quoted  and  Contradicted  — American  Officers 
Stamp  Out  a Falsehood  about  our  Troops — The 
Filipino  ‘^Allies”  Falsified  and  were  “Nuisances” — 
The  Proof — Aguinaldo  was  Helping  the  Spaniards 
to  Beef — The  Siege  was  in  August,  and  He  was  our 
Enemy  in  June — The  Alleged  Ally  Convicted  of 
Treachery  on  his  own  Testimony. 

IT  was  a part  of  the  policy  of  Aguinaldo  and  “com- 
partiots”  to  give  all  possible  importance  to  the  “as- 
sistance” rendered  by  the  Filipino  army  to  the  Ameri- 
cans in  the  capture  of  the  city  of  Manila.  Their  habit 
of  exaggeration  was,  unfortunately,  supported  to  slight 
extent  at  first  by  reports  of  American  officers,  civil  and 
• military.  Consul  Williams  claimed  that  before  the 
Spanish- American  War  was  started,  there  was  a great 
deal  of  war  around  Manila,  and  referred  to  “battles”  and 
many  evidences  of  desperate  fighting.  There  was,  how- 
ever, never  a casualty  list  that  exceeded  half  a dozen 
killed  and  wounded  in  a “battle” — unless  the  Spaniards, 
as  in  one  case  stated  by  Williams,  massacred  a garden 
party  of  the  natives,  and  called  it  a “battle.”  The  siege 
of  Manila  by  Aguinaldo  was  carried  on  by  a few  groups 
of  skirmishers  in  the  "profuse  vegetation,  who  wasted 

66 


Aguinaldo  as  Our  Ally. 


67 


ammunition  in  ‘‘sniping;”  that  is,  taking  long  shots  with 
the  view  of  picking  off  an  occasional  man.  The  fact 
that  Aguinaldo  and  the  Spanish  captain-general  were 
running  in  beef  cattle  was  proven  to  the  satisfaction  of 
General  Anderson,  when  his  scouts  brought  him  six 
men,  each  provided  with  a pass  signed  by  General  Agui- 
naldo and  General  Augustin,  permitting  the  parties  to 
pass  the  military  lines  of  both  armies  with  animals  for 
slaughter.  The  Spanish  general  commanding  could 
hardly  be  condemned  for  joining  the  Tagalo  chieftain 
in  promoting  an  enterprise  to  furnish  the  Spanish  army 
of  thirteen  thousand  fresh  meat.  Beef  on  the  hoof  was 
received  with  enthusiasm  by  the  Spaniards;  but  the 
knowledge  of  the  privileges  of  drivers  of  cattle  to  the 
Manila  market  may  not  have  been  generally  diffused 
among  the  Filipinos  resting  in  the  shady  jungles.  It 
was  a proceeding,  however,  perfectly  consistent  with 
Aguinaldo's  character.  It  was  grateful  to  his  feelings 
of  hostility  toward  the  Americans,  and  it  was  money  in 
his  pocket.  In  the  letter  of  October  25,  1898,  to  the 
commandant  of  Iloilo,  written  by  Aguinaldo,  he  refers 
to  his  own  “noble  intentions”  in  writing  to  General 
Augustin,  June  9th,  as  if  the  general  had  paid  no  at- 
tention to  the  overture  to  make  common  cause  against 
the  Americans.  This  was,  however,  in  Eastern  Asia, 
and  there  the  interpretation  most  likely  to  have  been 
given  this  complaint  by  Aguinaldo  of  Augustin  was 
that  a close  intimacy  existed  between  the  Spanish  and'" 
Filipino  leaders ! The  way  to  affirm  it  was  to  needlessly 
deny  it,  and  the  mere  courtesy  of  a professional  enemy 
of  Spain,  in  addressing  a Spanish  officer,  was  to  make 
known  that  there  would  be  no  disclosure,  and  it  would 


68 


Aguinaldo  as  Our  Ally. 


be  safe  to  do  business  with  so  cautious  a man  of  honor ! 
The  Iloilo  officer  would  understand  that  as  Aguinaldo 
did  not  admit  he  had  formed  a bond  of  brotherhood 
with  the  captain-general,  it  would  not  be  dangerous  to 
establish  an  affinity  with  him.  When  General  Anderson 
appeared,  three  weeks  after  the  letter  of  intentions  that 
were  'hioble’'  and  “warnings”  that  were  “frank,”  Agui- 
naldo was  deeply  exasperated  by  Admiral  Dewey’s  re- 
fusal to  take  Manila  for  him.  This  was  precisely  what 
the  Tagalo  asked,  but  not  the  form  in  which  he  put  it. 
The  circuitous  way  of  the  chief  of  the  Tagalos  was  to 
call  on  Dewey  and  mention  to  him  that  he  was  about 
to  take  Manila  and  do  it  himself;  and  Dewey’s  way  of 
refusing  was  to  disbelieve  the  probability  that  the  native 
army  could  do  it. 

The  claim  has  been  persistently  put  forth,  insisted 
upon  with  heat  and  fury  by  many  who  have  been  promi- 
nent antagonists  in  the  United  States  of  the  Filipino 
policy  of  the  Government,  and  the  violent  language  and 
extreme  and  agonized  earnestness  of  manner  has  im- 
pressed some  fair-minded  people  to  the  effect  that  the 
army  of  Aguinaldo  powerfully  besieged  Manila,  con- 
tributed vastly  to  the  comfort  and  success  of  the  Amer- 
ican army  that  beleaguered  and  captured  the  town,  and 
that  it  was  one  of  the  most  horrible  outrages  in  history 
that  when  our  brave  “allies”  had  done  so  much,  they 
were  not  permitted  to  participate  in  the  triumph,  but 
held  back  and  driven  out  of  the  town,  which  they  as- 
sisted with  extraordinary  valor  to  place  in  our  posses- 
sion. Aguinaldo  himself  seemed  almost  insane  from 
his  treatment  in  this  association.  He  made  all- manner 
of  threats,  and  finding  they  were  unavailing,  his  plead- 


Aguinaldo  as  Our  Ally.  69 

ing  for  a place  in  the  triumph  became  pathetic,  and 
really  excited  a good  deal  of  sympathy.  He  claimed  to 
have  expended  the  blood  and  the  money  of  his  beloved 
people,  only  to  be  denied  their  rights  as  participants  in 
the  occupation  of  the  city  they  had  conquered.  It  was 
thought  at  the  time  to  be  well  for  the  American  officers 
to  say  as  many  good  things  as  they  could  of  Aguinaldo 
and  his  army,  to  praise  them  as  much  as  was  admissible; 
but  the  Filipinos  were  of  less  account  than  our  Cuban 
auxiliaries  in  the  battles  before  Santiago.  This  is  to 
be  said  for  the  Tagalos,  however,  that  they  dug  a few 
wet  ditches,  though  not  in  the  right  places,  except  to 
get  in  the  way  of  the  American  troops  who  had  to  do 
the  work.  This  situation  was  well  known  to  General 
Merritt,  and,  of  course,  to  his  chief  of  staff,  General 
Babcock,  and  they  said  all  the  kind  things  they  could, 
even  indulged  to  some  extent  in  phrases  of  flattery;  but 
there  was  a point  of  business,  the  Filipino  insurgents 
were  not  doing  anything  to  help  the  attack.  It  was 
necessary  to  put  American  troops,  capable  of  service,  on 
a line  in  advance  of  that  of  the  Aguinaldo  forces,  that 
they  might  have  ground  to  make  further  advances,  and 
there  was  persuasion  mingled  with  urgency  that  was 
vigorous,  and  a certain  finesse,  that  caused  change  to  be 
made  from  the  unreal  soldiers  Aguinaldo  was  displaying, 
and  the  real  fighters,  to  whom  the  aggressive  work  was 
necessarily  confided.  It  throws  light  upon  the  critical 
circumstances  of  this  time  to  remember  this  was  on  the 
9th  of  August,  two  months  later  than  the  date  of  Agui- 
naldo’s  letter  to  the  new  captain-general  of  Manila, 
written  to  secure  an  alliance  with  him  to  ^‘save  the  sov- 
ereignty of  Spain  in  the  islands.’’  Aguinaldo  is  the  wit- 


70  Aguinaldo  as  Our  Ally. 

ness  to  this,  for  he  speaks  of  his  letter  and  its  nature  of 
the  9th  of  June,  in  the  letter  he  wrote  to  the  command- 
ant at  Iloilo  on  the  25th  of  October  following.  In  that 
he  made  no  secret  of  the  keenness  of  his  Spanish  sym- 
pathy and  his  purposes  of  doing  the  Americans  deadly 
mischief.  General  Anderson  had  written  to  the  War 
Department  long  before  that  Aguinaldo  was  treacher- 
ous, and  had  his  confidential  aide  in  Manila,  and  the 
proof  was  furnished  by  his  scouts  that  Aguinaldo  and 
Augustin  were  partners  in  furnishing  the  Spanish  army 
besieged  with  fresh  meat.  If  he  had  got  the  plans  of 
the  advance  on  Manila  on  the  decisive  day,  it  would 
have  been  still  more  decisive.  It  is  really  pitiful  that 
he  didn’t.  True,  the  odds  would  have  been  great 
against  the  Americans;  that  is,  in  numbers,  for  from 
nine  to  ten  thousand  Boys  in  Blue,  if  they  had  found 
the  Filipinos  and  the  Spaniards  all  fighting  against  them 
would  have  been  obliged  to  destroy  them,  and  there 
were  altogether  about  twenty-seven  thousand  Spaniards 
and  Filipinos.  That  would  have  cleared  off  the  job  at 
once.  The  Filipino  question  would  have  been  settled 
then  and  there.  There  would  n’t  have  been  occasion  to 
have  pursued  Aguinaldo  to  his  lair  in  the  mountain 
jungles  of  the  province  of  Isabella,  take  him  by  the  neck, 
deliver  him  to  a warboat  of  ours,  and  force  him  to  oc- 
cupy apartments  in  the  palace  that  he  demanded  General 
Merritt  should  give  up  to  him  as  the  great  and  only 
President,  Captain-General  and  Tycoon,  Sovereign 
Lord  of  the  Archipelago. 

It  is  familiar  that  Aguinaldo  claimed  to  have  been 
fighting  terribly  during  the  siege  of  Manila,  shedding 
much  blood  and  cutting  a great  swath  in  the  high  grass 


Aguinaldo  as  Our  Ai.ly.  71 

and  deep  mud  where  the  operations  were  carried  on; 
but  he  confined  himself  to  glittering  generalities,  as  a 
rule,  just  as  when  he  described  the  tremendous  military 
achievements  with  which  he  corralled  the  Spanish  garri- 
sons in  the  province  of  Cavite,  though  there  was  not  a 
gun  fired  in  a fight.  He  ventured  in  one  case  upon  a 
specification  of  that  which  he  did  during  the  siege  of 
Manila  in  aid  of  Americans,  and  we  have  the  whole  truth 
about  that.  He  told  a terrible  story.  We  presume  the 
authenticity  of  it  will  not  be  denied,  for  it  appeared  in 
the  Springfield  Republican,  of  Massachusetts,  and  was 
referred  to  on  the  floor  of  the  United  States  Senate  as 
an  authentic  production  of  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  y 
Eamy,  the  Tagalog  insurgent  leader,  entitled  ‘‘True  Ver- 
sion of  the  Philippine  Revolution,”  and  in  it  the  follow- 
ing statement  occurs: 

“Ten  days  after  the  Americans  occupied  the  trenches 
at  Maytubig  (this  move  being  well  known  by  the  Span- 
iards, who  were  intrenched  at  the  Magazine  in  San 
Antonio  Abad)  their  outposts,  composed  of  a few  men 
only,  were  surprised  by  the  Spaniards,  who  made  a night 
attack  on  them.  They  had  barely  time  to  get  out  of 
their  beds  and  fall  back  on  the  center,  abandoning  their 
rifles  and  six  field  guns  in  their  precipitate  retreat. 

“The  firing  being  distinctly  heard,  our  troops  im- 
mediately rushed  to  the  assistance  of  our  friends  and 
allies,  repulsing  the  Spaniards  and  recapturing  the  rifles 
and  field-guns,  which  I ordered  to  be  returned  to  the 
Americans  as  a token  of  our  good  will  and  friendship. 

“General  Noriel  was  opposed  to  this  restitution, 
alleging  that  the  arms  did  not  belong  to  the  Americans 
since  the  Filipino  troops  captured  them  from  the  Span- 


72 


Aguinaldo  as  Our  Ally. 


iards.  But  I paid  no  attention  to  the  reasonable  oppo- 
sition of  my  general,  and  gave  imperative  instructions 
that  they  be  returned  to  the  Americans,  showing  thereby 
clearly  and  positively  the  good  will  of  the  Filipinos.  The 
said  rifles  and  field-guns,  with  a large  quantity  of  ammu- 
nition, were  therefore  restored  to  those  who  were  then 
our  allies,  notwithstanding  the  fact  of  General  Noriel’s 
brigade  capturing  them  at  a cost  of  many  lives  of  our 
compatriots.” 

This  is  a sample  fabrication  that  had  large  circula- 
tion, and  was  very  much  believed  by  those  who  wanted 
to  be  assured  that  the  Americans  when  desperately 
pressed  were  wonderfully  relieved  by  the  Aguinaldo  be- 
siegers. If  this  had  happened  it  would  have  been  very 
strong  evidence  that  the  Filipinos  were  fighting  side  by 
side  with  the  troops  of  the  United  States  against  Spain, 
something  they  never  did  in  one  instance,  and  that 
they  were  under  competent  and  honorable  leadership. 
The  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Root,  addressed  a letter, 
dated  February  i6,  1900,  to  General  Francis  V.  Green, 
who  commanded  the  Second  Brigade,  Second  Division, 
Eighth  Army  Corps,  in  the  attack  upon  Manila.  The 
Secretary  said : 

‘‘The  soldiers  of  the  American  army,  to  which  the 
statement  refers,  must  necessarily  have  been  in  your 
brigade.  In  none  of  the  very  full  official  reports  of  the 
military  operations  of  the  period  referred  to  do  I find 
any  reference  to  such  an  occurrence.  Will  you  be  good 
enough  to  inform  me  whether  any  such  thing  happened, 
and,  if  so,  under  whose  immediate  command?” 

General  Green  replied,  May  29th,  transmitting  state- 
ments from  the  following  officers : Irving  Hale,  formerly 


73 


Aguinaldo  as  Our  Ally. 


colonel  First  Colorado  Infantry;  C.  M.  Moses,  formei'ly 
lieutenant-colonel  First  Colorado  Infantry;  Charles  H. 
Anderson,  formerly  major  First  Colorado  Infantry;  John 
P.  Bratt,  formerly  colonel  First  Nebraska  Infantry;  Vic- 
tor D.  Duboce,  formerly  colonel  First  California  In- 
fantry; James  E.  Barnett,  formerly  lieutenant-colonel 
Tenth  Pennsylvania  Infantry;  F.  A.  Grant,  formerly 
major  commanding  the  Utah  Eight  batteries. 

These  officers  and  gentlemen  were  personally  cog- 
nizant of  the  facts  m the  affair  to  which  the  imaginative 
Aguinaldo  assumed  he  was  referring  when  he  made  .the 
statement  that  was,  as  we  shall  see,  conclusively  contra- 
dicted. The  letters  from  the  officers  were,  at  the  request 
of  General  Green,  placed  in  the  files  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment. General  Thomas  Anderson  says  of  the  story  of 
the  night  attack  by  the  Spaniards  on  the  American  lines 
before  Manila,  driving  back  our  men,  taking  six  pieces 
of  artillery,  that  he  believes  “it  has  no  foundation  in 
fact  whatever.’’  The  general  adds: 

“I  was  in  command  of  the  division  of  troops.  I was 
on  the  ground  every  day;  never  heard  of  it.  General 
Green’s  brigade  was  in  the  trenches,  and  he  never  re- 
ported it  to  me.  The  Filipino  general,  Noriel,  who  was 
reported  to  have  recovered  the  guns  and  driven  back 
the  Spaniards,  never  made  any  such  statement  to  me, 
though  I knew  him  well  and  saw  him  frequently.  I am 
confident,  therefore,  that  there  is  no  foundation  what- 
ever for  this  extraordinary  statement.” 

The  trained  military  precision,  reserve,  and  dignity 
of  this  statement  by  General  Anderson  are  as  character- 
istic as  they  are  admirable. 

General  Irving  Hale,  writing  from  Denver,  Colo- 


74 


Aguinaldo  as  Our  Ally. 


rado,  February  28,  1900,  has  to  say  of  the  Aguinaldo 
story:  ‘‘I  have  the  honor  to  state  that  the  story  is  not 
only  false,  but  that  there  was  no  shadow  of  a foundation 
which  served  as  an  excuse  for  such  a fabrication.''  He 
adds  that  the  Spanish  did  make  several  attacks,  ^‘but 
these  were  all  repulsed.  The  Americans  neither  aban- 
doned any  rifles  and  field-pieces,  nor  retreated  nor  evac- 
uated any  portion  of  their  trenches."  There  was  no 
chance,  therefore,  for  the  Filipinos  to  assist  the  Ameri- 
cans in  regaining  positions.  General  Hale  continues  to 
give  this  certificate  of  the  character  and  the  services  of 
the  Aguinaldo  army,  and  incidentally  throws  light  upon 
the  personality  of  Aguinaldo  himself,  giving  valuable 
information  in  these  words: 

^^Consequently  the  Filipinos  could  not  and  did  not 
recapture  nor  assist  in  recapturing  any  American  po- 
sitions or  ordnance.  On  the  contrary,  their  presence  in 
this  vicinity  was  more  of  a nuisance  than  otherwise,  as 
they  interfered  with  our  operations  and  frequently  drew 
the  Spanish  fire,  to  the  great  annoyance  of  our  troops 
in  the  trenches,  in  reserve,  and  marching  to  and  from 
the  trenches." 

Colonel  Cassius  M.  Moses,  of  the  First  Colorado  In- 
fantry, says  of  the  Aguinaldo  story  of  assisting  Ameri- 
cans before  Manila,  'Tt  is  simply  the  product  of  a 
diseased  brain,"  and  adds: 

^‘The  Spaniards  made  several  quite  determined  at- 
tacks on  the  American  lines,  but  were  repulsed  at  every 
point.  At  no  time  did  an  American  soldier  quit  his 
position  or  lose  a rifle  or  field-piece.  The  so-called 
Filipino  army  was  of  no  assistance  to  the  American 


Aguinaldo  as  Our  Ally. 


75 


forces,  but  on  the  other  hand  were  a nuisance.  These 
facts  are  so  well  known  to  every  officer  and  enlisted  man 
who  served  on  the  island  of  Luzon  during  the  Spanish- 
American  War,  that  Aguinaldo’s  statement  is  simply 
absurd.” 

Colonel  Victor  D.  Duboce,  of  the  Lirst  California 
Infantry,  says : 

"‘On  the  night  of  July  31st  and  August  1st,  during 
the  heavy  firing,  the  insurgents  deserted  their  interior 
line  of  trenches,  while  the  Americans  held  the  advance 
trenches. 

“I  speak  positively  in  reference  to  this  particular  en- 
gagement, for  the  reason  that  I was  in  command  of  the 
first  and  second  battalions  of  the  First  California  Volun- 
teers, with  headquarters  at  the  crossroads — the  Calle 
Real  and  the  Pasie  road — and  I can  call  to  your  mind 
the  fact  that  a little  after  one  o’clock  on  the  morning  of 
August  1st  I sent  one  company  (Company  H,  First 
California)  to  Pasie  upon  receiving  word  that  General 
Noriel’s  troops  had  deserted  their  trenches  on  the  right.” 

This  Noriel  is  the  illustrious  patriot  who  pretended 
to  have  protected  the  Americans  and  saved  their  guns 
for  them. 

Colonel  John  Bratt,  of  the  First  Nebraska  Volun- 
teers, makes  like  denial  with  the  other  officers,  and  pro- 
ceeds with  this  further  testimony: 

“After  our  troops  intrenched  and  occupied  the  po- 
sition in  front  of  Fort  San  Antonio  Abad  I do  not 
remember  of  ever  seeing  an  armed  body  of  insurgents 
in  the  vicinity,  and  I am  certain  they  were  never  con- 
sidered an  ally  or  relied  upon  for  any  purpose.” 


76 


Aguinaldo  as  Our  Ally. 


Lieutenant-Colonel  John  E.  Barnett,  of  the  Tenth 
Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  writes: 

“The  Utah  Battery  did  not  lose  a gun,  but  fired  them 
skillfully  and  effectively  until  the  fight  was  over.  The 
Tenth  staid  with  them. 

“In  passing  it  might  be  remarked  that  none  of  the 
Filipinos  were  to  be  seen  anywhere  around,  and  that  the 
only  beds  our  men  had  to  be  awakened  from  were  mud 
and  water.” 

In  a letter  written  In  New  York,  February  19,  1900, 
General  PVank  Greene  says: 

“Statements  made  by  Aguinaldo  are  absolutely  with- 
out foundation;  each  and  every  one  of  them  is  untrue; 
the  United  States  troops  did  not  fall  back;  did  not 
abandon  a single  rifle  or  a single  field-gun;  did  not 
make  a precipitate  retreat;  the  Filipinos  did  not  rush 
to  our  assistance;  did  not  recapture  the  rifles  and  field- 
guns,  and  did  not  return  them  to  the  Americans.  The 
Filipinos  took  no  part  in  the  engagements  between  the 
Spaniards  and  American  troops.  Every  single  state- 
ment in  the  extract  quoted  in  your  letter  Is  false.” 

The  Secretary  of  War  performed  an  important  public 
service  in  calling  the  witnesses  to  prove  the  untruth 
of  a statement  by  Aguinaldo  that  found  its  way  to  the 
United  States  Senate,  where  it  was  applauded  by  the 
friends  of  the  insurgents.  The  proof  was  furnished  that 
the  Filipino  “allies”  before  Manila  were  not  a help  to 
our  troops,  did  not  do  a thing  they  said  they  did,  ran 
when  there  was  a fight,  were  wholly  untrustworthy,  and 
were  “nuisances.” 


CHAPTER  VIIL 


THE  EIEEDS  OF  FUNSTON’S  GLORY. 

The  Way  he  Won  his  Star — Deception,  of  the  Enemy 
as  to  American  Soldiers — The  First  of  the  Fight- 
ing— Fame  of  the  Twentieth  Kansas — Bloody  Road 
to  Mololos  and  Beyond — Luzon  as  a*  Hiding- 
place — Consul  Wildman’s  Hard  Fate^ — Battlefield 
Telegrams,  Official  Reports  by  and  about  Fun- 
stou — His  Prodigies  of  Valor — Lawton  Wanted 
Him — At  the  First  of  the  Fighting  the  American 
Soldiers  ran  at  Full  Speed  to  get  into  the  Fight — 
The  Sick  Fled  from  their  Beds  to  Avenge  Insults — 
The  Battle  Feats  of  the  Brave. 

HERE  was  an  Athenian  who  grew  weary  of  hearing 


1 Aristides  called  ‘hhe  Just,”  was  opposed  to  him, 
and  would  n’t  vote  for  him.  This  impatience  may  or 
may  not  have  disturbed  the  estimable  ancient,  who  was 
antagonized  for  his  virtue.  His  experience  has  been 
witnessed  in  other  countries  than  Greece,  and  in  these 
days  is  not  unknown  in  public  criticism  of  those  en- 
gaged in  the  business  of  war. 

It  is  not  forgotten,  and  should  always  be  in  mind, 
that  when  Aguinaldo  was  “in  the  zenith  of  his  power,” 
as  General  Otis  said  in  reporting  that  which  immediately 
preceded  the  insurgent  assault  upon  the  American  army 
at  Manila,  the  natives  had  confidence  that  the  armed 
men  they  had  gathered  and  arrayed  around  the  lines  of 
the  American  garrison  of  Manila — that  was  the  true 


77 


78 


The  Fields  of  Funston’s  Glory. 


situation — became  entirely  of  the  judgment  they  could 
safely  believe  in  their  numbers,  and  accepted  fully  the 
conviction  that  when  the  combat  they  had  so  long  pro- 
voked and  insisted  upon  should  come,  with  “clash  of 
arms,’'  the  thoroughness  of  their  success  might  be  taken 
for  granted;  and  they  were  light-hearted  when  the  battle 
began. 

They  certainly  might  have  been  persuaded  by  the 
'destruction  of  the  Spanish  fleet  off  Cavite  and  the  storm- 
ing of  Manila,  that  the  Americans  were  formidable  fight- 
ing men,  but  they  were  not  impressed  with  danger  to 
themselves  by  the  defeats  of  the  Spaniards.  They  de- 
ceived themselves  during  their  constant  exercise  in 
jeering  at  American  soldiers — regulars  and  volunteers — 
insulting  them  with  word  and  gesture,  pointing  guns 
at  our  sentinels  as  they  walked  their  rounds,  howling 
and  screeching  at  them,  working  themselves  into  the 
belief  that  the  “North  Americans”  were  tame  people, 
not  fierce,  but  timid,  and  that  they  could  be  “run  into 
the  sea.”  There  is  a pomp  and  assurance  in  the  Filipino 
letters  and  orders  of  that  time,  making  clear  the  re- 
markable inaccuracy  of  their  diagnosis  of  the  situation, 
a strange  undervaluation  of  those  they  were  forcing  into 
the  tremendous  trials  of  war. 

The  fighting  had  not  been  going  on  an  hour  when 
the  Filipino  troops  Spain  had  trained  as  soldiers,  and  es- 
teemed a.s  good  military  material  when  well  officered, 
believed  to  be  veterans  and  invincible,  discovered  that 
they  had  aroused  enemies  of  an  extraordinary  sort, 
whose  methods  were  unexampled  in  Spanish  warfare, 
and  a complete  surprise.  The  proceedings  of  the  North 
Americans  were  phenomenal,  and  caused  indignant  com- 


The  P^ields  of  Funston^s  Glory.  79 

plaints  that  they  were  not  according  to  usage  or  fair. 
It  was  the  P'ilipino  experience  immediately  that  the 
North  Americans  did  not,  like  the  Spanish  Peninsulars, 
stand  off  and  fire  at  long  range  a while,  raising  smoke 
and  hearing  the  music  of  flying  bullets,  and  whether  any 
one  was  hit  or  not,  calling  it  a battle.  The  American 
soldiers  ran  right  into  the  elaborated,  alleged  impreg- 
nable lines  of  circumvalation,  and  rushed  upon  the  de- 
fenders of  the  scientific  trenches,  carrying  the  barriers 
and  crushing  all  who  sought  to  withstand  the  inconceiv- 
able shock  of  encountering  what  appeared  to  the  im- 
aginative natives  infuriated  demons. 

There  was  an  additional  astounding  spectacle.  The 
stragglers,  so  to  speak,  who  ought  to  be  in  the  rear  of 
the  American  army,  did  not  drift  to  the  rear,  but  the 
other  way.  Nobody  went  back,  but  there  was  a pro- 
cession of  extraordinary  nature  going  at  high  speed 
to  the  front,  with  an  enthusiastic  recklessness  that  was 
incomprehensible  to  all  but  the  Americans  themselves. 
The  hospitals  were  deserted;  the  sick  got  upon  their 
feet,  snatched  guns,  and  ran  for  the  enemy.  Everybody 
about  the  various  headquarters,  who  could  be  spared, 
set  out  in  the  same  way,  at  full  speed.  They  never 
minded  the  weather  or  the  way  the  wind  blew.  All  who 
could  get  out  of  the  hospitals,  or  away  from  attendance 
on  the  camps,  were  making  haste  following  the  supreme 
direction  of  war  to  ''go  where  the  guns  are  at  play.’' 
The  Tagalo  boasters  had  to  flee  headlong  to  get  out  of 
the  road,  for  their  firing  had  no  influence  upon  the 
fellows  who  were  getting  "forwarder”  at  every  jump, 
and  when  the  Filipinos  undertook  to  stand  in  the  way 
they  were  mowed  down  by  a fire  incredibly  fatal,  run 


8o 


The  Fields  of  Funston’s  Glory. 


over,  trampled,  crushed,  by  the  irrepressible  charges  of 
inferior  numbers.  The  labored  entrenchments  were 
utterly  useless.  Even  the  thorny  thickets  were  not  an 
impediment.  The  Americans  were  simply  going  at  full 
speed  to  join  the  dance  to  the  music  of  the  rifles,  fero- 
cious to  be  even  with  those  they  had  been  restrained 
from  attacking  by  superior  orders  during  the  weeks 
Avhen  all  under  the  American  flag  suffered  and  were  dis- 
consolate, hoping  every  day  the  hour  would  come  that 
they  could  pay  their  debts  of  honor  on  the  field  of 
glory.  The  time  had  come,  and  the  debt  was  paid  with 
all  accumulated  interest. 

This  was  the  beginning  of  the  American-Filipino 
War — an  instantaneous  development  of  a type  of  Amer- 
ican soldiers  who  made  victory  certain  in  every  combat, 
no  matter  what  the  odds  in  numbers  or  the  advantage 
in  position.  Frederick  Funston,  of  Kansas,  a Con- 
gressman’s son,  was  of  this  sort,  and  had  a high  reputa- 
tion in  the  far  West  as  a fighting  boy,  who  never  dodged 
an  enemy,  always  was  ready  to  tackle  a ruffian,  no  matter 
what  his  size  or  how  he  was  armed,  and  took  to  war 
with  an  inherent  inspiration,  to  do  what  the  boys  gener- 
ally did  at  Manila — “went  for’  the, enemy  wherever  he 
stood  or  fled,  no  matter  what  he  was  like,  “got  him,” 
and  “staid  with  him”  until  he  ceased  to  trouble  and 
could  do  so  no  more.  It  was  not  long  in  the  army, 
in  the  midst  of  heroes,  until  young  Funston,  the  “fighter 
from  away  back” — though  there  was  n’t  much  time  to 
count,  for  he  had  n’t  been  in  the  world  more  than  thirty 
years — was  celebrated  for  prodigies  of  valor,  for  always 
going  ahead  to  see  what  was  the  matter,  developing  a 
tact  and  ingenuity  in  the  discovery  of  desperate  chances. 


The  Fields  of  P'unston’s  Glory.  8i 

that  he  took  with  enjoyment,  and  carrying  all  before 
him,  until  the  army  and  the  country  heard  of  him. 
Where  all  were  brave,  he  was,  by  common  consent  and 
with  universal  applause,  awarded  the  surpassing  honor 
of  being  “the  bravest  of  the  brave.”  This  much  had 
been  said  and  settled  before  the  lull  in  the  war  caused 
by  the  flight  of  Aguinaldo  into  the  jungles  of  the  moun- 
tains and  the  dispersion  of  his  forces.  There  were  in- 
stances here  and  there  of  offering  the  same  objection 
to  Funston  the  Hero,  that  the  cynical  Greek  made  for 
Aristides  the  Just.  The  histories  of  the  perils  and 
triumphs,  the  brave  deeds  and  thrilling  enterprise  of  one 
man,  seem  to  some,  who  speedily  exhaust  their  enthu- 
siasm about  everything,  and  content  only  with  the_com- 
monplace.  It  was  here  and  there  that  Funston’s 
achievements  and  brilliancy  became  monotonous  to  the 
tedious.  The  idea  was  that  perhaps  Funston  carried 
a charm,  knew  that  the  Filipino  bullets  could  iiT  hurt 
him — that  his  feats  were  of  magic.  What  did  Funston 
do  then  but  go  and  get  wounded?  Even  that  did  n’t 
keep  him  long  'from  the  fighting-ground,  but  a few 
days;  but  public  interest  began  to  shift  to  civil  rights, 
the  judiciary,  and  the  school  question.  The  Taft  Com- 
mission was  carrying  on  its  work  of  pacification  with 
statesmanship.  This  was  of  good  promise.  But  there 
was  one  thing  not  done  in  the  Philippines  by  the  glori- 
ous American  army.  Frederick  Funston  brooded  on  it, 
and  was  not  satisfied  that  Aguinaldo  was  missing.  It 
was  Bennett  who  said  to  Stanley,  “Go  and  find  Living- 
stone,” and  he  did.  No  one  told  Funston  to  go  and  find 
Aguinaldo.  The  Kansas  boy  got  the  idea  out  of  his  own 
head.  General  MacArthur  approved,  and  it  was  done. 

6 


^2  The  Tields  of  Funston^s  Glory. 

The  island  of  Luzon  is  larger  than  the  State  of  Ohio. 
It  contains  masses  of  mountains,  enormous  jungles, 
many  rivers,  vast  thickets,  and  an  enormous  growth  of 
grasses,  full  of  hiding-places,  where  even  the  anaconda 
gorges  and  sleeps  in  peace  save  for  monkeys.  There  is 
hardly  such  a place  for  sinister  secrets  and  ambuscades 
in  the  whole  world.  Aguinaldo  became  a mystery,  more 
mysterious  in  his  disappearance  than  when  he  was  in  evi- 
dence. It  was  the  opinion  of  that  accomplished  observer 
and  exceedingly  well  informed  man.  Consul  Wildman, 
of  Hong  Kong,  that  Aguinaldo  was  dead.  He  made 
that  announcement  in  an  interview  at  Honolulu,  the  last 
stopping-place  on  his  fatal  voyage  homeward,  after  dis- 
tinguished and  honorable  service  abroad,  doomed  to 
terminate  in  death  when  he  touched  the  shores  of  his 
own  country,  where  there  were  many  waiting  deeply 
interested  in  the  knowledge  he  had  accumulated,  ready 
to  concede  to  him  the  authority  of  uncommon  intelli- 
gence in  the  enlightenment  of  the  American  people  by 
the  relation  of  his  experiences,  so  far  as  might  be  com- 
patible with  the  restraints  imposed  by  official  obligation. 
The  exceptional  story  of  unusual  personal  knowledge 
has  been  lost,  and  the  loss  is  a lamentable  one.  In  his 
Honolulu  interview  he  held  the  opinion  Aguinaldo  was 
not  living,  that  some  one  was  professing  to  be  the 
departed  chief  who  was  not  he,  and  was  running  his  dic- 
tatorship machinery.  Funston  found  out  the  Tagalo 
Dictator  still  lived.  There  was  another  chance  for  Fun- 
ston.  He  grasped  it,  and  Aguinaldo  is  his  captive.  The 
capture  is  a story  that  will  live  in  the  songs  of  the 
people.  The  captivity  is  a chapter  of  history  that  will 
live  for  a thousand  years,  and  be  immemorial  like  a fable 
or  a proverb. 


The  Fields  of  Funston’s  Glory. 


83 


Thfe  military  reputation  of  Brigadier-General  Fun- 
ston  was  first  made  distinguished  by  his  activity  and 
intelligence,  bravery  and  efficiency  in  the  operations 
approaching  and  occupying  Mololos,  the  ‘‘My  Capital” 
of  Aguinaldo  when  he  left  Bacoor,  in  order  to  organize 
for  war  against  the  United  States,  without  being  in  the 
presence  every  day  of  American  officers.  The  then 
Colonel  Funston,  of  the  Twentieth  Kansas,  was  of  the 
brigade  of  Brigadier-General  Harrison  Gray  Otis.  The 
battle  of  Caloocan  was  fought,  in  the  language  oFH.  G. 
Otis,  “February  10  to  March  24,  1899,  inclusive.”  The 
famous  Brigade  was  composed  of  the  Third  Artillery 
acting  as  infantry,  the  Twentieth  Kansas  (Funston’s 
regiment),  and  six  companies  of  the  Tenth  Pennsyl- 
vania, from  West  Pennsylvania.  There  was  a brigade 
front  of  two  and  one-half  miles,  and  in  the  forty  days 
under  fire  a loss  in  killed  and  wounded  of  forty-nine 
officers  and  men.  Funston’s  regiment  was  near  the 
bay,  and  that  was  the  hottest  place  on  the  fire-lines  of 
the  seat  of  war.  That  was  for  some  reason  nearly  always 
the  sort  of  place  Funston  with  the  Twentieth  Kansas 
either  found  or  made.  The  fire  of  the  Kansas  sharp- 
shooters was  very  deadly  to  the  enemy.  Otis  says,  in 
passing,  of  a contribution  of  the  navy: 

“An  escaped  Spanish  prisoner  reported  to  me  that  a 
shell  fired  by  the  navy  against  the  Filipino  intrench- 
ments  near  Malabon  exploded,  killing  and  wounding 
between  forty  and  fifty  rebel  soldiers.” 

The  forty  days’  fighting  was  followed  by  the  move- 
ment against  Mololos.  The  men  were  required  to  carry 
not  less  than  one  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition,  but 
the  majority  preferred  to  carry  two  hundred  rounds. 


84  The^^Fields  of  Funston’s  Glory. 

The  Twentieth  Kansas,  led  by  Funston,  ^^under  a severe 
fire  crossed  the  Tuliahan  River,  the  men  wading  and 
swimming  the  stream  at  points  where  the  water  was 
neck  deep  and  even  deeper,”  crossed  the  river,  and 
crossing  rivers  was  one  of  Funston’s  fine  points,  and 
this  was  done  in  this  case  in  “face  of  a strongly  occu- 
pied blockhouse  on  the  north  bank,”  and  the  Twentieth 
suffered  considerable  losses  in  its  determined  onset,  but 
inflicted  severe  punishment  on  the  enemy,  driving  his 
picked  troops  from  the  blockhouse  after  killing  many 
of  them  on  the  bank  of  the  river.” 

Company  H,  of  the  Kansas  Twentieth,  “encoun- 
tered a sudden  and  severe  fire  from  the  enemy’s  in- 
trenchments  on  the  north  bank;  the  men  of  the  first 
line,  with  some  men  from  other  regiments,  rushed  gal- 
lantly down  the  steep  bank  into  the  unknown  stream, 
wading  or  swimming  it  under  a telling  fire,  which  re- 
sulted in  eight  casualties  in  the  Kansas  company  alone. 
The  rush  of  our  soldiers  was  so  sudden  and  impetuous 
that  the  enemy  was  unable  to  escape.” 

At  this  spot,  “out  of  the  whole  number  of  Filipinos 
engaged,  twenty-six  were  killed  outright,  two  mortally 
and  one  slightly  wounded,  and  one  appears  to  have  got- 
ten away.” 

Further  along  Funston  struck  another  river — rivers 
are  abundant  in  Luzon,  and  the  rebels  always  intrenched 
beyond  them.  This  river  was  the  Micalo.  Of  course 
the  Kansas  boys  crossed  under  fire.  The  next  river  a 
little  further  along.  Here  the  rebels  were  commanded 
by  their  best  military  leader.  Pilar,  and  the  Twentieth 
Kansas  lost  twenty-nine  men,  killed  and  wounded.  Two 
miles  south  of  Mololos,  the  Twentieth  “were  ordered 


The  Fields  of  Funston’s  Glory.  85 

forward  on  the  double  quick.”  That  settled  it.  Mololos 
was  ours ! The  sign  was,  “Smoke  and  flame  burst  from 
Aguinaldo’s  palace  on  the  public  square.” 

“In  the  Mololos  campaign  the  Brigade  in  which 
Funston  served  lost  one  hundred  and  thirty-six  in  killed 
and  wounded.  The  casualty  list  was  two  hundred  and 
eighty-five  during  the  service  up  to  that  time,  more  than 
ten  per  cent  of  effectives.  Funston  was  recommended 
on  “the  merits”  for  “such  special  mark  of  distinction” 
as  might  please  the  Commanding  General  and  the  War 
Department.  The  capture  of  Mololos  is  thus  reported 
by  General  H.  G.  Otis: 

“Colonel  Funston,  with  a small  detachment  of  the 
Twentieth  Kansas,  had  entered  about  9.30  A.  M.  at  a 
point  nearer  the  railway  line,  which  had  been  his  right 
guide  during  the  advance.  He  reported  to  me  on  the 
Public  Square  at  about  ten  A.  M. 

“‘Shortly  afterwards  the  First  Brigade  flag,  sur- 
mounted by  the  national  colors,  were  flying  from  an  im- 
provised staff  erected  in  front  of  the  burning  head- 
quarters building  of  a departed  rebel  government.” 

Here  is  a telegram  that  shines: 

“[Telegram.] 

“Bagbag  Bridge,  April  28,  1899. 

“Major-General  Lawton, — Many  thanks,  dear  Law- 
ton,  for  your  cordial  greetings,  which  are  hardly  justi- 
fied by  the  actual  facts.  By  the  splendid  daring  of 
Funston,  under  the  skillful  control  of  General  Wheaton, 
we  made  quite  a remarkable  passage  to  the  Rio  Grande 
yesterday  with  very  small  loss,  but  which  in  connection 


S6 


The  Tields  of  Tunston^s  Glory. 


'with  two  previous  days’  work,  in  which  they  lost  very 
heavily,  so  impressed  the  insurgents  that  General  Luna 
to-day  sent  his  chief  of  staff  with  the  information  that 
the  Filipino  Government  had  ordered  a suspension  of 
hostilities  and  wished  to  negotiate  for  peace.  Luna’s 
officers  are  now  in  Manila,  but  what  has  transpired  since 
their  departure  from  here  I do  not  know. 

“MacARTHUR.” 

The  four  business  telegrams  that  follow  tell  a splen- 
did story  incomparably : 

‘‘Hdqrs.  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps, 
“In  the  Field,  Baliuag,  May  ii,  1899. 

“Assistant  Adjutant-General,  Palace, — I desire  to 
call  attention  to  the  fact  that  I have  no  officers  of  rank 
except  Colonel  Summers.  Would  like  active  and  ener- 
getic officer  if  available;  otherwise  prefer  no  change. 

“LAWTON,  Major-General  Volunteers.” 

“Malacanan,  May  ii,  1899. 

“General  Lawton, — Would  you  like  General  Fun- 
ston  assigned  to  your  command?  He  is  available. 

“BARRY.” 

“Hdqrs.  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps. 

“In  the  Field,  Baliuag,  May  12,  1899. 

Adjutant-General  Department  Pacific, — The  assign- 
ment of  General  Funston  will  please  me  very  much. 

' “LAWTON,  Major-General  Volunteers.” 


The  Fields  of  Funston's  Glory.  87 

“Manila,  May  12,  1899. 

“General  Lawton, — General  Funston  very  desirous 
to  go,  but  doctor  forbids,  as  his  wound  is  still  trouble- 
some and  might  become  serious  on  exposure  in  the  field. 

“BARRY.” 

Historical  work  in  our  day  is  helped  in  a degree 
hardly  realized  by  the  public,  through  the  telegrams 
that  fly  about  battlefields,  between  the  various  detach- 
ments and  wide  wings  of  armies,  and  the  commanding 
generals  and  admirals  and  the  executives  of  the  depart- 
ments of  their  respective  Governments.  The  Lawton 
and  Barry — the  latter  the  adjutant  of  the  commander- 
in-chief — telegrams  are  an  example  that  is  an  object- 
lesson.  MacArthur’s  telegram  to  Lawton,  framing  the 
golden  words,  “the  splendid  daring  of  Funston,”  is 
worth  more  than  all  the  formalities  of  studied  official 
compliment.  Telegrams  send  forth  flashes  of  fact  with 
the  magnetic  sparkle  of  electricity  itself,  instinct  with 
action,  and  there  is  no  higher  authority  than  the  words 
the  wires  bear  from  the  stricken  fields  farther  than  the 
echoes  of  the  thunder’s  roll. 

The  wounding  of  Colonel  Funston  was  in  the  ad- 
vance from  the  vicinity  of  Calumpit  by  General 
Wheaton.  Five  miles  from  Calumpit  the  enemy  were 
found  “intrenched  upon  the  north  bank  of  a consider- 
able river,  deep  and  unfordable,  and  the  bridge  broken 
down,”  the  usual  thing;  and  the  Twentieth  Kansas  “be- 
came engaged  with  a large  force  of  the  enemy  occupying 
two  lines  of  intrenchments.”  They  were  carried,  and 
Wheaton  says,  “Colonel  Funston,  Twentieth  Kansas, 
was  wounded  at  this  time,” 


88 


The  Fields  of  Funston’s  Glory. 


Colonel  Funstoii  reported  the  operations  of  his  regi- 
ment from  April  24,  1899,  northward,  until  May  4th—- 
also  the  date  of  the  report — when  he  says,  ‘T  gave  up 
command  of  the  regiment,  being  wounded.’’  When  the 
advance  was  made  he  had  eight  hundred  and  seventy 
men.  One  of  the  combats  in  which  his  name  flamed 
forth,  was  the  passage  of  the  Bagbag  River.  His  official 
account  of  it  is : 

‘T  had  advanced  with  Company  K,  and  saw  that  the 
farther  span  of  the  railway  bridge  had  been  let  down  to 
the  water,  a distance  of  about  twelve  feet.  After  a furi- 
ous fight  of  about  ten  minutes  the  enemy’s  fire  began 
to  slacken,  and  some  of  them  were  seen  to  be  running. 
Second  Lieutenant  Collin  H.  Ball,  with  a small  detach- 
ment from  Company  E,  had  just  reported  from  a short 
exploring  tour  along  the  river  bank,  and  when  I called 
for  volunteers  to  join  me  in  a rush  on  the  bridge,  these 
men,  with  Sergeant-Major  (now  Second  Lieutenant) 
Cassius  M.  Warner,  Acting  Chief  Trumpeter  Sergeant 
C.  P.  Barshfield,  and  First  Sergeant  Raymond  S.  En- 
ston  of  Company  K,  responded.  We  found  all  the  ties 
and  rails  gone  from  the  bridge,  with  nothing  remaining 
to  walk  on  except  a few  steel  stringers  about  four  inches 
wide.  Company  K covered  us  well  with  their  fire  while 
we  were  working  our  way  slowly  along  the  dismantled 
bridge.  The  enemy  fired  some  shots  at  us  until  we  were 
half-way  across.  Reaching  the  broken-out  span.  Lieu- 
tenant Ball,  Sergeants  Enston  and  Barshfield,  Corporal 
A.  M.  Ferguson,  of  Company  E,  and  myself  descended 
to  the  river  on  the  ironwork  of  the  bridge,  and  swam 
the  remaining  distance  to  the  bank.  The  few  of  the 
enemy  who  had  remained  fled  as  soon  as  we  had  reached 


The  Fields  of  Funston’s  Glory.  89 

the  bank  within  a few  yards  of  their  trenches.  The  first 
one  of  our  party  to  reach  the  opposite  bank  was  Lieu- 
tenant Ball.  I wish  to  call  special  attention  to  the  signal 
gallantry  of  this  officer,  as  well  as  of  the  above-named 
enlisted  men,  who  volunteered  for  this  extra  hazardous 
piece  of  work  and  carried  it  through  to  a successful 
conclusion.” 

Elaborate  trenches  'were  found  deserted,  and  two 
miles  farther  on  was  another  river,  Rio  Grande  Pam- 
panga,  'ffine  of  the  largest  streams  on  Luzon  Island,” 
and  there  was  sharp  skirmishing.  Colonel  Funston 
proceeds : 

“When  darkness  came  I asked  Corporal  A.  M.  Fer- 
guson, of  Company  E,  who  has  been  previously  men- 
tioned in  this  report,  and  who  has  on  numerous  occa- 
sions shown  himself  to  be  a fearless  and  reliable  man, 
if  he  were  willing  to  attempt  a reconnoissance  of  the  rail- 
road bridge,  telling  him  that  the  work  was  so  hazardous 
that  I would  not  order  him  to  undertake  it.  He  con- 
sented to  go  at  once.  Under  cover  of  darkness.  Cap- 
tain Flanders,  of  Company  I,  and  myself  accompanied 
him  to  the  end  of  the  bridge.  Ferguson  took  off  his 
shoes  and,  armed  only  with  a revolver,  crawled  along 
through  the  network  of  iron  braces  underneath  where 
the  floor  had  been,  and  then  inch  by  inch  worked  his 
way,  hand  over  hand,  until  he  was  underneath  the  insur- 
gent ouR^ost,  stationed  on  the  other  end  of  the  bridge, 
and  returned  with  a complete  description  of  the  con- 
dition of  the  bridge,  which  was  afterwards  verified  in 
every  particular.  He  was  gone  two  hours.  A single 
misstep  would  have  meant  a fall  of  forty  feet  into  the 
river,  while  the  chances  were  greatly  in  favor  of  dis- 


90 


The  Fields  of  Funston's  Glory. 


covery  by  the  enemy,  which  would  have  meant  certain 
death  or  capture.  I can  not  too  strongly  recommend 
this  gallant  soldier  for  the  medal  of  honor.  His  action 
was  purely  voluntary,  and  of  greatest  possible  danger. 
He  reported  that  all  of  the  ties,  rails,  and  planks  were 
gone  from  the  bridge,  and  at  its  farther  end  all  but  one 
of  the  steel  girders.’’ 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  hero  gives  but  little  of  his 
space  to  himself.  One  brave  man  loves  another,  and  the 
colonel  proud  of  the  corporal  gave  him  the  highest 
praise. 

The  position  involved  was  very  important.  Without 
it  Calumpit  would  be  untenable.  The  river  was  broad 
and  deep,  and  the  enemy  “was  protected  by  a most 
elaborate  system  of  field  fortifications,  with  three  pieces 
of  artillery  and  one  rapid-fire  Maxim.  General  Wheaton 
reports : 

“Upon  consultation  with  Colonel  Funston  a point 
about  nine  hundred  yards  below  the  railroad  bridge  was 
selected  as  the  place  that  he  would  endeavor  to  cross 
a part  of  his  regiment.  The  enemy’s  intrenchments  op- 
posite this  point  were  well  screened  by  bamboo  thickets. 

“Colonel  Funston  advanced  to  the  river  bank  strong 
parties  that  kept  up  a fire  of  great  volume.  The  effect 
of  the  heavy  and  continued  fire  was  to  drive  part  of  the 
enemy’s  force  from  his  works,  and  Privates  Edward 
White  and  W.  B.  Trembly,  of  Company  B,  Twentieth 
Kansas  Volunteer  Infantry,  swam  the  river  with  a rope 
and  fastened  it  to  a stake  on  the  enemy’s  intrenchments 
while  yet  occupied.  Rafts  were  pulled  over  by  means  of 
this  rope,  Colonel  Funston  going  over  on  the  first 
raft. 


The  Fields  of  Funston’s  Glory.  91 

“When  Colonel  Funston  had  crossed  forty-five  ofii- 
cers  and  men  he  attacked  the  enemy,  turning  him  out  of 
his  works  near  the  bridge.  I then  crossed  the  bridge 
with  my  staff. 

“The  night  of  the  27th  the  Twentieth  Kansas  and 
First  Montana  bivouacked  in  the  town  north  of  the  rail- 
road bridge.  The  next  morning  two  commissioned  offi- 
cers came  in  from  the  rebels  under  a flag  of  truce  and 
asked  for  an  armistice,  saying  they  ‘wished  to  acknowl- 
edge the  valor  of  the  American  soldier/  They  were  sent 
to  the  division  commander. 

“I  respectfully  invite  attention  to  the  gallant  con- 
duct of  Colonel  Frederick  Funston,  now  brigadier- 
general,  United  States  Volunteers,  during  these  oper- 
ations. 

“The  conduct  of  Lieutenant  C.  H.  Ball  and  of  Ser- 
geants Enston  and  Barshfield  and  Corporal  A.  M.  Fergu- 
son, of  Company  E,  Twenieth  Kansas  Volunteer  In- 
fantry, in  swimming  the  Bagbag  with  Colonel  Funston 
under  the  fire  of  the  enemy  is  worthy  of  regard  and  of 
great  praise.’’ 

Of  this  material  the  great  reputation  as  a soldier 
General  Funston  has  is  constructed.  It  is  abundant. 
In  this  affair  fdl  Colonel  Stotsenberg,  of  the  First  Ne- 
braska, leading  a charge.  The  military  advantage 
gained  was  of  great  value,  and  the  commander-in-chief, 
MacArthur,  describes  the  remarkable  military  achieve- 
ment in  these  terms: 

“The  Rio  Grande  is  a broad,  deep  stream,  from  which 
all  boats  had  been  carefully  removed  by  the  defending 
army,  and  which,  in  the  absence  of  a pontoon  bridge, 
was  passable  only  at  the  railroad  bridge.  The  defense 


92  The  Fields  of  Funstoi^’s  Glory. 

was  made  by  something  more  than  four  thousand  men 
in  chosen  and  carefully-prepared  positions.” 

General  Bell  reported  the  killing  of  Colonel  Stot'sen- 
berg: 

“He  arrived  on  the  field,  and  immediately  took  com- 
mand of  his  regiment.  As  he  ran  up  behind  the  line,  he 
ordered  it  to  commence  firing,- and  immediately  ad- 
vanced against  the  insurgent  position.  On  General 
Hale’s  arrival,  I had  joined  the  cavalry  troop,  and,  ob- 
serving Colonel  Stotsenberg’s  advance,  advanced  the 
troop  in  unison  with  him.  The  insurgents,  seeing  our 
advance,  abandoned  their  trenches  and  fled,  not,  how- 
ever, before  they  had  inflicted  upon  us,  in  the  death  of 
Colonel  Stotsenberg,  the  most  serious  loss  our  army  has 
yet  suffered.  In  justice  to  his  memory,  I wish  to  pay 
an  especial  tribute  to  this  fearless,  brave,  and  gallant 
soldier,  for,  as  soon  as  he  arrived,  he  placed  himself  in 
front  of  his  regiment,  and,  with  hat  in  one  hand  and 
pistol  in  the  other,  led  it  against  the  trenches  of  the  in- 
surgents, routing  them  completely.  It  was  solely  due 
to  this  gallant  act  that  we  won  the  fight  so  promptly.” 

It  was  in  such  gallant  acts  Funston  was  conspicuous. 
The  fate  of  comrades  tells  the  risks.  Our  country  is 
richer  for  the  heroes  of  this  war — the  dead  and  the 
living. 


CHAPTER  TX. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  AGUINAEDO.  ' 

To  Hunt  Down  Aguinaldo  in  the  Jungles  was  a Well- 
matured  Scheme  of  Funston — He  had  under  Otis’s 
Orders  Scouted  the  Province  where  it  was  done — 
Some  Silly  Army  Gossip  Squelched — Aguinaldo 
Admits  the  Audacity  of  his  Captor — Kansas  Rises 
up  for  Anything  for  Funston — His  Mother  thought 
Frank’s  Luck  would  be  Bad  This  Time — The  Story 
of  the  Raid — A Wonderful  Adventure — The  Sharp 
Turns  and  Critical  Escapes — The  Future  of  Fun- 
ston. 

HE  expedition  under  General  Funston,  to  find 


1 Aguinaldo  and  take  him,  started  March  6th  on  the 
United  States  gunboat  Vicksburg,  and  had  not  been  out 
but  a few  days  when  the  news  of  the  enterprise  reached 
the  United  States  and  wherever  the  wires  carry  dis- 
patches. It  seemed  improbable,  if  the  story  was  true, 
that  the  secret  should  be  told.  General  Otis — not  the 
commander  of  the  brigade  in  which  Funston  served 
early  in  the  war,  but  the  Commander-in-Chief  succeed- 
ing Merritt — says  of  Funston’s  feat,  it  ‘‘proves  him  a 
great  scout,”  and  “He  and  his  officers  and  men  risked 
their  lives  in  the  hands  of  the  natives,  and  their  bravery 
as  easily  might  have  led  them  to  death  as  success. 

“Every  army  officer  will  rejoice  over  the  capture  of 
the  wary  insurgent,  and  there  doubtless  is  a sort  of  a 
ratification  meeting  being  conducted  in  Manila.  The 


93 


94 


The  Capture  of  Aguinaldo 


best  class  of  the  natives  will  be  happy  at  General  Fun- 
ston’s  success. 

‘Tt  long  had  been  General  Funston’s  hope  that  he 
would  be  able  to  capture  Aguinaldo.  While  in  com- 
mand in  the  Philippines  I sent  him  on  a scouting  expe- 
dition through  the  territory  in  which  he  realized  his 
hope.  It  is  a part  of  the  wildest  country  found  in  the 
islands.  Funston  probably  was  the  best  posted  man  on 
the  nature  of  the  country  in  the  army.  It  is  my  under- 
standing that  he  effected  the  capture  about  ninety  miles 
inland.  To  reach  that  point  Funston  and  his  men  had 
to  march  through  mountains  covered  with  undergrowth. 
There  were  no  roads,  and  only  narrow  bridle-paths  here 
and  there.  When  the  nature  of  the  country  is  taken 
into  consideration  the  capture  is  the  more  remarkable.’’ 

The  statment  of  General  Otis  that  the  idea  of  finding 
and  seizing  Aguinaldo  had  been  long  in  the  mind  of  the 
man  who  did  it  is  most  interesting,  and  in  that  connec- 
tion that  he  ‘‘scouted”  in  the  Province  of  Isabella, 
assists  to  make  the  strong  story  come  out  more  like  a 
matter  of  business,  and  yet  it  does  not  spoil,  but  rather 
enhances  interest,  and  increases  the  sense  of  public 
indebtedness  to  the  hero.  There  were  for  a time  a few 
officers  in  Washington  who  held  that  the  feat  of  Fun- 
ston was  a fake,  and  they  put  the  case  in  this  way: 

“Aguinaldo  must  have  connived  at  his  own  capture 
on  the  theory  that  he  was  impressed  with  General  Mac- 
Arthur’s  proclamation  giving  April  ist  as  the  date  when  % 
the  rebels  should  lay  down  their  arms.  It  was  suggested 
that  Aguinaldo,  with  characteristic  shrewdness,  had 
governed  his  own  surrender  by  the  imposing  fiction  of  a 


The  Capture  of  Aguinaldo. 


95 


Funstoii  capture.  It  was  difficult  for  some  of  the  regu- 
lars here  to  understand  how  General  Funston  and  a 
small  band  could  penetrate  to  Aguinaldo’s  secret  tent 
and  carry  out  a hazardous  ruse.’’ 

This  is  a sort  of  “senile  gossip”  that  is  not  to  be 
seriously  considered.  There  is  no  more  to  sustain  the 
suggestion  that  Aguinaldo  and  Funston  played  a part 
theatrically  concocted  between  them,  than  the  Agoncillo 
assumption  that  a false  Aguinaldo  is  a guest  in  the  Span- 
ish palace  of  the  governor-general  at  Manila.  Agui- 
naldo has  compliments  for  Funston,  and  often  praises 
the  skill  and  audacity  of  the  General  in  effecting  his  cap- 
ture, saying  that  only  by  stratagem  could  he  have  been 
taken.  The  gratuitous  assumption  of  a ridiculous  con- 
spiracy— a bargain-and-sale  trick — was  crushed  by  the 
handsome  terms  in  which  General  MacArthur  gave  the 
full  credit  to  Funston. 

Mr.  and  Mrs.  Funston,  father  and  mother  of  the 
hero,  live  in  a small  frame  house  five  miles  from  a tele- 
graph wire,  the  post-office  being  lola,  Kansas.  A news- 
paper correspondent  found  the  father  husking  corn  in 
a field  of  shocks,  and  gave  him  the  news.  The  old  man 
said,  “Well,  that  is  certainly  gratifying.”  The  details 
read,  he  said: 

“I  was  afraid  when  he  started  out  that  he  might  be 
the  dupe  of  the  treacherous  natives.  At  first  I doubted 
the  truth  of  the  story,  but  the  more  I thought  of  it  the 
more  credence  I gave  it.  This  is  the  first  time  I ever 
saw  his  mother  worry.”  Then  he  concluded  it  was  the 
“biggest  thing  in  the  century  so  far.” 

The  mother  was  at  home  and  joyous,  looked  long  at 


96 


The  Capture  of  Aguinaldo. 


the  newspaper  headlines  and  pictures,  and  said  with  dim 
e3^es : 

‘T  never  lost  faith  in  F'red’s  lucky  star  before,  but  I 
had  a feeling  he  was  risking  life  and  everything  on  a 
high  stake,  and  that  the  end  would  be  disastrous.  -I  was 
afraid  those  scouts  would  turn  traitors  to  him,  instead 
of  remaining  traitors  to  Aguinaldo.’' 

All  Kansas  took  a deep  interest  in  the  hero  of  the 
State,  unfurled  flags,  and  talked  of  festivals  and  of  offlces 
for  '‘Fred,”  and  took  it  for  granted  that  he  could  have 
anything  the  State  could  give — Governor,  Senator,  any 
honor.  All  was  his  for  saying  it,  and  later  came  the 
President’s  compliments  in  congratulations,  and  the 
appointment  to  be  brigadier-general  in  the  regular 
army. 

There  were  no  fuss  and  feathers,  frills  and  ribbons, 
about  the  plans  or  performance  of  the  scouting  and  the 
seizure  of  Aguinaldo.  It  was  a plain,  severe  life-and- 
death  business  from  first  to  last.  General  Funston’s 
account  must  forever  be  the  highest  authority.  It  was 
conversationally  made  and  cabled  at  something  over  five 
dollars  a word,  because  Congress  is  very  economical  as 
to  using  the  people’s  money  to  complete  our  conquest 
of  the  Pacific  Ocean,  in  which  we  have  a greater  interest 
than  any  other  nation. 

^ General  Funston  being  small,  weight  one  hundred 
and  fifteen  pounds,  is  called  the  “Little  Man  of  War.” 
On  January  24th,  a detachment  of  his  troops  captured 
at  Punta  Bangan,  Province  of  Nueva  Ecija,  a confi- 
dential messenger  from  Aguinaldo’s  headquarters  at 
Palanan,  Isabella  Province,  who  was  carrying  letters  to 
the  various  insurgent  chiefs  asking  them  to  send  rein- 


Luzon. 


MAP  SHOWING  LOCATION  OF  PALANAN, 
WHERE  AGUINALDO  WAS  CAPTURED. 


MAP  OF  THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS. 


The  Capture  of  Aguinaldo. 


97 


forcements.  These  letters  were  dated  January  nth, 
1 2th,  and  14th. 

On  February  Sth  one  of  Aguinaldo’s  staff  officers 
surrendered  to  Lieutenant  Taylor,  of  the  Twenty-fourth 
Infantry.  This  officer  had  in  his  possession  valuable 
correspondence  which  told  of  Aguinaldo’s  whereabouts 
and  of  the  strength  of  the  force  with  him.  One  of  the 
letters  was  addressed  to  Baldomero  Aguinaldo,  order- 
ing him  to  take  command  of  the  insurgents  in  Central 
Luzon,  and  to  send  four  hundred  riflemen  to  Agui- 
naldo’s headquarters. 

This  man  is  said  to  be  a cousin  of  Emilio,  and 
whether  he  is  or  not,  he  is  treated  as  “one  of  the  fam- 
ily,” and  was  treasurer  of  the  Hong  Kong  club  of  Fili- 
pinos, that  organized  itself  into  the  “Government,”  of 
which  Emilio  was  elected  President.  The  Filipino 
colony  in  Paris  play  that  they  are  part  of  a great  nation, 
and  they  do  hot  admit  the  Americans  have  caught 
the  President  Aguinaldo,  but  think  it  may  be  Baldo- 
mero. However,  all  their  pretenses  are  false  and  fraud- 
ulent. The  possibility  of  the  success  of  the  expedition 
rested  upon  the  captured  correspondence.  Among 
“captured  documents”  in  possession  of  Funston  was  the 
baggage  of  the  Filipino  General  Lacuna,  including 
many  official  papers,  a quantity  of  correspondence,  and 
Lacuna’s  private  seal.  It  was  the  “seal”  that  did  it. 
The  Filipinos  revere  seals,  and  Aguinaldo  saw  the  stamp, 
and  was  sure  Funston’s  letters,  prepared  to  deceive — 
to  the  horror  of  mugwumps  and  some  English  editors — 
and  they  had  the  desired  effect.  Aguinaldo  could  not 
hide  himself  securely  without  cutting  off  very  largely 
his  own  sources  of  information.  He  could  not  have  a 


9^  The  Capture  of  Aguinaldo. 

telegraph  wire,  and  so  the  world  was  far  off.  There 
was  no  foundation  for  the  fear  that  the  publication  of 
FunstonT  scheme,  while  he  was  in  the  woods  on  the 
way  to  the  retreat  of  his  victim,  would  reach  the  “Cap- 
ital’’ deep  in  the  mountain  forest.  The  “President” 
sending  out  orders  did  not  know  the  papers  of  General 
Lacuna  were  in  American  hands,  or  of  the  surrender  of 
a general  he  regarded  as  next  to  himself  in  importance. 
It  was  the  seclusion  for  personal  safety  of  the  pretender 
to  the  Presidency  that  caused  his  capture.  The  system 
of  hiding  himself  was  at  last  his  undoing.  General  Fun- 
ston  prepared  the  letters,  used  the  seal,  engaged  seventy- 
eight  Maccabebes,  twenty  wearing  insurgent  uniforms, 
the  others  the  garb  of  laborers.  They  were  armed  with 
fifty  Mausers,  eighteen  Remingtons,  and  ten  Krag 
Jorgenssens.  It  would  n’t  do  to  find  too  many  Ameri- 
can guns  in  rebel  recruits.  The  Maccabebes  were  com- 
manded by  Captain  Russell  T.  Hazzard,  of  the  Eleventh 
L^nited  States  Volunteer  Cavalry.  With  him  was  his 
brother.  Lieutenant  Oliver  P.  M.  Hazzard,  of  the  same 
regiment.  Captain  Harry  W.  Newton,  Thirty-fourth 
Infantry,  was  taken  because  of  his  familiarity  with  Casig- 
uran  Bay,  and  Lieutenant  Burton  J.  Mitchell,  Fortieth 
Infantry,  went  as  General  Funston’s  aide.  These  were 
the  only  Americans  accompanying  the  expedition. 

With  the  Maccabebes  were  four  ex-insurgent  offi- 
cers, one  being  a Spaniard  and  the  other  three  Tagalos, 
whom  General  Funston  trusted  implicitly. 

The  officers  wore  plain  blue  suits  and  Khaaka 
blouses.  Each  carried  half  a blanket.  Funston  was  sup- 
posed to  be  a prisoner  taken  by  insurgents.  March 
14th,  the  gunboat  ran  at  night  into  a cove  suitable,  as 


The  Capture  of  Aguinaldo. 


99 


it  was  a lonesome  place.  This  was  twenty-five  miles 
south  of  Casiguran,  Province  of  Principe.  The  landing 
was  a success;  the  boat  disappeared.  There  were  no 
lights,  little  noise.  The  boat  put  to  sea.  The  expedition 
took  to  the  woods.  An  ex-colonel  of  insurgents  was 
alleged  to  be  the  commander.  His  name,  Hilario 
Placido.  The  first  village  was  Casiguran,  and  the  troops 
announced  they  were  on  the  way  to  join  Aguinaldo,  and 
had  encountered  an  American  surveying  party  and  cap- 
tured some  of  them.  The  strategy  was  fine  drawn,  and 
might  snap  at  any  time,  but  the  greatest  hardship  was 
the  march  to  the  interior,  where  the  captured  corre- 
spondence showed  the  object  of  the  expedition  to  be 
located.  There  were  but  five  Americans  in  the  party, 
and  these  presumed  to  be  the  survivors  of  the  survey- 
ors— a shrewd  idea,  for  it  was  reasonable  the  Americans, 
believing  in  peace,  should  make  surveys.  The  con- 
cocted letters  were  forwarded  to  Aguinaldo  from  Casig- 
uran. The  objective  point  of  the  excursion  was  Pala- 
nan,  Province  of  Isabella.  March  17th  the  party  started 
on  their  ninety-mile  march,  with  scanty  rations  of 
cracked  corn.  The  road  was  rough,  rivers  swift,  preci- 
pices abounded.  March  22d  the  party  was  within  eight 
miles  of  its  destination,  and  the  men  so  weak  Funston 
sent  to  Aguinaldo  for  supplies,  and  the  response  was 
serviceable. 

American  prisoners  were  treated  kindly,  but  not 
allowed  to  enter  the  town.  On  the  morning  of  March 
23d  the  advance  was  resumed.  The  column  was  met 
by  the  staff  officers  of  Aguinaldo  and  a detachment  of 
Aguinaldo's  body-guard,  which  was  ordered  to  take 
charge  of  the  Americans.  While  one  of  the  ex-insurgent 


loo 


The  Capture  of  Aguinaldo. 


officers  conversed  with  Aguinaldo’s  aide,  another,  a 
Spaniard,  sent  a courier  to  warn  General  Funston  and 
the  rest,  who,  with  eleven  Maccabebes,  were  an  hour 
behind.  Having  received  this  warning.  General  Fun- 
ston avoided  Aguinaldo’s  detachment  and  joined  the 
column,  preventing  observation.  The  Tagalos  went 
ahead  to  greet  Aguinaldo,  and  the  column  slowly  fol- 
lowed, finally  arriving  at  Palauan. 

This  was  the  critical  place.  If  the  detachment  of 
Aguinaldo’s  guards  had  not  been  eluded,  the  killing  or 
capture  of  Funston  would  have  been  imminent. 
Though  the*  Maccabebes  might  have  won  a fight,  it 
would  have  been  at  the  expense  of  the  escape  of  Agui- 
naldo, and  then  there  would  have  been  extreme  danger 
of  the  destruction  or  capture  of  the  whole  party  on  the 
return  trip. 

General  Aguinaldo’s  household  troops,  fifty  men  in 
neat  uniforms  of  blue  and  white  and  wearing  straw  hats, 
lined  up  to  receive  the  newcomers.  General  Funston’s 
men  crossed  the  river  in  small  boats,  formed  on  the 
bank,  and  marched  to  the  right  and  then  in  front  of  the 
insurgent  grenadiers.  The  Tagalogs  entered  the  house 
where  General  Aguinaldo  was. 

Suddenly  the  Spanish  officer,  noticing  that  General 
Aguinaldo’s  aide  was  watching  the  Americans  suspi- 
ciously, exclaimed,  ‘‘Now,  Maccabebes,  go  for  them!” 
The  Maccabebes  opened  fire,  but  their  aim  was  rather 
ineffective,  and  only  three  insurgents  were  killed.  The 
rebels  returned  the  fire. 

On  hearing  the  firing,  General  Aguinaldo,  who  evi- 
dently thought  his  men  were  merely  celebrating  the  ar- 


The  Capture  of  Aguinaldo. 


lOI 


rival  of  reinforcements,  ran  to  the  window  and  shouted ; 
'‘Stop  that  foolishness ! Quit  wasting  ammunition !” 

Hilario  Placido,  one  of  the  Tagalog  officers  and  a 
former  insurgent  major,  who  was  wounded  in  the  lung 
by  the  fire  of  the  Kansas  regiment  at  the  battle  of 
Caloocan,  threw  his  arms  around  General  Aguinaldo, 
exclaiming,  “You  are  a prisoner  of  the  Americans !” 

Colonel  Simeon  Villia,  the  rebel  chief  of  staff.  Major 
Alambra,  and  others  attacked  the  men  who  were  hold- 
ing General  Aguinaldo.  Hilario  Placido  shot  Colonel 
Villia  in  the  shoulder.  Major  Alambra  jumped  out  of 
the  window  and  attempted  to  cross  the  river.  It  is  sup- 
posed that  he  was  drowned.  Five  other  insurgent  offi- 
cers fought  for  a few  minutes  and  then  fled,  making 
their  escape. 

When  the  firing  began  General  Funston  assumed 
command  and  directed  the  attack  on  the  house,  person- 
ally assisting  in  the  capture  of  General  Aguinaldo.  The 
insurgent  body-guard  fled,  leaving  twenty  rifles. 

Santiago  Barcelona,  the  insurgent  treasurer,  surren- 
dered without  resistance. 

When  captured.  General  Aguinaldo  was  tremen- 
dously excited,  but  he  calmed  under  General  Funston’s 
assurance  that  he  would  be  well  treated.  General  Fun- 
ston obtained  all  of  the  rebel  leader’s  correspondence, 
showing  that  he  had  kept  in  close  touch  with  the  sub- 
chiefs of  the  insurrection  in  various  parts  of  the  Archi- 
pelago. 

Aguinaldo  had  been  living  at  Palanan  for  seven 
months,  undisturbed,  except  when  a detachment  of  the 
Sixteenth  Infantry  visited  the  town.  On  that  occasion 


102 


The  Capture  of  Aguinaldo. 


the  entire  population  took  to  the  mountains,  and  re- 
mained there  until  the  troops  retired. 

General  Aguinaldo  admitted  that  he  had  almost  been 
captured  before;  but  he  asserted  that  he  had  never  been 
wounded,  adding:  ‘T  should  never  have  been  taken  ex- 
cept by  a stratagem.  I was  completely  deceived  by 
General  Lacuna’s  forged  signature.”  He  feared  he 
might  be  sent  to  Guam,  and  he  was  quite  glad  to  come 
to  Manila. 

Palanan  was  guarded  by  numerous  outposts  and  sig- 
nal stations.  During  the  fight  none  of  the  Maccabebes 
was  wounded. 

The  expedition  rested  March  24th,  and  then  marched 
sixteen  miles  the  following  day  to  Palanan  Bay,  where 
General  Funston  found  the  Vicksburg,  ’which  brought 
him  to  Manila.  Commander  Barry,  of  the  Vicksburg, 
rendered  General  Funston  splendid  assistance. 

General  Aguinaldo,  who  talked  freely  of  past  events, 
said  he  supposed  General  Trias  would  proclaim  himself 
Dictator,  evidently  not  knowing  that  General  Trias  had 
surrendered.  He  behaved  courteously,  and  gave  no 
trouble. 

General  Funston  says  Aguinaldo  is  above  the  aver- 
age in  intelligence  and  has  prepossessing  manners. 

General  Aguinaldo  was  brought  ashore  and  taken 
before  General  MacArthur  at  the  Malacanang  Palace. 
He  talked  freely,  but  seemed  ignorant  concerning  the 
situation.  He  was  in  good  health  and  cheerful.  He 
lunched  with  the  officers  of  General  MacArthur’s  staff, 
and  was  then  escorted  to  the  apartments  specially 
arranged. 

The  parents  of  General  Funston  were  justified  in 


The  Capture  of  Aguinaldo.  103 

their  apprehension  for'  the  safety  of  their  son,  when  the 
news  was  given  out,  or  at  least  scattered  about,  that  he 
was  off  on  a volunteer  expedition  to  make  a prisoner 
of  the  rebel  leader  in  Luzon,  and  there  were  those  who 
sincerely  felt  Funston  was  foolhardy,  and  had  made  his 
work  extra  hazardous  by  going  “with  a brass  band”  to 
catch  a weasel  asleep.  If  there  was  any  misgiving  after 
the  event,  it  was  dissipated  by  the  dispatch  of  General 
MacArthur,  concluding:  “The  transaction  was  brilliant 
in  conception  and  faultless  in  execution.  All  credit  must 
go  to  Funston.” 

MacArthur  added : “His  reward  should  be  signal  and 
immediate.  With  General  Wheaton,  I recommended 
General  Funston’s  retention  in  the  volunteers  until  he 
can  be  appointed  brigadier-general  of  regulars.”  It  was 
Funston  who  not  only  organized  the  raid  from  start  to 
finish,  but  who  had  originated  the  idea.  A dispatch 
from  Kansas  City  says : 

“General  Funston,  while,  colonel  of  the  Twentieth 
Kansas  Regiment,  in  February,  1899,  submitted  his  first 
plan  to  capture  Aguinaldo  to  General  MacArthur,  who 
rejected  it  because  of  a lack  of  soldiers.” 

Representative  Curtis,  of  Kansas,  said,  referring  to 
the  question  of  appointing  Funston  a regular  brigadier- 
general,  just  before  that  was  done,  remarked : 

“There  is  one  feature  about  Funston’s  career  that  is 
not  generally  known,  and  that  reflects  great  credit  on 
him.  He  has  never  asked  the  aid  of  the  politicians  of 
his  State  for  anything.  After  he  had  distinguished  him- 
self in  the  Philippines  he  did  not  ask  either  the  senators 
or  representatives  from  Kansas  to  urge  a reward  for 
his  work.” 


104  'I'he  Capture  of  Aguinaldo. 

General  Charles  King  says,  referring  to  the  Twen- 
tieth Kansas  Infantry ; 

“With  splendid  material,  the  regiment  lacked  dis- 
cipline. Funston  gave  it,  and  later,  from  the  day  he 
took  the  field  in  the  Philippines,  he  became  a noted  man. 
The  Nation  knows  his  exploits.  In  this  capture  of  Agui- 
naldo he  has  simply  climaxed  his  career.” 

. The  importance  of  the  appointment  of  General  Fun- 
ston to  be  brigadier-general  is  accented  by  reason  of  his 
youth,  which,  according  to  the  course  of  nature,  gives 
him  chances  to  become  senior  major-general,  and  in  line 
for  the  lieutenant-generalcy. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  HERO  AND  HIS  CAPTIVE. 

f 

The  Maccabebes,  the  Native  Assistance  of  Kunston — 
Native  Cruelty  to  Natives — Collateral  Circum- 
stances of  the  Capture  of  Aguinaldo — Mystery  of 
the  Orient — Whole  Truth  Wanted. 

The  circumstances  of  the  capture  of  Aguinaldo  will 
have  a wholesome  educational  influence  upon  the  ^ 
Filipinos  as  well  as  the  American  people.  We  have 
been  slow  in  understanding  the  peculiarities  of  Malay 
character,  and  the  Asiatic  ideas  of  the  finesse  of  diplo- 
macy, the  limitations  of  patriotism;  and  the  error ‘that 
lurks  in  the  habit  of  our  countrymen  using  the  word 
‘‘people”  as  synonymous  with  “inhabitants.” 

It  will  be  easy  to  give  undue  importance  to  the  par- 
ticipation of  the  Filipinos  in  the  expedition  that  en- 
trapped the  Tagalo  chief  in  his  own  remote  and  se- 
cluded retreat.  The  natives  who  played  the  part  of 
double  treachery,  and  were  the  efficient  allies  of  the 
gallant  soldier  and  brilliant  adventurer,-Frederick  Fun- 
ston,  are  the  Maccabebes,  deadly  enemies  of  the  Taga- 
los,  but  are  a numerous  tribe.  They  are  distingTiished 
by  habitual  ferocity.  The  difficulty  in  employing  them 
as  soldiers,  scouts,  or  police,  is  that  they  are  prone 
to  savagery,  rejoice  to  slaughter  their  foes,  and  relent- 
lessly hostile  to  people  of  their  own  color  with  whom 
they  have  difficulties.  They  are  an  implacable  lot.  As 


io6 


The  Hero  and  His  Captive. 


police  they  are  not  satisfied  to  arrest  persons  under 
suspicion,  but  are  urgent  to  torture  them  and  force 
confession.  They  have  the  grand  old  Spanish  ideas 
unmodified.  They  have  two  methods  of  procuring  tes- 
timony that  they  think  reliable.  One,  the  Chinese 
clubbing  with  bamboo  poles — a ceremony  remarkable 
for  the  gymnastics  of  the  executioner  and  the  outcry 
of  the  victims.  The  other  producer  of* satisfactory  evi- 
dence is  the  ‘‘water  cure.”  \Mien  it  is  applied,  the  per- 
son is  placed  on  his  back,  and  the  spout  of  a funnel 
inserted  in  his  mouth.  Water  is  poured  in  according 
to  the  elasticity  and  obstinacy  of  the  alleged  culprit; 
and,  after  liberal  supplies  are  used,  there  is  abundant 
evidence  of  the  expansiveness  of  human  beings  under 
hydrostatic  pressure,  and  the  culprit  will  admit  or  assert 
anything  to  stop  the  treatment.  The  American  au- 
thorities have  not  approved  these  methods  of  the 
]Maccabebes,  and  are,  therefore,  not  themselves  in  the 
highest  favor  with  the  administrators  of  preliminary 
forms  of  justice  in  the  Philippines. 

After  the  success  of  the  American  army  in  extend- 
ing its  lines,  there  seemed  to  be  a long  waiting  time 
until  the  people  of  the  United  States  took  a vote  that 
expressed  their  Filipino  policy.  The  question  was 
whether  the  Administration  of  President  ]^IcKinley 
should  be  approved  and  continued.  The  military  power 
of  the  United  States  had  been  asserted  and  established 
with  greater  expanse  and  thoroughness  than  had  been 
seriously  attempted  by  the  Spaniards  at  any  time  in 
their  three  centuries  of  partial  occupation,  and  the  re- 
sult of  the  election  in  1900  promised  no  change  in  the 
Philippines,  except  that  which  would  be  ascribed  to 


The  Hero  and  His  Captive.  107 

gain  in  confidence,  in  certainty,  and  the  promises  that 
assurance  and  ability  and  certainty  gave  to  the  adop- 
tion of  liberal  measures.  The  Taft  Commission  made 
rapid  and  steady  progress  in  the  establishment  of  civil 
government#  and  were  warranted  in  assuring  to  all 
friends  of  America,  protection  immediately  and  for  all 
time. 

There  was  no  spot  in  the  Archipelago  that  the 
Aguinaldo  group  of  warriors  could  fix  themselves  and 
be  safe  for  even  a few  weeks  from  American  assaults, 
unless  the  forces  of  insurgents  were  small  enough  to 
hide,  and  while  all  was  going  well  in  civil  affairs,  and 
the  sufficient  strength  of  the  army  was  provided  by 
Congress  to  uphold  the  faith  and  honor  of  the  army 
and  the  glory  of  the  flag,  the  news  came  that  Aguinaldo 
was  a prisoner  in  Manila,  and  the  credit  for  his  cap- 
ture was  divided  between  the  army  and  navy — the 
Americans  and  the  Filipinos.  The  war  was  already 
over,  except  in  strife  to  keep  up  appearances.  This 
was  for  some  time  before  the  capture  of  the  chieftain. 
It  was  the  circulation  of  letters  prepared  by  him,  com- 
manding the  consultation  of  scattered  bands,  and 
threatening  submission  to  the  Americans  with  barba- 
rous vengeance,  that  the  Talago  leader  and  fugitive 
pointed  out.  his  hidden  headquarters.  There  were 
found  volunteers  for  the  expedition  that  closed  with  a 
stroke  of  strategy  and  skill  surpassing  anything  that 
transpired  on  the  American  continent  in  wars  be- 
tween the  white  and  the  red  man.  The  world  is  not 
only  indebted  to  General  Funston  for  chapters  of  his- 
tory that  will  never  fade,  but  for  a zeal  and  heroism 
that  will  live  in  romance,  and  a story  of  adventure  that 


io8 


The  Hero  and  His  Captive. 


enriches  literature.  The  excellence  of  the  marvelous 
achievement  is  increased  immeasurably  because  it  is  in 
behalf  of  a cause  without  a blemish,  and  has  removed 
from  his  last  refuge  a man  who  was  never  faithful  to 
Filipino,  American,  or  Spaniard,  save  as  he  believed 
he  was  serving  his  own  purpose;  and  he  had~.no  claim 
to  the  fame  that  is  due  the  fighters  for  freedom  in  any 
land.  His  government,  that  he  exploited  with  endless 
writing  and  tedious  iteration,  that  it  was  his  very  own, 
that  it  was  his  and  that  he  made  it,  and  would  dissolve 
or  change  it  as  he  pleased,  and  yet  that  it  was  free,  had 
no  warrant  or  sanction  of  the  people,  for  it  was  a tissue 
of  tyrannies,  an  extension  and  elongation,  simply,  of 
-the  Hong  Kong  Junta.  The  American  people  owe  it 
to  themselves  to  know  the  whole  truth  about  the 
strange  stories  of  Aguinaldo  and  his  Oriental  mysteries. 
He*  is  a man  who  cultivated  superstition  as  a support 
of  despotism,  and  made  selfishly  the  sacrifices  of  the 
blood  of  brave  men.  We  will  know  he  has  repented 
when  he  has  done  works  meet  for  repentance. 


CHAPTER  XL' 


OUR  FEROCIOUS  FILIPINO  FRIENDS. 

Fiinston’s  Guard — The  Hereditary  Foes  of  the  Taga- 
los — ;Their  Savage  Character — They  are  Faithful 
to  Spain  and  to  Us — They  Pursued  Aguinaldo 
more  than  Once — The'  Lamented  Lawton’s  Good 
Opinion  of  Them. 

HE  effective  force  of  the  expedition  of  General  Fun- 


1 ston  for  the  capture  of  Aguinaldo  was  composed 
of  Maccabebes,  who,  in  spite  of  the  Tagalos  and  affili- 
ated insurgents,  have  been  from  the  first  friends  of  the 
United  States.  Of  these  tribesmen  our  officers  con- 
stantly speak  in  terms  of  high  consideration.  They  were 
first  friends  of  Spain,  and  the  hereditary  enemies  of  the 
Tagalos,  whom  they  were  anxious  to  fight.  After  our 
troops  had  taken  Mololos,  it  was  obvious  that  a consid- 
erable portion  of  the  surrounding  country  was  full  of 
robbers — independent  bands  hidden  in  the  dense  nipa — 
and  General  MacArthur  thought  well  of  using  the  Mac- 
cabebes against  the  criminals,  who  were  in  no  sense  war- 
riors. Two  companies  were  raised  of  one  hundred  and 
twenty-eight  men  each,  and  in  order  to  test  their  efficacy 
they  were  directed  by  competent  officers  to  clear  out  the 
thieves,  and  the  native  soldiers  were  supplied  with  small 
boats.  General  Otis  had  for  some  time  to  permit  such 
organizations;  but  the  result  was  they  were  very  efficient 
as  guides,  scouts,  and  detectives,  and  in  going  through 

" 109 


no 


Our  Ferocious  Filipino  Friends. 


Northern  Luzon,  pursuing  armed  insurgents,  they  kept 
pace  with  cavalry.  The  Commander-in-Chief  says  of 
them  that  they  were  ‘'greatly  feared  by  the  inhabitants 
of  all  sections  of  country  through  which  they  advanced. 
Many  of  them  had  been  Spanish  soldiers,  and  were  ac- 
quainted only  with  Spanish  methods  of  dealing  with 
rebellious  subjects,  or  with  natives  from  whom  they 
wished  to  extract  information,  and  those  methods  were 
in  most  instances  attended  with  inexcusable  harshness. 
Later,  when  a detachment  of  sixty  were  employed  as 
scouts  in  the  extreme  south  of  Luzon,  particularly  in 
the  province  of  Tayabas,  it  was  found  expedient  to  with- 
draw them  and  send  them  back  to  their  homes  in  the 
city  of  Maccabebe,  that  the  fleeing  inhabitants,  who 
feared  them  but  had  the  utmost  confidence  in  the  hu- 
manity of  the  American  troops,  might  be  persuaded  to 
leave  their  concealments  in  the  hills  and  mountains  and 
return  to  their  towns.’’  They  needed  constant  watch- 
ing, as  their  conduct  would  be  excessively  vindictive. 

The  Maccabebe  question  has  been  a superheated  one 
in  Luzon,  and  this  telegram  from  General  Funston 
shows  the  feeling  aroused : 

“San  Isidro,  March  27,  1900. 
“Adjutant-General  Second  Division: 

“Last  night  three  men  of  the  company  of  Macca- 
bebes,  now  with  Major  Wheeler,  who  have  been  in  the 
hospital  of  San  Isidro  and  had  been  discharged  from  the 
hospital  a few  days  ago,  but  had  not  been  able  to  join 
their  company,  were  kidnaped  on  the  street  of  San 
Isidro  by  about  twenty  men  and  taken  to  Gapan,  where 
they  were  kept  over  night  in  a house,  and  early  this 


Our  Ferocious  Filipino  Friends. 


Ill 


morning,  with  their  arms  tied  behind  them,  were  started 
toward  the  mountains.  By  chance  they  ran  into  the  de- 
tachment that  Captain  Koehler  and  I were  bringing  in. 
One  of  the  Maccabebes  escaped,  ran  to  us,  and  hastily 
explained  matters,  whereupon  we  pursued  the  band  and 
killed  three  of  them.  A further  search,  and  some  of  our 
men  came  upon  two  of  them  engaged  in  boloing  the 
other  two  Maccabebes.  They  were  caught  in  the  act, 
made  no  defense,  and  we  took  them  up  into  the  barrio, 
within  two  hundred  yards  of  the  scene  of  their  crime, 
and  within  ten  minutes  thereafter  publicly  hanged  them. 
We  then  went  with  the  three  men  to  the  house  in  Gapan 
where  they  had  been  kept  over  night.  As  we  ap- 
proached the  house  three  men  attempted  to  escape. 
One  of  them,  whom  the  Maccabebes  recognized  as  one 
of  the  leaders  of  the  kidnapers,  was  instantly  killed. 
Another  swam  the  river,  but  was  shot  on  the  other  bank ; 
the  third,  dashing  into  a crowd  of  women  and  children, 
escaped.  We  burned  the  house.  The  two  Maccabebes 
were  badly  carved  up,  but  will  recover. 

‘‘FUNSTON.” 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Funston  was  justified  in 
his  confidence  in  the  Maccabebes,  who  were  his  body- 
guard when  he  sought  Aguinaldo. 

General  Lawton  telegraphed  November  lo,  1899, 
from  Caranatuan : 

“One  company  Maccabebes  scouted  country  in 
direction  of  Lupao  this  morning.  They  returned  at 
noon,  bringing  in  personal  and  official  papers  of  General 
Lanera,  whose  son  we  held  here  as  prisoner.  Batson, 
believing  Lanera  with  some  force  to  be  in  the  mouh- 


112 


Our  Ferocious  Filipino  Friends. 


tains  near  here,  started  out  with  one  company  about 
three  o'clock.  A messenger  from  him  has  just  arrived 
with  note  as  follows:  ‘Four  A.  M. — On  trail  of  General 
Lanera;  within  two  hours  of  him;  will  follow.  Before 
four  A.  M.  our  people  were  fired  upon  by  a few  Mausers 
far  up  in  the  mountains,  about  the  time  they  foiuid 
Lanera’s  baggage  hidden  in  the  woods.  They  were  un- 
able to  see  an  enemy.  With  the  baggage  were  taken 
one  Winchester  with  plenty  of  ammunition  and  one 
shotgun,’  a courier  Avith  a dispatch  from  Tarlac  ad- 
dressed ‘Officer  in  charge  of  telegraph  station  at  Panta- 
bangan,’  with  copies  of  most  urgent  telegrams  via 
Rosales,  San  Quentin,  Bunion,  and  at  top  of  envelope 
‘Via  Baninathas;’  also  dispatches  containing  important 
information.  All  are  inclosed  herewith. 

“I  gather  from  these  dispatches  that  Aguinaldo  was 
in  Tarlac  yesterday;  that  all  important  prisoners  of  ours 
held  by  the  enemy  are  in  Aparri  or  near  there;  that  a 
telegraph  line  is  ordered  constructed  from  Bambang, 
province  of  Nueva  Vizcaya,  near  Bayonbong,  on  the 
Rio  Grande  de  Cagayan,  over  the  mountains  to  Tayug, 
via  Cayapa.  The  Cayapa  referred  to  is  a little  town  in 
the  mountains  over  the  divide,  northeast  of  Tayug.  It 
is  not  known  on  any  map  that  I have,  but  the  postmaster 
here  pointed  out  the  location,  and  said  letters  had  come 
from  that  place.  He  insisted  that  it  was  not  the  Cuyapo 
near  Tarlac.  I consider  these  dispatches  very  important 
as  showing  Aguinaldo’s  intentions.” 

November  12th,  Lawton  from  Talavera  to  Staff.  He 
had  just  received  news  at  San  Jose  of  the  chase  after 
Aguinaldo: 


SUPPLY  TRAIN  FORDING  PARAO  RIVER,  NEAR  BAMBAN. 


GENERAL  MACARTH  U R’S  PRIVATE  CAR. 


Our  Ferocious  Filipino  Friends.  113 

‘'Headquarters  Fourth  Cavalary, 
"Carranglan,  November  nth. 

“To  Adjutant-General  CavahxBrigade,  First  Division: 

“I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  at  half-past  ten 
o’clock  this  morning  I intercepted  and  captured  172 
bolo  men  of  the  insurgent  army.  These  men  are  part 
of  a force  of  400  that  left  Nueva  Vizcaya  on  Monday, 
6th  inst.,  under  orders  from  Aguinaldo  to  proceed  to 
this  place  and  act  as  escort  for  Colonel  Emer,  private 
secretary  to  Aguinaldo,  and  now  here  in  custody,  and 
turn  over  all  the  property  pertaining  to  the  insurgent 
army  and  government  that  escaped  capture  by  the 
Fourth  Cavalry  at  Talavera.  Aguinaldo’s  orders  were 
addressed  to  General  Canon,  who  is  the  officer  evi- 
dently in  command  of  the  insurgent  forces  in  the  prov- 
ince of  Nueva  Vizcaya.  On  the  arrival  of  the  400  men 
at  Rosario,  228  of  their  number  remained  there  to  pro- 
cure supplies  and  rest.  Major  Coleman,  with  the  prop- 
erty in  his  charge,  was  to  have  been  escorted  from  this 
place  to  Nueva  Vizcaya.  The  prisoners  captured  were 
without  firearms,  and  carried" one  day’s  rations  of  rice.’’ 

General  Young  telegraphed  Lawton,  November  18, 
1899,  and  Lawton  remarks: 

“He  has  the  Maccabebes  and  fifty  picked  men  of 
Chase’s  troop  and  thirty  picked  men  of  Captain  John- 
son’s troop.  Third  Cavalry,  under  Chase.  On  receipt  of 
Young’s  note  I dispatched  Major  Swigert  with  available 
men  of  two  troops  Third  Cavalry  and  Lieutenant-Col- 
onel Parker  to  Agoo  by  road,  to  cut  off  Aguinaldo  if 
possible  and  to  co-operate  with  Young.  Young  seems 


8 


II4  Our  Ferocious  Filipino  Friends. 

very  sanguine.  He  will  at  least  make  Aguinaldo  very 
unhappy.  It  is  my  opinion  that  Aguinaldo  should  be 
followed  every  moment  from  this  time.  He  should  not 
be  permitted  to  establish  himself  at  any  point  or  again 
organize  a government  or  an  army.  Wherever  he  can 
go  an  American  soldier  can  follow,  and  there  are  many 
who  are  anxious  to  undertake  the  service. 

“In  this  connection  I can  not  forget  the  Maccabebes, 
'who  have  distinguished  themselves  from  the  moment  of 
their  employment,  and  are  now  our  main  reliance  and 
support.  They  have  been  well-behaved,  loyal,'  and  act- 
ive, notwithstanding  that  they  have  been  maligned  and 
are  falsely  accused  by  the  insurgents,  who,  I am  satisfied, 
have  themselves  committed  outrages,  representing 
themselves  to  be  Maccabebes.  After  leaving  Young  at 
eleven  A.  M.  yesterday,  I rode  through  to  San  Jacinto, 
where  I expected  to  meet  and  confer  with  Wheaton, 
but  found  he  had  come  back  to  this  place.  I rode 
through,  arriving  at  this  place  about  dark,  having  been 
in  the  saddle  about  eighteen  hours.” 

On  November  2ist  the  following  communication  was 
received  from  General  Lawton,  by  boat  from  Dagupan : 

“Headquarters  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps, 

“(In  the  Field)  San  Fabian,  November  19,  1899. 

“Chief  of  Staff,  Manila : 

“I  was  enabled  to  leave  the  point  where  I was  water- 
bound  the  night  of  the  17th,  and  proceeded  at  once  in 
quest  of  General  Young.  I overtook  him  at  Pozorrubio 
at  ten  A.  M.,  the  i8th,  just  ready  to  leave  on  trail  of 
Aguinaldo.  He  seemed  to  be  satisfied  that  he  was  on 


Our  Ferocious  Filipino  Friends.  115 

the  right  trail,  and  that  Aguinaldo  had  actually  passed 
out  in  the  direction  indicated.  I inclose  a copy  of  state- 
ment made  by  a prominent  citizen  of  the  place,  the 
truth  of  which  I have  no  reason  to  doubt.  I greatly 
regret  that  the  insurgents  were  not  ‘shut  up  in  the  rail- 
road country'  by  the  troops  ‘at  the  north,’  as  I was  as- 
sured they  would  ‘probably’  be,  in  General  Otis’s  com- 
munication of  the  2cf  instant,  or  that  they  did  not  hold 
the  points  occupied  by  them,  from  which  they  were 
almost  immediately  withdrawn.  Hearing  nothing,  how- 
ever, from  the  column  in  the  north.  General  Young  with- 
out hesitation  pushed  rapidly  across  the  Agno  River, 
and  occupied  the  country  to  or  near  the  coast;  not  in 
time,  however,  to  make  the  necessary  dispositions  to 
intercept  Aguinaldo,  who  passed  out  via  Urdaneta, 
Manaoag,  and  Pozorrubio,  with  Young  in  hot  pursuit 
and  fighting  with  his  rear  guard.  Aguinaldo  will  prob- 
ably strike  the  main  coast  road  at  Agoo,  where  the  trail 
on  which  he  now  is  comes  into  said  road.” 

“Bautista,  December  6,  1899. 
“General  Schwan,  Chief  of  Staff,  Manila : 

“Colonel  Bell  reports  something  like  circumstantial 
hearsay  evidence  to  the  effect  that  Aguinaldo’s  wife,  ac- 
companied by  Zizialcita,  an  adjutant,  passed  through 
Mangatarem  some  time  since,  en  route  to  Orani,  with 
a view  to  escape  therefrom  to  Cavite  or  Batangas  prov- 
inces, or  possibly  to  Hong  Kong;  that  they  were  sup- 
plied with  valuable  jewelry  and  twenty  thousand  dollars 
in  gold.  The  same  people  expressed  belief  that  Agui- 
naldo, in  disguise,  has  gone  the  same  way  with  a view 


ii6  Our  Ferocious  Filipino  Friends. 

to  reaching  the  same  destination.  The  movement  of 
my  column  in  Bataan  and  Zambales  may  expedite  flight 
of  fugitives  if,  by  chance,  they  are  moving  as  reported, 
in  which  light  possibility  of  intercepting  them  is  sug- 
gested if  thev  should  attempt  embarkation  on  coast  of 
Bataan.  ' LAWTON.’^ 


CHAPTER  XII. 


THE  THEODORO  SANDICO  POLICY. 

The  Intrigues  and  Theories  of  the  Filipino  Hong  Kong 
Junta  before  the  War — Prearranged  Scheme  to 
Play  an  lago  Part — The  Terms  on  which  Agui- 
naldo  would  have  been  Our  Ally — Suggestion  of 
Percentages  in  Business  Matters,  and  the  Logic  of 
it  as  Applied  to  the  Offer  of  Two  Provinces  and 
the  Customs  Duties  of  Manila  for  Recognition  by 
the  United  States  of  the  Hong  Kong  Junta  as  the 
Philippine  Republic — Letter  by  Aguinaldo  to  San- 
dico,  written  in  Tagalog,  Confessing  he  hardly  Un- 
derstands Spanish — The  Letter  seems  to  make  Cer- 
tain that  the  Dictator  only  well  Understands  the 
Language  of  his  Own  Tribe. 

IT  is  of  much  consequence  to  examine  all  sources  of 
authentic  information,  in  measuring  up  the  quality  - 
of  civilization  that  the  most  enlightened  of  the  Philip- 
pine leaders  possess.  They  have — from  Aguinaldo  to 
the  subalterns,  so  far  as  we  know  them,  in  all  branches 
of  insurrectionary  service  against  ourselves,  as  well  as 
in  their  conflicts  with  the  Spaniards — had  a great  deal 
to  say  of  all  the  fine  things  that  they  have  heard  of,  held 
in  favor  by  the  people  of  the  Americas  and  of  Europe. 
They  pose  as  humanitarians,  profess  sympathy  with  the 
downtrodden,  assume  that  they  are  civilized  creatures 
and  merciful  even  in  combat.  They  claimed  our  good 
offices  at  the  beginning  of  our  association  with  them, 

117 


ii8  The  Theodoro  Sandico  Policy. 

when  it  was  not  questioned  that  they  were  antagonists 
of  Spaniards;  that  they  conducted  warfare  upon  rather 
Christian  and  philanthropic  principles.  Aguinaldo  re- 
peatedly promised  all  our  consuls  he  met  that  there 
should  be  no  barbarism  on  the  part  of  the  natives  al- 
lowed to  discredit  their  struggle  for  liberty.  So  far  as 
proclamations  went,  he  kept  his  word,  except  in  his 
denunciations  of  all  Filipinos  who  held  any  communi- 
cation whatever  with  Spaniards.  Such  offenders  were 
to  be  executed  at  once,  and  their  corpses  were  made 
conspicuous,  bearing  the  label  “traitor.”  It  is  now  evi- 
dent that  the  object  of  Aguinaldo  in  prescribing  such  ter- 
rible penalties  for  talking  with  Spaniards,  meant  simply 
he  wanted  a monopoly  of  intercourse  between  the  Span- 
ish and  those  he  was  pleased  to  call  “my  beloved  peo- 
ple.” He  had  the  same  cautiousness  in  this  respect  that 
he  had  when  compelled  by  his  fellow-committeemen, 
Avho  called  themselves  a Republic  at  Hong  Kong,  not 
to  go  to  Cavite  without  a contract  with  Admiral  Dewey. 
Then  he  made  it  a condition  that  no  one  should  go  with 
him  he  did  n’t  want,  and  that  no  one  should  be  per- 
mitted to  refuse  to  go  that  he  did  want.  He  was  playing 
a double  game  then.  The  official  minutes  of  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  Hong  Kong  Committee,  who  had  con- 
verted their  Club  into  a “Government,”  examined  in 
connection  with  circumstances  throwing  sidelights  es- 
tablished that  the  celebrated  journey  of  Aguinaldo  to 
Singapore  was  a private  enterprise  on  his  part  to  open 
negotiations  with  the  Spaniards.  Undoubtedly  he  pre- 
pared the  way  for  overtures  from  himself  to  the  new 
Captain-General  Augustin.  The  old  Captain-General, 
Rivera,  the  one  with  whom  he  had  made  the  treaty — 


The  Theodoro  Sandico  Policy.  119 

or  rather  Paterno  negotiated  it,  and  he  approved  it  and 
carried  off  the  cash — had  promised  in  the  so-called 
“protocol”  to  remain  in  the  island  and  see  that  the  ad- 
ditional money  was  paid  and  execute  the  Spanish  re- 
forms that  were  promised,  but  Rivera  never  meant  any- 
thing by  the  stipulated  reformation,  and  Aguinaldo 
never  expected  anything.  Each  knew  the  other  was  a 
cheat,  and  strove  to  outwit  his  fellow  “pacificator.” 
Rivera  took  flight  to  Spain — knew  all  the  time  he  was 
going,  made  of  the  treaty  his  own  last  scheme  for  get- 
ting money  for  himself  and  associates,  and  then  sneered 
at  the  Filipinos  from  Madrid. 

Aguinaldo  seems  to  have  been  at  a tolerably  early 
date  aware  that  the  strained  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain  would  culminate  in  war.  What 
he  desired  and  worked  for  with  intensity,  was  to  take 
all  the  chances  between  the  two  to  gain  an  advantage 
for  himself  and  those  who  were  about  him,  and  had  al- 
ready gone  through  the  motions  and  the  forms  of  organ- 
izing a “Government”  that  they  desired  above  all  things 
should  be  “recognized”  as  one  of  “the  nations  of  the 
earth”  by  one  of  the  “great  Powers.”  He  was  moving 
in  that  direction — on  that  line  of  policy— November  3, 
1897,  when  he  sent  Agoncillo  from  his  quarters  in  Hong 
Kong  to  those  of  the  American  consul,  Wildman,  to 
propose  a contract  for  guns  to  be  immediately  attended 
to,  and  also  at  the  same  time  to  offer  the  United  States 
two  Filipino  provinces  and  the  revenues  of  Manila, 
about  two  million  dollars  a year,  to  obtain  the  recog- 
nition of  their  self-ordained  and  appointed  Junta  as  the 
Republic  of  the  Philippines.  The  two  provinces,  un- 
doubtedly, were  Manila  and  Cavite,  much  the  most  im- 


120 


The  Theodoro  Sandico  Policy. 


portant  in  the  island,  very  populous  and  of  commanding 
situation.  It  naturally  seemed  to  this  new  Government, 
that  (according  to  their  official  minutes)  was  composed 
of  sixteen  persons,  the  provinces  would  be  a great 
temptation  to  a country  with  a reputation  for  acquisitive- 
ness of  territory  like  the  United  States.  Aguinaldo  was 
in  the  position  of  the  devil  on  the  mountain.  ITe- could 
give  away  the  two  provinces,  just  the  same  as  the  devil 
could  give  away,  the  whole  world,  and  the  consideration 
of  this  audacious  and  most  impudent  presumption  gives 
the  key  to  Aguinaldo’s  character  in  the  first  attempted 
transaction  reported  officially  with  the  United  States. 
He  had  concealed  himself  in  the  matter,  and  put  forward 
Agoncillo,  having  “empowered  him  with  power”  (a 
phrase  that  Agoncillo  applied  to  himself)  to  make 
treaties.  Much  has  been  said  of  the  vast  and  varied 
knowledge  of  Aguinaldo  of  the  Constitution  and  Ad- 
ministration of  the  American  Government;  but  he  do  nT 
seem  to  have  known  enough  to  know  that  the  Amer- 
ican consuls  were  not  one  and  all  empowered  to  make 
treaties,  and  to  ratify  them  for  the  Government,  which 
they  represented,  and  he  implied  that  he  thought  they 
might  as  well  make  money  in  it,  and  he,  doubtless,  ex- 
pected to  get  an  ample  share  of  the  cash  that  the  United 
vStates  would  have  in  hand,  in  case  they  accepted  and 
occupied  and  possessed  the  two  provinces  he  graciously 
tendered. 

His  Spanish  education  taught  him  there  would  be 
millions  to  divide,  and  he  associated  this  very  large 
transaction  with  his  initiative  looking  to  a gun  contract. 
It  is  n’t  quite  clear  what  he  meant  about  those  guns, 
but  he  wanted  a contract  for  guns.  Perhaps  the  basic 


The  Theodoro  Sandico  Policy. 


I2I 


proposition  in  his  mind  was  that  a gun  contract  might 
be  made  to  include  all  the  money  he  and  his  associates 
got  from  the  Spaniards  when  they  sold  their  guns  to 
make  peace.  If  they  were  to  have  an  army,  of  course 
they  needed  guns,  and  wanted  them  landed  at  a ‘‘spot 
in  Luzon.’’  It  would  have  been  quite  easy,  if  the  Amer- 
icans had  not  been  liberal  when  the  allottment  of  surplus 
money  was  made,  to  have  sold  the  guns  to  the  Span- 
iards; that  is,  to  have  sold  the  secret  of  the  location 
where  they  were,  and  allowed  the  Spaniards  the  pleasure 
of  picking  them  up.  But  the  characteristic  feature  in 
the  proposal  for  the  gun  contract  was  the  offer  of 
twenty-five  or  thirty  per  cent  of  the  money.  The  phrase 
used  was,  that  the  United  States  was  to  get  this  money. 
It  really  was  an  offer  deeply  disguised  to  bribe  the 
American  consul,  who  dutifully  at  once  wrote  the  whole 
truth  about  it  to  the  Government.  Inside  of  this  was 
the  subtle  suggestion  that  if  the  bargain  was  consum- 
mated all  round,  Mr.  Wildman  kindly  making  and  sign- 
ing the  treaty  for  the  United  States,  and  Agoncillo 
doing  the  same  thing  for  the  Republic  of  the  Philip- 
pines, and  the  United  States  recognized  the  Hong  Kong 
Club  as  a Republican  form  of  Government,  Aguinaldo, 
Agoncillo  and  Company,  would  in  equity  and  through 
common  sympathy  reasonably  claim  and  secure  twenty- 
five  or  thirty  per  cent  of  the  value  of  the  two  provinces, 
and  unto  them  would  be  annexed  the  other  provinces, 
and  Aguinaldo  would  be  the  Viceroy  of  the  Great 
Northern  Republic  and  live  in  the  Captain-General’s 
Palace. 

With  such  inducements,  of  course,  he  would  betray 
the  Spaniards,  no  matter  what  negotiations  he  might 


122 


.The  Theodoro  Sandico  Policy. 


have  had  with  them;  no  particular  concern  about  what- 
ever oaths  he  had  taken.  With  a treaty  amounting  to 
this,  no  doubt  Aguinaldo  Would  have  gone  with  all  his 
energy  as  an  ally  of  the  United  States,  and  he  and 
Uncle  Sam  would  have  shared  and  shared  alike  the 
Spanish  spoil.  It  is  to  be  remarked  that  when  the 
self-appointed  President  of  the  Philippines,  duly  con- 
firmed in  his  High  Office  by  the  sixteen  members  of  the 
Club,  who  were  converted  by  a resolution  of  their  own 
into  the  Cabinet  and  military  officers  and  Great  Digni- 
taries, Potentates  and  Plenipotentiaries  of  the  Govern- 
ment, which  was  of  themselves  and  for  themselves — 
when  this  Supreme  Official  started  to  Singapore,  he  had 
heard  from  the  American  consul,  who  had  heard  from 
Washington  in  response  to  the  flattering  propositions 
that  had  been  made  for  the  alliance  and  strict  co-oper- 
ation of  the  two  Governments,  the  Republic  of  the 
Philippines  and  the  Republic  of  the  United  States,  and 
that  the  latter  contemptuously  declined  the  great  gun 
contract  and  the  two  provinces,  and  ruthlessly  rejected 
the  whole  magnificent  scheme  to  combine  two  Repub- 
lics, to  crush  out  Spain  and  take  charge  of  Oriental 
affairs  and  divide  the  profitableness. 

We,  the  people  of  the  United  States,  were  not  en- 
abled at  first,  or  indeed  until  the  official  dispatches  were 
published  and  the  documents  captured  by  our  soldiers 
at  the  various  Aguinaldo  Capitals,  to  point  out  just 
the  point  at  which  Aguinaldo  made  up  his  mind  that 
his  first  choice  of  a partner  in  the  war-dance  that  was 
coming  off  was  not  the  United  States,  but  his  old  friend, 
Spain.  Aguinaldo,  therefore,  set  off  to  Singapore,  and 
entered  into  “negotiations”  there,  as  he  pretended. 


The  Theodoro  Sandico  Policy.  123 

through  the  American  Consul,  with  Admiral  Dewey,  but 
actually  through  the  British  renegade  Bray,  with  the 
Spaniards.  We  see  in  the  minutes  of  the  Hong  Kong 
meetings  precisely  how  this  scheme  worked  upon  the 
Dictatorial  mind,  why  he  went  to  Singapore,  why  he 
asserted  he  negotiated  with  Dewey — why,  when  he  got 
back  to  Hong  Kong,  and  found  that  the  American  fleet 
had  annihilated  that  of  Spain,  he  felt  that  all  his  plans 
had  gone  awry,  and  was  compelled  by  this  change  in 
affairs,  which  he  had  evidently  not  anticipated  or 
dreamed,  to  change  his  program  of  Imperial  conduct, 
as  the  President  of  a Hong  Kong  Club,  into  a profes- 
sion of  intense  friendship  and  admiration  for  and  de- 
votion to  the  Americans.  The  Hong  Kong  minutes, 
duly  recorded  in  what  the  New  Republic  officials  termed 
their  “Book  of  Acts,”  display  this  state  of  facts  as  in  an 
illumination.  There  is  n’t  a point  in  the  narrative  now 
that  is  in  doubt.  The  case  is  a transparency  lit  up. 

The  first  move  of  Aguinaldo  was  an  effort  to  get 
what  he  called  a “contract”  with  Dewey.  This  was  a 
considerable  descent  from  the  lofty  altitude  on  which 
he  attitudinized  when  he  proposed  to  chuck  up  two 
provinces  in  a treaty  to  be  made  offhand  and  forever 
between  his  man  and  the  American  consul.  He  was 
beginning  to  get  down  to  the  facts,  but  he  does  not 
seem  to  have  immediately  ascertained  where  the  func- 
tions of  American  officers — naval,  military,  and  civil — 
ended  in  representing  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  in  making  treaties  that  our  Constitution  styles 
the  “supreme  law  of  the  land.”  He  may  not  mean  to 
falsify,  or  did  not,  but  he  did  falsify  when  he  said  Ad- 
miral Dewey  had  promised  him  to  help  him  acquire  the 


124  Theodoro  Sandico  Policy. 

possession,  Ihe  authority,  the  ruling  influence,  the  dic- 
tatorship, of  an  Independent  Philippine  Government. 
The  admiral  has  repeatedly  denounced  this  fabrication 
with  a good  deal  of  animation.  He  did  it  in  his  dis- 
patches, did  it  in  his  conversation.  • He  was  early  to 
inform  the'Government  that  he  had  not  the  confidencce 
of  Aguinaldo,  and  declined  to  co-operate  with  him  for 
the  capture  of  Manila  until  the  American  soldiers 
came. 

Right  here  Aguinaldo  parted  with  the  Admiral  in 
anger,  doubtless,  but  did  not  display  that.  He  was 
smooth  and  suave  and  cunning  in  certain”  phases  of 
politeness,  but  a mortal  enemy,  notwithstanding  his 
smiles.  Possibly  there  was  a phase  of  this  intercourse 
not  understood  by  the  Admiral.  Aguinaldo  seemed  to 
think  that  if  Wildman  allowed  him  to  sit  two  hours  in 
his  ofiice,  and  be  veiY^’  much  in  the  way,  and. was  given 
an  occasional  cigar,  and  told  good  morning  and  little 
things  like  that,  that  it  was  an  oflicial  recognition  by 
the  United  States  Government,  and  the  President  of 
the  Filipino  Club,  which  had  resolved  that  it  was  a sov- 
ereign Republic,  and,  therefore,  Aguinaldo  was  at  per- 
fect liberty  to  change  the  form  of  it,  has  only  asserted 
his  good  faith  in  accepting  the  salutations  of  the  Amer- 
ican admiral  as  a treaty  of  recognition  of  his  E Pluribus 
Unum  impersonation,  nine  millions  of  Filipinos  in  one 
man,  and  according  to  his  habit  issued  proclamations 
to  that  effect. 

It  is  a matter  of  concern,  gravely  so,  to  the  people 
of  the  United  States  to  be  able  to  analyze,  with  scien- 
tific certainties,  the  composition  of  General  Aguinaldo — 
the  ingredients  of  his  construction.  Much  depends 


The  Theodoro  Sandico  Policy.  125 

upon  his  faith,  and  perhaps  upon  his  interpretation  of 
his  oaths — his  sense  of  personal  and  official  obligation. 
It  is  well  to  follow  closely,  and  observe  studiously,  his 
facile  manners  and  methods  of  contradicting  himself, 
of  teaching  the  arts  of  conspiracy  to  his  followers,  giv- 
ing them  specific  and  artful  instructions  how  to  become 
traitors  and  carry  on  a game  of  treason;  of  his  re- 
peated proclamations  commending  falsehood  and  law- 
lessness, and  prescribing  secret  murderous  assaults, 
ordering  the  widespread  devastation  of  property  by  fire, 
and  more  than  all,  notwithstanding  his  frequent  voluble 
expressions  of  anxieties  to  be  merciful  and  esteemed  as 
an  enlightened,  civilized  being,  how  shall  we  be  sure 
that  it  means  anything  when  he  makes  profession  of  a 
change  of  policy  and  sentiment,  even  a passion  for 
peace?  It  is  n’t  the  first  time  he  has  done  that  sort  of 
thing.  Can  he  be  trusted  now?  If  he  had  command 
of  the  resources  of  a few  provinces  in  the  Philippines, 
and  was  permitted  to  hold  an  official  relation  to  the 
people  and  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
what  dependence  could  be  placed  upon  his  word  of 
honor — if  you  please,  his  oath?  The  most  fearful  oaths 
are  rather  frivolously  considered  in  the  Philippines. 
That  is  marked  in  their  many  secret  and  desperate  soci- 
eties that  did  not  all  grow  out  of  religious  prejudice,  or 
a care  for  self-defense.  The  torch  and  the  dagger  are 
their  insignia.  • 

One  of  the  most  instructive  associations  that  Agui- 
naldo  has  had  has  been  with  Mr.  Theodoro  Sandico. 
He  was  one  of  the  important  men  of  the  Hong  Kong 
Committee.  In  the  absence  of  Aguinaldo  on  his  Singa- 
pore expedition,  when  the  war  opened  between  the 


126 


The  Theodoro  Sandico  Policy. 


United  States  and  Spain,  Sandico  was  permitted, 
through  the  intercession  of  Consul  Wildman,  to  go  with 
the  admiral,  and  was  present  in  the  battle  of  Manila. 
He  had  a great  deal  to  say  about  the  af¥airs  of  the  Re- 
public, agreeable  to  Americans.  He  was  a plausible 
person  of  high  degree.  He  could  spin  as  many  fine 
phrases  as  Aguinaldo  himself,  in  the  same  Spanish  style. 
He  made  as  many  promises  and  professions  expressive 
of  his  loyalty  to  the  United  States  as  any  one.  It  is  to 
be  presumed,  he  w^as  one  of  the  friends  of  whom  Agui- 
naldo said,  they  were  “all  in  favor  of  annexing  the 
Philippines  to  the  United  States.”  A change  came  over 
the  spirit  of  his  dream,  and  soured  the  original  sweet- 
ness of  his  disposition.  He  is  the  author  of  the  much 
disputed,  but  absolutely  established  as  a verity,  murder 
order,  applied  to  the  women  and  children  of  Manila, 
the  ghastly  distinction  of  which  is  that  it  was  con- 
structed to  mean  that  white  women  and  children,  with- 
out any  other  identification  as  enemies,  were  to  be 
slaughtered.  Only  the  Filipino  families  were  to  be  saved 
from  the  massacre.  This  Theodoro  Sandico  is  a literary 
man,  and  wrote  many  letters.  He  was  the  friend  and 
adviser,  confided  in  and  influential  in  his  company,  and 
by  correspondence  a prominent  figure  in  the  Filipino 
“Government,”  and  familiar  relations  with  Aguinaldo 
developed  atrocious  propensities  on  the  same  line  with 
the  man  he  called  master,  and  with  whom  he  enjoyed 
fellowship. 

General  MacArthur  forwarded  to  the  War  Depart- 
ment in  the  summer  of  1900  a Sandico  letter — dated 
Central  Filipino  Committee,  Hong  Kong,  May  i6th — 
showing  that  Sandico  was  keeping  out  of  harm’s  way 


The  Theodoro  Sandico  Policy.  127 

as  far  as  he  could.  He  gave  a striking  sketch  of  Amer- 
ican politics  of  the  encouragement  of  the  insurgent 
Filipinos,  saying: 

‘T  communicate  to  you  as' most  important  the  state 
of  American  politics  with  reference  to  our  country. 
Above  all,  it  is  positively  assured  that  the  struggle  be- 
tween the  imperialists  and  the  anti-imperialists  continues 
with  implacable  fierceness,  the  former  feeling  greatly  en- 
couraged by  the  triumph  they  expect  to  obtain  for  the 
upholders  of  the  capitalists  in  the  coming  elections,  and 
the  latter,  firm  at  their  posts  of  honorable  aspirations 
and  not  dismayed  one  moment,  trusting  that  the  light 
of  justice  will  fall  upon  American  ears  ( !)  and  soon  pene- 
trate their  hearts,  carrying  good  for  all. 

'Tn  Congress  the  imperialists  have  set  forth:  That 
the  Philippine  Islands  are  not  a part  of  America,  but 
the  property  of  the  United  States;  that  expansion  is  in- 
herent to  the  genius  of  America,  and  gives  a certainty 
of  riches  for  the  future;  that  in  McKinley’s  hands  should 
be  placed  all  power  to  direct  the  future  of  the  islands; 
that  no  resolution  of  Congress  is  necessary  therefor; 
that  the  Archipelago  should  be  held  to  civilize  it  and  re- 
deem it  from  Tagalo  savages. 

“The  anti-imperialists,  on  their  part,  have  defended 
us,  wdiether  protesting  energetically  against  the  extrava- 
gant applause  of  the  imperialists  for  the  ideas  of  expan- 
sion; whether  opposing  the  policy  of  the  Administration 
wdth  regard  to  the  islands;  whether  making  inspired 
speeches  that  show^  that  the  retention  of  the  islands  will 
surely  bring  international  complications  and  constitute 
an  economical  error  for  the  United  States,  or,  inaugu- 
rating the  many  demonstrations  of  sympathy,  they  show 


128 


The  Theodoro  Sandico  Policy. 


that  the  spirit  of  upright  men  is  not  lacking  in  the  halls 
of  Congress.'’ 

It  appears  this  publicist  has  a fair  flow  of  the  lingo 
of  our  politics.  He  refers  to  a great  speech  by  a Boston 
man,  and  to  a Methodist  bishop  in  New  York  who 
spoke  of  the  Great  Father  of  all  races  and  their  rights, 
and  adds : 

‘‘They  say  that  McKinley  heard  the  sermon  with  a 
confused,  hypocritical  look  that  characterizes  him. 

“From  all  this  we  may  deduce: 

“i.  That  we  must  not  consider  the  armistice  except 
upon  condition  of  an  immediate  independence. 

“2.  That  now  in  America  proper  the  supporters  of 
our  cause  are  being  increased  in  number. 

“3.  That  the  victories  obtained  by  our  seasoned 
army  in  this  unequal  struggle  exercise  great  influence  in 
the  very  impressionable  mind  of  American  people. 

“4.  This  impression  is,  and  will  be,  one  of  the  de- 
termining causes  of  our  triumph." 

June  23,  1900,  Sandico  was  writing  again: 

“The  present  campaign  and  some  other  circum- 
stances have  created  in  America  a political  situation 
that  may,  perhaps,  produce  the  downfall  of  McKinley, 
which  will  signify  the  triumph  of  our  ideals. 

“I  believe,  moreover,  it  very  necessary  and  urgent 
that  we  send  a patriotic  call  to  all  local  residents  in  this 
zone,  that  they  lay  down  their  offlces  as  presidents  in 
the  briefest  possible  time;  failing  to  do  this,  they  must 
be  considered  as  suspects  and  as  supporters  of  the  Amer- 
ican cause. 

“In  conclusion,  I send  a copy  of  a letter  directed  to 
me  from  the  Central  Committee  at  Hong  Kong,  signed 


The  Theodoro  Sandico  Policy.  129 

by  General  Riego  de  Dios,  and  from  which  we  may  de- 
duce that  our  cause  prospers  in  America. 

‘Tf  the  re-election  of  Mr.  McKinley  be  accomplished 
and  the  revolution  in  China  be  wiped  out  and  the  war 
in  the  Transvaal  take  no  new  complications,  then  will 
I be  the  first  to  accept  the  peace  that  I believe  to  be 
necessary,  though  it  be  at  the  cost  of  acknowledging 
the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States,  since  I consider 
that  our  forces  are  now  impotent  to  defend  our  sacred 
and  legitimate  rights. 

“I  believe,  then,  that  under  the  conditions  so  favor- 
ably colored  by  the  present  circumstances,  it  is  necessary 
that  we  continue  the  struggle,  and  only  accept  peace 
on  the  base  of  independence,  although  under  an  Amer- 
ican protectorate. 

“In  planning  this  line  of  conduct  it  is  not  my  desire 
to  inaugurate  a campaign  against  the  noble  and  patriotic 
propositions  of  Senors  Paterno,  Buencamino,  and  Ve- 
larde; nor  do  I wish  to  signify  by  this  that  our  leading 
men  who  are  working  patriotically  for  peace  are  pro- 
ceeding on  a base  of  individual  considerations,  and  are 
so  simplein  political  matters  that  they  do  not  recognize 
the  present  favorable  circumstances. 

“I  take  my  leave  as  your  affectionate  servant,  whose 
hand  I kiss.  (wSigned,)  T.  SANDICO, 

“The  Superior  Chief  Republican  Guard.’’ 

The  exact  language  of  the  Sandico  order  is: 

“2.  Philippine  families  only  will  be  respected.  They 
should  not  be  molested;  but  all  other  individuals  of 
whatever  race  they  may  be  will  be  exterminated  without 
any  compassion  after  the  extermination  of  the  army  of 
occupation.” 

9 


130  The  Theodoro  Sandico  Policy. 

The  Secretary  of  War,  the  Hon.  Elihu  Root,  in  a 
public  speech  read  from  the  Treaty  of  Biac-na-Bato : 

Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  in  his  quality  as  Supreme 
Leader  of  those  in  the  Island  of  Luzon  now  waging 
open  hostilities  against  their  legitimate  Government, 
and  Don  Baldomero  Aguinaldo  and  Don  Mariano 
Llanera,  who  also  exercise  important  commands  in  the 
forces  mentioned,  are  to  cease  their  hostile  attitude, 
surrender  their  arms  that  they  are  using  against  their 
fatherland,  and  are  to  surrender  to  the  legitimate  au- 
thorities claiming  their  rights  as  Spanish  Filipino  citi- 
zens which  they  desire  to  preserve.  As  a consequence 
of  this  surrender,  they  obligate  themselves  to  cause  the 
surrender  of  such  individuals  as  actually  follow  them, 
and  those  who  recognize  them  as  leaders  and  obey 
their  orders.” 

The  program  prepared  and  signed  for  carrying  out 
this  treaty  was : 

“25th  December. — Departure  of  Don  Emilio  Agui- 
naldo and  his  companions,  with  Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno 
and  Don  Miguel  Primo  de  Rivera,  for  Lingayan,  where 
the  Spanish  Government  will  have  a merchant  steamer 
to  take  them  to  Hong  Kong,  the  gentlemen  going 
aboard  may  take  their  revolvers  and  the  two  rifles  asked 
for  by  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo.  On  the  departure  of 
these  gentlemen  from  Biac-na-Bato  the  Spanish  Gov- 
ernment will  give,  by  Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno  to  Baldo- 
mero Aguinaldo  a letter  payable  to  the  order  of  the 
Spanish-Filipino  Bank  upon  some  bank  in  Hong  Kong 
for  the  sum  of  $400,000,  the  cost  of  exchange  being 
charged  to  the  Spanish  Government,”  etc. 

August  31,  1899,  Aguinaldo  issued  an  elaborate 


The  Theodoro  Sandico  Policy.  131 

proclamation  from  Tarlac.  The  Americans  had  been 
compartively  quiet,  and  among  his  many  phrases  he 
said : 

“We  ourselves  are  prepared  to  encounter  any  diffi- 
culty and  to  fight  while  there  remains  a breath  of  life 
within  us. 

“The  Filipino  army  would  a thousand  times  rather 
succumb  in  the  defense  of  justice  than  live  without 
honor  and  in  slavery.  What  value,  in  truth,  have  we 
for  life  under  such  circumstances? 

“It  would  be  a pity  that,  after  three  centuries  of  ordi- 
nary life  with  our  old  mother  country,  Spain,  which  gave 
us  her  own  civilization,  to  allow  ourselves  to  be  domi- 
nated by  an  enemy  who  wishes  to  impose  upon  us  new 
ideas  and  customs;  for  example,  their  language,  which 
in  order  to  learn  one  has  to  return  to  his  childhood.’’ 

Here  are  three  things  pertinent  to  the  captivity  of 
Aguinaldo : First,  his  resolution  to  fight  while  a breath 
of  life  remained;  second,  a preference  for  death  to  slav- 
ery; third,  good  words  for  Spain.  He  added  this: 

“I  make  known  before  the  face  of  all  civilized  na- 
tions that  the  Filipino  Nation  does  not  forget  the  agree- 
ment of  alliance  and  friendship  concluded  by  me,  as  its 
representative,  with  Admiral  Dewey,  the  first  represent- 
ative that  came  here  from  the  United  States,  through 
the  American  consuls  of  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore. 

“Do  not  attribute  this  declaration  to  my  vanity,  but 
to  my  desire  to  fulfill  a former  promise.  This,  aside 
from  the  fact  that  the  struggle  for  the  independence  of 
our  country  is  just  and  based  upon  our  perfect  rights. 

“We  are  not  alarmed  by  the  numerous -arms  or  the 
valor  of  the  enemy.  What  is  life  to  us  if  we  are  to  be 


132  The  Theodoro  Sandico  Policy. 

the  slaves  of  the  foreigner?  It  is  a pity  that  all  the  en- 
lightened Filipinos  do  not  employ  their  knowledge  and 
experience  in  the  defense  of  their  country.” 

These  passages  prove  the  hostility  of  the  Hong 
Kong  Committee  in  part  to  date  before  the  departure 
of  Aguinaldo,  and  these  are  the  persons  taken  with 
him,  with  Agoncillo  left  behind  to  watch  those  who 
might  give  signs  of  the  peril  of  Americanization.  Al- 
ready war  with  the  United  States  was  contemplated; 
vSpain  eulogized;  and  Aguinaldo  has  not  lost  any  occa- 
sion when  he  could  put  forth  the  doctrine,  that  he  must 
die  fighting,  quoting  his  oaths  of  office. 

This  chapter  fitly  closes  with  a letter  written  by 
Aguinaldo  to  Sandico.  It  is  an  ''authenticated  verity.” 

"(Translation.) 

"Tarlac,  August  2,  1899. 
"Mr.  Theodoro  Sandico,  Santo  Domingo: 

"Respected  and  Dear  Sir, — I received  your  letter  to- 
day, and  immediately  take  my  pen  to  answer  it. 

"Do  not  believe  the  notices  you  have  received,  nor 
accept  them  as  true,  for  I have  heard  nothing  of  them. 
You  may  be  sure  that  I will  suppress  them  in  time;  that 
I will  not  allow  them  to  pass,  though  you  did  not  write 
to  me.  I am  disposed  in  defense,  for  I must  be  the  first 
of  all;  especially  now  that  you  are  involved. 

"Concerning  your  brother-in-law’s  letter,  I received 
it  to-day  with  yours,  and  thank  him. 

"Regards  to  all  of  you,  and  command  me  always. 

"(Signed,)  E.  AGUINALDO.” 


The  Theodoro  Sandico  Policy.  133 

“I  have  now  received  new  advices  which  say  that 
Mr.  Mabini  has  an  article  in  La  Independencia,  entitled, 
‘Something  for  Congress,’  which  says  that  he  criticises 
that  body,  apart  from  the  fact  that  this  should  not  be 
done  because  it  is  an  ugly  thing  for  our  country,  and 
that  it  is  an  obstacle  which  proves  that  we  are  not 
united,  I do  not  know,  for  I have  not  read  it  even, 
and  if  I wished  to  read  it  I would  not  understand  it  well, 
for  you  well  know  that  I hardly  understand  Spanish, 
and  that  they  say  the  said  article  is  signed  with  the  name 
Paralitico.  Your  comrade, 

“(Signed,)  RUBRICA.” 

This  letter  has  a curious  interest,  because  it  shows 
the  intimacy  of  Aguinaldo  with  Sandico.  They  were 
Talogs  together,  and  corresponded  in  that  language. 
The  letter  above  is  translated  from  Talog,  and  it  dis- 
poses, on  the  highest  authority,  of  the  claims  that  Agui- 
naldo is  a scholarly  man.  He  says,  “You  know  well  that 
I hardly  understand  Spanish,”  which  proves  the  truth 
to  be,  as  often  suspected,  that  the  Aguinaldo  literature 
was  translated  out  of  coarse  stuff  by  his  secretaries  and 
interpreters.  Practically,  there  is  no  Tagalog  literature, 
and  a man  who  knows  no  other  language  than  that  must 
have  a very  limited  range  of  information. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


AGUINALDO’S  SPLIT  ROCK  TREATY. 

The  Official  Filipino  Story  of  the  Negotiations  at  Biac- 
na-Bato — It  is  an  Exposure  of  False  Pretense, 
Treachery,  and  Bribery — Copied  from  the  Hong 
Kong  “Book  of  Acts” — Aguinaldo’s  Plea  not  to 
go  to  See  Dewey — Schedule  of  Property  Surren- 
dered, “225  Fire-arms” — The  Place  where  the 
Treaty  was  Made. 

[Official  Filipino.] 

“Act  of  Filipino  Committee,  in  Hong  Kong, 

May  5,  1898. 

“pvON  DORETEO  LOPEZ  Y PEREZ,  private  sec- 
retary  to  the  Filipino  Committee  established  in 
Hong  Kong  with  the  object  of  watching  over  the  inter- 
ests of  the  country, — 

“Certifies : This  to  be  a copy  from  the  Book  of  Acts, 
volume  one,  whose  literal  contents  are  the  following: 

“In  the  city  of  Hong  Kong  on  May  4,  1898,  were 
gathered  together  in  committee  the  following  gentle- 
men : Don  Filipe  Agoncillo,  Don  Mariano  Llanera,  Don 
Miguel  Malvar,  Don  Andres  Garchitora,  Don  Servo 
Buenaventura,  Don  Amastesio  Francisco,  Don  Teodoro 
Sandico,  Don  Maximo  Kabigting,  Don  Faustimo  Lich- 
anco,  Don  Antonio  Montenegro,  and  Don  Doreteo 
Lopez.  The  session  was  opened  by  the  temporary  presi- 

134 


Aguinaldo’s  Split  Rock  Treaty.  135 

dent.  The  temporary  secretary  read  the  following  act, 
which  was  unanimously  agreed  to : ‘The  temporary 
president  informs  you  that  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  has 
just  arrived  here  from  Singapore,  and  he  must  now  take 
possession  of  the  office  to  which  he  has  been  elected;  it 
is  also  necessary  to  fill  the  position  of  Vice-President, 
which  has  been  vacated  by  Senor  Alejandrino  (Don 
Jose),  since,  under  the  conditions  which  confront  the 
Filipines,  it  is  necessary  to  draw  to  the  side  of  this  com- 
mittee men  who,  by  their  ability,  can  throw  light  upon 
the  solution  of  those  most  important  problems  which 
the  Filipinos  must  now  consider.  In  view  of  these  cir- 
cumstances the  committee  proposes  the  election  of  a 
suitable  person,  whose  substitution  for  Senor  Alejan- 
drino will  give  universal  satisfaction.^ 

“When  the  votes  had  been  counted  it  was  found  that 
Don  Galicano  Apacible  had  received  ten  votes,  Don 
Arcadio  del  Rosario  two,,  and  Don  Justo  Lucban  one. 
Accordingly  Senor  Apacible  was  elected  by  a majority 
of  votes. 

“Then  on  account  of  the  unexpected  arrival  of  Senor 
Aguinaldo,  the  session  was  suspended  for  a few  mo- 
ments for  the  purpose  of  adjourning,  so  that  previous 
to  taking  their  oaths  they  could  take  possession  of  their 
respective  offices.  The  session  having  been  resumed, 
with  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  and  Don  Galicano  Apacible 
present,  the  following  oath  was  taken  by  the  two  latter, 
it  being  administered  by  the  temporary  president:  ‘You 
swear  upon  your  honor  to  be  faithful  to  our  fatherland, 
and  to  carry  out  loyally  and  faithfully  the  duties  which 
you  have  just  accepted.’  When  the  candidates  replied, 
‘We  swear  it,’  the  president  said,  ‘This  the  country 


136  Aguinaldo’s  Split  Rock  Treaty. 

offers  you  as  a reward,  and  if  you  fail  she  demands  it 
of  you.’ 

‘'When  this  ceremony  was  over,  Don  Filipe  Agon- 
cillo  turned  over  the  Presidency  to  Don  Emilio.  He 
and  Senor  Apacible  took  possession  of  their  respective 
offices,  after  having  expressed  to  the  gentlemen  of  the 
committee  their  profound  thanks  for  the  high  honor 
they  had  done  them,  promising  to  carry  out  faithfully 
all  of  the  duties  of  their  offices  as  far  as  their  poor  abil- 
ities would  permit,  since  they  held  those  charges  to  be 
most  sacred  ones.  The  President  described  the  nego- 
tiations which  took  place  during  his  absence  in  Singa- 
pore with  the  American  consul  of  that  English  colony; 
both  agreed  that  the  President  should  confer  with  the 
admiral  commanding  the  American  squadron  in  Mir 
Bay,  and  if  he  should  accept  his  propositions  as  bene- 
ficial, in  his  judgment,  to  the  Filipinos,  he  should  go  in 
one  of  the  cruisers  which  form  the  fleet,  and  take  part 
in  the  subsequent  events.  As  he  did  not  find  the  ad- 
miral he  thought  it  well  to  have  an  interview  with  the 
American  consul  in  this  colony,  but  was  not  able  to 
obtain  one. 

“Considering  the  critical  situation  in  the  Filipines 
at  present,  he  begged  that  the  Committee  would  decide 
whether  or  no  it  would  be  proper  for  him  to  go  into 
those  islands  with  all  the  leaders  of  prominence  in  the 
last  rebellion  now  resident  in  this  colony,  in  case  the 
admiral  gave  them  an  opportunity  to  do  so.  Senor 
Sandico  says  that  from  conferences  which  he  had  with 
the  admiral  of  the  American  fleet  and  with  the  Amer- 
ican consul  in  this  colony  he  believes  that  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  for  the  President  to  go  to  the  Filipines,  the 


Aguinaldo's  Split  Rock  Treaty.  t37 

situation  being  what  it  is,  since,  according  to  the  Amer- 
ican consul,  Manila  has  been  taken  by  the  fleet  and  a 
provisional  government  is  now  being  formed  in  that 
capital;  the  intervention  of  the  President  in  the  forma- 
tion of  that  government  is  undeniably  essential,  since 
his  prestige,  which  evej-ybody  recognizes,  will  evidently 
avoid  dissensions  among  the  sons  of  the  soil,  and  with 
it  will  be  obtained  a perfect  organization  for  the  military 
and  civil  development  of  that  country. 

“Senors  Garchitora  and  Apacible  expressed  them- 
selves in  about  the  same  terms.  Notwithstanding  the 
previous  remarks,  the  President  insists  that  he  considers 
it  dangerous  for  him  to  go  to  the  Filipines  without  a 
previous  written  agreement  with  the  admiral,  since  it 
may  happen  that  if  he  places  himself  at  his  orders  he 
may  make  him  sign  or  seal  a document  containing  pro- 
posals highly  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  the  father- 
land,  from  which  may  arise  the  following  grave  disad- 
vantages : 

^Tst.  If  he  accepts,  he  undoubtedly  executes  an  un- 
patriotic act,  and  his  name  will  be  justly  eternally  cursed 
by  the  Filipinos. 

‘‘2d.  If  he  refuses,  the  break  between  the  two  is  evi- 
dent. And  to  avoid  this  fatal  dilemma  he  proposes  to 
the  committee  that  the  four  committees  of  the  insur- 
gents now  here,  under  charge  of  heads  named  and  ap- 
pointed and  authorized  in  writing  by  him,  should  go  to 
the  Filipines  to  intervene,  by  means  of  conferences  with 
the  admiral,  in  these  most  important  questions.  These 
are  the  means,  he  thinks,  which  should  be  first  employed 
to  find  out  certainly  what  are  the  intentions  of  the 
United  States  in  regard  to  that  country;  and  if  his  inter- 


138  Aguinaldo’s  Split  Rock  Treaty. 

vention  is  necessary,  it  will  not  be  out  of  the  way  for 
him  to  go  at  once  to  the  Filipines,  procuring  by  such 
means  as  he  can  obtain,  this  he  will  arrange,  succor  for 
the  fatherland,  to  which  he  offers  and  always  will  offer 
willingly  the  sacrifice  of  his  life. ' 

“He  adds,  besides,  that  the  admiral,  there  being  no 
previous  contract,  may  not  divide  the  armament  neces- 
sary to  guarantee  the  happiness  of  the  fatherland;  if  this 
happens,  perhaps  he  will  be  under  the  necessity  of  taking 
a fatal  resolution,  fatal  to  himself,  since  nothing  could 
then  prevent  the  $400,000  being  claimed  by  the  Spanish 
Government  on  account  of  his  subsequent  conduct, 
quite  apart  from  the  attachment  against  that  sum  which 
Don  Ysabelo  Artacho  has  obtained  from  the  supreme 
court,  which,  yielding  to  his  claim,  has  suspended  the 
payment  of  this  sum  by  the  Shanghai,  Hong  Kong,  and 
Chartered  Banks,  although  that  suspension  of  payment 
can  only  operate  at  present  against  $350,000,  since  he 
holds  $50,000  in  his  hands,  a sum  which  he  drew  from 
the  Chartered  Bank  on  account  of  this  demand;  he  was 
not  able  to  draw  out  all  the  funds,  in  spite  of  the  need 
for  them,  because  the  directors  of  the  said  banks  ob- 
jected to  it,  the  attachment  being  in  force.  Two  hun- 
dred thousand  dollars  are  on  time  deposit  in  the  Hong 
Kong-Shanghai  Bank,  and  the  other  $200,000  are  in  the 
Chartered  Bank,  under  the  condition  that  he  can  draw 
from  that  sum  $50,000  every  three  months,  so  that  there 
remains  now  150,000.  Srs.  Sandico,  Garchitora,  Gon- 
zago,  and  Apacible  reply  that  it  thoroughly  agreed  upon 
with  the  admiral  of  the  American  squadron  that  he  is  to 
give  to  the  President  all  the  arms  which  he  needs,  since 
the  former  is  convinced  that  the  fleet  can  do  nothing  in 


Aguinaldo’s  Split  Rock  Treaty.  139 

the  Filipines  if  it  is  not  used  in  connection  with  the  in- 
surgents in  carrying  out  their  plan  of  war  against  the 
Spanish  Government. 

‘Tt  is  impossible  to  believe  that  the  admiral  will  be 
anything  but  pleased  to  take  the  President  and  his  lead- 
ers aboard  one  of  his  cruisers.  As  to  his  making  the 
President  sign  a document  containing  agreements  preju- 
dicial to  the  Filipinos,  the  gentlemen  present  think  that 
can  not  occur  when  one  considers  the  degree  of  culture 
and  civilization  of  the  admiral,  and  if  it  does  occur  after 
all,  the  President  may  refuse,  stating  that  in  this  colony 
there  is  a committee  which  carries  on  the  functions  of 
government,  which  is  charged  with-  all  political  ques- 
tions, and  with  which  it  is  necessary  to  first  come  to  an 
understanding.  The  authority  to  treat  which  the  Presi- 
dent thinks  of  giving  to  the  other  chiefs,  without  re- 
flecting at  all  upon  their  personal  deserts,  they  do  not 
believe  can  be  as  effective  as  his  personal  attention  to 
the  matter,  to  such  serious  affairs  as  those  which  are  the 
subject  of  discussion.  There  will  be  no  better  occasion 
than  the  present  for  the  expeditionary  forces  to  land  on 
those  islands  and  to  arm  themselves  at  the  expense  of 
the  Americans,  and  assure  the  attainment  of  our  legiti- 
mate aspirations  against  those  very  people. 

“The  Filipino  people,  unprovided  with  arms,  will  be 
the  victim  of  the  demands  and  exactions  of  the  United 
. States,  but  provided  with  arms  will  be  able  to  oppose 
themselves  to  them  and  struggle  for  their  independ- 
ence, in  which  consists  the  true  happiness  of  the  Fili- 
pines.  And  they  finish  by  saying  that  it  made  no  differ- 
ence if  the  Spanish  Government  did  claim  the  return 
of  the  $400,000,  and  if  the  claim  was  effectual,  since  the 


140  Aguinaldo’s  Split  Rock  Treaty. 

object  of  the  sum  would  be  secured  if  the  admiral  ob- 
tained for  the  Filipinos  the  arms  which  were  necessary 
for  them  to  struggle  with  to  obtain  the  satisfaction  of 
their  legitimate  aspirations. 

''Sehor  Agoncillo,  taking  into  consideration  the  rea- 
sons set  forth  by  Sehors  Sandico,  Gonzago,  Garchitora, 
and  Apacible,  that  in  the  present  circumstances  the  re- 
sult of  the  President’s  going  is  undoubtedly  dependent 
on  chance  in  the  actual  circumstances  so  critical  for  the 
country,  we  can  see  that  from  what  has  happened,  for 
probably  no  one  foresaw  a war  between  the  United 
States  and  Spain. 

'Tn  order  to  set  aside  the  difficulties  which  the  Presi- 
dent urges,  it  is  necessary  to  examine  the  benefits  which 
the  country  will  receive  and  the  ills  which  she  will  suffer 
if  the  President  goes  or  does  not  go  to  the  Filipines, 
and  this  must  be  done  without  losing  sight  of  the 
prestige  which  he  acquired  in  the  last  rebellion,  and 
which  is  so  deeply  rooted  in  the  soil  of  the  Filipines; 
and  if  we  weigh  in  a balance  the  ills  against  the  benefits 
we  shall  undoubtedly  discover  which  weighs  the  heavier. 
Once  the  President  in  the  Filipines,  with  his  prestige,  he 
will  be  able  to  arouse  those  masses  to  combat  the  de- 
mands of  the  United  States  if  they  colonize  that  country, 
and  will  drive  them,  the  Filipinos,  if  circumstances  ren- 
der it  necessary,  to  a Titanic  struggle  for  their  inde- 
pendence, even  if  later  they  should  succumb  to  the 
weight  of  the  yoke  of  a new  oppressor. 

“If  Washington  proposes  to  carry  out  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  its  Constitution,  it  is  most  improb- 
able that  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  colonize  the  Fili- 
pines or  annex  them.  It  is  probable  then  that  independ- 


Aguinaldo’s  Split  Rock  Treaty.  141 

ence  will  be  guaranteed;  in  that  case,  then,  the  presence 
of  the  President  is  necessary;  since  he  will  be  able  to  pre- 
vent dissensions  among  sons  of  the  soil  who  desire  place 
and  position,  dissensions  which  may  cause  the  interven- 
tion of  foreign  Powers,  which  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt 
would'  be  highly  prejudicial  to  patriotic  interests.  He 
will  save  that  country,  and  on  account  of  the  confidence 
placed  in  him  will  be  able  to  create  in  that  country  an 
organization  as  perfect  as  the  present  circumstances  will 
permit  and  adapted  to  the  new  conditions  there.  The 
conditions  in  the  Filipines  are  such  that  that  country 
calls  for  the  aid  of  her  strong  sons  in  controlling  her’ 
destiny,  and  not,  we  hope,  for  their  aid  in  guarding  her. 
What  injury  can  come  to  the  Filipines  even  if  the  ad- 
miral does  not  give  arms  to  the  President  on  account  of 
his  refusal  to  sign  a document  containing  an  agreement 
prejudicial  to  the  country,  if  he  has  first  taken  all  means 
to  provide  for  her  defense?  None. 

“Such  an  act  of  the  President  could  not  be  cen- 
sured, but  would  be  most  meritorious,  because  it  would 
be  one  proof  more  of  his  patriotism.  His  failure  to  go 
to  the  Filipines  at  the  present  critical  moment  would  be 
charged  to  want  of  patriotism ; the  fatal  consequences  of 
such  a charge  are  evident.  His  inaction,  even  momen- 
tary, could  be  attributed  to  criminal  weakness,  and  all 
these  things  would  destroy  the  glory  which  the  President 
so  worthily  conquered  in  the  last  rebellion.  It  must  be 
known  that  he  who  consecrates  himself  to  the  well-being 
of  his  country  must  risk  his  life  in  a thousand  ways,  and 
if  it  be  sacrificed  it  will  be  well  spent  and  will  be  eter- 
nally blessed. 

“Senor  Agoncillo  thinks  that  he,  in  a general  way. 


142  Aguinaldo’s  Split  Rock  Treaty. 

has  stated  the  advantages  which  will  accrue  to  the  Fili- 
pines  if  the  President  goes  there  in  the  present  critical 
circumstances,  and  the  considerable  dangers  which  are 
sure  to  arise  if  his  departure  is  postponed  for  even  a 
short  time,  for  in  that  time  may  arise  all  those  dangers 
which  his  presence  will  cause  the  country  to  avoid.  And, 
finally,  the  suspension  of  the  payment  of  the  funds  must 
be  agreed  to  and  reckoned  with  as  short  as  compared 
with  the  delay  caused  by  the  suit  which  Don  Ysabelo 
Artacho  has  entered  against  the  President,  as  shown. 
To-day  they  are  the  object  of  a suit  whose  end  can  not 
be  seen,  hence  skillful  measures  are  not  necessary  to 
arrange  for  those  funds,  whose  purpose  is  known  by  all 
here  present.  In  consequence,  no  good  will  arise  for  the 
country  by  waiting  for  the  time  w^hen  we  can  dispose  of 
these  funds,  while  the  problems  which  confront  the  Fili- 
pines  to-day  require  immediate  solution  by  those  of  her 
sons  in  whose  hearts  burn  the  sacred  fire  of  patriotism. 
On  account  of  the  reasons  given,  Sehor  Agoncillo  is  of 
the  opinion  that  Sehor  Aguinaldo,  with  the  other  lead- 
ers, can  go  in  one  of  the  vessels  of  the  American  fleet, 
now  that  one  is  offered,  and  asks  that  a vote  be  taken  to 
decide  whether  the  President  should  leave  the  manage- 
ment of  affairs  relating  to  the  policy  of  the  country  to 
this  committee  if  it  inspires  him  with  absolute  confi- 
dence to  manage  affairs  of  this  nature. 

“The  vote  having  been  taken  upon  this  proposition 
of  Sehor  Agoncillo,  which  was  also  supported  by  Sehors 
Gonzaga,  Sandico,  Garchitorena,  and  Apacible,  the  roll 
being  called,  the  proposition  was  unanimously  agreed  to 
in  all  its  parts.  Also  the  request  of  the  President  that 
absolute  freedom  be  left  him  as  to  the  choice  of  persons 


Aguinaldo’s  Split  Rock  Treaty.  143 

who  were  to  accompany  him  upon  the  next  expedition, 
was  unanimously  agreed  to,  and  his  request  that  none 
of  the  persons  named  by  the  President  for  this  expe- 
dition should  be  at  liberty  to  decline  to  go  was  also 
unanimously  agreed  to;  and  as  the  af¥airs  which  were 
the  subject  of  discussion  were  of  the  highest  public  im- 
portance, it  was  agreed  that  the  proper  act  should  be 
drawn  up  for  the  approval  of  those  taking  part  in  it,  and 
it  was  agreed  that  in  accordance  with  his  request  the 
President  should  be  given  a copy  of  the  said  act. 

''Emilio  Aguinaldo,  Felipe  Agoncillo,  Faustino  Lich- 
auco,  Andres  Garchitorena,  Galiciano  Apacible,  Se- 
vero  Buenaventura,  Gracio  Gonzaga,  Anastasio 
Francisco,  Tomas  Mascado,  Macimo  Kabigtin,  Vito 
Belarmino,  Miguel  Malvar,  Mariano  Llanera,  Teo- 
doro  Sandico,  Antonio  Montenegro,  D.  Eopez. 

"(All  duly  signed  with  rubrics.) 

"This  agrees  with  the  original,  and  by  direction  of 
the  committee  is  handed  to  Sehor  Emilio  Aguinaldo  for 
his  compliance. 

"In  Hong  Kong,  the  fifth  day  of  May,  eighteen  hun- 
dred and  ninety-eight. 

"The  temporary  President, 

"FILIPE  AGONCILLO. 
"The  temporary  secretary, 

"DORETEO  LOPEZ  PEREZ. 

"I  certify  that  this  translation  of  the  certified  copy 
of  this  act  found  among  the  papers  of  the  insurgent 
government  in  my  charge  is  correct  to  the  best  of  my 
ability.  "JOHN  R.  M.  TAYLOR, 

"Captain  Fourteenth  Infantry,  in  Charge  of  Insurgent 
Records. 

"Manila,  Philippine  Islands,  January  25,  1900.” 


144 


Aguinaldo’s  Split  Rock  Treaty. 


“Program. 

“Negotiations  at  Biac-na-Bato,  December,  1897. 

“14th  December. — Departure  of  D.  Ysabelo  Arta- 
cho,  with  the  approval  by  the  Ex.  Sr.  governor-general 
of  the  convention  of  peace. 

“i6th  December. — Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  issues  the 
order  proclaiming  peace  to  all  his  troops  in  the  various 
provinces. 

“23d  December. — Departure  for  S.  Miguel  de  Ma- 
yumno  of  the  Ex.  Sr.,  D.  Pedro  A.  Paterno  with  the 
Ex.  Srs.  generals  chief  of  the  general  staff,  Don  gelestino 
Fernandez  Tejeido  and  Don  Ricardo  Monet,  an  adju- 
tant, two  staff  officers,  and  Eieutenant-Colonel  of  In- 
fantry Don  Miguel  P.  de  Rivera. 

“24th  December. — Arrival  at  Biac-na-Bato  of  the 
most  excellent  Sehors  Generals  Tejeiro  and  Monet,  who 
will,  with  his  two  aides  and  adjutant,  be  met  and  re- 
ceived by  D.  Ysabelo  Artacho  and  D.  Jose  San.  Na- 
tividad. 

“25th  December. — Departure  of  D.  Emilio  Agui- 
naldo and  his  companions  with  D.  Pedro  A.  Paterno 
and  D.  Miguel  P.  de  Rivera  for  Eingayan,  where  the 
Spanish  Government  will  have  a merchant  steamer  to 
take  them  to  Hong  Kong;  the  gentlemen  going  abroad 
may  take  their  revolvers  and  the  two  rifles  asked  for  by 
Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo.  On  the  departure  of  these  gen- 
tlemen from  Biac-na-Bato  the  Spanish  Government  will 
give,  by  Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno,  to  Baldomero  Agui- 
naldo, a draft  payable  to  the  order  of  the  Spanish  Fili- 
pino Bank  upon  some  bank  in  Hong  Kong  for  the  sum 
of  $400,000,  the  cost  of  exchange  being  charged  against 
the  Spanish  Government. 


REBEL  CHIEFS  IN  RAILROAD  CAR  ON  THE  ROAD  TO  MANILA 


Aguinaldo’s  Split  Rock  Treaty.  145 

“27th  December. — The  above-mentioned  gentle- 
man^ having  left  the  port  of  Lingayan  and  having  ar- 
rived at  Hong  Kong,  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  will  tele- 
graph to  Don  Artemio  Recarte  in  order  that  he  may 
carry  out  the  following:  First,  the  turning  in  of  the 
arms  and  munitions  inventoried;  second,  the  execution 
of  the  order  of  Aguinaldo,  given  before  his  departure 
from  these  islands,  directing  the  surrender  of  all  arms 
remaining  in  the  hands  of  the  various  groups  of  insur- 
gents scattered  in  the  various  provinces;  third,  that  he 
may  notify  General  Tejeiro  and  the  other  gentlemen 
who  remain  in  Biac-na-Bato  that  they  may  leave  the 
said  town.  As  soon  as  the  officially  inventoried  articles, 
225  firearms,  2,382  cartridges,  and  20  pieces  of  ord- 
nance, and  2 swords,  are  turned  over  to  the  Spanish 
Government  at  Biac-na-Bato,  Don  Artemio  Recarte  will 
notify  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  in  cipher,  in  order  that  he 
may  draw  upon,  or  cash  the  draft  for  $400,000  guaran- 
teed by  the  Government  of  the  Filipines,  and  the 
captain-general  will  notify  Don  Miguel  Primo  de  Rivera 
and  Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno  that  he  has  received  the  arms 
mentioned. 

“Generals  Tejeiro  and  Don  Artemio  Ricarte  will  dis- 
tribute passes  and  guarantees  to  the  insurgents,  per- 
mitting them  to  go  where  they  see  fit. 

“As  soon  as  seven  hundred  men  and  arms  have  been 
surrendered,  at  least  half  the  arms  being  modern  fire- 
arms, Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno  will  be  given  two  checks 
for  the  like  sums,  $200,000  each,  which  will  be  good 
when  the  Te  Deum  is  sung  and  the  general  amnesty  is 
proclaimed,  which  will  be  as  soon  as  peace  reigns  in  the 
Filipines;  the  continued  existence  of  bands  of  Tulisanes 
10 


146  Aguinaldo's  Split  Rock  Treaty. 


(armed  robbers)  will  not  be  considered  as  a violation 
of  peace. 

“The  surrender  of  arms,  when  the  two  hundred  and 
twenty-five  arms  and  other  articles  inventoried  have 
been  verified,  will  be  made  to  the  commander  of  any 
body  of  troops,  and  will  be  made  on  triplicate  receipts — 
one  for  the  governor-general,  one  for  Don  Pedro  A. 
Paterno,  and  the  third  to  Don  Artemio  Ricarte,  to  whom 
the  governor-general  will  give  the  necessary  instruc- 
tions. 

“This  program  is  the  same  as  the  original  project 
by  the  Most  Excellent  Sr.  D.  Pedro  A.  Paterno,  with  the 
exception  of  insignificant  variations  whose  explanations 
accompany  them.  These  variations  are  made  in  agree- 
ment with  the  said  gentleman,  who  signs  it  at  Manila, 
14th  December,  1897,  with  the  General-in-Chief. 

“The . Captain-General : 

“FERNANDO  P.  de  RIVERA. 

“The  Arbitrator: 

“PEDRO  A.  PATERNO. 

“There  is  a seal  inscribed  ‘Office  of  the  Captain- 
General  of  the  Filipines.  Headquarters  of  the  General 
Staff.’  There  are  two  signatures — Fernando  D.  de  Ri- 
vera and  Pedro  A.  Paterno.” 

The  place  from  which  Aguinaldo  emerged  as  a great 
man,  having  conducted  negotiations  with  Captain-Gen- 
eral Rivera  so  successfully,  will,  of  course,  be  at  least 
a long  time  held  as  one  of  the  immortal  names — Biac- 
na-Bato,  or  “Split  Rock.”  It  is  described  by  General 
Lawton  to  be,  as  the  name  indicates,  a gigantic  cleft  in 
the  mountain  range,  forming  J^natural  fortification,  lo- 
cated south  of  Mount  Madlon,  Mount  Madio  being 


Aguinaldo’s  Split  Rock  Treaty.  147 

higher  and  to  the  rear  or  east.  There  are  no  inhabitants 
except  the  garrison.  Country  rocky;  no  crops;  plenty  of 
wood  and  water.  Was  successfully  held  January  8,  1897, 
by  sixteen  insurgents  against  nine  hundred  Spaniards. 
The  place  was  esteemed  impregnable,  owing  to  its  po- 
sition, but  was  taken  by  the  Americans,  and  Lawton 
ordered  it  to  be  held  until  the  surrounding  country 
could  be  examined.  Colonel  Hayes,  of  the  Fourth 
United  States  Cavalry,  telegraphed  from  San  Miguel, 
December  13,  1899,  to  Lawton,  who  transmitted  the 
dispatch  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  this  account  of 
the  capture  of  the  Split  Rock: 

^‘Headquarters  Fourth  Cavalry,  Biac-na-Bato, 
“December  12,  1899. 

“Adjutant-General,  San  Miguel: 

“Sir, — I have  the  honor  to  report  that  I arrived  at 
this  point  to-day  at  noon,  and  on  my  approach  was  fired 
upon  by  the  enemy  from  the  precipitous  height  of  the 
opposite  side  of  the  river.  It  was  impracticable  to  cross 
the  latter,  and  the  advance  guard  under  Lieutenant 
Arnold,  Fourth  Cavalry,  dismounted,  crossed  the  river, 
and  drove  the  enemy  from  the  commanding  position  on 
the  heights  that  had  been  reported  inaccessible.  Lieu- 
tenant Arnold  discovered  in  this  natural  stronghold  a 
storehouse  containing  the  following  property:  Ten  rifles, 
thirty  thousand  pounds  rice,  six  hundred  dollars  worth 
uniform  cloth  and  clothing,  a large  and  various  collec- 
tion of  tools  and  material  for  the  manufacture  of  ex- 
plosives, medical  supplies,  etc.  Major  Charles  Morton, 
Fourth  Cavalry,  with  a force  of  seventy  officers  and  men, 
dismounted,  will  start  at  daylight  to-morrow  morning 


148  Aguinaldo’s  Split  Rock  Treaty. 

to  reconnoiter  the  stronghold  beyond  the  point  reached 
by  Lieutenant  Arnold.  The  trail  leading  into  it  is  im- 
practicable for  all  kinds  of  troops,  except  foot  troops, 
and  is  extremely  difficult  for  foot  soldiers.  Lieutenant 
Arnold  deserves  credit  for  the  energy  and  persistency 
displayed  in  overcoming  all  the  obstacles  encountered. 
Apparently  the  enemy  has  been  collecting  supplies  in 
this  naturally  strong  defensive  position  for  several 
months.’’ 

It  was  here  that  Paterno  got  the  reputation  of  the 
Arbitrator.  The  defensible  character  of  the  position  gave 
it  a formidable  reputation  among  the  Spaniards,  that 
went  far  to  justify  the  use  of  so  much  money  as  was 
paid  to  Aguinaldo  to  give  it  up,  and  he  got  but  the 
smaller  share  of  the  sum  drawn  from  Spain  to  pay  for 
the  surrender,  as  the  army  and  equipment  of  Aguinaldo 
was  ludicrously  overestimated.  The  sum  “pacification” 
by  Rivera  cost  Spain  was  not  less  than  one  million, 
and  he  had  reported  he  was  authorized  to  draw  two 
millions;  and  it  was  asserted,  to  justify  the  large  invest- 
ment, that  an  army  of  one  hundred  thousand  would  be 
needed  to  take  the  Split  Rock.  Seventy  American  offi- 
cers and  men  took  it.  The  notion  that  military  positions 
might  be  sold,  as  Arnold  sold  West  Point,  prevailed  ex- 
tensively among  the  Filipinos.  General  Rio  del  Pilar 
wrote  to  an  acquaintance  in  Manila,  and  his  letter  went 
into  American  hands,  that  he  would  soon  take  the  town 
and  capture  the  archbishop  and  carry  him  off,  but  for 
one  million  dollars  he  would  hand  over  to  the  Amer- 
icans Aguinaldo  and  his  Government.  He  was  assassi- 
nated in  Aguinaldo’s  anteroom  because  suspected. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


AGuixALDO’S  FIRST  OFFICIAE  AP- 
PEARANCE. 

First  Reports  of  Him  by  American  Consuls  in  Asia — 
The  Peace  Bribe  Increased  the  War — There  were 
Others  wanted  Mexican  Silver — The  Offer  of  Two 
Provinces — General  Whittier’s  Official  Interview — 
State  Department  Heard  from — Anaylsis  of  Early 
Situation. 

IT  is  interesting  and  it  is  important  to  go  back  into 
the  correspondence  of  our  consuls  before  the  war, 
and  see  what  foundation  there  is  of  record  as  to  the 
character  of  the  Tagal  chiefs,  and  note  in  what  apparel 
and  for  what  purpose  they  first  appeared  in  our  official 
papers.  The  first  consular  report  about  the  Philippines 
is  the  first  document,  under  the  head  of  consular  cor- 
respondence in  the  Senate  peace  treaty  papers.  No.  62. 
It  is  interesting  as  being  the  earliest  official  information 
touching  the  Philippines  when  war  was  in  the  air,  and 
in  giving  it  we  omit  only  a few  lines  of  a personal  nature. 
The  date  of  this  paper  is  February  22,  1898.  This  was 
three  months,  lacking  three  days,  before  Aguinaldo’s 
return  from  exile,  and  he  had  been  absent  from  the 
Philippines  nearly  six  months. 

There  was  no* peace  after  the  treaty  of  Split  Rock, 
because  there  was  no  integrity  in  it  on  either  side.  Mr. 
Williams,  our  consul  at  Manila,  said  in  his  first  report 

149 


T50  Aguinaldo’s  First  Official  Appearance. 

that  mentioned  the  treaty  bargain  and  sale,  that  ‘‘cer- 
tain rebel  leaders  were  given  a cash  bribe” — and  then 
comes  this  striking  phrase — “to  consent  to  public  de- 
portation to  China.”  There  is  dishonor  in  every  word 
of  that  line  for  those  deported. 

Aguinaldo  cut  but  a small  figure  in  the  public  eye 
then.  But  he  got  the  ch'eck  bribe,  and  Mr.  Williams 
says,  “This  bribe  and  deportation  only  multiplied  claim- 
ants and  fanned  the  fires  of  discontent.” 

Aguinaldo  was  not  named,  but  indicated.  Here  is 
the  first  paper: 


“Consulate  of  the  United  States, 
“Manila,  Philippine  Islands,  February  22,  1898. 

“.  . . . Peace  was  proclaimed,  and  since  my 

coming  festivities  therefor  were  held;  but  here  is  no 
peace,  and  has  been  none  for  about  two  years.  Con- 
ditions here  and  in  Cuba  are  practically  alike.  War 
exists,  battles  are  of  almost  daily  occurrence,  ambu- 
lances bring  in  many  wounded,  and  hospitals  are  full. 
Prisoners  are  brought  here  and  shot  without  trial,  and 
Manila  is  under  martial  law. 

“The  crown  forces  have  not  been  able ‘to  dislodge  a 
rebel  army  within  ten  miles  of  Manila,  and  last  Satur- 
day, February  19th,  a battle  was  there  fought,  and  five 
left  dead  on  the  field.  Much  of  such  information  is 
found  in  my  longer  dispatch,  referred  to,  and  which  is  at 
your  command. 

“The  governor-general,  who  is  amiable  and  popu- 
lar, having  resigned,  wishes  credit  for  pacification,  and 
certain  rebel  leaders  were  GIVEN  A CASH  BRIBE 
of  $1,650,000  to  consent  to  public  deportation  to  China. 


Aguinaldo's  First  Official  Appearance.  151 

This  bribe  and  deportation  only  multiplied  claimants 
and  fanned  the  fires  of  dis^content. 

“Insurgents  demand  fewer  exactions  from  Church 
and  State,  a half  of  public  offices,  and  fewer  Church 
holidays,  which  seriously  retard  business. 

“A  Republic  is  organized  here,  as  in  Cuba.  Insur- 
gents are  being  armed  and  drilled,  are  rapidly  increas- 
ing in  numbers  and  efficiency,  and  all  agree  that  a gen- 
eral uprising  will  come  as  soon  as  the  governor-general 
embarks  for  Spain,  which  is  fixed  for  March. 

“OSCAR  F.  WILLIAMS,  Consul.” 

The  Spaniards  agreed  to  turn  over  double  the  sum 
of  money  they  paid,  and  the  insurgents  to  give  up  twice 
as  many  guns  as  they  had.  This  shows  the  character  of 
the  transaction. 

The  second  appearance  of  the  “new  Republic  of  the 
Philippines”  was  in  a letter  from  Consul  Wildman  to 
Secretary  of  State  Day.  It  is  presented  here,  with  the 
response  of  the  State  Department: 

“(No.  19.) 

“Hong  Kong,  November  3,  1897. 

“Sir, — Since  my  arrival  in  Hong  Kong  I have  been 
called  upon  several  times  by  Mr.  F.  Agoncillo,  foreign 
agent  and  high  commissioner,  etc.,  of  the  new  Republic 
of  the  Philippines. 

“Mr.  Agoncillo  holds  a commission,  signed  by  the 
President,  members  of  Cabinet,  and  General-in-Chief 
of  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines,  empowering  him  ab- 
solutely with  power  to  conclude  treaties  with  foreign 
Governments. 

“Mr.  Agoncillo  offers  on  behalf  of  his  Government 


152  Aguinaldo’s  First  Official  Appearance. 

alliance  offensive  and  defensive  with  the  United  States 
when  the  United  States  declares  war  on  Spain,  which, 
in  Mr.  Agoncillo’s  judgment,  will  be  very  soon.  In  the 
meantime,  he  wishes  the  United  States  to  send  to  some 
port  in  the  Philippines  twenty  thousand  stand  of  arms 
and  two 'hundred  thousand  rounds  of  ammunition  for 
the  use  of  his  Government,  to  be  paid  for  on  the  recog- 
nition of  his  Government  by  the  United  States.  He 
pledges  as  security  two  provinces  and  the  custom-house 
at  Manila. 

“He  is  not  particular  about  the  price — is  willing 
the  United  States  should  make  twenty-five  per  cent  or 
thirty  per  cent  profit. 

“He  is  a very  earnest  and  attentive  diplomat,  and 
a great  admirer  of  the  United  States. 

“On  his  last  visit  he  surprised  me  with  the  informa-  ^ 
tion  that  he  had  written  his  Government  that  he  had 
hopes  of  inducing  the  United  States  to  supply  the  much- 
needed  guns,  etc. 

“In  case  Sehor  Agoncillo's  dispatch  should  fall  into 
the  hands  of  an  unfriendly  Power  and  find  its  way  into 
the  newspapers,  I have  thought  it  wise  to  apprise  the 
State  Department  of  the  nature  of  the  high  commis- 
sioner’s proposals. 

“Sehor  Agoncillo  informs  me  by  late  mail  that  he 
will  proceed  at  once  to  Washington  to  conclude  the 
proposed  treaty,  if  I advise. 

“I  shall  not  advise  said  step  until  so  instructed  by  the 
State  Department. 

“I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  your  obedient  servant, 
“ROUNSEVIUUE  WIEDMAN,  Consul,” 


Aguinaldo’s  First  Official  Appearance.  153 

MR.  CRIDLER  TO  MR.  WIEDMAN. 

“(No.  23.) 

^‘Washington,  December  15,  1897. 

“Sir, — I have  to  acknowledge  receipt  of  your  dis- 
patch, No.  19,  of  November  3,  1897,  in  which  you  an- 
nounce the  arrival  at  your  post  of  Mr.  F.  Agoncillo, 
whom  you  describe  as  foreign  agent  and  high  commis- 
sioner of  the  new  Republic  of  the  Philippines,  and  who 
holds  full  power  to  negotiate  and  conclude  treaties  with 
foreign  Powers.  Mr.  Agoncillo  offers  an  alliance  ‘of- 
fensive and  defensive  with  the  United  States  when  the 
United  States  declares  war  on  Spain,  which,  in  Mr. 
Agoncillo’s  judgment,  will  be  very  soon,’  and  suggests 
that  twenty  thousand  stands  of  arms  and  two  hundred 
thousand  rounds  of  ammunition  be  supplied  to  the 
Government  by  that  of  the  United  States. 

“You  may  briefly  advise  Mr.  Agoncillo,  in  case  that 
he  should  call  upon  you,  that  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  does  not  negotiate  such  treaties,  and  that 
it  is  not  possible  to  forward  the  desired  arms  and  am- 
munition. 

“You  should  not  encourage  any  advances  on  the 
part  of  Mr.  Agoncillo,  and  should  courteously  decline  to 
communicate  with  the  Department  further  regarding  his 
alleged  mission.  Respectfully  yours, 

“THOMAS  W.  CRIDLER, 
“Third  Assistant  Secretary.” 

General  Whittier,  of  General  Merritt’s  staff,  called 
on  Aguinaldo  by  appointment  at  Malolos  (see  page  498, 
Senate  Document  62,  Treaty  of  Peace  papers),  and  had 


154  Aguinaldo’s  First  Official  Appearance. 

a business  talk  with  him.  There  occurred  between  the 
General  and  the  Tagal  tyrant  a thorough  conversation 
on  the  subject  of  the  American  protectorate  of  the 
Philippines.  General  Whittier  told  Aguinaldo  that  in 
a few  days  he  would  go  to  Paris  to  appear  before  the 
Peace  Commission  sitting  in  that  city,  and  the  General 
added  (we  quote  his  official  report  of  the  conversation) : 

^T  started  the  talk  by  announcing  to  Aguinaldo  that 
I was  to  leave  in  a few  days  to  appear  before  the  Peace 
Commission,  and  that  I had  a very  friendly  feeling  for 
the  Filipinos  and  admiration  for  many  of  their  good 
qualities,  their  quiet,  cleanliness,  temperance,  and  great 
imitative  power,  and  a possibility  of  learning  almost 
any  profession  oy  business;  that  I would  like  to  be  able 
to  present  to  the  Commission  his  and  his  people's  views 
and  demands,  and  what  relation  they  expected  to  hold 
to  the  United  States  in  case  we  decided  to  keep  the 
islands." 

It  will  be  noted  that  General  Whittier  expressed 
himself  very  fully  and  clearly.  He  says: 

' ^^Aguinaldo  replied,  rather  naively,  that  his  people 
were  divided  into  two  parties — those  in  favor  of  abso- 
lute independence  and  those  of  an  American  protector- 
ate; that  the  parties  are  about  equal;  that  he  is  waiting 
to  see  who  will  have  the  majority,  in  that  case,  to  take 
his  position." 

This  report  of  what  Aguinaldo  had  to  say  about  a 
division  of  opinion  between  independence  and  an  Amer- 
ican protectorate  was  nearly  two  years  ago.  Aguinaldo 
had  made  himself  troublesome  at  Bacoor,  and  his  re- 
moval to  Malolos,  it  is  evident  now,  was  a step  that 
meant  preparations  for  war  with  the  Americans.  He 


Aguinaldo^s  P'irst  Official  Appearance.  155 

found  he  was  not  to  be  admitted  to  Manila,  and  made 
choice  of  a position  on  the  railroad  from  which  he  ex- 
pected to  turn  and  capture  the  city.  He  was  engaged 
in  this  work  when  General  Whittier  called  upon  him, 
and  he  eluded  the  penetrating  question  asked  him  by 
saying  the  parties  among  his  countrymen  in  respect  to 
absolute  independence  or  an  American  protectorate 
were  about  equal,  and  he  was  waiting  to  see  who  would 
have  the  majority  to  take  his  position. 

Aguinaldo  has  this  habit  of  avoiding  giving  a 
straight  answer  to  a strong  question.  General  Whittier 
told  him  the  objections  to  Philippine  independent  gov- 
ernment that  existed,  and  says : 

‘‘I  pointed  out  to  him  that  it  would  probably  be  use- 
less to  try  to  bring  those  in  favor  of  absolute  independ- 
ence to  any  change  of  opinion,  but  they  must  consider 
that  they  are  without  any  navy  and  without  capital, 
which  is  greatly  needed  for  the  development  of  the 
country;  that  the  Philippine  Government  alone  did  not 
possess  the  element  of  strength  to  insure  the  retention 
of  the  islands  without  the  assistance  of  other  Govern- 
ments. They  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  any  of  half  a 
dozen  Powers  striving  to  take  either  a part  or  a whole 
of  the  islands,  and  they  must  consider  that  their 
greatest  prosperity  would  come  by  the  gradual  acces- 
sion of  power  under  American  auspices.” 

This  was  to  the  point,  and  Aguinaldo  was  disturbed. 
There  is  nT  a particle  of  doubt  that  he  had  already  fully 
made  up  his  mind  to  make  war  for  complete  independ- 
ence without  any  expectation  or  desire  to  please  the 
United  States,  but  it  was  too  early  for  him  to  avow  his 
purpose.  He  knew  perfectly  that  his  views  of  carrying 


156  Aguinaldo’s  First  Official  Appearance. 

on  a personal  government  could  not  be  acceptable  to 
the  people  of  the  United  States.  The  reply  of  Agui- 
naldo  to  Whittier  and  his  remarks  upon  a further  ques- 
tion are  of  sensational  pith  and  moment  now.  We  quote 
General  Whittier’s  report : 

‘‘He  said:  ‘But  the  civilized  nations  of  the  world 
would  see  that  our  possessions  were  not  taken  from  us.’ 

I replied : ‘Blow  has  it  been  in  China,  where  England, 
Russia,  France,  Germany,  etc.,  all  strive  to  control 
territory?’  To  this  he  could  make  no  reply.  I further 
asked  what  that  side  would  expect  America,  acting 
the  role  of  protector,  to  do.  He  said:  ‘To  furnish  the 
navy,  while  the  Filipinos  held  all  the  country  and  ad-  ^ 
ministered  civil  offices  with  its  own  people.’  ‘And  what 
then  would  America  get  from  this?’  said  I.  ‘That  would 
be  a detail,’  he  said,  ‘which  would  be  settled  hereafter.’  ” 

General’  Whittier  adds:  “We  pursued  this  subject  of 
a protectorate  for  some  time  without  getting  any  satis- 
factory results.  Mr.  Higgins,  a friend  of  Whittier,  who 
accompanied  him,  felt  that  Aguinaldo  had  been  simply 
repeating  a lesson,  but  I did  not  feel  so  sure  of  that. 
Buen  Carnino,  a close  friend  of  Aguinaldo,  was  not 
present  at  this  conversation,  but  came  in  and  gave  his 
opinion — he  was  an  intimate  of  Aguinaldo — that  the 
President  was  in  favor  of  an  American  protectorate.” 

It  was  on  the  5th  of  May,  1898,  that  Aguinaldo 
appeared  before  the  Committee,  or  Junta  of  Filipinos, 
in  Hong  Kong,  after  his  journey  to  Singapore,  which 
has  never  been  explained  consistently  with  his  honor. 
According  to  Bray — an  Englishman  devoted  to  much 
newspaper  writing,  who  had  known  Aguinaldo  in  Ma- 
nila, they  say;  and  Pratt,  the  American  consul,  who 


Aguinaldo's  First  Official  Appearance.  157 

seemed,  for  a few  weeks,  to  be  persuaded  that  he  was 
making  the  worJd  hum  like  a top — it  was  desirable  the 
public  should  theorize  to  the  effect  that  the  object  the 
Tagalo  chief  had  in  going  so  far  away  from  the  Amer- 
ican fleet  was  to  place  himself  in  communication  with 
Commodore  Dewey!  On  the  way  from  Hong  Kong, 
his  residence,  according  to  the  Paterno  treaty,  ‘‘during 
the  pleasure  of  the  King  of  Spain,”  Aguinaldo  stopped 
at  a Chinese  port,  and  there  is  no  trace  of  him  there 
that  his  friends  give,  and  no  knowledge  of  him  in  pos- 
session of  others,  because  he  was  not  known,  save  to 
the  extent  that  his  Mexican  silver  treaty  had  been  heard 
of.  Even  the  greater  part  of  that  was  credited  to  Pa- 
terno. The  role  of  Aguinaldo  in  it  was  a false  pretense. 
He  was  a pretender  that  he  had  a great  army,  and  was 
for  business  purposes  sustained  by  the  Spanish  officers. 

All  that  has  been  m.ade  known  of  that  which  took 
place  at  Singapore  during  Aguinaldo’s  visit  relates  to 
his  conference  with  the  British  writer,  Bray,  and  the 
influence  held  over  the  American  consul,  Mr.  Platt,  the 
cables  to  Dewey,  and  the  response  that  he  was  to 
“come  at  once.”  The  reason  for  the  words  “at  once”, 
was  revealed  when  the  Tagalo  got  to  the  home  of  his 
silver  cash  during  his  period  of  deportation,  and  dis- 
covered that  the  American  fleet  had  shattered,  burned, 
and  sunk  that  of  Spain.  Three  days  after  the  arrival 
of  this  pilgrim  he  met  the  Committee  formally,  and  got 
reinstatement  as  President — that  great  office  was  filled 
by  Agoncillo  in  his  absence — and  he  made  a report  of 
his  “negotiations”  with  Commodore  Dewey — at  Singa- 
pore— that  is,  through  the  x\merican  consul.  When 
told  it  was  the  opinion  of  his  compatriots  that  he  should 


158  Aguinaldo’s  First  Official  Appearance. 

make  haste  to  join  Dewey,  he  shrank  from  the  task, 
and  was  fourteen  days  making  haste  slowly  from  his 
silver-lined  exile  to  the  place  where  he  was  born.  There 
are  two  things  certain  in  this  case:  First,  that  Agui- 
naldo  had  at  least  an  intuition  he  did  not  want  the 
society  of  Dewey;  and,  second,  knowledge  that  the  busi- 
ness which  took  him  to  Singapore  was  not  about  rela- 
tions with  the  Commodore,  nor  was  it  to  invite  and 
promote  friendly  relations  with  the  United  States.  He 
had  been  some  months  before  justly  and  severely 
snubbed  by  the  State  Department  of  the  great  North 
American  Republic,  and  he  had  not  forgotten  it,  and 
the  Americans  had  never  heard  of  it,  for  in  the  consul 
reports  he  had  been  distinguished  in  his  alleged  position 
from  Hong  Kong  by  his  office,  and  riot  by  his  name. 
He  had  taken  up  his  residence  in  Hong  Kong,  at  the 
Spanish  expense,  in  September,*  and  in  November  had 
a new  Republic  ready,  and  “empowered”  Agoncillo  to 
make  treaties — draft,  and  sign,  and  ratify  them — and 
the  comprehensive  statesman  and  agent  wanted  two 
things — this  is  official — for  the  late  Hong  Kong  Consul 
Wildman  made'an  official  report  of  it.  The  first  thing 
was  a gun  contract,  the  United  States  to  furnish  and 
.smuggle  the  guns  into  Luzon,  and  accept  from  twenty- 
five  to  thirty  per  cent  for  money-making  compensation. 
This  has  until  lately  all  the  time  been  believed  to  be  a 
monstrous  proposition  to  our  Government  to  engage 
in  finding  arms  and  ammunition  for  the  insurgents  as 
against  Spain,  while  we  were  at  peace  with  that  king- 

* I find  the  fact  to  be  that,  in  Wildman’s  report,  he  must  have 
written  December ; and  the  typographical  error  of  September  in  the 
official  publication  has  been  very  misleading. 


Aguinaldo's  First  Official  Appearance.  159 

dom,  and  an  urgency  to  accept  a bribe  for  our  ami- 
ability toward  those  who  fought  against  oppression. 
There  is  now  a very  different  understanding.  Agui- 
naldo’s  captured  papers  show  he  was  for  Spain  as 
against  us,  and  the  true  purpose  seems  to  have  been, 
by  the  purchased  ‘‘ally”  of  Spain,  to  have  invested 
Spanish  money  for  the  use  of  Spain  in  the  war  against 
us.  It  would  have  been  a good  joke  on  Uncle  Sam 
to  have  bribed  him  to  smuggle  rifles  and  cartridges 
into  some  sequestered  spot  of  Luzon  to  be  used  against 
himself.  It  would  have  been  perfectly  consistent  with 
the  character  of  Aguinaldo  to  have  invented  and  carried 
out  such  a plot  as  this,  and  the  arms  could  have  been 
given  away  to  the  Spaniards  by  a timely  tip  of  friendly 
information.  Such  a service  would  have  been  highly 
appreciated  by  Spain,  and  a second  installment  of  the 
Mexican  dollar  treaty  fund  might  have  been  paid  as  a 
“bit  of  bread”  cast  to  the  consenting  exiles,  as  Captain- 
General  Rivera  said  in  the  Spanish  Cortes  a little  later, 
describing  his  dealings  with  the  exiles. 

It  may  be  said  to  discredit  this,  that  the  Spaniards 
had  many  guns  and  much  ammunition  in  Manila;  but . 
they  did  not  have  them  in  November,  1898.  The  large 
supply  of  Mauser  rifles  and  “clips”  arrived  but  a few 
weeks  before  the  war  opened.  Whatever  Aguinaldo 
meant  to  do  if  the  United  States  had  entered  into  the 
proposed  gun  contract,  it  was  on  his  part  an  infamy, 
and  ^was  so  treated  by  our  State  Department.  Assistant 
Secretary  Cridler  wrote  Consul  Wildman  a note  of 
warning  not  to  have  anything  to  do  with  such  a person. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

First  proof  aguinaldo’S  treachery. 


He  Says  he  Made  Cash  Treaty  on  Account  Scant  Re- 
sources— His  People  to  be  Free  had  to  Submit  to 
Him — Make  Him  a Despot,  and  he  would  be  a 
Republican — His  Letter  to  General  Rios,  of  Iloilo, 
Proves  him  Traitor. 

ON  the  25th  of  May,  1898,  Admiral  Dewey  mailed 
to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  three  of  Aguinaldo’s 
proclamations;  and  this  incident  of  formally  forward- 
ing information  has  been  one  of  the  points  in  the  Fili- 
pino contention  that  the  admiral  recognized  the  Tagalo 
chief  as  the  President  of  the  Filipino  Republic,  assumed 
at  Hong  Kong  to  exist.  A translation  by  Captain  John 
R.  M.  Taylor,  Fourteenth  U.  S.  A.,  “in  charge  of  In- 
surgent records,”  differs  slightly,  but  not  materially, 
from  the  first  version  published.  According  to  Captain 
Taylor,  the  proclamation  of  Aguinaldo  of  May  24th 
opened  with  these  words : 

“My  Dear  Countrymen, — I accepted  the  peace  pro- 
posed by  Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno,  together  with  the 
captain-general  of  these  islands,  under  certain  condi- 
tions, in  consequence  of  which  I laid  down  the  arms 
and  dissolved  the  forces  placed  immediately  under  my 
orders,  because  I believed  that  this  would  be  more  bene- 
ficial to  the  country  than  to  keep  up  the  insurrection 
which  was  being  carried  out  with  very  scant  resources; 

160 


AGUINALDO’S  HEADQUARTERS  AT  TAREAC. 


First  Proof  Aguinaldo’s  Treachery.  i6i 


but  on  account  of  want  of  compliance  with  some  of 
these  conditions,  some  forces  were  discontented  and  did 
not  surrender  their  arms,  and  because  now,  after  the 
passage  of  five  months,  none  of  the  . . . 

This  was  a smoothing  over  of  the  fact  that  Paterno 
had  differed  with  him  about  the  Spanish  money,  claim- 
ing that  those  left  behind  to  confront  the  Spaniards 
were  more  deserving  than  they,  who,  consenting  to 
'exile  at  the  expense  of  Spain,  took  the  treaty  money 
with  them.  It  was  in  this  proclamation  that  Aguinaldo 
proclaimed  for  the  United  States  these  principles  to 
govern  us  in  the  Philippines: 

“I  see  that  the  Spanish  Government  is  unable  to 
struggle  with  certain  elements  which  constantly  op- 
pose the  progress  of  this  country,  and  whose  deadly  in- 
fluence has  been  one  of  the  causes  of  a rising  of  its 
masses,  and  now  since  the  powerful  and  great  North 
American  Nation  has  come  showing  a disinterested  pro- 
tection, which  will  enable  us  to  secure  the  liberty  of  this 
country,  I come  to  assume  the  command  of  all  the 
forces,  ready  to  insure  the  attainment  of  our  revived 
aspirations.  I establish  a dictatorial  government.’^ 

Before  concluding,  the  Dictator  stated  that  when 
the  islands  ‘diave  been  brought  completely  under  my 
Government,  we  shall  be  able  to  form  a constituent 
republican  assembly;”  and  when  this  happened,  he 
would  ‘'resign  the  command  of  these  same  islands.”  This 
was  “given  at  Cavite,”  five  days  after  Aguinaldo’s  arrival 
there,  less  than  three  weeks  after  he  had  been  pleading 
desperately  at  Hong  Kong  not  to  go  without  a “con- 
tract” to  Dewey.  He  already  was  “Dictator,”  and  able 
to  define  the  policy  of  the  North  Americans  for  them; 

11 


i62  'First  Proof  Aguinaldo’s  Treachery.  ' 

and  sixteen  days  later  he  was  writing  to  the  new  captain- 
general  of  the  Philippines — General  Augustin — ^with  a 
'‘noble”  purpose,  to  instruct  him  how  to  "save  the  sov- 
ereignty of  Spain,”  notwithstanding  the  American  vic- 
tory. The  way,  of  course,  was  to  make  common  cause 
with  the  Filipino  Dictator,  the  policy  of  whom  was 
simply  that,  before  anything  else  was  done,  all  the 
islands  had  to  be  brought  "completely  under  my  gov- 
ernment.” The  incidental  observation  that  the  United 
States’  policy  was  "disinterested  protection”  was  gratu- 
itously presented,  and  this  was  a case  of  Malay  states- 
manship, with  no  room  for  veracity. 

The  Tagalo  chief  who,  on  May  5th,  at  Hong  Kong, 
was  anxious  not  to  go  to  Cavite,  on  May  25th  was 
apologizing  for  his  treaty  with  Rivera — charging  his 
surrender  to  Rivera  to  scanty  resources,  claiming  that 
he  had  to  be  put  in  possession  of  the  whole  country  as 
a Dictator  before  it  could  become  a republic;  and  he 
had,  on  the  3d  of  November  previous,  sent  his  Hong 
Kong  lawyer  to  Consul  Wildman,  to  announce  a New 
republic  for  the  Philippines,  established  in  Hong  Kong, 
that  desired  recognition  by  the  American  Republic,  and 
professing  to  pass  over  two  Philippine  provinces  to  the 
United  States  for  the  concession  of  recognition,  also 
the  customs  revenues  of  Manila,  and  twenty-five  or 
thirty  per  cent  of  a gun  contract,  the  guns  to  be  smug- 
gled into  Luzon  by  the  American  Government.  In  his 
proclamation  of  May  24,  1898,  Aguinaldo  used  the  name 
of  Paterno  to  claim  favor  with  his  countrymen,  who  did 
not  approve  of  the  sale  of  arms  and  offices  to  the  Span- 
iards. On  the  9th  of  June,  Aguinaldo  has  himself  in- 
formed us,  in  his  25th  October  letter  to  the  commandant 


First  Proof  Aguinaldo.’s  Treachery.  163 

of  the  Spanish  forces  at  Iloilo,  he  had  written  to  General 
Augustin  at  Manila,  who  had  taken  the  place  of  the 
treaty-maker — the  cash  payer  for  the  deportation  to 
China  of  disarmed  Filipino  insurgents  who  had  made 
sale  of  their  guns,  rendering  him  good  offices  for  the 
Spanish  cause.  The  9th  of  June  was  three  weeks  be- 
fore an  American  soldier  placed  his  foot  on  the  soil  of 
the  Philippines.  The  first  officer  of  the  American  army 
to  re-enforce  Admiral  Dewey  landed  at  Cavite,  April 
30th — nearly  two  months  after  Dewey’s  victory — was 
General  Anderson;  and  Aguinaldo,  after  tendering  him- 
self as  an  ally  of  Spain,  wrote  Anderson  that  his  ob- 
ject in  going  down  from  Hong  Kong  to  Cavite  was 
to  prevent  his  countrymen  from  fighting  with  the  Span- 
iards, and  he  invented  that  idea. 

‘^Private.) 

‘‘Revolutionary  Government,  Philippines, 
“Office  of  the  President, 
“Mololos,  October  25,  1898. 

“The  Excellent  Sehor,  General  Diego  Rios: 

“Respected  General, — I write  to  you  without  any 
desire  of  offending  your  dignity  or  your  patriotism, 
or  of  interfering  in  your  high  duties  in  the  present  cir- 
cumstances, so  critical  for  all  of  us — Filipinos,  Spaniards, 
and  Americans.  I write  to  you.  General,  actuated 
solely  by  the  desire  of  doing  an  act  of  evident  justice, 
compatible  with  your  honor  and  with  those  high  du- 
ties which  I cite  above,  and  especially  with  the 

HOPE  OF  YET  SAVING  FROM  THE  SHIPWRECK  THE  SOV- 
EREIGNTY OF  SPAIN  ON  THESE  ISLANDS.  I shall  explain 


164  First  Proof  Aguinaldo’s  Treachery. 

myself,  General,  to  see  if  you  can  understand  me,  and 
to  see  whether  it  will  be  the  same  as  with  General 
Augustin,  who  did  not  care  to  pay  any  attention  to 
THE  FRANK  WARNINGS  I GAVE  HIM,  WITH  NOBLE  INTEN- 
TIONS, IN  MY  LETTER  OF  JUNE  9TH  LAST. 

• ‘T  am  informed  that  you  are  considering  surrender- 
ing the  place  to  us  or  to  the  Americans.  After  six 
months  of  vigorous  siege  and  of  total  abandonment,  I 
understand  how  you  can  prefer  us  to  the  others. 

^‘The  way  to  make  this  surrender  is  to  join  us  and 
proclaim  the  federation  of  the  Filipino  Republic  with 
the  Spanish  Republic,  recognizing  the  chieftainship  of 
our  honorable  President,  Sehor  Emilio  Aguinaldo.  A 
fraternal  embrace  will  take  place  between  Filipino  Vi- 
sayans  and  Spaniards;  there  will  be  hurrahs  for  Spain 
and  the  Philippines  united  as  a federal  republic;  your 
troops  will  pass  into  the  common  army;  you  will  be 
promoted  to  be  a lieutenant-general;  the  Spanish  em- 
ployees in  the  Visayas  will  be  supported  by  us;  the  Gov- 
ernment will  pass  to  our  provincial  councils  and  local 
juntas. 

“Those  who  want  to  go  back  to  Spain  will  be  sent 
back  at  our  expense,  with  enough  to  pay  their  way  to 
Spain,  and  the  flags  of  Spain  and  the  Philippines  will 
float  side  by  side.  You  will  give  an  account  of  this  to 
Madrid,  and  especially  to  Pi.  Marfal;  and  in  the  mean- 
time we  shall  fight  the  Americans  together;  we  shall 
conquer,  and  then  we  shall  wait  (and  adjust  our  future 
relations). 

“My  ideas  are  placed  before  you  in  this  confused 
manner  because  I am  pressed  for  time,  but  the  bearer 
can  give  you  fuller  explanations,  and  I ask  you  to  see 


First  Proof  Aguinaldo’s  Treachery.  165 

in  this  only  my  desire  to  stop  the  shedding  of  blood 
by  Spaniards  and  Filipinos,  and  to  reconciliate  both  of 
them  by  appealing  to  the  chivalric  feeling  so  character- 
istic of  the  high  and  lofty  point  of  view  of  Spain. 

“The  surrender  of  the  heroic  column  you  command 
is  the  greatest  outrage  which  can  be  inflicted  upon 
those  valiant  men,  since  they  have  suffered  the  humilia- 
tions which  their  unfortunate  companions  suffer  here; 
and  you,  the  able  and  upright  and  valiant  general,  are 
you  going  to  sign  a treaty  with  the  Americans? 

“God  preserve  you  from  it,  sir! 

“All  of  us  admire  your  valor  and  your  self-restraint 
in  battle  and  in  misfortune.  For  this  reason  we  want 
to  keep  you  as  one  of  ours;  for  in  this  camp  we  can 
appreciate  a brave  man,  even  if  he  is  an  enemy. 

“Your  transfer  to  our  side  does  not  really  involve 
treason  to  Spain,  since  the  moment  sovereignty  passes 
to  the  Americans  you  are  free  to  transfer  your  allegiance. 
This  is  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  national 
honor.  On  the  other  hand,  if  you  join  us  you  cause 
the  following:  First,  liberty  for  all  the  nine  thousand 
Spanish  prisoners  in  our  hands,  and  then  it  would  serve 
as  the  first  base  of  the  new  alliance  between  Spain  and 
the  Philippines;  and  then  from  both  will  come  honor 
and  applause  for  you  as  having  been  the  one  fortunate 
enough  to  effect  it.  This  is  all  that  I can  say  to  you 
at  present,  and  I hope  that  you  will  tell  me  that  you 
agree  with  me,  and  then  I shall  be  able  to  present  this 
to  my  Government  and  obj^ain  from  it  an  agreement 
to  what  I have  written  as  a private  individual. 

“Your  most  respectful  and  affectionate. 


— M.’’ 


i66  F'irst  Proof  Aguinaldo’s  Treachery. 

‘T  certify  that  this  translation  is  correct  to  the  best 
of  my  ability.  “JOHN  R.  M.  TAYLOR, 

“Captain,  Fourteenth  Infantry,  in  Charge  Insurgent 
Records.” 

“Manila,  Philippine  Islands,  February  i6,  1900.” 

This  is  thoroughly  an  Aguinaldo  letter,  written  on 
official  Presidential  paper,  and  aided  in  producing  the 
embarrassing  incident  of  the  surrender  of  Iloilo.  The 
signature  is  the  more  positive  identification,  because  it 
is  a cipher  used  by  Aguinaldo;  and  the  “M”  stood  for 
the  word  in  the  code  that  was  Emilio.  The  authorship 
of  the  letter,  traced  to  the  President,  has  only  been 
denied  by  Filipino  advocates  under  stress  of  debate. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE  TRUE  STORY  OF  THE  BRIBE. 


Complaint  by  Paterno  and  Others  that  Spanish  Bribe 
was  not  Justly  Divided — The  Matter  Considered 
by  the  Hong  Kong  Junta,  and  the  Facts  Made 
Known — Aguinaldo  Drew  $50,000  for  Current  Ex- 
penses— Official  Filipino  Statements. 

The  Senate  of  the  United  States,  January  17,  1900, 
passed  a resolution  requesting  copies  of  communi- 
cations between  the  Executive  Departments  of  the  Gov- 
ernment and  Aguinaldo,  or  other  persons  undertaking 
to  represent  the  people  in  arms  against  the  United 
States  in  the  Philippines;  and  the  President  was  re- 
quested to  “communicate  without  delay  so  much  of 
such  information  as  was  in  his  posvsession,”  or  in  any  de- 
partment, “without  waiting  to  obtain  so  much  informa- 
tion as  may  require  considerable  delay,  or  communica- 
tion with  the  Philippine  Islands,  and  to  communicate 
the  remainder  of  the  information  as  soon  thereafter  as 
it  can  be  obtained.’’ 

This  uncommon  urgency  of  inquiry  shows  the  Sen- 
ate’s conception  of  the  value  of  the  information  on  the 
way.  The  President  submitted,  March  27,  1900,  this: 
“Meeting  of  the  Filipino  Committee  in  Hong  Kong, 
“24th  February,  1898. 

“In  Hong  Kong,  an  English  Colony, 
“To-day  the  24th  February,  1898. 
“The  gentlemen  representing  the  supreme  council 
of  the  people  have  united  this  day,  and  Sehor  President 

167 


i68 


The  True  Story  of  the  Bribe. 


Emilio  Aguinaldo  showed  to  the  committee  the  copy  of 
the  act  made  by  the  leaders  in  the  past  insurrection, 
which  had  been  sent  him  by  Senor  Pedro  A.  Paterno, 
which  act  was  as  follows : 

“There  is  upon  it  a seal  in  black  ink,  which  says, 
'Republic  of  the  Filipines.  Office  of  the  President.’ 

“Those  who  sign,  principal  leaders  of  the  insurrection, 
remaining  in  Biac  na  Bato  in  order  to  carry  into  effect 
the  basis  established  in  the  convention  of  harmony  and 
pacification  between  the  Spanish  Government  and  the 
Filipino  republic,  represented  respectively  by  the  most 
excellent  Senor  the  Marquis  de  Estrella,  Senor  Don 
Fernando  Primo  de  Rivera  y Sobremonte,  and  by  the 
most  excellent  Senor  Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno  as  medi- 
ator, which  convention  met  on  the  29th  December, 
1897,  in  Biac  na  Bato,  under  the  presidency  of  Don 
Ysabelo  Artacho  as  principal  and  first  representative 
of  the  supreme  council  of  the  Filipino  republic,  to  de- 
liberate concerning  the  form  and  manner  of  carrying  out 
the  compliance  with  the  original  bases.  The  object  of 
the  meeting  having  been  explained  by  the  president, 
there  followed  a long  discussion,  at  the  end  of  which 
the  following  was  unanimously  agreed  to: 

1st.  That  Don  Jose  Salvador  Natividad  be  sent  to  . 
Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno  to  explain  to  him  that  it  is  the 
insurgents  actually  damaged  in  their  persons,  families, 
and  interests  who  should  first  be  the  objects  of  the  care 
and  attention  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic,  and 
they  should  receive  some  succor  and  indemnity  for  their 
losses,  since  they  are  the  people  who  have  enjoyed  and 
who  will  enjoy  the  least  of  the  benefits  of  the  pacifica- 
tion, since  up  to  the  present  no  money  has  been  given 


The  True  Story  of  the  Bribe.  169 

to  them  nor  any  assigned  to  them,  since  there  is  but 
little  left  in  the  Filipines  in  charge  of  the  secretary  of 
the  treasury,  Don  Baldomero  Aguinaldo;  the  exact 
amount  is  not  known  by  those  present,  but  according 
to  the  secretary  there  is  hardly  enough  to  pay  off  some 
chiefs  and  officials  remaining  at  Biac  na  Bato  and  Cavite. 

“2d.  That  there  exists  a certain  discontent  in  various 
groups  of  the  insurgents  and  leaders  on  account  of  that 
want  of  attention,  in  addition  to  the  natural  feelings 
of  discontent  produced  in  many  who  held  a better  right 
to  a share  in  the  benefits  of  the  pacification  than  those 
who  received  them,  by  the  fact  that  they  have  been  left 
abandoned  on  these  islands  while  others  of  less  desert 
have  gone  abroad  to  live  off  of  the  so-called  treasury 
of  the  insurrection. 

“3d.  In  consequence  of  this  the  members  of  the 
meeting  feel  that  there  is  a certain  difficulty  in  carrying 
into  effect  the  provisions  of  the  agreement,  and  this 
will  remain  until  the  sad  situation  of  the  insurgents  and 
disheartened  leaders  left  on  the  island  of  Luzon  be 
remedied. 

“4th.  That,  as  a fair  and  equitable  remedy,  they  pro- 
pose that  the  whole  of  the  last  two  payments,  or 
$400,000,  be  given  to  the  most  necessitous  insurgents, 
which  sum  of  money  will  be  turned  over  to  Don  Jose 
Salvador  Natividad,  in  accordance  with  the  present  act, 
for  distribution. 

“Biac  na  Bato,  29th  December,  1897. 

“Ysabel  Atracho,  Artemio  Ricarte  Vibora,  Jose  Salvador 

Natividad,  Isidoro  Conn,  Paciano  Rizal  Mercado, 

Francisco  M.  Soliman. 

“The  Arbitrator:  PEDRO  A.  PATERNO. 


170  The  True  Story  of  the  Bribe. 

'‘Note. — The  power  given  me  by  the  present  act  I 
transfer  to  Don  Paciano  Rizal,  as  a man  in  my  confi- 
dence, enjoying  in  full  that  which  should  exist  between 
brothers  in  arms. 

“Manila,  7th  January,  1898. 

“JOSE  SALVADOR  NATIVIDAD.’^ 

The  President  declared  that  .he  had  received  a letter 
from  Don  Miguel  Primo  de  Rivera  in  the  name  of  Gen- 
eral Fernando  Primo  de  Rivera,  stating  that  he  would 
not  pay  the  $200,000  remaining  unpaid,  forming  the 
third  payment,  until  the  complete  pacification  of  the 
Filipines  and  the  total  disappearance  of  the  Katipunan. 
He  also  showed  the  committee  the  letter  and  account 
sent  him  by  Senor  Artacho.  In  the  said  communication 
he  resigns  his  position  as  secretary  of  the  interior  and 
head  of  the  committee  on  commerce,  since  he  is  going 
abroad,  according  to  the  agreement  made  at  Biac  na 
Bato  (Filipines)  on  19th  December  of  the  past  year,  and 
Senor  Artacho  also  asks  that  he  be  paid  the  sum  of 
$508.75,  which,  according  to  him,  he  is  owed,  as  will  be 
seen  from  his  accounts. 

In  consequence  of  all  this  the  President  asked  for  a 
detailed  discussion,  and  as  a result  of  it  the  committee 
is  of  the  following  opinion : 

“That  the  writing  or  contract  made  at  Biac  na  Bato 
(Filipines),  December  19,  1897,  is  void  and  of  no  value. 
Equally  are  null  and  void  the  parts  of  the  ‘constitution’ 
cited  in  said  writing,  since  it  is  not  possible  to  carry 
them  out;  first,  because  the  other  members  of  the  gov- 
ernment now  in  the  Filipines  want  to  divide  up  the 
$200,000  of  the  second  payment;  second,  the  third  pay- 


The  True  Story  of  the  Bribe.  171 

ment  is  not  to  be  made;  there  is  then  an  end  to  every 
convention  which  was  agreed  upon  in  the  writing  of 
19th  December,  1897,  since  of  the  $800,000  promised 
by  the  Spanish  Government  to  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo, 
the  President  of  the  Filipino  republic,  through  Don 
Pedro  A.  Paterno,  only  $400,000  have  been  received  to 
date,  which  sum  is  deposited  at  four  per  cent  interest 
in  the  Chartered  and  Hong  Kong  banks.  Now  that  the 
writing  of  19th  December,  1897,  is  to-day  modified  and 
declared  null,  all  persons  here  present  agree  that  only 
Senor  Emilio  Aguinaldo  will  be  authorized  to  spend 
anything  of  that  sum  except  the  interest,  according  to 
the  plan  agreed  on  on  the  9th  of  last  January,  also  that 
on  no  account  will  the  principal  or  the  $400,000  be  with- 
drawn except  for  the  common  good.  If  any  one  claims  a 
share  in  said  fund,  Senor  Aguinaldo  will  decide  whether 
the  claim  is  just,  and  he  will  also  decide  what  amount 
to  pay  himself  for  having  been  chief  of  the  insurrection, 
and  he  who  knows  most  about  it,  since  he  alone  is  ac- 
quainted with  the  merits  and  demerits  of  his  several 
coadjutors.  If  later  on  a better  place  for  the  deposit  of 
the  $400,000  be  found,  and  if,  perhaps,  later  on  we  re- 
ceive from  the  Spanish  Government  the  third  payment, 
or  a bank  paying  a higher  rate  of  interest  be  found, 
those  here  present  will  investigate  the  matter. 

“They  will  accept  the  resignation  by  Senor  Ysabel 
Artacho  of  his  charge  as  secretary  of  the  interior,  and 
in  charge  of  the  junta  of  commerce,  now  that  the  writ- 
ing of  19th  December,  1897,  is  declared  null  and  void; 
and  as  for  the  sum  which  he  asks  for,  it  will  not  be  paid 
without  consultation  with  Senors  Pedro  A.*  Paterno  and 
Baldomero  Aguinaldo,  to  find  out  whether  Senor  Arta- 


172 


The  True  Story  of  the  Bribe. 


cho  received  anything  from  the  Spanish  Government 
on  account  of  the  peace. 

“We  agree  to  comply  strictly  with  this  agreement, 
and  I,  the  secretary,  certify  to  it. 

“Emilio  Aguinaldo,  Vito  Belarmino,  Mariano  Llenara, 
Anastasio  Francisco,  Doreteo  Eopez,  Vincente 
Lueban,  Lezaro  Macapagal,  Salvador  Estrella,  Luis 
Viola,  Escolastica  Viola,  Tomas  Mascardo,  Leon 
Novenario,  Miguel  Malvar,  Pedro  Aguinaldo,  Carlos 
Ronquillo,  Teodoro  Legaspi,  Rosendo  Banaag, 
Anastacio  Vida,  Gregorio  H. 'del  Pilar,  Elias  Men- 
doza, Sebastian  Castill,  Wenceslao  Viniegra,  Max- 
imo Cabagting,  Benito  Natividad,  Manuel  Tinto, 
Antonio  Montenegro.” 

The  date  of  this  meeting  of  the  “Filipino  Com- 
mittee” was  two  months  and  one  week  before  the  de- 
struction of  the  Spanish  fleet;  two  months  and  two 
weeks  before  the  declaration  of  the  war  with  Spain  by  the 
United  States;  and  three  months  after  Agoncillo  called 
on  the  American  consul  at  Hong  Kong  to  make  a treaty 
with  him,  involving  a gun  contract  and  offering  a per- 
centage of  the  profit  to  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  and  a couple  of  provinces  of  territory  for  a paper 
of  recognition. 

The  communication  from  Biac  na  Bato  was  dated 
the  29th  of  December,  twenty-six  days  before  action 
by  the  Hong  Kong  Committee.  The  Committee  that 
treated  with  the  Spanish  Captain-General  was  divided, 
the  minority  remaining  at  the  place  of  the  treaty  with 
Paterno,  “the  Arbitrator,”  and  the  majority  going  with 
Aguinaldo  and  the  money  to  Hong  Kong.  Aguinaldo, 


The  True  Story  of  the  Bribe.  173 

having  deposited  the  money,  was  supported  by  “all  here 
present”  The  Biac  na  Bato  communication  is  an  offi- 
cial report,  showing  the  inside  of  the  cash  transaction, 
and  announces  “discontent  produced  by  many  who  held 
a better  right  to  a share  of  the  benefits  of  the  pacification 
than  those  receiving  them.”  Artacho  is  the  man  "de- 
nounced by  Agoncillo  as  the  one  influenced  by  the 
Jesuits  to  dissipate  the  money.  The  possession  of 
$400,000  by  Aguinaldo  is  conceded  by  him  at  Hong 
Kong,  January  24,  1898,  and  May  5th  he  admitted  that 
he  had  drawn  $50,000,  under  a provision  that  he  could 
take  that  much  a month  out  of  the  Chartered  Bank, 
and  he  gave  no  account  of  his  expenses.  It  seems  that 
this  sum  was. used  in  the  Singapore  journey,  or  in  that 
way  accounted  for.  ^ 


CHAPTER  XVII. 


AGUINALDO  A STRANGE  COMPOUND.  HIS 
NATURE  AS  MIXED  AS  HIS  BLOOD. 

His  Personal  Instructions  for  Assassination  of  Amer- 
icans, mingled  with  Mockeries  of  Professed  Good- 
feeling— His  Style  of  Regard  for  his  Oaths,  and 
“Artful  Duplicity — His  Falsehoods,  and  Contradic- 
tion of  Himself — He  Perjures  Himself  Cheerfully — 
He  is  Cruel,  Revengeful,  and  Gloats  over  Horrors 
that  Might  have  Appalled  a Pirate. 

WHATEVER  may  be  the  proportion  of  the  blood 
of  races  mingled  in  the  composition  of  the  Dic- 
tator, a title  warranted  by  his  repeated  proclamations 
of  that  dignity  and  duty,  there  is  no  avoiding  the  con- 
clusion that  there  is  mixed  in  his  makeup  the  character- 
istics of  the  yellow,  red,  and  dark  peoples  we  call  off- 
hand Orientals.  He  has  often  officially  announced 
himself  as  observing  the  humanities  of  civilization,  and 
sometimes  the  amenities  and  courtesies  of  communica- 
tions between  antagonists  in  the  intervals  between  armed 
conflicts.  Lieutenant  Gilmore,  who  was  for  several 
months  a prisoner  among  the  Tagalos,  made  haste  when 
the  Chief  of  the  Tribe  was  taken  prisoner  to  say  a good 
word  for  him  in  remembrance  of  favor  shown  himself. 
There  are  easily  traced  two  influences  that  affected  an 
amelioration  of  the  personal  propensity  of  Aguinaldo. 
One  was  the  importance  imposed  upon  him  by  our  con- 

174 


Aguinaldo  a Strange  Compound.  175 

suls  in  Hong  Kong,  Manila,  and  Singapore  in  the  early 
state  of  American  relation  with  the  Filipinos,  that  civil- 
ized usages  should  be  scrupulously  observed.  That  was 
the  first  thing  the  consuls  thought  of;  and  the  second 
was  that  the  little  barbarian,  always  ready  to  profess  true 
goodness  and  smile  away  apprehension,  should  give 
promise  on  his  word  of  honor  that  he  would  be  obedient 
to  Admiral  Dewey. 

It  occurred,  of  course,  immediately  to  Aguinaldo, 
whose  grand  passion  from  the  beginning  was  to  get 
some  nation  to  recognize  his  committee  as  the  govern- 
ment of  a country,  that  his  recognition  would  be  pro- 
moted, perhaps  depended  upon,  an  understanding  in 
America  and  Europe  that  he  was  civilized,  and  there  was 
no  way  of  so  certainly  pressing  that  point  upon  the 
great  peoples  as  awarding  to  prisoners  of  war  humane 
consideration.  The  prominence  of  Lieutenant  Gilmore’s 
case  made  it  exceptional,  and  the  kindnesses  to  him  were 
not  obscure.  American  public  opinion,  Aguinaldo  was 
eagerly  advised,  was  going  to  his  aid,  and  he  was  pressed 
to  do  all  he  could  to  promote  its  favorable  progress  with 
every  blandishment  he  could  bestow.  The  Tagalo 
Katupuna  (blood  brotherhood)  was  no  doubt  restrained 
to  some  extent  by  this  influence  occasionally. 

When  the  American  army  advanced  through  the 
provinces,  where  the  insurgents  were  strong,  each  day’s 
lessons  were  that  though  the  cause  of  the  American 
authorities  might  be  disputed  at  home  in  the  States,  the 
armed  forces  of  the  Great  Republic  were  conquering 
and  to  conquer  in  the  Philippines.  The  Tagalos  were 
less  well  acquainted  with  the  Americans  than  the  Boers 
with  the  British.  The  Boers  knew  that  their  wives  and 


176  Aguinaldo  a Strange  Compound. 

children  were  safe  where  British  authority  was  secure, 
and  were  comforted  when  exciting  their  fighting  mobil- 
ity by  that  knowledge.  The  Tagalos  were  not  sure  until 
they  gained  information  by  contact;  and  then  from 
Aguinaldo,  up  or  down,  the  truth  that  the  Americans 
were  not  hard  on  the  helpless  had  illustration,  and  was 
taken  advantage  of  and  calculated  upon.  Aguinaldo 
was  as  well  satisfied  his  wife  would  be  treated  with  re- 
spect as  Oom  Paul  was  that  his  wife  could  remain  tran- 
quilly in  Pretoria  while  he  sought  aid  in  Europe  against 
England. 

The  relentless  cruelty  and  crafty  treachery  of  Agui- 
naldo was  constantly  displayed  in  his  dealings  with  his 
own  people,  and  he  was  engaged  in  schemes  of  burning 
and  slaughter  as  horrible  as  the  habits  in  war  of  the 
original  North  Americans. 

The  most  competent  of  witnesses  in  this  matter  is 
Major-General  E.  S.  Otis,  who  says  in  his  official  re- 
port, from  September  i,  1899,  to  May  5,  1900,  that  at 
the  date  of  August  i,  1899,  war  had  in  the  proper  mean- 
ing of  the  word  ceased  to  exist,  and  the  chief  care  of  the 
American  soldiers  was  to  give  protection  to  the  natives 
who  wanted  peace  from  the  scattered  insurgents.  Gen- 
eral Otis  says : 

“Under  Tagalo  domination,  or  what  was  really  the 
irresponsible,  unlimited  dictatorship  of  Aguinaldo 
cruelly  enforced  by  his  military  officers,  there  was  no 
rule  by  which  the  right  or  wrong  of  personal  action 
could  be  determined,  nor  indeed  did  individual  liberty 
of  any  kind  exist.  The  so-called  insurgent  Government, 
whatever  it  might  have  been  at  its  inception,  degener- 
ated into  a military  despotism  of  a low  order,  in  which 


Aguinaldo  a Strange  Compound.  177 

neither  property  nor  life  had  the  least  security.  Insur- 
gent officers  were  given  a discretionary  power  to  assume 
entire  control  of  all  places,  barrios,  or  municipalities,  in 
any  wise  occupied  by  their  troops,  and  to  use  the  inhab- 
itants and  their  property  for  war  purposes  as  their  judg- 
ment dictated,  if  the  exigencies  of  defense  or  the  desire 
for  attack  appeared  to  them  to  warrant  it.  The  people, 
of  course,  were  obliged  to  contribute  very  largely  of 
their  property  acquisitions  and  in  manual  labor. 

‘‘The  embargoed  or  confiscated  estates  of  absent 
owners,  and  the  assassination  of  residents  on  suspicion 
merely,  indicate  that  the  rule  of  Aguinaldo  and  his  lieu- 
tenants was  relentless.” 

It  would  have  saved  many  American  lives  if  the 
authorities  had  consented  to  the  unsparing  use  of  natives 
against  the  enemies  of  the  United  States,  but  that  it 
then  seemed  would  have  been  promoting  savage  cruelty 
and  devastation.  General  MacArthur,  telegraphing 
January  5,  1900,  from  Bantista,  gives  a telegram  from 
General  Grant,  at  Magalavy,  giving  account  of  a skir- 
mish in  exploring  Mount  Arayet,  says: 

“Five  American  prisoners  were  retaken,  all  having 
been  shot  and  mutilated  by  bolos.  Two  are  dead,  one 
will  probably  die,  and  two  (one  of  whom  is  a sergeant 
of  the  Twelfth  Infantry)  may  recover.  American  pris- 
oners were  all  from  the  Ninth  and  Twelfth.” 

The  claim  of  Aguinaldo’s  friends  has  been  that  he 
was  attacked  before  Manila  when  he  had  been  inoffens- 
ive. There  is  abundant  outside  proof  to  the  contrary; 
but  the  strongest  witness  is  himself.  As  the  command- 
ing general  of  the  United  States  army  says,  “it  is 
absolutely  convincing  evidence  of  intention  to  attack 
12 


178  Aguinaldo  a Strange  Compound. 

the  United  States  troops  found  in  Aguinaldo’s  auto- 
graphic instructions  of  January  9,  1899  (nearly  four 
weeks  before  active  hostilities  were  inaugurated), 
wherein  he  displays  great  simplicity  in  knowledge  of. 
military  matters,  but  not  that  savage  ferocity  which 
characterized  his  instructions  issued  after  the  signal  de- 
feat of  his  troops  on  February  5th,  and  which  were  set 
out  on  page  182  of  my  report  of  August  31st  last.  His 
duplicity  at  this  time  was  marvelous,  for  he  was  profess- 
ing friendship  toward  the  United  States,  manifesting  a 
great  desire  to  restrain  his  people  from  committing  hos- 
tile acts,  and,  upon  the  day  his  instructions  bear  date,  he 
appointed  a commission  to  confer  with  one  to  be  ap- 
pointed by  myself  ‘for  the  sake  of  peace, ^ as  he  expressed 
it.  The  instructions  are  in  Tagalo,  and  the  following  is 
a translation : 

“ ‘Malolos,  9th  of  January,  1899. 

“ ‘Instructions  to  the  Brave  Soldiers  of  Sandatahan 
of  Manila. 

“ ‘Article  i.  All  Filipinos  should  observe  our  fellow- 
countrymen  in  order  to  see  whether  they  are  American 
sympathizers.  They  shall  take  care  to  work  with  them 
in  order  to  inspire  them  with  confidence  of  the  strength 
of  the  holy  cause  of  their  country. 

“ ‘Whenever  they  are  assured  of  the  loyalty  of  the 
convert  they  shall  instruct  them  to  continue  in  the  char- 
acter of  an  American  sympathizer  in  order  that  they 
may  receive  good  pay,  but  without  prejudicing  the  cause 
of  our  country.  In  this  way  they  can  serve  themselves 
and  at  the  same  time  serve  the  public  by  communicating 
to  the  committee  of  chiefs  and  officials  of  our  army  what- 
ever news  of  importance  they  may  have. 


Aguinaldo  a Strange  Compound.  179 

“ ‘Article  2.  All  of  the  chiefs  and  Filipino  brothers 
should  be  ready  and  courageous  for  the  combat,  and 
should  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity  to  study  well 
the  situation  of  the  American  outposts  and  headquarters, 
observing  especially  secret  places  where  they  can  ap- 
proach and  surprise  the  enemy. 

“ ‘Article  3.  The  chief  of  those  who  go  to  attack  the 
barracks  should  send  in  first  four  men  with  a good  pres- 
ent for  the  American  commander.  Immediately  after 
will  follow  four  others,  who  will  make  a pretense  of  look- 
ing for  the  same  officer  for  some  reason,  and  a larger 
' group  shall  be  concealed  in  the  corners  or  houses  in 
order  to  aid  the  other  groups  at  the  first  signal.  This 
wherever  it  is  possible  at  the  moment  of  attack. 

“Article  4.  They  should  not,  prior  to  the  attack,  look 
at  the  Americans  in  a threatening  manner.  To  the  con- 
trary, the  attack  on  the  barracks  by  the  Sandatahan 
should  be  a complete  surprise,  and  with  decision  and 
courage.  One  should  go  alone  in  advance  in  order  to 
kill  the  sentinel.  In  order  to  deceive  the  sentinel  the 
one  should  dress  as  a woman,  and  must  take  great  care 
that  the  sentinel  is  not  able  to  discharge  his  piece,  thus 
calling  the  attention  of  those  in  the  barracks.  This  will 
enable  his  companions  who  are  approaching  to  assist 
in  the  general  attack. 

“Article  5.  At  the  moment  of  the  attack  the  Sanda- 
tahan should  not  attempt  to  secure  rifles  from  their  dead 
enemies,  but  shall  pursue,  slashing  right  and  left  with 
bolos  until  the  Americans  surrender,  and  after  there 
remains  no  enemy  who  can  injure  them  they  may  take 
the  rifles  in  one  hand  and  the  ammunition  in  the  other. 

“Article  6.  The  officers  shall  take  care  that  on  the 


i8o  Aguinaldo  a Strange  Compound. 

top  of  the  houses  along  the  streets  where  the  American 
forces  shall  pass  there  will  be  placed  four  to  six  men, 
who  shall  be  prepared  with  stones,  timbers,  red-hot  iron, 
heavy  furniture,  as  well  as  boiling  water,  oil,  and  mo- 
lasses, rags  soaked  in  coal-oil  ready  to  be  lighted  and 
thrown  down,  and  any  other  hard  and  heavy  objects 
that  they  can  throw  on  the  passing  American  troops. 
At  the  same  time  in  the  lower  parts  of  the  houses  will  be 
concealed  the  Sandatahan,  who  will  attack  immedi- 
ately. Great  care  should  be  taken  not  to  throw  glass 
in  the  streets,  as  the  greater  part  of  our  soldiers  go 
barefooted.  On  these  houses  there  will,  if  possible,  be 
arranged,  in  addition  to  the  objects  to  be  thrown  down, 
a number  of  the  Sandatahan,  in  order  to  cover  a retreat 
or  to  follow  up  a rout  of  the  enemy’s  column,  so  that 
we  may  be  sure  of  the  destruction  of  all  of  the  opposing 
forces. 

^‘Article  7.  All  Filipinos,  real  defenders  of  their 
country,  should  live  on  the  alert  to  issist  simultaneously 
the  inside  attack  at  the  very  moment  that  they  note  the 
first  movement  in  whatever  barrio  or  suburb,  having 
assurance  that  all  the  troops  that  surround  Manila  will 
proceed  without  delay  to  force  the  enemy’s  line  and 
unite  themselves  with  their  brothers  in  the  city.  With 
such  a general  movement,  so  firm  and  decided  against 
the  Americans,  the  combat  is  sure  to  be  a short  one,  and 
I charge  and  order  that  the  persons  and  goods  of  all 
foreigners  shall  be  respected,  and  that  the  American 
prisoners  shall  be  treated  well. 

‘‘Article  8.  All  of  our  chiefs  in  the  suburbs  should 
prepare  groups  of  the  Sandatahan,  who  will  attack  with 


Aguinaldo  a Strange  Compound.  i8i 

ferocity  and  decision  the  Americans  within  their  lines, 
attempting  to  surround  each  group  of  Americans  or  to 
break  through  their  lines.  This  must  be  done  if  the 
nature  of  the  ground  occupied  by  the  Americans  will 
permit,  and  if  the  Sandatahan  have  the  proper  amount 
of  courage  and  resolution,  and  the  more  courage  and 
intelligence  that  they  show  in  the  moment  of  the  attack 
the  surer  will  be  the  result  and  the  fewer  will  be  their 
own  losses. 

'‘Article  9.  In  addition  to  the  instructions  given  in 
paragraph  6 there  shall  be  in  the  houses  vessels  filled 
with  boiling  water,  tallow,  molasses,  and  other  liquids, 
which  shall  be  thrown  as  bombs  on  the  Americans  who 
pass  in  front  of  their  houses,  or  they  can  make  use  of 
syringes  or  tubes  of  bamboo.  In  these  houses  shall  be 
the  Sandatahan,  who  shall  hurl  the  liquids  that  shall  be 
passed  to  them  by  the  women  and  children. 

"Article  10.  In  place  of  bolos  or  daggers,  if  they  do 
not  possess  the  same,  the  Sandatahan  can  provide  them- 
selves with  lances  and  arrows  with  long  and  sharp  heads, 
and  these  should  be  shot  with  great  force  in  order  that 
they  may  penetrate  well  into  the  bodies  of  the  enemy. 
And  these  should  be  so  made  that  in  withdrawal  from 
the  body  the  head  will  remain  in  the  flesh. 

"Article  ii.  It  can  be  taken  for  granted  that,  if  the 
above  instructions  are  observed,  the  enemy  will  not  be 
able  to  use  firearms  because  of  the  confusion  in  his 
ranks,  as  they  would  shoot  one  another.  For  this  reason 
I have  always  thought  the  rifle  useless  in  this  kind  of 
combat,  for  experience  has  taught  me,  my  dear  brothers, 
that  when  the  Sandatahan  make  their  attack  with  cour- 


i82 


Aguinaldo  a Strange  Compound. 


age  and  decision,  taking  advantage  of  the  confusion  in 
the  ranks  of  the  enemy,  the  victory  is  sure,  and  in  that 
case  the  triumph  is  ours. 

“Article  12.  At  last,  if,  as  I expect,  the  result  shall 
favor  us  in  the  taking  of  Manila  and  the  conquering  of 
the  enemy,  the  chiefs  are  charged  with  seeing  that  the 
officers  and  soldiers  respect  the  consulates,  the  banks, 
and  commercial  houses,  and  even  the  Spanish  banks 
and  commercial  houses,  taking  care  that  they  be  not 
seduced  by  the  hope  of  plunder.  As  if  God  sees  this,  he 
will  reward  us,  and  the  foreign  nations  will  note  the 
order  and  justice  of  our  conduct.  I charge  that  in  the 
moment  of  combat,  the  officers,  soldiers,  and  whatever 
patriots  take  part  in  the  struggle  will  not  forget  our 
noble,  sacred,  and  holy  ideals.  Liberty  and  Independ- 
ence. Neither  will  you  forget  your  sacred  oath  and  im- 
maculate banner;  nor  will  you  forget  the  promises  made 
by  me  to  the  civilized  nations,  whom  I have  assured  that 
we  Filipinos  are  not  savages,  nor  thieves,  nor  assassins, 
nor  are  we  cruel;  but  on  the  contrary,  that  we  are  men 
of  culture  and  patriotism,  honorable  and  very  humane. 

“Above  all,  I expect  that  you  will  respect  the  per- 
sons and  goods  of  private  persons  of  all  nationalities, 
including  the  Chinese;  that  you  will  treat  well  the  pris- 
oners and  grant  life  to  those  of  the  enemy  who  sur- 
render. And  that  you  be  on  the  sharp  lookout  for  those 
traitors  and  enemies  who,  by  robbery,  will  seek  to  mar 
our  victory.  EMILIO  AGUINALDO.’’ 

There  is  no  doubt  in  any  sound  mind  of  the  authen- 
ticity of  this  murderous  paper,  and  no  question  that  it 
is  the  most  hideous  proclamation  that  ever  appeared 


Aguinaldo  a Strange  Compound.  183 

in  the  history  of  wars.  It  was  issued  when,  pretend- 
ing that  he  was  pleading  for  peace,  he  was  planning 
wholesale  massacre;  and  it  was  not  his  first  treachery 
preparing  to  burn  and  slaughter,  and  purring  peace. 
That  is  what  he  was  doing  when  our  troops  took  Manila 
by  storm,  and  would  not  let  him  in  to  fraternize  with 
the  Spaniards  and  turn  on  the  Americans. 

July  7,  1899,  Tagardo  wrote  to  Aguinaldo,  who 
had  asked  his  frank  opinion  of  the  situation  then,  these 
words  of  personal  flattery  and  public  truth: 

‘T  will  refrain  from  making  a critical  judgment  of 
all  your  actions  prior  to  the  4th  of  February,  the  date 
of  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  taking  them  simply  as 
data  upon  which  to  base  my  deductions,  and  will  pre- 
suppose in  all  of  them  good  faith  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  patriotic  motives  which  impelled  you  to  perform 
them. 

“We  have  commenced  hostilities;  we  have  had  our 
wish — for  I remember  perfectly  well  that  war  was  the 
desire  of  the  majority  in  Malolos,  the  military  element, 
however,  being  prominent  in  this  majority,  and  raising 
its  voice  upon  the  subject,  dragging  after  it  the  rest  of 
the  people.  And  what  has  been  gained?  Nothing  but 
ruin,  death,  and  desolation. 

“We  have  not  been  able  to  prevent  the  Americans 
from  going  anywhere  they  pleased,  and  it  has  been 
plainly  evident  that  the  valor  upon  which  we  depended 
was  not  enough;  but  to  conquer,  it  is  necessary  to  have 
many  things  which  the  Americans  possess  in  abundance, 
and  which  we  lack. 

“As  time  goes  on,  our  chances  for  victory  grow 
less,  and  the  further  the  American  troops  advance  so 


184  Aguinaldo  a Strange  Compound. 

much  worse  is  our  condition  for  asking  concessions  for 
our  unhappy  country. 

‘‘Up  to  the  present  time  the  American  troops,  in  my 
opinion,  have  had  no  other  object  in  view  than  to  show 
their  bravery,  a quality  which  had  unjustly  and  errone- 
ously been  denied  them  both  privately  and  in  the  public 
press.  So  far,  either  on  that  account  or  for  other  rea- 
sons, America  has  not  sent  here  an  army  capable  of  a 
military  occupation  of  all  our  territory,  nor  has  a formal 
campaign  been  commenced;  that  America  can  do  so 
we  are  unable  to  doubt,  and  that  it  will  be  done  if  we 
persist  in  our  present  attitude  we  may  feel  certain.  And 
what  will  then  remain  to  us?  What  could  we  ask  for? 

“We  are  in  error,  and  yet  we  persist  in  that  error, 
impelled  by  those  who  dream  of  a triumph  of  a party 
which  is  to-day  in  a minority  in  the  United  States, 
without  perceiving  that  this  party  is  also  American,  and 
that  they  are  not  going  to  give  us  our  independence  out 
of  hand  as  a matter  of  sentiment  at  the  expense  of  the 
honor  of  America,  and  in  spite  of  the  grave  responsi- 
bility, both  international  and  domestic,  contracted  under 
the  treaty  of  Paris.  Others  dream  that,  because  part  of 
the  press  of  Europe  copies  from  the  American  anti- 
imperialist papers  the  criticisms  of  that  party  against 
the  Government  of  President  McKinley,  a European  in- 
terv^ention  in  our  favor  is  to  take  place,  without  reflect- 
ing that  the  treaty  of  Paris  was  made  before  all  the 
civilized  world,  and  with  its  assent. 

“The  war  so  far  has  only  laid  bare  our  insufficiency 
and  our  shortcomings. 

“In  my  judgment,  giving  these  conditions,  the  time 
has  arrived  for  your  policy  to  change  in  a radical  man- 


Aguinaldo  a Strange  Compound.  185 

ner,  unless  you  wish  to  see  forever  annihilated  the  hope 
that  our  people  may  some  day  take  its  place  in  the  con- 
cert of  the  civilized  world,  unless  you  wish  to  see  the 
complete  ruin  of  our  race  and  of  all  our  country,  and 
unless  you  are  willing  to  accept  the  grave  responsi- 
bilities which  will  fall  upon  you. 

^‘To-day,  then,  I address  you  as  a friend  and  as  a 
Filipino,  and  say:  Teace  is  an  imperative  necessity. 
Nothing  can  prevent  the  triumph  of  America.  Do  not 
struggle  against  the  inevitable.’  Peace  must  come  some 
time,  and  the  man  who  restores  peace  to  the  Philippines 
will  win  the  admiration  of  the  world  and  the  gratitude 
of  his  country.  Be  that  man.  Since  1896  you  have 
been  the  soul  of  the  people,  and  have  merited  their 
blessings  for  your  wonderful  and  providential  wisdom. 
Be  now  the  peace-maker,  that  your  glory  may  be  per- 
petuated. As  you  are  the  man  who,  when  brought  here 
by  the  Americans,  roused  the  people  as  one  to  the  work 
of  our  emancipation  from  Spain,  be  now  the  one  to 
say : ‘Enough  of  conflict.  W e have  seen  that  our  ideals 
can  not  be  realized  by  this  means;  let  us  make  peace, 
and  let  us  work  and  learn.  For  by  working  and  learn- 
ing with  a free  people,  such  as  the  Americans,  we  shall 
cast  from  us  the  vices  of  our  old  masters,  and  will  some 
day  win  the  independence  we  so  much  desire.’  ” 

Herein  Lagardo  tells  Aguinaldo:  “We  have  com- 
menced hostilities,”  and  “gained  nothing  but  ruin, 
death,  and  desolation.”  Here  in  substance  is  the  reply 
of  the  Dictator: 

“I  am  convinced  of  this  fact,  and  even  before  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities  was  sure  that  with  their  wealth 
and  their  innumerable  and  powerful  elements  of  war. 


i86 


Aguinaldo  a Strange  Compound. 


they  could,  whenever  they  so  desired,  send  as  many  as 
they  need.  In  reply  to  this  I must  tell  you  that  it  is 
impossible  for  me  to  turn  back  from  the  enterprise 
which  I have  undertaken — that  of  defending  our  coun- 
try, and  especially  as  I have  sworn  that  as  long  as  life 
lasts  I shall  labor  until  I gain  the  acknowledgment  of 
the  independence  of  the  Philippines.” 

How  void  his  oath  to  recognize  the  sovereignty  of 
the  United  States  after  this: 

“We  must  no  longer  allow  ourselves  to  be  fasci- 
nated by  the  flattering  promises  of  the  enemy.  You 
know  that  they  first  solemnly  assured  me  that  they 
would  acknowledge  our  independence. 

“I  repeat,  we  will  not  give  up  the  struggle  until  we 
gain  our  longed-for  independence;  death  is  of  but  little 
moment  to  us  if  we  are  but  able  to  assure  the  happiness 
of  the  people  and  of  future  generations. 

“I  advise  all  those  who  do  not  feel  themselves  strong 
enough  to  accept  this  sacrifice,  and  whose  services  are 
not  indispensable  to  our  Government,  to  return  to  Ma- 
nila and  the  towns  occupied  by  the  enemy,  reserving 
themselves  to  strengthen  the  organization  of  our  Gov- 
ernment when  our  independence  is  gained,  replacing 
those  who,  wearied  by  the  struggle,  are  in  need  of  rest. 

“I  am  not  displeased  that  some  Filipinos  have  con- 
sented to  hold  office  under  the  Americans;  on  the  con- 
trary, I rejoice  that  they  have  done  so,  for  thus  they  will 
be  enabled  to  form  a true  estimate  of  the  character  of 
the  Americans.  I also  rejoice  that  our  enemies,  having 
had  recourse  to  the  Filipinos  for  the  discharge  of  the 
duties  of  high  positions  in  the  public  service  in  its  vari- 


Aguinaldo  a Strange  Compound.  187 

ous  branches,  have  shown  that  they  recognize  the  capac- 
ity of  our  people  for  self-government. 

“Before  closing  I take  the  liberty  of  addressing  you 
the  following  question:  To  what  is  due  that  policy  of 
attraction  employed  by  our  enemy  if  not  to  the  resist- 
ance of  our  army?  ‘One  should  never  repent  of  a just 
determination.’ 

“Kind  regards  to  your  family, 'and  to  Messrs.  Arel- 
lano, Pardo,  Torres,  and  other  friends. 

“Command  at  will  your  most  affectionate  friend, 

“E.  AGUINALDO.” 

What  is  his  oath  worth  if  he  swears  to  accept  United 
States  sovereignty?  What  do  his  words  mean  if  he 
issues  an  address?  They  would  give  him  another  chance 
to  betray  another  people.  . 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

AGUINAEDO’S  TRUE  INWARDNESS  OUT. 


When  and  Why  He  First  Hated  Us — He  Declared 
War  on  Us  Secretly  in  Hong  Kong,  May  4,  1898 — 
What  His  Friendship  would  have  Cost — Wanted 
Contract  with  Dewey  to  Divide  Armament — He 
to  Furnish  Army,  We  to  Protect — Official  Minutes 
Cited — Wanted  us  to  Furnish  Arms  to  be  Used 
against  Us — The  Part  the  Bribe  Money  Played — 
Forced  Return  to  Dewey — His  Money  in  Bank 
and  in  Pocket. 

There  is  a consistency  in  the  characteristics  of 
Aguinaldo’s  proclamations  and  letters,  early  and 
late;  and  the  two  most  prominent  points  are  the  display 
of  his  enmity  toward  the  United  States,  which  was 
prominent  in  his  speech  before  the  committee,  that  he 
regarded  as  his  personal  Government,  in  Hong  Kong, 
on  the  4th  of  May,  1898.  He  knew  then  that  the  Span- 
ish fleet  was  destroyed,  and  could  foresee  the  fact  that 
probably  the  most  important  opposition  he  would  meet, 
if  he  undertook  to  assert  himself  in  behalf  of  the  com- 
mittee, which  he  controlled,  as  the  highest  authority 
among  the  Filipinos,  and  to  strive  for  the  establishment 
of  an  organization  to  possess  the  Archipelago,  of  which 
he  should  be  the  head,  would  be  the  people  they  are 
in  the  habit  of  calling  in  that  part  of  the  world,  to  par- 
ticularly distinguish  them,  ‘'North  Americans.'’  And 
he  made  declarations  then  of  hostility  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States. 

188 


Aguinaldo’s  True  Inwardness  Out.  189 

The  official  minutes  of  the  meeting  said  the  Presi- 
dent, Aguinaldo,  ‘'described  the  negotiations  which  took 
place  in  Singapore  with  the  American  consul.”  This 
was  in  accordance  with  his  habit  of;regarding  anything 
that  placed  him  in  touch  with  an  American  consul  as 
something  important  and  official,  and  that  must  be  taken 
to  be  impressive.  He  had  returned  three  days  before  to 
Hong  Kong,  and  reported  that  as  he  did  not  find  the 
admiral — there  was  a good  reason  for  that — he  thought 
it  well  to  have  “an  interview  with  the  American  consul 
in  this  colony,  but  was  not  able  to  obtain  one.”  Now 
Mr.  Wildman,  the  consul,  stated  in  his  official  corre- 
spondence that  Aguinaldo  called  upon  him  “immedi- 
ately,” and  there  is  nothing  said  to  the  effect  that  there 
was  any  difficulty  in  their  coming  together.  What 
Aguinaldo  desired  then  and  there  was  to  obtain  some 
official  status  through  the  action  of  the  consul,  and  he 
persisted  in  seeking  some  assistance  from  American 
officials,  with  the  purpose  that  is  now  seen  was  deep 
in  his  mind,  to  insist  upon  the  courtesies  of  civil  officials 
and  officers  of  the  army  and  navy.  He  was  in  a way 
to  magnify  every  little  thing  of  that  kind,  so  great  was 
his  solicitude  to  get  the  Americans  to  commit  them- 
selves to  the  policy  of  accepting  him  as  the  head  of  the 
Philippine  Nation.  He  considered  the  situation^of  the 
^ Filipinos  at  the  moment  critical.  He  used  the  language, 
“considering  the  critical  situation  in  the  Philippines  at 
present,”  and  begged  the  committee  would  “decide 
whether  it  would  be  proper  for  him  to  go  into  those 
islands  with  the  leaders  of  prominence  in  the  last  re- 
bellion, in  case  the  admiral  gave  them  an  opportunity 
to  do  so.”  At  this  point,  Senor  Sandico  (Theodoro) 


190  Aguinaldo’s  True  Inwardness  Out. 

said  the  conferences  which  he  had  with  the  admiral  on 
the  American  fleet,  and  with  the  American  consul  at 
Hong  Kong,  led  him  to  believe  it  was  necessary  for  the 
President  to  go  to  the  Philippines.  The  necessity  ex- 
isted “because  Manila  had  been  taken  by  the  American 
fleet” — which  was  a mistake.  The  American  fleet  was 
able  to  destroy  Manila,  but  there  were  only  marines 
enough  to  land  and  guard  the  arsenal  at  Cavite.  Dewey 
■ therefore  sent  word  to  Manila  that  he  would  destroy  the 
city  if  they  fired  another  gun  at  his  ships;  but  he  did  nt 
take  the  town.  That  did  not  happen  for  something 
more  than  three  months.  The  Hong  Kong  Committee 
thought  the  town  had  been  taken.  Sandico  had  been 
in  a hurry  to  get  to  Hong  Kong  after  the  battle — if  it 
is  really  true  that  he  was  in  it — and  he  stated  that  “a 
provisional  Government  was  being  formed  in  that  cap- 
ital,” and  the  intervention  of  the  President  in  the  forma- 
tion of  that  Government  was  undeniably  essential.  That 
is,  Sandico  knew  there  was  an  intrigue  to  fix  up  a Gov- 
ernment there,  and  it  might  interfere  with  the  Hong 
Kong  Committee.  Other  members  of  the  committee 
were  anxious  to  have  Aguinaldo  go;  but  he  said  he  con- 
sidered it  “dangerous”  for  him  to  go  to  the  Philippines 
“without  a previously  written  agreement  with  the  ad- 
miral,” as  “it  might  happen  that  if  he  placed  himself  at 
Dewey’s  orders”  he  might  make  him  “sign  or  seal  a 
document  containing  proposals  highly  prejudicial  to  the 
interests  of  the  fatherland,  from  which  may  arise  grave 
disadvantages.”  Here,  again,  Aguinaldo’s  extreme 
urgency  on  the  subject  of  a contract,  that  was  written, 
with  the  Americans  reappeared.  He  grew  very  strong 
in  his  language,  saying,  if  he  accepted  such  a situation 


Aguinaldo’s  True  Inwardness  Out.  191 

as  he  had  recited  and  Dewey  might  force  him  into,  '‘he 
would  execute  an  unpatriotic  act,”  and  his  name  “would 
be  justly  eternally  cursed  by  the  Filipinos;”  and  if  he 
refused,  the  break  between  the  two  was  evident!  This 
he  held  to  be  a “fatal  dilemma.”  He  proposed  that  a 
committee  should  go,  named  and  authorized  in  writing 
by  him,  to  the  Philippines,  to  “intervene  with  the  ad- 
miral in  these  most  important  que^stions.” 

Aguinaldo  desired  not  to  come  in  personal  contact 
with  the  Americans  at  all,  but  to  authorize  a committee 
to  maintain  his  dignity  in  ascertaining  what  they  were 
about,  and  doing  nothing  without  a written  contract. 
He  thought  these  were  the  means  to  be  first  employed, 
to  find  out  certainly  what  the  intentions  of  the  United 
States  were  in  regard  to  the  Philippines.  He  would  ar- 
range, he  said,  to  procure  such  means  obtainable  and 
“arrange  succor  for  the  fatherland,  to  which  he  offers, 
and  always  will  offer  willingly,  the  sacrifice  of  his  life.” 
He  spoke  of  this  sacrifice  very  freely,  but  added,  that 
the  admiral,  “there  being  no  previous  contract,”  might 
“not  divide  the  armament  necessary  to  guarantee  the 
happiness  of  the  fatherland.”  Clearly  Aguinaldo  wanted 
the  contract  that  he  was  calling  for  to  contain  a pro- 
vision that  the  admiral  should  “divide”  authority  with 
him.  There  is  no  other  meaning  to  be  attached  to  the 
phrase  “divide  the  armament”  than  this. 

The  Filipinos  certainly  had  no  power  at  sea.  They 
had  n’t  a ship,  and  the  admiral  had  n’t  military  forces. 
Aguinaldo  wanted  then  and  there  to  have  his  portion 
of  the  authority  fixed.  He  desired  the  admiral  to  coin- 
cide with  him,  that  there  should  be  a division  of  force 
and  authority;  and  this  should  be  in  the  written  contract 


192  Aguinaldo’s  True  Inwardness  Out. 

for  which  he  strove.  There  was  no  other  way  to  “guar- 
antee the  happiness  of  the  fatherland.'’  As  there  was  n’t 
any  previous  contract,  the  admiral  might  not  consent 
to  parceling  out  power,  and  if  this  happened,  said  the 
President  of  the  Committee,  he  would  be  “under  the 
necessity  of  taking  a fatal  resolution — fatal  to  himself.” 
That  was,  if  he  was  sent  without  a treaty  made  up  for 
Dewey  to  sign,  or  if  Dewey  would  refuse  to  sign  or  to 
consent  to  his  wishes,  there  would  be  a necessity  of  tak- 
ing a “fatal”  resolution  if  he  was  there  in  person.  In  .this 
committee  of  four  that  he  wanted  should  go,  they  could 
negotiate;  he,  being  the  executive,  would  wait  to  act. 
There  would  be  no  power  behind  him  to  whom  anything 
could  be*  referred;  hence,  the  opening  for  a fatality.  It 
should  not  be  forgotten  that  while  Aguinaldo  was  ex- 
ploiting the  fancy  that  he  had  most  vividly  in  his  mind 
all  the  while,  that  any  American  officer  could  do  any- 
thing he  pleased  for  the  United  States  when  far  away 
from  home,  he  manifestly  believed  that  Dewey  would, 
in  the  Agoncillo  phrase  of  the  3d  of  November,  be 
“empowered  with  power”  by  the  United  States  to  make 
a “written  contract”  with  the  head  of  the  Junta,  located 
nearly  a thousand  miles  away  from  the  Philippines,  and 
unknown  to  the  United  States,  or  any  other  country 
officially,  as  having  no  titles  to  speak  for  or  act  for  the 
Philippines.  The  preoccupation  of  Aguinaldo  was  con- 
stantly that  he  was  the  Philippine  Nation,  and  that  all 
Americans  who  were  friendly  with  him  recognized  him 
in  that  capacity,  and  catered  to  his  ambition  to  become 
a sovereign.  Of  course.  Admiral  Dewey  was  expected 
to  turn  over  to  him  all  there  was  of  authority  for  regu- 
lating the  land,  governing  it,  taxing  the  people,  con- 


THE  LUNETA,  MANILA,  WHERE  INSURGENTS  ARE  EXECUTED. 


Aguinaldo’s  True  Inwardness  Out.  193 

scripting  soldiers,  levying  assessments  on  property,  thus 
building  up  a military  power  that  might  be  used  for  or 
against  the  Spaniards  or  the  Americans,  and  that  has 
been  his  idea  ever  since.  If  the  Americans  accepted  him 
as  an  ally,  he  would  want  the  land  and  all  it  contained 
to  rule  over,  and  get  the  share  of  the  lion;  and  the 
Americans  could  command  the  sea  about  the  Pliilip- 
pines,  and  protect  him  as  Lord  of  a Thousand  Islands. 
Here  was  the  line  of  cleavage,  the  place  of  difficulty. 
Aguinaldo  told  the  writer  of  this  substantially  that,  and 
told  General  Whittier  of  General  Merritt’s  staff.  The 
terms  of  alliance  was  that  the  land  was  his,  the  water 
ours.  He  never  has  failed  to  present  and  insist  upon  it. 
But  what  was  the  fatal  resolution  of  himself,  if  Admiral 
Dewey  declined  to  receive  him  as  the  President  of  the 
-Philippines,  and  forced  him  to  take  a part  with  the 
Americans  against  the  Spaniards,  all  for  the  want  of  a 
signature  and  a seal?  What  was  the  fatality?  In  a 
moment  he  explained.  It  was  that  “nothing  could  then 
prevent  the  $400,000  being  claimed  by  the  Spanish  Gov- 
ernment on  account  of  his  subsequent  conduct.”  That 
was  his  way  of  saying  that  when  he  accepted,  and  those 
who  were  around  him  and  constituted  the  Government 
had  also  accepted,  so  far  as  they  could,  the  $400,000, 
they  had  placed  themselves  under  obligations  not  to  be 
hostile  to  Spain.  If  they  did,  that  would  be  fatal  subse- 
quent conduct.  This  was  why  Aguinaldo  called  for  a 
written  contract.  He  had  one  of  those  written  contracts 
with  Captain-General  Rivera,  and  as  early  as  the  9th 
of  the  next  month  he  was  writing  to  the  successor  of 
Rivera — Augustin — wanting  to  get  into  confidential 

communication  with  him  for  the  • preservation  of  the. 

13 


194  Aguinaldo’s  True  Inwardness  Out. 

Spanish  monarchy  as  the  sovereignty  in  the  Philippines. 
By  that  time — the  9th  of  June,  1898 — Aguinaldo  had 
cast  in  his  lot  with  the  Spaniards,  and  that  was  before 
the  first  detachment  of  American  soldiers  had  arrived. 
The  first  arrival  of  the  American  army  was  on  the  last 
day  of  June,  fifty-five  days  from  the  time  that  Aguinaldo 
was  delivering  himself  to  the  committee  at  Hong  Kong 
about  the  faltality  of  his  subsequent  conduct. 

It  would  be  a fatal  thing,  Aguinaldo  said  for  himself, 
to  give  up  that  money.  Hong  Kong  is  an  English 
colony;  the  courts  are  English.  What  the  President  of 
the  Filipino  Club,  who  presently  appointed  himself  sev- 
eral times  Dictator  of  the  Philippines,  was  most  afraid 
of,  was  the  integrity  of  the  courts  that  the  money — the 
price  of  “two  hundred  and  thirty-two  fire-arms”  and  a 
supposed  impregnable  position  in  the  cleft  of  the  moun- 
tains, that  was  called  by  the  Tagalo  words  for  Split 
Rock — Biac-na-Bato — and  for  five  hundred  ragged  fel- 
lows, that  it  was  an  agreement  should  be  made  up 
to  seven  hundred.  The  hard-earned  money  paid  for  this 
portentous  pacification,  $400,000  for  two  hundred  and 
thirty-two  guns  and  some  scattering  skirmishers — and 
this  paid  for  surrender  to  Spain  and  agreement  to  be 
deported  and  to  remain  in  exile  so  long  as  it  was  the 
pleasure  of  the  King  of  Spain.  Those  were  the  terms 
of  the  convention  and  compensation  and  deportation 
for  patriotism,  and  subsequent  misconduct  to  Spain 
would  be  fatal  to  him.  If  he  should  go  to  war  with 
Spain,  the  Spanish  consul  in  Hong  Kong  might  procure 
an  injunction  tying  up  the  money,  which  had  been 
placed  in  two  banks,  the  “Shanghai”  and  the  “Char- 
tered,” and  the  precious  silver  might  never  be  within 


Aguinaldo’s  True  Inwardness  Out.  195 

reach  of  a patriot  for  sale  any  more.  That  was  the  fatal 
thing,  and  in  the  expression  of  this  apprehension  Agm- 
naldo  stated  what  he  felt  to  be  the  responsibility  he  had 
taken  upon  himself,  and  the  obligation  that  rested  upon 
him  when  the  money  was  given  to  him.  That  was  his 
fraction  of  the  money  that  the  Spanish  Government  had 
been  buncoed  out  of  by  a ludicrous  exaggeration  of 
the  importance  of  himself  and  his  cleft  in  the  rocks, 
that  was  held  to  be  impregnable  because  nine  hundred 
Spaniards  failed  to  take  it  when  it  was  defended  by 
seventy  men.  The  fact  that  the  position  was  not  im- 
pregnable was  demonstrated  by  a company  of  Amer- 
ican cavalry,  numbering  sevent}^  They  carried  it  with 
a rush,  though  some  hundreds  of  Filipinos,  a more  con- 
siderable force  than  Aguinaldo  had  there  to  surrender, 
believed  themselves  to  be  defending  this  ever  distin- 
guished gorge  in  the  rocks.  In  this  connection  out 
came  a confession  from  Aguinaldo  of  the  sharpest  perti- 
nence. He  said,  and  it  is  so  reported  in  the  official  min- 
iates that  we  have  certified  to  us  is  a true  copy  from 
the  Book  of  Acts,  Volume  I,  ‘'whose  literal  contents 
are,”  and  so  on.  This  is  a formidable  style  for  vouch- 
ing the  solemnity  of  the  minutes  of  a committee  meet- 
ing. One  of  the  “literal  contents”  is  that  in  the  report 
of  Aguinaldo’s  speech,  and  we  quote  it  literally,  page  6, 
line  7,  from  the  bottom  of  Senate  Document  208,  part  2. 
The  minutes  are  included  in  a message  from  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  transmitting  “in  further  re- 
sponse to  resolution  of  the  Senate  of  January  17,  1900, 
additional  papers  relating  to  the  Philippine  Islands,  and 
the  conduct  and  events  of  the  insurrection  against  the 
United  States  in  the  Philippine  Islands.”  In  another 


196  Aguinaldo’s  True  Inwardness  Out. 

chapter  of  this  paper  the  entire  minutes  of  this  meeting 
of  the  committee  and  record  of  Aguinaldo’s  speech  and 
subsequent  proceedings  are  literally  given. 

It  has  been  claimed  from  the  beginning  of  contro- 
versy concerning  Aguinaldo’s  conduct,  and  is  deepened 
continually  from  the  commencement,  because  there  has 
been  added  from  time  to  time  testimony  that  had  been 
lacking,  and  that  has  cleared  up  the  difficulties  of  the 
situation,  until  now  we  have  the  whole  story  and  are 
able  to  scrape  the  bottom  of  the  matters  long  in  issue. 
One  of  the  averments  of  those  who  have  persisted  in 
championing  Aguinaldo  as  a virtuous  patriot,  is  that  the 
sum  of  $400,000  had  been  held  sacred,  not  a Mexican 
dollar  of  it  touched.  What  Aguinaldo  had  to  say  about 
this  in  the  seventh  line  from  the  bottom  of  page  sixth 
is,  ‘‘that  suspension  of  payment  can  only  operate  at 
present  against  $350,000,  since  he  holds  $50,000  in  his 
own  hands,  a sum  which  he  drew  from  the  Chartered 
Bank,”  and  Aguinaldo  goes  on  to  say,  “On  account  of 
this,  demand.”  Now  that  demand  was  another  story 
that  should  have  been  mentioned  sooner.  The  “de- 
mand” was  that  Artacho  had  “obtained  from  the  Su- 
preme Court,  which  yielding  to  his  claim  has  suspended 
payment  of  this  sum  ($350,000)  by  the  Shanghai,  Hong 
Kong,  and  Chartered  Banks.”  Aguinaldo  apologized 
for  not  being  able  to  draw  out  all  the  funds,  as  he  ex- 
plained, “in  spite  of  the  need  for  them,  because  the  direc- 
tors of  the  banks  objected  to  it,  the  attachment  being  in 
force.”  That  w^as  rather  a good  reason  for  objection  on 
the  part  of  the  directors  of  the  banks.  One  of  the  patri- 
ots who  had  obtained  the  money,  at  least  had  seen  it 
safe  into  Aguinaldo’s  hands,  this  very  Artacho,  wanted 


Aguinaldo’s  True  Inwardness  Out.  197 

his  share  of  it,  and  began  legal  proceedings.  Still  Agui- 
naldo  had  $50,000  of  it  “in  his  hands,”  as  was  stated, 
and  this  seems  to  have  been  the  expeditionary  fund  of 
his  voyage  to  Singapore  with  a staff — a show  of  pros- 
perity— and  glory  of  uniforms,  and  which  began-  evi- 
dently in  a very  different  temper,  and  was  carried  on  for 
a very  different  purpose  from  that  in  which  it  ended. 
It  is  in  line  to  notice  how  carefully  Aguinaldo  had  kept 
the  accounts,  and  how  thos^  who  were  loyal  to  him  were 
to  support  his  absolute  authority,  particularly  over  the 
money  that  gave  him  his  greatness  and  got  him  into 
mischief. 

There  was,  it  needs  saying  here  in  explanation,  a 
meeting  of  the  Filipino  Committee  in  Hong  Kong,  on 
the  24th  of  February,  1898.  The  minutes  are  the  first 
part  of  the  document  we  have  just  been  considering, 
and  the  date  of  it  has  some  significance  as  follows : “In 
Hong  Kong,  an  English  Colony,  to-day,  the  24th  of 
February,  1898.”  This. was  the  day  upon  which  “the 
gentlemen  representing  the  Supreme  Council  of  the 
people”  united,  and  “Senor  President  Emilio  Aguinaldo 
showed  to  the  committee  a Copy  of  the  Act  made  by 
the  leaders  in  the  past  insurrection.”  There  was  a seal 
upon  this  in  black  ink — that  is,  upon  the  copy  of  it  that 
fell  into  the  hands  of  American  military  authorities — 
and  the  seal  said,  “Republic  of  the  Philippines,  Office 
of  the  President.”  A Filipino  poses  on  a seal. 

Now  Aguinaldo,  though  a few  months  later  confess- 
ing his  obligation  to  Spain,  under  the  law  of  the  Eng- 
lish colony  where  he  had  agreed  to  live  at  the  pleasure 
of  the  King  of  Spain,  admitted  that  Spain  would  have 
a claim  for  the  money  if  he  took  up  arms  against  her. 


198  Aguinaldo’s  True  Inwardness  Out. 

He  had  received  from  eight  members  of  the  original 
committee,  one  the  Arbitrator  himself,  Pedro  A.  Pa- 
terno,  and  Don  Paciano  Rizal  held  a power  of  attorney 
from  another  member.  These  illustrious  patriots  said 
there  existed  a “certain  discontent”  in  various  groups 
of  the  insurgents,  etc.,  and  those  who  had  been  living 
on  the  islands  were  in  a sad  situation  and  disheartened, 
and  wanted  some  of  the  money.  Aguinaldo  presented 
this  remonstrance  of  those  who  had  staid  at  home 
against  those  who  got  the  money  and  were  abroad  and 
enjoying  themselves  at  Hong  Kong,  the  city  that  seems 
to  the  Filipinos  as  quite  the  greatest  and  most  fasci- 
nating in  the  whole  world;  and  in  referring  to  the  paper 
mentioned  he  had  received  a letter  from  Primo  de 
Rivera,  in  the  name  of  General  Fernando  Primo  de 
Rivera,  the  Spaniard  who  pacificated  with  cash;  and  this 
Sehor  said  he  would  n’t  pay  the  $200,000  he  had  agreed 
to  pay,  and  had  n’t  paid,  forming  the  third  payment, 
until  the  Filipinos  were  really  pacificated,  “and  the  total 
disappearance  of  the  Katipunan,”  which  is  the  most 
alarming  of  the  secret  societies  in  the  Philippines,  and 
known  as  the  Bloody  Brotherhood.  Aguinaldo 
could  n’t  put  down  the  Katipunan,  which  is  as  fiendish 
as  any  in  Italy,  or  could  n’t  suppress  the  insurgents. 
Fie  had  got  a great  deal  more  for  what  he  had  sold  than 
it  Avas  worth,  and  his  announcement  meant  that  there 
was  no  more  money  coming  from  the  Spaniards.  At 
the  same  time  Artacho  was  displaying  himself  as  a dis- 
satisfied patriot,  and  resigned  his  position  as  “Secretary 
of  the  Interior  and  head  of  the  Committee  on  Com- 
merce.” It  will  be  noticed  at  once  here  was  a person 
of  prominence  and  probable  social  dignity.  More  than 


Aguinaldo’s  True  Inwardness  Out.  199 

that,  he  was  going  abroad,  according  to  an  agreement 
made  with  him  when  the  treaty  was  negotiated  at  Biac- 
na-Bato  (the  Split  Rock),  and  this  was  on  the  19th  of 
December  of  the  past  year;  that  is,  the  19th  of  Decem- 
ber, 1897.  Now  this  Artacho  even  wanted  to  be  paid 
$508.75,  and  sent  an  account  that  it  was  owing  to  him. 
The  committee  decided  that  the  contract  made  at  Biac- 
na-Bato,  December  19,  1897,  “is  void  and  of  no  value,” 
and  “parts  of  the  constitution”  cited  by  the  disturber 
Artacho  were  “null  and  void,”  since  it  was  not  possible 
to  carry  them  out — because  members  of  the  Govern- 
ment wanted  to  divide  the  money.  Eight  hundred  thou- 
sand dollars  was  promised  the  Biac-na-Bato  dignitaries 
by  the  Spanish  Government,  so  Aguinaldo  stated  to 
Artacho,  through  Don  Pedro  Paterno,  and  only  half 
had  been  received,  and  that  was  deposited  at  four  per 
cent  interest.  Especially  it  would  n\  do  to  disturb  that, 
and  it  was  resolved  and  carried  that  “the  writing  of  the 
19th  of  December,  1897,  is  to-day,  24th  of  February, 
1898,  modified  and  declared  null.  All  persons  as  are 
present  agree  that  only  Senor  Emilio  Aguinaldo  will  be 
authorized  to  spend  anything  of  that  sum  except  the 
interest,”  and  if  any  one  claimed  a share  in  the  fund, 
“Senor  Aguinaldo  will  decide  whether  the  claim  is  just, 
and  he  will  also  decide  what  amount  to  pay  himself  for 
having  been  chief  of  the  insurrection,  and  he  who  knows 
most  about  it,  since  he  alone  is  acquainted  with  the 
merits  and  demerits  of  his  several  coadjutors,”  and  as 
for  paying  anything  to  Artacho,  it  could  n’t  be  done 
without  consultation  with  Paterno,  and  also  Baldomero 
Aguinaldo.  This  Baldomero  Aguinaldo  is  said  to  be  a 
cousin  of  Emilio,  and  the  last  official  act  that  the  Presi- 


200  Aguinaldo’s  True  Inwardness  Out. 

dent  who  three  times  appointed  himself  Dictator  per- 
formed before  he  was  captured  by  Funston,  was  to  issue 
an  order  from  this  financial  cousin  of  his  was  to  take 
charge  of  guerrilla  warfare  in  a certain  district.  It  is 
interesting  to  notice  that  this  member  of  the  royal  fam- 
ily was  watch-dog  of  the  treasury  when  it  had  that 
$350,000  in  it.  Aguinaldo  himself  had  an  arrangement 
with  the  Chartered  Bank  that  he  was  to  pull  out  $50,000 
a month,  and  he  had  only  got  one  pull,  but  he  had  re- 
duced the  funds  to  $350,000,  so  that  the  sacred  bulk  of 
Mexican  dollars  so  much  talked  about  had  been  violated. 
One  quarter  of  the  fund  made  holy  for  war,  made  a 
permanent  disappearance  in  Aguinaldo’s  pocket. 

Sandico,  Apacible,  and  others  replied  to  Aguinaldo’s 
plea  about  money  and  dignity  and  written  contract  and 
all  that,  that  they  agreed  that  the  admiral  of  the  Amer- 
ican squadron  should  give  to  the  President  all  the  arms 
he  needed.  Sandico  was  convinced  the  fleet  could  do 
nothing  in  the  Philippines  if  it  was  not  used  in  connec- 
tion with  the  insurgents,  and  it  was  '‘impossible,  in  his 
judgment,  to  believe  the  admiral  would  be  anything 
but  pleased  to  take  the  President  and  his  leaders  aboard 
one  of  his  cruisers;’'  and,  as  to  making  the  President 
sign  a document  concerning  agreements  prejudicial  to 
the  Filipinos,  the  President  might  refuse,  "stating  that 
in  this  Colony  there  is  a Committee  which  Carries  the 
Functions  of  Government,  which  is  charged  with  all 
political  questions,  and  with  which  it  is  necessary  to 
first  come  to  an  understanding.”  Distinctly  there  was 
in  this  reply  to  the  personal  and  pecuniary  plea  of  Agui- 
naldo to  be  permitted  to  remain  in  Hong  Kong  a threat. 
The  words  were  smooth,  but  they  were  an  assurance 


Aguinaldo's  True  Inwardness  Out. 


201 


to  Aguinaldo  that  he  was  not  so  much  the  master  as 
he  thought  he  was,  that  he  was  not  a sovereign  whose 
importance  would  not  permit  him  to  be  risked.  There 
was  a “Committee  that  carried  the  functions  of  Govern- 
ment,’’ and  it  “is  necessary  to  first  come  to  an  under- 
standing with  it.”  Sandico  is  a scoundrel,  but  he  called 
upon  Aguinaldo  to  remember  he  was  not  endowed  with 
the  only  authority,  and  that  was  manly.  Apacible,  how- 
ever, who  was  the  Vice-President,  appears  to  have  been 
the  man  of  will  who  had  his  way. 

The  termination  of  the  discussion  was  that  Agui- 
naldo had  to  go,  and  Consul  Wildman  states  that  it  took 
two  weeks  to  get  permission  from  Dewey  for  him  to  go. 
Dewey  did  n’t  want  him,  had  no  use  for  him,  did  n’t 
telegraph  Wildman  to  “tell  Aguinaldo  to  come  at  once,” 
because  he  was  n’t  in  any  hurry  to  go  away  from  Ma- 
nila, as  he  was  to  leave  Hong  Kong  in  April.  Wildman 
was  at  the  time  impressed  that  Aguinaldo  could  be  a 
great  help,  and  called  his  morose  bits  of  pride  sulky 
childishness.  The  arrival  from  Singapore  was  May  2d, 
the  committee  met  on  the  4th,  and  the  arrival  at  Ma- 
nila was  the  19th.  Wildman  must  have  asked  per- 
mission before  the  committee  met.  Then  came  the 
statement  that  the  Filipino  people  were  unprovided  with 
arms,  and  this  is  at  the  beginning  of  the  third  paragraph 
of  the  seventh  page  of  the  paper  of  the  Filipino  Secret 
Acts.  It  runs  that  unprovided  with  arms  the  Filipinos 
would  be  victims  “of  the  demands  and-  exactions  of  the 
United  States,  but  provided  with  arms,  able  to  oppose 
themselves  to  them,  could  struggle  for  independence.” 
This  evidently  was  from  a very  plain-spoken  person,  and 
a part  of  Aguinaldo’s  business,  according  to  the  views 


202  Aguinaldo’s  True  Inwardness  Out. 

of  the  committee,  one  that  he  was  personally  competent 
to  perform,  was  to  go  to  Cavite  and  be  gentle  with 
Dewey,  and  get  arms  from  him  to  fight  the  Spaniards 
with,  and  he  did  that  very  thing,  after  some  delay, 
multiplying  the  guns  received,  and  he  got  other  arms 
from  the  Spaniards,  those  that  were  surrendered  by  the 
cut-off  and  broken-down  garrisons,  then  looking  for  a 
helper  to  whom  the}^  could  surrender. 

The  undertone  of  animosity  already  felt  toward  the 
Americans  by  this  self-constituted,  high-tipped  Hong 
Kong  Committee  is  to  be  carefully  considered.  It  was 
on  November  3d  that  this  committee  had  made  a dis- 
honorable proposition  to  our  country  to  recognize  them 
as  a nation,  and  a dishonorable  proposition  also  to 
smuggle  arms  for  somebody  into  Luzon,  and  take 
twenty-five  or  thirty  per  cent  of  the  gun  contract  money 
for  doing  so;  and  in  the  same  connection  to  give  two 
provinces  that  they  did  n’t  possess,  a thousand  miles 
away,  to  the  Americans  for  a “written  contract,”  but 
that  was  not  verbally  specified,  that  the  United  States 
would  uphold  the  Aguinaldo  Government.  Mark  these 
words:  “Provided  with  arms,  the  Filipinos  will  be  able 
to  oppose  themselves  to  them  (the  United  States),  and 
struggle  for  their  independence.”  That  is,  if  the  United 
States  could  be  persuaded  to  arm  the  Filipinos  they 
would  be  able  to  fight  the  United  States.  The  com- 
mittee were  looking  forward  to  it  then.  They  “got  the 
guns  and  got  the  money  too,”  like  the  British  jingoes; 
but  they  did  n’t  have  any  ships.  However,  they  did 
fight  the  United  States  with  those  very  guns,  and  had 
sympathetic  admirers  in  the  United  States  as  Christian 
statesmen  and  warriors  and  signers  of  the  Declaration 


Aguinaldo’s  True  Inwardness  Out.  203 

of  Independence  for  doing  so,  and  it  turned  out  that 
the  forcing  of  Aguinaldo  to  go  to  Cavite  was  the  inci- 
dent upon  which  his  fortunes  turned.  The  tide  was  at 
the  flood,  and  led  on.  The  transformation  scene  fol- 
lowed literally.  An  army  was  wafted  into  Aguinaldo’s 
hands,  and  the  delays  in  the  treaty-making  and  long- 
protracted  uncertainties  caused  the  array  of  a powerful 
force  of  enemies  of  our  great  and  generous  country. 

The  people  of  the  United  States  should  understand 
the  hostility  of  Aguinaldo,  that  his  attitude  toward  the 
Americans  was  premeditated  from  the  moment  of  the 
refusal  to  recognize  the  Hong  Kong  Committee  as  the 
Philippine  Republic,  and  the  fact  of  the  refusal  of  the 
United  States  was,  of  course,  stated  formally  to  the 
Hong  Kong  Committee,  through  the  American  consul, 
Mr.  Wildman,  who  was  curtly  instructed  by  the  Third 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States,  not 
only  not  to  accept  the  base  propositions  made,  but  not 
to  give  Mr.  Agoncillo  and  others  of  his  committee  en- 
couragement to  make  themselves  further  intimate  and 
intrusive  in  our  affairs. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 


TPIE  TATES  NOT  TRUE. 

Told  by  Aguinaldo’s  Agoncillo — Specifications  of  Falsi- 
fication— Attempt  to  Entrap  Admiral  Dewey,  in 
order  to  get  Him  to  make  a Contract — The  Biac- 
na-Bato  Bleeders  of  Spain — Aguinaldo  never  For- 
gave the  Snub  from  Our  State  Department  when 
He  Attempted  to  Introduce  International  Bribery 
as  a Patriotic  Duty. 

ON  the  steamer  China,  which  left  Manila  for  San 
Francisco,  by  way  of  Nagasaki,  General  Wesley 
Merritt  was  a passenger,  en  route  for  the  Paris  Confer- 
ence of  Treaty  Commissioners,  and  for  him  the  steamer 
was  diverted  to  Hong  Kong,  where  the  General  took 
an  English  boat  to  pass  through  the  Red  Sea  into  the 
Mediterranean.  General  Frank  Green  was  the  ranking 
officer  for  the  rest  of  the  journey,  and  among  the  pas- 
sengers were  Agoncillo  and  Sixto  Lopez. 

General  Green  was  laboring  during  the  trip,  prepar- 
ing an  exhaustive  report  from  Spanish  documents  on 
Philippine  history  and  resources,  and  he  stimulated 
Agoncillo  to  get  up  a paper  on  the  contested  points  of 
the  clash  between  Spaniards  and  natives.  Evidently  the 
labor  was  one  of  extreme  difficulty,  for  days  were  spent 
in  fashioning  single  paragraphs.  The  result  was  the  well- 
known  memorandum  entitled  “Brief  Notes,”  included 
in  my  “Story  of  the  Philippines,”  and  generally  known. 

204 


The  Tales  Not  True. 


205 


Any  reader  of  the  '‘Notes,”  now  that  there  has  been  an 
accumulation  of  indisputable  evidence  that  covers  nearly 
everything  of  note,  can  understand  the  severe  struggle 
of  Agoncillo  to  distort  and  deny  the  truth,  and  substi- 
tute systematic  falsification. 

The  work  Agoncillo  undertook  was  that  of  a lawyer 
dealing  with  a crooked  client.  The  first  “note”  writ- 
ten is  this: 

“On  the  same  day  that  Admiral  Dewey  arrived  at 
Hong  Kong,  Senor  Aguinaldo  was  in  Singapore, 
whither  he  had  gone  from  Hong  Kong,  and  Mr.  Pratt, 
United  States  consul  general,  UNDER  INSTRUC- 
TIONS EROM  SAID  ADMIRAE,  held  a conference 
with  him.” 

Admiral  Dewey  did  not  give  the  American  consul 
“instructions,”  but  Agoncillo  wanted  to  thrust  upon  the 
record  that  there  was  a “recognition”  of  the  Tagalog 
as  a Government.  The  next  clause  of  the  note  was 
there  was  an  agreement  “that  Senor  Aguinaldo  and 
other  revolutionary  chiefs,  in  co-operation  with  the 
American  squadron,  should  return  to  take  up  arms 
against  the  Spanish.”  There  was  no  such  agreement. 
The  word  was  used  expressly  to  deceive.  Agoncillo 
said  there  was  an  agreement,  because  he  wanted  to  give 
that  style  of  untruth  a run  in  the  world,  and  he  suc- 
ceeded in  that.  He  took  the  liberty  of  stating  right 
there  that  it  was  the  “sole  desire”  of  “the  Washington 
Government”  “to  concede  to  the  Philippine  people  ab- 
solute independence.”  Where  was  that  information  to 
be  obtained?  Only  the  State  Department  or  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  could  express  such  a desire 
on  behalf  of  the  Washington  Government.  In  his  Taga- 


2o6 


The  Tales  Not  True. 


log  ignorance  and  Malay  mendacity,  that  was  what 
Agoncillo  would  have  been  glad  to  get,  but  he  con- 
tinued the  policy  of  quoting  the  consuls  as  if  they  spoke 
officially  for  the  Government,  and  he  founded  a school 
of  imitators  in  America. 

There  was  method  about  the  falsehoods  with  which 
Agoncillo  was ' SO  facile.  He  wrote  this  stuff  in  Sep- 
tember, and  in  the  previous  May  he  had  been  present 
at  the  meeting  of  the  Committee  of  Filipinos  in  Hong 
Kong,  where  Aguinaldo  strove  to  find  excuses  to  avoid 
going  to  Manila  to  meet  Dewey,  desiring  to  send  a com- 
mittee to  demand  ‘'a  written  contract.”  It  has  been  the 
game  of  Aguinaldo  and  his  advisers  ever  since  to  de- 
clare that  unauthorized  persons  had  traded  away  the 
United  States  with  them,  though  they  were  the  dishon- 
orables  who,  November  3,  1897,  offered  to  buy  a “writ- 
ten contract,”  that  would  be  a recognition,  with  two 
Philippine  provinces!  Why  any  one  should  persist  in 
the  preposterous  stupidities  of  fabrication  in  the  matter, 
and  take  what  is  said  against  the  Americans  in  accusa- 
tions of  impossibilities,  and  at  the  same  time  treat  all 
American  authorities  who  tell  the  plain  truth  as  falsi- 
fiers, is  a muddle  of  Agoncillo’s  distemper  for  telling  not 
the  truth  that  seems  like  brain  disease  disordering  mind, 
but  it  may  be  regarded  as  a Malay  mania,  and  charged 
to  the  climate. 

The  second  paragraph  of  the  “Notes”  opens  with 
“By  virtue  of  this  agreement” — still  insisting  that  there 
was  a bargain — Aguinaldo  proceeded  by  the  first 
steamer,  “for  the  express  purpose  of  embarking  on  the 
Olympia  and  going  to  Manila,”  but  this  did  not  happen. 
Why  not?  “Because  the  American  squadron  left  Hong 


The  Tales  Not  True. 


207 


Kong  the  day  previous  to  his  arrival.”  Agoncillo  knew 
perfectly  well  when  he  wrote  it  this  was  the  reverse  of 
the  truth.  He  was  at  Hong  Kong,  and  knew  Aguinaldo 
got  to  Hong  Kong,  not  the  day  after  Dewey  left  that 
place,  but  the  day  after  the  battle  of  Manila,  eight  hun- 
dred and  twenty-three  miles  away.  In  support  of  this 
falsehood,  efYervescing  in  foolishness,  the  Hong  Kong 
lawyer  says’  ‘‘This  is  what  Mr.  Wildman,  United  States 
consul-general  in  Hong  Kong,  said  to  Senor  Aguinaldo 
in  an  interview  that  took  place  between  them.”  This  is 
another  effort  to  strain  a quibble  to  give  the  appearance 
of  official  recognition.  Wildman  could  not  have  said 
anything  of  the  kind.  Four  months  before  this  perverse 
writing,  Agoncillo  was  present  at  Hong  Kong  when 
Aguinaldo  made  another  false  statement  that  he  had  not 
succeeded  in  visiting  Wildman  three  days  after  landing, 
though  Wildman  reported  that  Aguinaldo  called  im- 
mediately after  his  arrival,  but  that  it  took  at  least  ten 
days  to  persuade  Dewey  to  let  “the  President”  of  the 
Hong  Kong  Club  go  to  him  at  Cavite.  Instead  of 
giving  the  facts,  or  any  approach  to  them,  as  he  con- 
tinued his  version  of  that  which  had  happened,  by  say- 
ing what  had  not,  Agoncillo  went  out  of  his  way  so 
far  as  to  say  when  the  McCullough  arrived,  “his  com- 
mander said  to  Senor  Aguinaldo  that  Admiral  Dewey 
needed  him  (le  necesitaha)  in  Manila,  and  he  brought 
an  order  to  take  him  on  board.”  This  was  to  say  that 
Dewey  was  in  such  need  he  gave  to  the  commander  of 
the  McCullough  “an  order”  for  this  man,  who  was  a ne- 
cessity. This  has  no  resemblance  to  the  truth.  Agon- 
cillo was  a participant  in  the  May  5th  meeting  of  the 
Hong  Kong  Club,  heard  Aguinaldo  plead  to  be  per- 


2o8 


The  Tales  Not  True. 


mitted  not  to  go,  and  was  constrained  against  his  will 
to  go  by  Sandico  and  others.  In  every  line  of  Agon- 
cillo’s  notes  there  is  tampering  with  the  truth,  as  we 
now  have  it  before  us  in  form  that  is  not  rationally  ques- 
tionable. Repeatedly  he  challenges  the  fact  with  a 
square,  telltale  falsehood.  He  talks  about  the  “cam- 
paign” against  the  Spaniards  by  Aguinaldo,  a thing  he 
never  did.  With  his  staff  of  seventeen  he  is  supposed 
to  have  marched  out  and  conquered  the  Spanish  Gen- 
eral Pena,  who  surrendered  fifteen  hundred  soldiers. 
The  revolutionary  army  is  declared  in  six  days’  “oper- 
ations” to  have  captured  seven  garrisons.  There  was 
no  fight,  however;  not  a gun  fired  in  anger  or  earnest. 
The  garrisons  were  wild  to  give  themselves  up.  Still 
we  have  it  recited — a queer  fancy  in  these  terms,  “At 
the  same  time  the  province  of  Cavite  was  being  con- 
quered.” The  conquering  was  done  by  the  guns  of  the 
American  fleet  May  ist.  There  is  a coincidence  to 
which  we  shall  call  attention  in  a paragraph  we  copy, 
this;  “On  the  9th  of  June  last  the  whole  province  of 
Cavite  was  under  the  control  of  the  Provisional  Revo- 
lutionary Government,  and  there  were  many  Spanish 
prisoners  and  friars,  seven  thousand  guns,  great  quan- 
tities of  ammunition,  and  some  cannon.”  What  is  there 
familiar  in  the  date,  June  9,  1898?  Simply,  it  was  the 
very  day  in  which  Aguinaldo  wrote  his  letter  described 
by  himself  as  one  of  “frank  warnings”  and  “noble  in- 
tentions” to  the  Spanish  Captain-General  Augustin. 
Undoubtedly  that  letter  was  intended  to  make  an  alli- 
ance with  Augustin,  and  it  succeeded,  though  the  fact 
was  concealed  for  a time,  that  it  might  be  used  against 
Americans  as  a surprise.  .As  soon  as  Aguinaldo  -got 


RAILROAD  STATION,  TARLAC. 


First  military  Train  made  up  north  of 

TARLAC,  AT  PANIQUI. 


The  Tales  Not  True. 


209 


hold  of  his  native  province,  and  had  ‘‘seven  thousand 
guns  and  a great  quantity  of  ammunition  and  some 
cannon,”  he  proceeded  to'prepare  for  the  use  of  arms 
against  the  United  States,  as  he  intimated  he  would  do 
in  his  speech  officially  reported  at  Hong  Kong  on  May 
4th.  Aguinaldo  was  in  command  of  the  native  soldiers 
who  had  been  in  the  Spanish  army,  and  with  them  in 
hand,  gathered  in  the  bushwhacking  snipers  on  the 
other  side  of  the  bay,  and  he  was  ready  to  unite  Spanish 
and  Filipino  armies,  and  make  a joint  assault  on  the 
Americans  as  invaders. 

The  letter  that  Aguinaldo  wrote  on  the  25th  of 
October,  1898,  that  was  influential  in  the  surrender  of 
Iloilo  to  the  Filipinos  after  the  Americans  were  in- 
formed the  town  was  to  be  given  up  to  them — the  state- 
ment was  made  on  authority  to  General  Otis — marks 
the  line  of  co-operation  of  Aguinaldo  with  the  Span- 
iards. It  was  in  the  Iloilo  letter  that  Aguinaldo  speaks 
of  his  “noble”  letter  to  Augustin,  and  gives  the  key  fact 
to  much  that  might,  without  that  captured  paper,  have 
proved  troublesome  to  unravel.  Now  it  is  plain.  It 
was  in  this  connection  Agoncillo  stated  that  “The  Span- 
ish Government  has  sent  to  Senor  Aguinaldo  various 
emissaries  who  invited  him  to  make  common  cause  with 
Spain  against  the  United  States;”  but  it  was  “too  late,” 
the  “word  of  honor”  had  already  been  pledged  “in  favor 
of  certain  representatives  of  the  Government  at  Wash- 
ington.” This  was  written  for  the  American  people  by 
a man  on  the  way  to  Washington  and  Paris,  who  knew 
it  would  be  disadvantageous  to  tell  the  truth.  Finally 
Agoncillo  wrote  out  his  story  of  the  Biac-na-Bato  treaty, 

disguising  and  changing  the  facts  to  suit  himself,  espe- 
14 


210 


The  Tales  Not  True. 


cially  writing  in  speaking  of  the  Artacho  suit,  “Sehor 
Artacho,  induced  by  the  father  solicitor  of  the  Domin- 
icans and  the  consul-general  of  Spain,  filed  in  the  courts 
in  that  colony,”  etc.  Agoncillo  knew  all  about  that  suit, 
but  never  thought  of  the  “Book  of  Acts”  doing  service 
for  the  whole  truth  as  a “Captured  Document,”  and 
did  not  find  occasion  to  be  accurate,  but  dealt  out  that 
new  story  of  the  father  solicitor  of  the  Dominicans  and 
the  Spanish  consul-general.  The  minutes  of  the  meet- 
ing of  May  5th  show  that  Pedro  A.  Paterno,  the  Arbi- 
trator, and  Paciana  Rizal,  brother  of  the  martyr,  de- 
manded a division  of  the  Biac-na-Bato  money — the 
letter  of  this  party  claiming  the  cash  was  largely  for 
them — and  it  was  signed  by  eight  names.  ■ Agoncillo 
says  three  only  were  dissatisfied.  Pie  says  specific- 
ally “forty-seven  revolutionaries  were  opposed.”  They 
mustered  only  twenty-six,  including  two  Aguinaldos. 
There  is  not  a sign  in  the  official  proceedings  of  the 
father  confessor  or  the  consul-general.  Agoncillo 
is  a dramatist,  and  put  that  in  as  an  ornament.  It 
seems  that  telling  anything  truthfully  ‘ was  quite  un- 
natural to  Agoncillo,  and  he  introduces  the  “solicitor  of 
the  Dominican  order”  and  the  Spanish  consul  at  the 
close,  and  boasts  of  paying  Artacho  $5,000  to  withdraw 
the  suit.  The  reason  for  that  payment  is,  Aguinaldo 
had  drawn  $50,000  and  held  it,  but  could  get  no  more, 
for  Artacho  had  attached  the  money  in  the  bank,  and 
it  could  not  be  used  at  all  unless  the  attachment  could 
be  raised.  Artacho  was  paid  $5,000  to  raise  it. 

The  course  of  the  Filipino  insurgents  toward  Ad-* 
miral  Dewey  has  been  steadfastly  malignant,  and  at  the 
same  time  dull-witted.  The  reason  is  obvious.  He 


I 


The  Tales  Not  True.  3ii 

refused  to  conform  his  conduct  to  their  views  of  their 
own  dignity.  He  held  them  in  light  esteem,  though  he 
said  they  were  more  capable  of  self-government  than 
the  Cubans,  but  that  was  not  saying  they  were  capable 
at  all.  The  minutes  of  the  Filipino  Committee  in  Hong 
Kong,  May  4th,  unveils  the  motives  that  actuated  them. 
They  had  made  a bid  five  months  and  two  days  before 
that  proposing  direct  and  indirect  bribery  of  the  United 
States  officials  to  buy  '‘recognition.”  That  was  what 
they  pined  and  planned  for  from  the  first.  They  did  not 
lack  a certain  intelligence,  and  knew  that  this  proceed- 
ing was  rascally;  that  is,  they  knew  it  as  well  as  Malays 
with  Spanish  education  could  comprehend  anything  dis- 
graceful in  public  affairs. 

On  the  same  day — November  3,  1897 — they  tried 
to  have  a secret  understanding  with  Consul  Wildman, 
and  to  purchase  the  United  States.  This  personal  move- 
ment was  awkward  and  candid,  though  crooked.  All 
Wildman  would  have  had  to  do  to  get  some  of  the 
Spanish  money  was  to  make  a consenting  gesture,  and 
he  could  have  been  the  Philippine  agent  of  Tagalog 
schemes  for  the  purchase  of  firearms.  If  there  had  been 
a corrupt  National  Administration  of  the  United  States, 
the  offer  of  two  provinces  they  alleged  to  be  theirs  and 
two  millions  in  annual  customs  duties  would  have  been 
fascinating.  It  would  have  been  more  land  for  the 
people.  It  involved  the  commitment  of  this  country  to 
support  the  Filipino  Hong  Kong  Committee  in  its  pre- 
tension of  nationality  for  all  time;  and  if  we  set  up  the 
committee  as  the  country,  then  were  the  spoils  to  be 
made  over  to  us,  and  we  could  have  offered  twenty-five  ^ 
or  thirty  per  cent  as  a "bit  of  bread”  for  good  fellows. 


212 


The  Tales  Not  True. 


Agoncillo  was  able  to  have  written,  signed,  sealed,  rati- 
fied, and  recorded  the  treaty  giving  the  Manila  and 
Cavite  provinces — the  broad  harbor,  the  great  city,  the 
arsenal — a magnificent  Asiatic  station  just  to  our  hand, 
with  the  rock  of  Corrigedor,  another  and  greater 
Gibraltar,  at  the  mouth  of  the  bay.  All  we  had  to  do 
was  to  have  Wildman  sign  a treaty,  put  a ribbon  and 
wax,  stamped  with  a great  seal  of  some  sort,  on  the 
paper,  record  it  in  the  “Book  of  Acts,”  and  all  there 
was  of  the  Philippine  Republic  would  have  been  ours 
most  devotedly,  and  Aguinaldo  could  never  have  re- 
frained from  crying  out,  waking  and  sleeping,  that  all 
this  he  had  done  for  the  good  of  a great  cause.  He 
would  have  sworn  this  on  his  \vord  of  honor,  touched  it 
up  with  some  of  his  Imperial  Tagalog  tongue,  converted 
into  grand  Spanish  by  a talented  and  educated  secre- 
tary and  interpreter,  and  then  added  as  an  emotional 
indication  of  brotherly  affection,  “O,  my  beloved,  coun- 
trymen !”  This  was  the  plot  of  a committee  to  capture 
the  United  States  with  two  bribes — one  the  money  with 
which  the  Spaniards  paid  for  “peace”  when  they  did  not 
get  any  peace;  and  the  other,  two  rich  provinces  for 
the  United  States,  just  such  a treasure  and  located  so 
that  any  great  European  Power  would  have  been  ready 
to  go  to  war  about  it. 

This  “diplomatic”  adventure,  clearly  and  fully 
known,  and  set  forth  with  the  sustaining  documents  re- 
cently supplied  by  the  capture  of  the  archives  of  the 
committee  that  resolved  itself  from  a club  into  a coun- 
try at  war,  is  proof  of  the  semi-barbarous  state  of  the 
Filipino  leaders.  They  are  but  little  advanced  in  the 
understanding  of  international  morals  beyond  the  in- 


.The  Tales  Not  True. 


213 


terior  tribes  of  Africa.  The  statesmen  of  Biac-na-Bato 
soon  ascertained  that  the  United  States  would  not  enter 
into  a fraudulent  transaction  with  them.  Consul  Wild- 
man  wrote  the  whole  story  to  the  State  Department 
promptly,  and  got  his  instructions,  which,  of  course,  it 
was  his  duty  to  communicate  to  the  committee,  that 
was  self-styled  a Junta — for  that  word  had  an  official 
sound,  and  seemed  to  some  people  to  signify  formality, 
dignity,  and  revolution.  This  was  before  the  war,  and 
already  the  Biac-na-Bato  treaty-makers  had  one  trans- 
action and  two  proposals  on  their  record — each  dis- 
honorable. First,  the  treaty  itself  was  a fraud  from  the 
first — an  imposition  by  the  Spanish  officers  upon  their 
Government — making  false  representations  to  get 
money,  paying  $400,000  for  less  than  seven  hundred 
tramps  in  the  cleft  of  the  mountains  and  two  hundred 
and  thirty-five  arms;  and,  as  was  claimed,  twenty  can- 
non, when  they  had  not  one  effective  as  a shotgun — 
cannon  of  bamboo  wound  with  a rope,  no  doubt ! The 
negotiations  were  sordid.  The  whole  affair  was  a case 
of  bleeding  poor  Spain  by  a combination  of  Spanish 
officers  and  a parcel  of  alleged  insurgents.  There  is 
nothing  more  scandalous  in  the  bloody  and  shameful 
colonial  history  of  the  kingdom  of  Spain. 

The  second  dishonor  was  that  of  the  proposed  gun 
contract.  The  idea  was  for  the  United  States  to  sell, 
ship,  and  smuggle  guns,  make  money,  depositing  the 
weapons,  imported  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  United  States,  in  the  woods,  so  that  the  patriotic 
Hong  Kong  Committee  could  sequester  them,  and  send 
word  to  the  Spaniards  to  promptly  take  care  of  them. 
There  iiever  was  a more  infamous  case  of  fraudulency. 


214 


The  Tales  Not  True. 


If  there  is  an  exception  to  this  generalization,  it  is 
in  the  endeavor  to  set  up  a claim  to  two  Philippine 
provinces,  title  to  be  furnished  by  the  bribed  committee 
at  Hong  Kong,  who  sold  the  guns  of  their  soldiers,  that 
the  “leaders”  might  run  away  with  the  money,  and  be, 
as  Aguinaldo  confessed,  good  to  Spain  that  gave  it, 
or  not  be  able  to  get  it  out  of  bank.  They  had  no  more 
title  to  the  provinces  of  Manila  and  Cavite  to  sell  and 
convey  to  a foreign  Power,  than  Benedict  Arnold  had 
when  he  sold  West  Point  (and  did  not  deliver  it)  to 
make  over  New  York  and  Connecticut  to  the  British 
Empire  or  Spain  or  Prance. 

The  disreputable  schemes  urged  upon  the  United 
States,  through  our  own  consul  at  Hong  Kong,  were 
disdained  and  rejected,  and  the  fact  that  their  atrocious 
overtures  were  treated  disrespectfully  rankled  in  the 
bosoms  of  Aguinaldo  and  his  compatriots,  and  gave  the 
coloring  matter  to  the  secret  proceedings  of  May  4th.* 
The  Singapore  expedition  followed,  and  Aguinaldo  was 
* in  funds,  for  he  had  drawn  $50,000  out  of  the  second 
$200,000  the  Spaniards  had  turned  over  to  the  patriots, 
who  had,  with  their  consent,  been  exiled  from  O ! their 
“beloved  country!” 

On  the  return  from  Singapore,  the  Spanish  fleet 
battered,  burned,  and  sunk,  Aguinaldo  begged  not  to 

*It  is  possible  that  some  innocent  and  incredulous  persons, 
unable  to  account  for  the  use  of  the  State  secrets  of  the  Filipinos, 
who  have  been  in  arms  against  us,  may  want  to  know  just 
exactly  how  it  occurred.  Aguinaldo  found  himself  defeated  and 
driven  from  Malolos,  and  fled  so  closely  pursued  that  he  had  to 
walk  around  villages  in  the  night.  His  wife  and  her  mother  were 
captured,  and  also  his  official  papers ; and  they  have  been  translated, 
and,  by  order  of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  made  public  docu- 
ments. 


The  Tales  Not  True. 


215 


be  put  in  Dewey’s  hands,  and  Dewey  did  not  want  him, 
but  allowed  him  to  ‘"come.”  It  would  have  surprised 
the  gallant  and  amiable  admiral  if  he  could  have  known, 
on  the  19th  of  May  at  Cavite,  what  the  proceedings  of 
Aguinaldo  and  Company  had  been  at  Hong  Kong  on 
the  4th,  when  Aguinaldo  begged  to  be  spared  from 
Dewey,  unless  supported  by  a “written  contract.”  This 
passion  for  contracts  has  been  the  leading  feature  of  the 
President  and  Dictator  ever  since  he  was  chosen  as  the 
head  of  a committee,  and  became  fierce  to  grasp  all  in 
sight,  that  all  his  titles  should  be  made  good.  He  sud- 
denly wanted  the  world.  It  has  been  with  him  an  in- 
consistency and  incongruity  to  claim  that  he  was  recog- 
nized, and  at  the  same  time  entreat  all  comers — Commo- 
dores, Consuls,  and  Generals — to  give  him  recognition. 
He  wanted  promises  given  by  Dewey  and  Anderson,  the 
first  men  to  find  out  and  expose  his  treacheries.  They 
were  first  only,  however,  because  they  had  the  early 
opportunities,  that  were  given  by  his  conduct  in  personal 
testimony. 

All  others  sources  failing,  he  recognized  himself, 
and  had  the  ceremony  duly  certified,  signed,  sealed,  and 
put  away  to  be  captured  some  time.  It  was  the  only 
recognition  from  a friendly  Power  he  ever  had. 

General  Anderson,  nineteen  days  after  his  arrival  at 
Cavite,  wrote: 

“The  insurgent  chief,  Aguinaldo,  has  declared  him- 
self Dictator  and  self-appointed  President.  He  has  de- 
clared martial  law,  and  promulgated  a minute  method 
of  rule  and  administration  under  it.  We  have  observed 
all  military  courtesies,  and  he  and  his  followers  express 
great  admiration  and  gratitude  to  the  great  American 


2i6 


The  Tales  Not  True. 


Republic  of  the  North;  yet  in  many  ways  they  obstruct 
our  purposes,  and  are  using  effort  to  take  Manila  with- 
out us.  I suspect  that  Aguinaldo  is  secretly  negotiating 
with  the  Spanish  authorities,  as  his  confidential  aid  is 
in  Manila.” 

The  date  of  this  letter  was  July  i8,  1898.  Aguinaldo 
had  opened  his  clandestine  correspondence  with  Au- 
gustin June  9th,  and  the  treason  to  the  Filipinos  and 
conspiracy  against  the  Americans  was  ripening  rapidly. 
May  26th,  Secretary  Long  cabled  Dewey  his  entire 
confidence,  told  him  he  must  exercise  full  discretion, 
but  it  was  ‘‘desirable,  as  far  as  possible  and  consistent 
for  your  success  and  safety,  not  to  have  political  alli- 
ances with  the  insurgents  or  any  faction  in  the  islands 
that  would  incur  liability  to  maintain  their  cause  in  the 
future.” 

It  was  known  to  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  that  there  was  too  much  zeal  among  the  con- 
suls; but  they  all  knew  their  duty  much  better  than  the 
Tagalog  Dictator  knew  his  limitations.  Six  days  before 
Aguinaldo  notified  Augustin  that  he  was  for  sale  to 
another  captain-general,  this  dispatch  was  sent  by 
steamer  to  Hong  Kong,  cable  being  cut: 

“Cavite,  June  3d;  Hong  Kong,  June  6th. 

“Have  acted  according  to  the  spirit  of  the  Depart- 
ment’s instructions  therein  from  the  beginning,  and  I 
have  entered  into  no  alliance  with  the  insurgents  or 
with  any  faction.  This  squadron  can  reduce  the  de- 
fenses of  Manila  at  any  moment,  but  it  is  considered  use- 
less until  the  arrival  of  sufficient  United  States  forces  to 
retain  possession.  DEWEY.” 


.The  Tales  Not  True. 


217 


It  was  ten  days  after  the  arrival  of  Aguinaldo  at 
Cavite  when  he  attempted  to  do  business  with  the  ad- 
miral, and  this  is  Dewey’s  report : 

“Hong  Kong,  May  30,  1898. 

‘‘Secretary  of  Navy : 

“Aguinaldo,  revolutionary  leader,  visited  the  Olym- 
pia yesterday.  He  expects  to  make  personal  attack  on 
May  31st.  Doubt  ability  to  succeed.  DEWEY.” 

The  time  that  steamers  were  under  way  from 
Manila  is  to  be  remembered,  when  the  dates  of  cable 
dispatches  are  considered.  The  voyage  occupied  about 
three  days.  Aguinaldo  did  not  expect  to  attack  Manila 
seriously.  It  was  not  his  plan  to  push  the  fighting  with 
the  Spaniards  without  “a  written  contract”  with  Dewey, 
to  be  construed  as  a treaty  with  the  United  States.  He 
had  not  made  his  arrangements  with  Captain-General 
Augustin  at  that  time.  When  Aguinaldo  tried  his  modus 
vivendi  on  Dewey,  and  opened  the  game  by  telling 
when  he  would  attack  Manila,  the  real  intention  was  to 
get  Dewey  to  declare  himself.  It  would  have  been  the 
greatest  satisfaction  to  the  Tagalog  Dictator  to  have  a 
written  contract  with  the  admiral  that  the  fleet  was  to 
take  the  city,  and  Aguinaldo  garrison  it  with  his  army, 
when  he  could  have  carried  on  his  policy  of  offering- 
bargains  to  the  Spaniards  and  Americans,  and  occupy- 
ing the  palace  to  air  himself  and  the  city  as  his'  base. 
Dewey  did  not  make  a written  contract  or  any  other. 
He  calmly  told  Aguinaldo  that  he  would  wait  for  Amer- 
ican soldiers  to  garrison  the  town.  That  was  to  the 
Tagalog  a declaration  of  war;  and  his  first  move  was  to 
write  with  “noble  intentions”  to  the  Spanish  captain- 


2i8 


The  Tales  Not  True. 


general,  at  Manila,  sent  to  him  to  stay  with  him  his  most 
confidential  aide,  and  presently  he  was  besieging  the  city 
by  levying  a tariff,  exorbitant  but  not  prohibitory,  on 
the  importation  of  cattle.  The  Spaniards  still  had 
money  for  meat,  and  Augustin  and  Aguinaldo  issued 
joint  passes  on  the  roads  to  the  Filipino  cowboys,  who 
are  a very  different  breed  from  our  cowboys,  and  there 
is  the  same  broad  variations  as  to  beef  cattle.  General 
Anderson’s  scouts  captured  six  of  the  natives  provided 
with  passes  good  through  both  lines,  if  accompanied  by 
meat  on  the  feet. 


CHAPTER  XX. 


THE  PARTING  OE  THE  WAYS. 

The  Methods  of  Aguinaldo  to  Appeal  to  the  Vanity  and 
Ambition  of  His  Followers — They  Stimulated  and 
Expanded  Him  in  Turn — He  took  the  Measure 
of  the  Amount  of  Impertinence  an  American  would 
Stand,  and  when  he  Found  he  Crossed  the  Fine 
he  Flinched,  Apologized,  and  Promised — How  he 
Repeated  at  Cavite  the  Hong  Kong  Anxiety  for 
Divided  Armament — He  Grew  from  Tentative  to 
Pompous  Insolence,  and  Declared  War  in  Prin- 
ciple in  July,  ’98 — After  that  the  Logic  and  Ihtent 
of  every  Step  of  the  Tagalog  was  War  with  Us. 

While  it  is  understood  that  Aguinaldo  is  not  a 
highly-educated  man,  he  has  been  held  by  many 
to  be,  on  account  of  the  style  of  his  public  writing,  and 
nearly  all  his  papers  are  published,  including  private 
letters,  one  can  not  think  that  he  is  ill-informed  as 
to  the  relations  of  nations  and  the  forms  of  trans- 
acting international  business,  as  he  frequently  affected 
to  be.  He  has,  from  the  first  move  made  in  his  character 
of  ruler,  acted  as  if  he  knew  nothing  at  all  of  diplomatic 
intercourse  between  Governments,  great  or  small.  He 
has  proceeded  with  the  arrogance  of  an  African  king, 
or  Red  Indian  Great  Chief,  to  rudely  assert  the  total 
supremacy  of  his  will.  Napoleon  Bonaparte  never  took 
things  into  his  hands  and  made  the  laws  of  nations  con- 
form to  his  fancies,  so  far  as  he  had  force  to  give  his 

219 


220 


The  Parting  of  the  Ways. 


words  substance,  as  did  Aguinaldo.  The  first  con- 
tact of  our  Government,  through  our  consuls,  with  him 
was  in  several  ways  the  most  remarkable  experience  of. 
the  United  States.  Unless  Mr.  Wildman  was  unac- 
countably in  error,  Aguinaldo  and  his  club  of  Biac-na- 
Bato  colleagues  arrived  in  Hong  Kong  in  September,- 
1897,  but  the  proceedings  of  the  convention  of  peace 
were  in  December  of  that  year,  and  the  ‘‘contract”  was 
the  “writing,”  as  the  Filipinos  call  it,  and  are  distinct 
in  doing  so,  was  dated  the  19th  of  that  month.  This 
would  appear  to  mean  that  the  migration  was  after  the 
settlement.  There  is  here  a confusion  of  dates,  or  a 
misprint.*  Either  Wildman  or  Aguinaldo  was  wrong  as 
to  the  date,  or  there  is  somewhere  an  error  of  figures. 
The  dates  that  the  convention  was  in  the  September 
preceding  the  organization  of  the  Government  are  more 
probable  than  to  put  it  the  other  way.  That  is,  the 
“contract”  must  have  been  signed  December  19,  1896, 
whether  it  was  a preliminary  “writing”  or  a “treaty.” 
Perhaps  some  time  was  lost  in  the  final  revisions.  Spain 
may  have  been  tedious  in  adjustments,  as  our  peace 
commissioners  were  in  passing  from  the  stage  of  the 
protocol  to  that  of  the  treaty.  The  peculiarity  under 
attention  is  that  the  first  we  hear  from  Aguinaldo  as 
to  foreign  affairs  is  the  same  as  the  last.  He  wanted  the 
American  consul  to  make  a treaty  with  his  Secretary  of 
State,  and  could  not  understand  that  any  man  bearing 
the  commission  of  the  United  States  was  not  a sover- 
eign diplomat,  capable  in  his  own  official  right  of  bind- 
ing the  nations  in  obligations  that  would  be  supreme 

The  fact  is,  there  is  both  confusion  and  misprint  and  a miss- 
ing link ; but  truth  that  is  important  is  not  involved  in  doubt. 


The  Parting  of  the  Ways. 


221 


law  internationally.  It  is  hard  to  measure  the  intensity 
and  obduracy  of  such  ignorance,  but  he  was  adhesive. 
Agoncillo  evidently  was  of  the  persuasion,  when  he 
added  the  word  general  to  the  title  of  consul,  that  there 
was  no  doubt  possible  of  his  equivalency  to  any  poten- 
tiality in  national  contracts  to  be  described  as  “this 
writing.”  He  had  the  same,  view  all  the  way  through 
from  the  assumption  of  imperialism  as  a right  to  the 
acceptance  of  captivity  as  fate.  His  price  for  helping 
the  Americans  in  the  war  with  Spain,  and  going  into 
partnership  with  them  in  affairs  international,  has  not 
changed  from  asserting  the  position  of  the  Americans, 
that  of  protecting  the  Archipelago  from  European  inter-  ^ 
ference  and  colonization,  yielding  to  him  the  land  with 
its  inhabitants  and  the  fruits  thereof.  He  wanted  all 
the  land  and  the  people,  and  assigned  to  the  Americans 
the  part  of  disinterested  benevolence,  quoting  the  Cuban 
precedent,  and  desiring  to  extend  it.  His  outcries  for 
recognition  meant  that  precisely.  As  the  war  ap- 
proached, the  committee  at  Hong  Kong  was  converted 
into  a free  country  with  a dictatorship — Aguinaldo  the 
Dictator — and  wanted  to  be  recognized  as  a Nation; 
and  the  Dictator  prescribed  a gun  contract  with  money 
in  it  for  the  United  States,  and  a gift  of  two  provinces 
to  the  United  States,  to  give  the  committee  the  neces- 
sary status  to  play  the  part  in  the  world  of  a Power.  He 
wanted  to  “divide  armament” — a really  clever  phrase — 
with  the  United  States,  and  to  make  a “written”  bar- 
gain with  Dewey.  The  contract  was  that  he  should  be 
protected  by  the  American  fleet,  and,  as  the  Spanish 
fleet  was  removed,  he  was  economical  in  land,  and  had 
no  provinces  to  spare.  The  Spaniards  had  no  navy. 


222 


The  Parting  of  the  Ways. 


The  Americans  had  no  army  at  hand,  but  were  much 
engaged  in  Cuba.  Therefore,  there  was  to  be  an  alli- 
ance. Aguinaldo  and  Dewey  were  to  be  the  high  con- 
tracting parties,  each  to  speak  for  his  own  great  coun- 
try. The  Americans  had  not  even  considered  the  Poly-  ^ 
nesian  gift  of  two  provinces  and  two  millions  of  Mexican 
dollars  a year;  and  the  war  was  on.  Aguinaldo,  as  he 
had  been  to  Singapore  on  an  expedition  that  he  has 
never  explained,  and  always  has  darkened  as  much  as 
he  could  when  he  had  anything  to  say  about  it,  evi- 
dently considered  himself  fixed  to  drive  a negotiation 
between  Spain  and  the  United  States,  and  throw  the 
Filipino  insurgents  into  the  game  to  be  placed,  and 
secure  all  that  was  possible  for  their  manager,  and  inci- 
dentally themselves.  The  first  blow  was  struck  while 
Aguinaldo  was  at  sea  on  the  way  to  Hong  Kong,  and 
the  American  fleet  was  unharmed, . while  that  of  the 
Spaniards  ceased  to  exist.  This  was  a new  situation, 
and  enhanced  the  idea  of  the  original  Aguinaldo  policy 
of  assigning  Dewey  the  mastery  of  the  sea,  and  using 
him  and  his  country  to  help  the  Hong  Kong  Club  to  an 
ernpire  with  greater  resources  than  Japan,  in  -all  but 
people;  and  of  this  imperial  thousand  islands,  why  not 
Aguinaldo  for  Tycoon?  On  the  4th  of  May,  1898,  when 
the  President  of  the  Biac-na-Bato  Club  walked  into  the 
committee-room  he  had  much  on  his  mind — more  than 
he  could  trust  to  any  one.  He  had  glimpses  of  a great 
hereafter.  Spain  and  the  great  Power  of  America  were 
at  war,  and  Spain  already  cut  off  from  her  Oriental 
colony.  He  might  aid  the  Americans  to  blockade  the 
Spanish  troops,  and  force  their  surrender ! He  needed, 


The  Parting  of  the  Ways.  223 

first  of  all,  to  use  to  the  utmost  his  Presidency  of  the 
Filipino  Committee  at  Hong  Kong,  to  hold  the  as- 
signment of  Chief  Executive  of  the  insurgents.  What 
was  he  to  get  after  doing  that?  What  for  himself — for 
his  fellow-committeemen — for  the  population  of  the 
islands,  not  Spanish?  He  had  a pull  on  the  Spaniards, 
for  he  had  been  in  a notorious  transaction  with  a cap- 
tain-general and  associates.  There  had  not  been  formed 
a Blood  Brotherhood,  but  a Mexican  Silver  Community. 
He  had  been  scornfully  refused  when  he  had  made  ad- 
vances to  the  United  States,  and  named  the  consider- 
ation he  would  agree  to  give  as  security  for  recognition 
as  a Republic,  in  the  event  of  the  war  now  opened.  The 
Battle  of  Manila  had  shuffled  the  cards.  The  Dominion 
of  Spain  would  be  at  an  end  in  the  Philippines,  unless 
the  insurgent  Filipinos  co-operated  with  Spain.  Of 
course,  the  Spaniards  would  be  ready  to  agree  to  any- 
thing that  would  unite  the  Filipinos  with  them,  and  so 
that  line  of  communication  was  open  for  negotiation, 
but  the  population  were,  for  the  moment,  with  and  for 
the  Americans.  In  certainly  one  particular  Aguinaldo 
had  a vast  advantage  over  the  American  officers.  They 
were  in  a far,  strange  country.  They  were  not  in  com- 
munication, save  by  a costly  cable  and  a slow  boat 
across  the  Sea  of  China,  with  Washington  and  the  world. 
Aguinaldo  was  in  Cavite,  and  all  the  world  for  him  was 
there.  He  was  acquainted  with  it,  and  whatever  news 
there  was  he  got  daily.  The  Americans  had  helped  him 
to  this  confidingly,  and  he  used  the  very  weapons  they 
gave  him  against  them,  according  to  arrangement  with 
his  compatriots  and  without  scruple.  In  the  Asiatic 


224 


The  Parting  of  the  Ways. 


sense  of  brightness,  nothing  else  could  be  quite  so  bril- 
liant. It  adds  zest  to  assassination  to  use  the  victim’s 
knife,  or,  as  the  Filipinos  would  say,  ‘Tolo.”  ‘ 

It  was  necessary  to  make  a movement  with  caution. 
He  did  not  want  to  meet  the  victorious  American  ad- 
miral, and  to  him  commit  himself  for  the  Americans, 
and  not  know  what  he  was  to  get.  Hence,  the  languish- 
ing requiremer^  of  Aguinaldo  that  the  admiral  should 
make  a “contract,”  a “writing,”  terms-  and  conditions 
specified.  There ‘was  already  a rebellion  in  the  midst 
of  the  committee  of  peace — the  negotiators  of  the  “cash 
bribe”  treaty — and  Paterno,  Artacho,  Rizal,  Natividad, 
and  others,  “all  honorable  men,”  had  demanded  division 
of  the  bribe  money,  in  which  his  strength  was,  and 
attached  the  payment  of  the  deposits  in  the  Chartered 
and  Shanghai  Banks  of  Hong  Kong.  If  that  was  gone, 
the  prop  that  did  sustain  an  empire  had  fallen.  If 
he  displayed  himself  as  warring  upon  the  Spaniards, 
they  also  would  attach  the  money,  and  so  he  must  not 
go,  but  send  to  Dewey.  He  was  getting  too  precious 
to  the  public  to  travel.  Presently  he  saw  he  must  go 
or  lose  his  leadership  at  the  moment  it  was  everything 
but  the  money,  and  he  took  the  leap  in  the  dark  and 
came  out  in  the  light,  bought  off  Artacho  for  $5,000, 
and  saw  the  waves  of  imperialism  rise  and  fall  at  his  feet. 
The  Admiral  knew  better  than  to  commit  himself  to  a 
contract,  written  or  spoken;  but  his  refusal  was  looked 
upon  by  Aguinaldo  as  in  the  nature  of  the  caprice  of  an 
individual,  and  in  no  word  recorded  has  the  Presidential 
Dictator  ever  conceded  or  appeared  conscious  of  the 
fact  that  all  officers  of  the  United  States  had  not  as- 
signed to  them  the  unqualified  treaty-making  preroga- 


The  Parting  of  the  Ways. 


225 


tive,  and  he  considered  the  admiral’s  words  of  civility 
to  be  promises  that  he  would  see  to  it  that  the  Filipinos 
had  their  independence.  Aguinaldo  did  not  know 
twenty  words  of  English,  and  had  a talented  interpreter. 

There  was  art  in  the  way  he  handled  the  delicate 
questions  arising  from  his  predicament.  In  the  absence 
of  a written  “contract”  he  tried  to  substitute  events  that 
would  bear  the  construction  he  wanted.  He  had  won- 
derful success  in  finding  Spanish  garrisons  in  the  Cavite 
province  ready  and  eager  to  surrender,  all  given  to  him 
or  forced  upon  him.  It  was  a prodigy — almost  a miracle. 
Suddenly  he  held  the  entire  province,  and  had  seven 
thousand  firearms,  and  with  the  swarms  of  snipers 
around  Manila  he  had  an  army  numerous  as  that  of  the 
Spaniards,  ineffective  in  some  particulars,  but  tenfold 
what  he  had  ever  seen.  This  was  the  realization  of  what 
he  had  hoped  at  the  outset  from  formal  negotiation, 
and  was  the  state  of  affairs  June  the  9th.  He  had  the 
land,  and  the  Americans  the  water — the  very  “division 
of  armament”  he  said  at  Hong  Kong  was  the  necessity 
of  the  Philippine  Republic.  This  had  been  hurled 
upon  him.  He  made  two  propositions,  one  to  the  Span- 
ish commander,  Augustin,  in  writing,  fixing  up  a soft 
place  to  fall  in  with  the  Spanish,  if  Dewey  was  not  willing 
to  divide  with  him.  It  did  not  occur  to  him  in  such  a 
way  that  any  sign  of  it  survives,  that  the  American  ad- 
miral was  not  at  the  head  of  his  Government.  The 
attempt  to  use  the  American  fleet  through  Dewey  was 
adroit.  He  would  furnish  the  army  and  Dewey  the 
navy,  and  they  would  take  Manila,  and  he  would  take 
the  town  and  Dewey  keep  the  harbor.  There  was  the 
ideal  division  of  forces.  Dewey  waited  for  American 
15 


226  The  Parting  of  the  Ways. 

soldiers  to  hold  the  town  after  it  was  taken;  and  he  knew 
the  Filipinos  could  not  conquer  the  city,  for  they  did 
not  have  the  artillery  or  any ‘sufficient  equipment  to 
make  a serious  impression  upon  Manila  well  fortified, 
with  a great  store  of  rice,  abundant  cannon,  twenty-two 
thousand  stand  of  arms,  ten  million  cartridges,  and  thir- 
teen thousand  trained  soldiers. 

When  General  Anderson  arrived  and  became  ac- 
quainted with  the  situation,  he  suspected  Aguinaldo  of 
secretly  negotiating  with  the  Spaniards,  and  said  so. 
This  was  July  i8th,  two  weeks  after  landing.  Anderson 
knew  at  once  what  a hard  nut  Manila  would  be  to 
crack  if  the  Spaniards  fought,  and  on  that  had  re- 
marked: ‘‘The  city  is  strongly  fortified,  and  hard  to  ap- 
proach in  the  rainy  season.  If  bombardment  fails,  we 
should  have  the  best  engineering  ability  here.’’  Here 
were  two  timely  and  pregnant  observations  in  one  letter. 

The  conduct  of  Admiral  Dewey  was  excellent 
throughout  his  association  with  Aguinaldo  and  his  pro- 
moters. When  Consul  Pratt  began  to  bombard  him 
with  fulsome  praises  of  the  Tagalog  Pretender,  from 
Singapore,  and  was  backed  by  the  literature  of  the 
British  spellbinder  Bray,  telling  the  surprises  that  could 
be  wrought  with  a little  co-operation,  and  that  inside 
invaluable  insurgent  information  could  be  procured, 
Dewey  then  wanted  to  see  Aguinaldo  “at  once,”  for  it 
was  touch  and  go  with  him,  and  there  was  hurrying  and 
hiding,  and  Aguinaldo  set  out  in  disguise  and  under  a 
false  name,  as  though  he  was  too  important  to  allow 
him  to  go  forth  where  he  would  strike  daylight,  without 
protection  from  the  direct  rays  of  the  sun.  It  was  rather 
a sorry  way  to  take  the  road  to  glory.  At  that  moment 


The  Parting  of  the  Ways. 


227 


there  was  an  American  fleet  and  a Spanish  fleet,  and 
it  was  not  in  the  Oriental  mind  a sense  of  certainty 
which  would  win.  Dewey  was  no  longer  in  haste  for 
the  insurgent  who  had  been  pushed  upon  him  with  such 
easy  profusio-n.  He  declined  to  strike  Manila  for  the 
Malay’s  sake.  The  reason  was  perfect.  He  could  not 
occupy  the  town,  but  could  destroy  it.  He  held  the 
harbor  and  arsenal,  and  announced  that  there  must  be 
no  firing  upon  his  ships,  or  he  would  destroy  the  city. 
That  was  a different  thing  from  bombarding  it,  and 
turning  over  what  was  left  standing  to  the  Tagals.  He 
declined  the  offer  of  Aguinaldo  to  go  into  partnership 
and  take  the  city.  In  the  correspondence  that  opened 
the  operations  before  Manila,  the  admiral  insisted  that 
the  notice  of  bombardment  would  be  followed  by  firing 
should  be  given  with  the  qualifying  phrase  that  the  fire 
should  be  directed  upon  the  “defenses.”  That  was  to 
say,  not  upon  the  city  itself.  When  the  American  ad- 
miral declined  to  use  his  guns  on  behalf  of  the  Tagalog 
policy,  and  declared  he  would  wait  for  American  soldiers 
to  garrison  it,  the  “two  Nations”  were  at  the  parting  of 
the  ways,  and  parted.  Our  war  with  the  Philippines 
was  proclaimed  then  in  the  mind  of  Aguinaldo,  who 
began  his  confidences  that  Dewey  had  promised  him 
the  independence  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Archipelago, 
when  he  had  no  more  right  than  a boy  in  the  street  to 
make  such  promises,  and  it  was  not  in  the  man  to  do 
such  folly;  his  education  for  his  profession,  his  experi- 
ence, his  professional  dignity  and  trained  intelligence  of 
duty  of  his  Government  forbade  him  to  make  agreements 
beyond  his  authority.  Still,  Aguinaldo  was  responsible 
for  statements  in  a pamphlet  published  by  deluded 


2Z8 


The  Parting  of  the  Ways. 


American  citizens,  and  called  a '‘True  Version  of  the 
Philippine  Revolution,”  when  it  was  as  false  as  any  fable 
in  a yellow  novel.  Of  these  versions  here  is  a specimen: 

"That  in  course  of  an  official  interview  General  An- 
derson solemnly  and  completely  indorsed  the  promises 
made  by  Admiral  Dewey  to  him,  asserting  on  his  word 
of  honor  that  America  had  not  come  to  the  Philippines 
to  wage  war  against  the  natives  nor  to  acquire  and  re- 
tain territory,  but  only  to  liberate  the  people  from  the 
oppression  of  the  Spanish  Government.” 

This  was  one  of  the  many  falsehoods  about  Ander- 
son that  he  did  not  care  enough  about  to  contradict; 
but  as  to  this  he  was  asked  by  the  Secretary  of  War 
whether  it  was  true,  and  answered,  saying : 

"This  interview  of  Admiral  Dewey  and  myself  with 
Aguinaldo  took  place  on  the  ist  of  July,  1898,  and  not 
upon  the  4th.  I did  not  make  the  statement  asserted  by 
General  Aguinaldo,  as  I was  not  aware  that  Admiral 
Dewey  ever  had  made  him  any  promises,  and  did  not 
know  at  that  time  what  had  happened  or  what  passed 
bewteen  Consuls  Pratt,  Wildman,  and  Williams,  and 
Admiral  Dewey  on  the  one  part,  and  the  Filipino  lead- 
ers on  the  other.  In  this  interview  Admiral  Dewey 
made  no  promises  or  statements  whatever.” 

This  was  a critical  time  for  Aguinaldo.  He  had  been 
opposed  to  the  sending  of  American  troops.  That  was 
against  the  purpose  of  his  life — the  division  of  arma- 
ment, the  land  and  water  apportionment.  Anderson 
was  the  first  American  general  to  arrive,  and  the  inter- 
view was  the  first  day  after  he  got  there,  and  while  his 
troops  were  on  shipboard.  Aguinaldo  had  been  in  pos- 
session of  the  province  of  Cavite  for  nearly  a month. 


The  Parting  of  the  Ways.  229 

It  was  the  place  of  his  nativity.  He  was  of  the  opinion 
that  he  was  a man — the  man  with  greater  rights  than 
another.  He  was  about  to  demand  that  Anderson 
should  tell  what  his  object  was  in  landing  troops,  and 
wanted  a “writing”  about  that;  and  it  is  believed  he 
thought  of  resisting  with  arms  the  landing  of  American 
soldiers  without  a written  contract.  There  was  a reason 
for  his  omission  to  make  war  then — the  American 
fleet — and  he  may  not  have  perfected  his  alliance  with 
Spain,  foreshadowed  in  the  9th  of  June  letter.  That 
which  was  in  the  mind  of  the  Tagalog  comes  out  quickly 
according  to  Anderson,  the  very  man  to  give  him  the 
information  he  was  seeking.  Dewey  had  made  no  prom- 
ises or  statements.  Anderson  says  of  himself — he  ar- 
rived June  30th,  and  this  was  July  ist — and  states  this: 

“I  told  General  Aguinaldo  that  I had  come  with  a 
brigade  of  troops;  that  I had  come  to  fight  the  Span- 
iards, and  that  it  would  indirectly,  of  course,  be  to  his 
advantage;  that  as  we  were  fighting  a common  enemy, 
I would  have  to  appeal  to  him  or  his  people  for  trans- 
portation, forage,  fuel,  and  other  supplies;  but  that  his 
people  would  be  liberally  and  surely  paid  for  whatever 
we  received  from  them.” 

Anderson  had  no  expectation  of  the  wild  and  woolly 
swollen  state  of  Aguinaldo  and  his  excessive  preten- 
sions. Dewey  would  not  recognize  his  Government — 
calmly  paid  no  attention  to  the  farcical  pose  of  it.  Pos- 
sibly Anderson  was  the  treaty  man,  the  writing  con- 
tractor, who  had  been  prophesied,  looked,  and  longed 
for,  and  he  rushed  his  question  upon  the  American 
general.  Anderson  says: 

“He  asked  me  if  my  Government  was  going  to  rec- 


230  iThe  Parting  of  the  Ways. 

ognize  his  Government,  calling  my  attention  to  the  fact 
that  it  had  been  proclaimed  a few  days  before/’ 

Aguinaldo,  deeply  versed  in  American  affairs — 
wonderful  man  to  know  so  much  of  us! — thought  per- 
haps it  was  the  military  man  that  looked  after  the 
treaties!  He  had  been  rebuffed  by  the  State  Depart- 
ment, to  whom  he  had  proposed  before  the  war  two 
provinces  as  “security” — after  recognition — for  recog- 
nition; and  here  was  Anderson,  who  ought  to  do  it  for 
him  without  any  provinces.  Anderson  said  of  recog- 
nizing “my  Government:” 

“I  answered  I was  there  simply  in  a militay  capacity; 
that  I could  not  acknowledge  his  Government,  because 
I had  no  authority  to  do  so,  and  of  course,  up  to  that 
time,  even  the  Government  of  the  United  States  was 
probably  not  aware  of  what  he  had  done.  I may  have 
said  on  that  or  some  other  occasion  that  we  had  come 
to  liberate  the  Filipino  people  from  the  oppression  of 
Spain;  but  I told  him  then,  and  repeatedly  afterwards  in 
correspondence,  that  I could  not  recognize  his  political 
authority.” 

That  was  a conclusive  answer — perfect  in  form;  and 
to  an  intelligent  person  the  self-evident  truth.  Upon 
this  Aguinaldo  began  to  work  up  his  war  with  the 
United  States.  His  proceedings  bear  the  marks  of  a 
perfected  policy  of  aggression  and  insult.  He  arrested 
one  of  Anderson’s  staff  officers  that  day — did  it  because 
the  officer  crossed  an  imaginary  line  drawn  by  the  Taga- 
log  to  define  a supernatural  assignment — and  this  was. 
meant  as  an  announcement  of  a conflict  of  military 
authority.  A message  was  conveyed  to  him  that  by  no 
chance  must  such  a mistake  occur  again.  It  was  no  mis- 


iThe  Parting  of  the  Ways.  231 

take  at  all,  however.  July  4th,  Aguinaldo  apologized 
in  a sneering  way,  having  “ordered  my  people  not  to 
interfere  in  the  least  with  your  officers,”  and  he  wanted 
to  be  “informed  of  any  misconduct”  of  “his  people.” 
July  6th,  Anderson  wrote  of  the  expectation  of  addi- 
tional forces;  and  said  Aguinaldo  told  him  he  had  about 
fifteen  thousand  men,  eleven  thousand  armed  with  guns, 
and  four  thousand  prisoners,  and  added: 

“When  we  first  landed  he  seemed  very  suspicious, 
and  not  at  all  friendly;  but  I have  now  come  to  a better 
understanding  with  him,  and  he  is  much  more  friendly 
and  seems  willing  to  co-operate. 

“But  he  has  declared  himself  Dictator  and  Presi- 
dent, and  is  trying  to  take  Manila  without  our  assist- 
ance. This  is  not  probable;  but  if  he  can  effect  his 
purpose  he  will,  I apprehend,  antagonize  any  attempt 
on  our  part  to  establish  a provisional  Government.” 

The  quartermaster  of  the  American  army  wrote 
Aguinaldo,  July  17th,  that  another  expedition  had  ar- 
rived, and  there  would  be  from  five  thousand  to  seven 
thousand  men  encamped  at  Paranaque,  and  certain  as- 
sistance was  required  to  supply  this  army — horses,  buf- 
faloes, carts,  bamboo  for  shelter,  wood  to  cook  with, 
and — 

“For  all  this  we  are  willing  to  pay  a fair  price,  but 
no  more.  We  find  so  far  that  the  native  population 
are  not  willing  to  give  us  this  assistance  as  promptly  as 
required.  But  we  must  have  it,  and  if  it  becomes  neces- 
sary we  will  be  compelled  to  send  out  parties  to  seize 
what  we  may  need.  We  would  regret  very  much  to  do 
this,  as  we  are  here  to  befriend  the  Filipinos.  Our  Na- 
tion has  spent  millions  of  money  to  send  forces  here  to 


232  The  Parting  of  the  Ways. 

expel  the  Spaniards  and  to  give  good  government  to 
the  whole  people,  and  the  return  we  are  asking  is  com- 
paratively slight.” 

This  business  letter  so  astonished  Aguinaldo,  that 
he  sent  a man  to  see  whether  such  things  could  be.  The 
quartermaster  had  even  added  this : - 

“General  x\nderson  wishes  you  to  inform  your  peo- 
ple that  we  are  here  for  their  good,  and  that  they  must 
supply  us  with  labor  and  material  at  the  current  market 
prices.  We  are  prepared  to  purchase  five  hundred 
horses  at  a fair  price,  but  can  not  undertake  to  bargain 
for  horses  with  each  individual  owner.” 

As  Aguinaldo  wanted  very  much  to  know,  he  got 
this  in  response  to  a formal  demand  to  whether  the  ter- 
rible quartermaster  spoke  with  Anderson’s  knowledge: 

“First  Brigade  Headquarters, 
“July  17,  1898. 

“The  request  herein  made  by  Major  Jones,  chief 
quartermaster,  was  made  by  my  direction. 

“THOMAS  M.  ANDERSON, 
“Brigadier-General  U.  S.  V.,  Commanding.” 

“L.  R.  No.  137. — Received  July  22,  1898.  From 
Jones,  Sam  R.,  chief  quartermaster.  First  Brigade. 
Dated  at  Cavite,  P.  L,  July  20,  1898. 

“Brief. — States  that  it  is  impossible  to  procure  trans- 
portation except  upon  Sehor  Aguinaldo’s  order  in  this 
section,  who  has  an  inventory  of  everything.  The  na- 
tives have  removed  their  wheels  and  hid  them. 

“Action.— Filed.” 


,The  Parting  of  the  Ways. 


233 


This  was  the  spirit  of  a policy  well  studied  out  of 
obstruction  of  the  American  army.  Anderson  presently 
discovered  that  Aguinaldo  was  on  intimate  and  treach- 
erous terms  with  the  Spaniards.  July  226.  he  wrote  as 
to  the  announcement  of  Aguinaldo  that  he  was  a Dic- 
tator and  proclaimed  martial  law:  ‘T  have  no  authority 
to  recognize  this  assumption.  I have  no  orders  from 
my  Government  on  the  subject.^^  A long  letter  from 
Aguinaldo  followed,  containing  these  passages: 

‘T  came  from  Hong  Kong  to  prevent  my  country- 
men from  making  common  cause  with  the  Spanish 
against  the  North  Americans,  pledging  before  my  word 
to  Admiral  Dewey  to  not  give  place  [to  allow]  to  any 
internal  discord,  because,  [being]  a judge  of  their  de- 
sires, I had  the  strong  convictions  that  I would  succeed 
in  both  objects,  establishing  a Government  according  to 
their  desires.  . . . 

'T  consider  it  my  duty  to  advise  you  of  the  undesir- 
ability of  disembarking  North  American  troops  in  the 
places  conquered  by  the  Filipinos  from  the  Spanish, 
without  previous  notice  to  this  Government,  because  as 
no  formal  agreement  yet  exists  between  the  two  nations 
the  Philippine  people  might  consider  the  occupation  of 
its  territories  by  North  American  troops  as  a violation 
of  its  rights.’’ 

Before  concluding  this  letter,  Aguinaldo  admitted 
that  the  American  fleet  had  helped  the  cause  of  his 
Government,  and  made  a sardonic  attempt  to  be  smil- 
ingly  gracious  about  it.  He  had  been  concealed  from 
the  United  States  as  the  author  of  two  shameful  and  silly 
schemes  by  his  lack  of  importance,  and  was  through  in- 


234  'I'he  Parting  of  the  Ways. 

significance  the  anonymous  President  of  a Junta,  com- 
posed of  the  men  who  had  taken  Spanish  money  for  the 
abandonment  of  the  insurgent  cause,  and  this  Presi- 
dential potentate  had  hastened  to  Singapore  to  renew, 
or  rather  continue,  amicable  relations  with  the  Span- 
iards, returning  from  exile  for  that  purpose,  shrinking 
later  in  the  presence  of  the  Junta  that  had  advanced 
him,  confessing  that  he  had  taken  $50,000  from  the 
‘‘concession  of  cash,”  and  that  he  feared  to  lose  it  all  if 
he  appeared  as  an  armed  enemy  of  Spain  again,  an  ad- 
mission that  he  had  sold  himself,  his  men,  and  guns  to 
Spain — paying  $5,000  to  a “compatriot”  who  attached 
the  “cash  bribe”  in  bank,  to  give  up  legal  proceedings; 
and  this  was  followed  by  the  infamous  plan  that  suc- 
ceeded, of  procuring,  through  the  favor  of  the  United 
States,  arms  to  be  used  against  them  and  for  the  Span- 
iards! After  this  came  the  rush  of  Spanish  troops  to 
Aguinaldo’s  arms,  and  then  into  his  ranks.  That  the 
Spanish  officers  at  that  time  had  an  intimation  that  it 
was  known  the  Filipino  leader  was  a traitor  is  not  im- 
probable, but  no  documents  yet  captured  prove  that. 
The  fact,  however,  forces  itself  upon  our  attention.  In 
due  order,  when  the  conspirator  had  paid  the  Artacho 
blackmail  of  $5,000,  and  could  draw  money  from  the 
Hong  Kong  banks,  and  Dewey’s  victory  had  spoiled  the 
credit  of  Spain,  why,  the  fact  that  the  bribe  was  a plain 
case  of  dishonor  and  treason  to  the  Filipino  cause  was 
denied,  for  the  Aguinaldo  policy  was  to  be  in,  to  all 
appearance  with  the  Americans,  and  yet  to  be  their 
enemy,  protesting  and  threatening  when  they  landed, 
claiming  that  he  had  gone  to  Hong  Kong  to  prevent  his 
countrymen  from  aiding  the  Spaniards,  and  yet  at  once 


The  Parting  of  the  Ways. 


235 


instigating  and  deluding  them  to  do  that  very  thing. 
His  task  was  to  convert  his  followers  to  accept  his 
treason. 

Mr.  Williams,  as  the  American  consul,  took  part  in 
getting  the  Spanish  money  out  of  bank,  giving  his  legal 
services  to  the  execution  of  a power  of  attorney  to  draw 
all  the  money  from  the  Shanghai  and  Chartered  Banks, 
and  this  on  a “fake”  gun  contract.  There  is  reason  to 
doubt  whether  a gun  was  purchased.  There  was  a show 
of  a contract  for  three  thousand  guns,  after  Aguinaldo 
had  boasted  that  he  had  about  fifteen  thousand  troops 
with  eleven  thousand  guns,  so  that  three  thousand  was 
about  the  number  wanted  to  complete  his  armament. 
That  was  a fixed-up  coincidence.  In  fact,  Aguinaldo 
had  not  that  many  m*en  or  guns,  but  he  held  the  prov- 
ince of  Cavite  and  some  thousands  of  guns,  did  not  need 
them  for  anything  visible,  and  did  need  money,  and  by 
favor  of  the  polite  assistance  of  the  United  States  con- 
sul the  money  was  drawn  on  a power  of  attorney  and 
disappeared,  and  in  the  Malay  sense  the  sequestered 
fund  was  a sacred  thing.  It  ceased  from  troubling. 

Admiral  Dewey  treated  Aguinaldo  as  an  interesting 
little  fellow,  stupidly  vain,  childishly  conceited,  suddenly 
inflated,  and  to  be  poopoohed,  but  did  not  see  the  dark 
and  bloody  and  treacherous  side  of  his  character.  When 
Punston  captured  the  Dictator,  and  delivered  him  at  the 
headquarters  of  our  army  in  Manila,  the  admiral  was 
genial  in  his  appreciation  of  the  heroism  of  the  deed,  ^ 
and  said  almost  compassionately,  and  quite  benevo- 
lently, that  he  had  sometimes  wondered  whether  it 
might  not  have  been  possible  for  Aguinaldo  to  have 
been  treated  so  as  to  win  him  to  be  smoothly  friendly 


^3^  The  Parting  of  the  Ways. 

with  us.  The  thought  was  generous,  but  the  truth  does 
not  support  the  suggestion.  The  logic  of  the  course  of 
Aguinaldo,  from  the  moment  Dewey  did  not  give  him 
Manila  to  set  up  a royal  and  imperial  Tycoon  establish- 
ment, was  to  make  war  on  the  United  States,  and  to 
use  the  Spanish  power  for  his  own  elevation  and  enrich- 
ment, the  bloodshed  an  inconsequential  ‘'detail.”  One 
thing  Dewey  and  Anderson  might  have  done — and  they 
must  have  had  temptations  to  do  it — Aguinaldo  should 
have  been  eliminated  from  the  Philippine  situation  by 
his  forcible  deportation  to  Hong  Kong  when  he  ob- 
structed the  American  army.  He  was  the  declared 
enemy  of  the  United  States  before  Anderson  arrived. 
Indeed,  Anderson’s  brother  officers  did  not  understand 
the  utility  of  that  general’s  Correspondence  with  Agui- 
naldo, though  it  was  that  which  saved  the  American 
position  from  being  ashore,  second  to  the  Aguinaldo 
Government,  before  the  arrival  of  the  appointed  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  of  the  army  of  the -United  States  in 
the  Philippines.  Aguinaldo  had  passed  the  forks  of  the 
road,  and  marked  out  his  course  for  the  camps  of  Spain. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 


1 


( 


MADRID  SCHOOL  OR  ASSASSINATION. 

Aguinaldo’s  Identification  by  Proclamation  with  the 
Madrid  Revolutionary  Committee’s  Book  of  Tac- 
tics and  Strategy  to  Systematize  Guerrilla  War- 
fare— The  Madrid  School  of  Murder  is  Devoted 
to  Killing  ‘‘Yankees” — But  the  “Yanks”  Beat  the 
Tagals  at  that  Game,  Killing  Twelve  to  One — Gen- 
eral MacArthur  on  this  Aguinaldoism. 

The  Presidential  election,  into  which  the  consider- 
ation of  our  relations  to  possessions  in  Asiatic  islands 
had  an  interesting,  and  for  a time  an  incalculable,  part, 
having  been  peaceable,  and  the  result  indisputable,  the 
minds  of  our  citizens  have  been  opened  to  studies  in  aid 
of  truth  rather  than  partisan  help,  and  the  time  was  pro- 
pitious for  the  reception  at  their  full  worth  of  the  cap- 
tured documents  of  the  Philippines;  and  these  to  the 
candid  whose  intelligence  had  been  cloudy  have  been 
surprises  in  the  certainties  they  have  established.  It  was 
not  believed  until  made  sure  by  testimony  it  would  be 
irrational  to  contest,  that  Aguinaldo  was  during  the 
Spanish-American  War  a symapthizer  with  Spain.  We 
find  him  at  Hong  Kong  proposing,  as  a deliberate  pol- 
icy, to  get  arms  from  Americans,  on  the  ground  that 
Filipinos  were  allies  of  the  United  States,  to  use  against 
“the  North  Americans.”  We  find  him  seeking  a con- 
tract with  the  United  States  Government  for  arms  to  be 

237 


23^  Madrid  School  of  Assassination. 

paid  for  out  of  the  Split  Rock  fund,  and  placed  at  the 
direction  of  Aguinaldo  in  Luzon,  that  they  ' might  be 
handed  to  either  party  according  to  circumstances,  and, 
as  it  turned  out,  if  there  had  been  such  a contract  the 
Spaniards  would  have  got  the  arms.  We  find  Aguinaldo 
writing  to  the  Spanish  officer  in  command  at  Iloilo,  and 
influencing  him  to  surrender  to  the  Tagalo^  interest, 
when  he  had  sent  word  to  General  Otis  that  he  was  ready 
to  give  up  to  the  irresistible  arms  of  the  United  States, 
and  referring  to  a letter  of  June  9,  1898,  which  was  the 
first  day  he  had  an  army  to  command,  addressed  to  the 
war  Captain-General  Augustin,  '‘frankly”  avowing  his 
allegiance  to  the  Spanish  side,  and  doubtless  claiming 
that  he  had  and  would  give  Spain  compensation  for  the 
Split  Rock  money,  in  which  General  Rivera  represented 
the  King  of  Spain,  and  handled  the  Spanish  silver;  and 
next  he  argued  before  his  own  committee  in  Hong  Kong 
that  he  must  not  even  pretend  to  take  up  arms  against 
Spain,  for  the  English  courts  in  the  Colony  of  Hong 
Kong  would  tie  up  the  bribe  money  in  the  banks  if 
he  did  so. 

All  this  means  that  Aguinaldo  had  sold  himself  to 
Spain,  and  was  faithful  to  his  bargain,  having  for  a time 
fancied  he  could  secure  American  recognition  and  a 
protectorate  that  would  cause  him  to  be  what  he  was 
assuming  to  be,  a friend  and  partisan  of  the  United 
States. 

These  things  are  of  such  supreme  consequence  and 
significance,  that  they  quite  change  the  scenery,  and 
Aguinaldo  appears  as  an  “ally,”  it  is  true,  but  as  the 
“ally”  of  Spain,  and  all  he  said  and  did  falls  into  line 
with  that  course  of  conduct. 


Madrid  School  of  Assassination. 


239 


There  is  further  confirmation,  and  it  comes  not  from 
any  of  the  seats  of  American  learning,  but  from  Madrid. 
There  is  a school  of  the  art  of  assassination  there,  that 
is  exclusively  applicable  to  the  “Yankees,’’  and  no  doubt 
has  its  relationships  in  the  United  States,  its  correspond- 
ence and  co-operation.  It  is,  at  any  rate,  a part  of 
Aguinaldoism.  When  the  war  in  the  Philippines  was 
over,  so  far  as  the  engagement  of  organized  military 
forces  was  concerned,  there  arose  a new  school  of  tactics 
and  strategy  for  the  teaching  of  methods  of  war  after 
the  manner  of  the  savages,  we  of  the  United  States  dis- 
possessed of  the  territory  occupied  by  our  several 
States. 

When  Aguinaldo  ascertained  that  he  could  not  keep 
armies  in  the  field,  he  adopted  the  desperate  plans,  the 
preparation  for  which  was  made  in  Madrid;  and  he  was 
not  anticipating  captivity,  for  he  managed  to  give  the 
scouts  and  expeditions  pursuing  him  the  slip,  issued  an 
address  commanding  guerrilla  war  in  such  terms  that  he 
could  not  claim  the  immunities  of  a prisoner  of  war,  in 
the  presence  of  severe  orders;  but  he  has  saved  himself 
from  capital  punishment  by  being  “satisfied  with  the 
Americans”  and  swearing  allegiance  to  the  Government. 

A copy  of  an  Aguinaldo  order  was  found  in  the 
possession  of  General  Pantaleone  Garcia,  who  was  cap- 
tured May  6,  1900,  and,  in  the  language  of  Major-Gen- 
eral Arthur  Mac  Arthur,  “affords  an  interesting  sugges- 
tion and  authentic  glimpse  of  the  proceedings  of  a 
council  of  war  held  at  Bayambang,  Pangasinan,  about 
November  12,  1899,  which  was  attended  by  General 
Aguinaldo  and  many  of  the  Filipino  military  leaders, 
by  whom  a resolution  was  adopted  to  the  effect  that  the 


240 


Madrid  School  of  Assassination. 


insurgent  forces  were  incapable  of  further  resistance  in 
the  field,  and  as  a consequence  it  was  decided  to  dis- 
band the  army,  the  generals  and  the  men  to  return  to 
their  own  provinces,  with  a view  to  organizing  the  peo- 
ple for  general  resistance  by  means  of  guerrilla  warfare.” 

This  is  the  order  officially  declared  authentic  by  the 
Commander-in-Ghief  of  the  army  of  the  United  States 
in  the  Philippines: 

‘Tn  accordance  with  the  present  politico-militai*}^ 
status  in  this,  the  center  of  Luzon, ‘and  using  the  powers 
I possess,  in  accordance  with  my  council  of  Govern- 
ment,-I  decree  the  following: 

‘T.  The  politico-military  command  of  the  center  of 
Luzon  is  hereby  established,  comprising  the  provinces 
of  Bataan, . Nueva  Ecija,  Bulacan,  Pampanga,  Tarlac, 
Zambales,  and  Pangasinan. 

“2.  The  superior  commander  in  question  will  have 
full  and  extraordinary  powers  to  issue  order  by  procla- 
mation, impose  contributions  of  war,  and  to  adopt  all 
such  measures  as  may  seem  for  the  good  service  of  the 
country. 

“3.  The  troops  which  will  operate  in  all  of  the  de- 
scribed district  will  maneuver  in  flying  columns  and  in 
guerrilla  bands;  and  these  will  be  under  the  orders  of  the 
aforesaid  superior  commander,  to  whose  orders  all  the 
other  leaders  and  generals  will  be  subject,  reporting  to 
him  and  receiving  from  him  the  orders  and  instructions 
of  the  Government;  nevertheless,  all  orders  received 
direct  from  the  Government  will  be  obeyed,  and  advice 
of  same  will  be  given  to  the  superior  commander  afore- 
said. 

“4.  Sr.  Don  Pantaleone  Garcia,  general  of  division. 


Madrid  School  of  Assassination. 


241 


is  appointed  politico-military  commander  of  the  center 
of  Luzon,  and  he  will  assume  in  addition  the  judicial 
powers  which  belong  to  me  as  Captain-General. 

‘‘Given  at  Bayambang,  November  12,  1899. 

“The  President,  EMILIO  AGUINALDO.” 

Of  the  nature  of  the  warfare  that  followed.  General 
MacArthur  remarked: 

“In  war  relative  situation  frequently  counts  as  much 
as  positive  strength,  a principle  which,  consciously  or 
otherwise,  the  insurgent  leaders  possibly  had  in  view  in 
making  such  a change  of  methods,  as  the  country  affords 
■great  advantages  for  the  practical  development  of  such 
a policy.  The  practice  of  discarding  the  uniform  en- 
ables the  insurgents  to  appear  and  disappear  almost  at 
their  convenience.  At  one  time  they  are  in  the  ranks 
as  soldiers,  and  immediately  thereafter  are  within  the 
American  lines  in  the  attitude  of  peaceful  natives,  ab- 
sorbed in  a dense  mass  of  sympathetic  people,  speaking 
a dialect  of  which  few  white  men,  and  no  Americans, 
have  any  knowledge. 

“A  widely-scattered  formation  of  the  Eilipinos 
quickly  followed  the  adoption  of  the  guerrilla  policy 
above  referred  to,  which  led  to  a corresponding-  dissemi- 
nation of  American  troops,  the  rapidity  and  extent  of 
which  may  be  appreciated  by  reference  to  the  fact  that 
the  fifty-three  stations  occupied  in  the  Archipelago  on 
November  i,  1899,  had,  on  September  i,  1900,  expanded 
to  four  hundred  and  thirteen.  Of  course,  under  the 
conditions  described  all  regular  and  systematic  tactical 
operations  ceased;  but  as  hostile  contact  was  established 
throughout  the  entire  zone  of  activity,  an  infinite  number 
16 


242  Madrid  School  of  Assassination. 

of  minor  affairs  resulted,  some  of  which  reached  the  dig- 
nity of  combats.  As  the  actions  themselves  were  iso- 
lated a connected  narrative  thereof  is  impracticable,  and 
in  view  of  the  record  of  events,  which  has  been  regularly 
transmitted  by  semi-monthly  installments,  it  is  not  nec- 
essary for  information  of  the  Department.  It  may  be 
stated,  however,  that  the  casualties  arising  from  this 
irregular  warfare  in  the  American  army  between  No- 
vember I,  1899,  and  September  i,  1900,  were  268  killed, 
750  wounded,  55  captured.  The  Filipino  losses  for  the 
same  time,  as  far  as  of  record,  3,227  killed,  694  wounded, 
2,864  captured.  It  also  may  be  stated,  in  conclusion  of 
this  paragraph,  that  the  extensive  distribution  of  troops 
strained  the  soldiers  of  the  army  to  the  full  limit  of  en- 
durance. Each  little  command  had  to  provide  its  own 
service  of  security  and  information  by  never-ceasing 
patrols,  explorations,  escorts,  outposts,  and  regular 
guards.” 

It  is  not  known  and  appreciated  in  its  bearings,  that 
in  the  capital  of  Spain  a Filipino  Revolutionary  Com- 
mittee is  engaged  in  putting  down  the  “Yankees,”  and 
that  the  specialty  of  the  committee  is  stirring  up  the 
inhabitants  of  the  Philippine  Islands  to  endless  and  sav- 
age warfare.  This  malignancy  is  due  in  all  probability 
to  the  direct  influence  of  Aguinaldo,  who  would  be  re- 
ceived as  a Spanish  patriot  and  hero  if  he  should  visit 
what  he  calls  “the  Mother  Country”  now.  The  Revolu- 
tionary Committee  have  systematized  the  regulations  for 
the  government  of  guerrillas.  These  have  been  com- 
piled and  published.  The  Filipino  guerrillas  laboring 
in  Madrid  go  rather  further  than  sympathizers  with  the 
insurgents  in  this,  country. 


Madrid  School  of  Assassination.  243 

We  give  extensive  extracts  from  a pamphlet  pub- 
lished under  the  auspices  of  the  Filipino  Revolutionary 
Committee  in  Madrid  by  Isabelo  de  Los  Reyes,  Madrid, 
July  15,  1900. 

The  pamphlet  purports  to  teach  ‘‘guerrilla  tactics,’’ 
and  the  object  is — we  quote  the  language — “imperialists” 
who  “want  to  reduce  us  to  slavery  and  confiscate  our 
rich  Archipelago,  and,  in  order  to  hide  their  greed,  they 
allege  that,  without  their  interference,  anarchy  would  be 
general  in  the  Philippines.” 

These  people  are  to  be  shown  by  guerrilla  warfare 
that  they  are  mistaken.  “Our  guerrillas,”  it  is  carefully 
stated,  “will  not  have  to  give  battle  in  the  field;  the  dis- 
eases shall  soon  enough  finish  off  the  enemy.”  “Peace- 
able people  are  to  be  prevented  from  getting  tired  of  the 
war  and  helping  invaders.”  The  guerrillas  are  to  “seek 
the  sympathies  of  the  people,”  and  “defend  them  against 
bandits  and  thieves.”  In  fact,  the  guerrillas  are  so  con- 
fused with  bandits  and  thieves  that  discrimination  is  not 
possible. 

The  instructions  of  the  lovers  of  liberty  in  Madrid  is 
divided  into  three  parts : 

, “I. — Guerrilla  Tactics. 

“The  guerrillas  shall  make  up  for  their  small  num- 
bers by  their  ceaseless  activity  and  their  daring.  They 
shall  hide  in  the  woods  and  in  distant  barrios,  and,  when 
least  expected,  shall  fall  upon  the  enemy,  and  disappear 
at  once  to  enjoy  whatever  spoils  they  may  have  taken 
from  the  Yankees;  but  they  shall  be  careful  never  to  rob 
their  countrymen. 

“Before  going  into  action  the  guerrilla  chief  shall 


244 


Madrid  School  of  Assassination. 


carefully  review  his  forces,  adding  to  them  if  necessary, 
and  leaving  behind  any  men  liable  to  interfere  with  the 
rapidity- of  his  movements;  he  shall  keep  his  men  in 
good  trim  by  giving  them  plenty  of  food  and  plenty 
of  rest. 

‘‘The  guerrilla  chief  must  be  clever  and  daring,  but 
also  prudent — as  daring  without  proper  caution  is  pro- 
ductive of  disaster.  Always  in  ambush  and  watching  for 
an  opportunity  to  cause  some  damage  to  the  enemy, 
he  shall  never  camp  two  days  on  the  same  grounds,  in 
order  to  better  thwart  the  enemy  and  his  spies;  he  shall 
march  at  night,  shall  allow  himself  to  be  seen  at  places 
where  he  does  not  intend  operating,  to  fall  suddenly 
where  least  expected;  he  shall  be  on  the  watch  when 
everybody  sleeps,  and  sleep  in  the  daytime  in  distant 
and  secure  parts,  protected  by  vigilant  sentries. 

“When  the  guerrillas  are  resting  the  officer  shall 
choose  a strategic  point,  and  designate  the  places  of 
assembly  in  case  of  surprise,  after  taking  all  the  usual 
means  of  precaution. 

“By  his  spies  he  shall  be  informed  of  the  position 
and  the  tactics  of  the  enemy,  which  shall  be  easy,  as  all 
the  inhabitants  are  in  our  favor. 

“The  soldiers  and  horses  of  the  guerrilla  forces  shall 
be  carefully  chosen. 

“As  a matter  of  precaution  bur  soldiers  shall  draw 
their  food  at  some  distance  from  the  place  which  they 
intend  to  surprise;  they  shall  ask  for  contributions  of 
war  in  the  shape  of  rice,  poultry,  hogs,  etc.,  but  without 
taxing  the  pueblos  too  high,  on  account  of  the  miser- 
able condition  due  to  the  war,  and  shall  only  take  what 
is  absolutely  necessary.  They  shall  always  let  the  natives 


Madrid  School  of  Assassination. 


245 


believe  that  they  are.  in  great  numbers,  to  make  them- 
selves better  respected. 

“When  an  attack  is  made  on  a pueblo  occupied  by 
the  Yankees,  our  forces  shall  divide  into  three  platoons: 
First,  the  most  active  men  for  the  attack;  second,  men 
who  are  not  so  active;  third,  the  heaviest  men.  The  two 
last  platoons  shall  be  placed  in  ambush,  in  echelons,  on 
our  line  of  retreat  to  protect  the  men  of  the  first  platoon 
when  they  run  away.  Care  shall  be  taken  not  to  pass  in 
muddy  places  for  fear  of  betraying  our  movements  by 
the  tracks  left  in  the  mud. 

“Five  hundred  Filipinos  are  sufficient  for  one  prov- 
ince; we  shall  divide  them  between  the  different  pueblos, 
with  a base  of  operations  chosen  in  strategic  conditions 
in  the  mountainous  part  of  the  province.  Each  party 
shall  only  consist  of  a few  men,  so  as  not  to  call  atten- 
tion and  to  easily  disappear  when  necessary.  When  the 
enemy  attacks  the  small  parties  they  shall  retreat  toward 
their  base  of  operations,  and,  once  the  enemy  tired  out, 
shall  unite  to  fall  upon  him  all  together,  with  all  the 
advantage  of  a position  carefully  studied  beforehand. 

“Having  no  telegraph,  our  chiefs  shall  teach  the  dif- 
ferent parties  an  easy  method  of  signal,  by  cuts  on  the 
trees,  heaps  of  stones,  strips  of  cloth,  balloons,  fires,  etc., 
changing  them  frequently,  as  well  as  the  password  and 
countersigns,  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  discovering 
them. 

“We  must  also  be  careful  to  hide  our  movements 
from  the  prisoners,  who  are  likely  to  make  excellent 
guides  for  the  enemy. 

“Our  wounded,  when  they  interfere  with  our  oper- 
ations, shall  be  turned  over  to  the  inhabitants  of  the 


246  Madrid  School  of  Assassination. 

country,  the  latter  being  threatened  with  severe  penal- 
ties if  they  should  not  properly  care  for  and  conceal 
them. 

“When  our  men  are  closely  pursued  in  one  part  of 
the  country  they  shall  move  to  another,  only  to  come 
back  suddenly  as  soon  as  circumstances  should  allow  it. 

“We  say  again  that  a guerrilla  warfare  is  easy  to  sus- 
stain  and  to  keep  up  indefinitely,  all  the  pueblos  pro- 
tecting, of  course,  our  guerrillas,  who  are  only  defend- 
ing the  common  cause,  and  are  satisfied  with  a handful 
of  rice  or  corn,  and  we  shall  certainly  do  all  we  can  for 
the  men  who  are  risking  their  lives  for  the  honor  of  the 
nation,  for  our  independence,  and  the  future  of  our  sons. 

“11. — Surprises,  Ambuscades,  Attacks  of  Convoys. 

“Before  starting  on  a surprise  party  a chief  must 
have  a well-studied  plan,  anticipating  all  chances  of  dan- 
ger so  as  to  be  prepared  to  avoid  them  or  meet  them 
beforehand,  and  never  risk  the  lives  of  his  men,  his  own 
life  and  reputation  in  the  mixup  and  the  confusion  which 
are  the  fatal  consequences  of  the  lack  of  plan  and  calcu- 
lation. 

“A  surprise,  properly  planned,  always  gives  great  re- 
sults, and  it  often  happens  that  a few  guerrillas  are 
enough  to  gain  the  most  unexpected  triumphs;  for  such 
reason  we  recommend  the  method  to  our  soldiers. 

“A  surprise  is  an  attack  with  superior  forces,  brought 
forward  by  rapid  marches,  made  on  the  enemy  where 
he  does  not  expect  it. 

“An  ambuscade  consists  of  a party  of  soldiers  con- 
cealed in  a proper  place,  and  which  suddenly  falls  upon 
the  enemy  while  on  the  march. 


Madrid  School  of  Assassination.  247 

^‘Surprises  often  give  better  results  than  ambuscades, 
as  the  enemy  is  likely  to  be  on  the  lookout  for  the  latter. 

‘‘The  object  of  surprises  and  ambuscades  is  to  pre- 
vent the  enemy  from  extending  his  field  of  action  by 
pushing  on  rapidly,  as  a few  severe  lessons  shall  teach 
him  caution;  also  to  cut  off  a convoy,  to  crush  a de- 
tachment, or  to  secure  any  real  advantage,  as  we  must 
not  risk  the  lives  of  our  men  and  waste  ammunition  to 
no  purpose. 

“Ambuscades  are  excellent  to  prevent  convergent 
movements  on  the  part  of  the  enemy;  a few  of  them 
should,  then,  be  prepared  in  favorable  points  in  antici- 
pation of  the  enemy’s  attack  on  the  flanks  of  our  po- 
sitions. 

“We  say  again  that  the  result  of  a surprise  depends 
on  the  way  the  plan  has  been  laid  out,  all  contingencies 
being  provided  for  and  nothing  being  left  out,  as  it  often 
happens  that  an  insignificant  piece  of  negligence  brings 
about  a disaster.  All  possible  advantage  must  be  taken 
of  the  position  chosen,  the  men  shall  be  properly  posted 
and  concealed,  and  all  measures  taken  to  cause  an  im- 
mense loss  to  the  enemy  with  as  little  as  possible 
to  us. 

“The  chief  who  takes  charge  of  an  ambuscade  must 
be  skillful,  prudent,  unmoved  by  danger,  and  resolute 
in  the  attack;  before  all,  he  must  not  lose  his  head,  but 
quietly  wait  for  the  proper  opportunity  before  giving 
the  order  to  fire.  The  soldiers  must  be  picked  men, 
accustomed  to  warfare,  who  shall  keep  cool  and  reserve 
their  energy  for  the  moment  of  the  attack.  ' 

“In  an  ambuscade  it  is  a matter  of  “Risk  all  to  gain 
all;  succeed  or  die;”  nevertheless  the  position  shall  be 


248  Madrid  School  of  Assassination. 

chosen  so  as  to  allow  a chance  of  escaping  in  case  of 
misfortune;  our  guerrillas  are  sure  to  feel  better  if  they 
know  that  there  is  a way  open  behind  them. 

“Tdie  positions  to  be  preferred  are  those  command- 
ing a narrow  passage,  where  the  enemy  can  not  deploy; 
also  those  with  a way  in  for  the  attack,  and  a way  out 
to  escape;  if  possible,  the  position  should  be  at  a certain 
distance  from  the  road,  far  enough  to  escape  discovery 
by  the  flankers  of  the  enemy,  but  not  too  far,  so  as  to 
allow  our  men  to  grab  what  they  want  and  get  off  before 
the  enemy  is  ready  to  fight. 

^‘The  Philippines  are  full  of  woods,  mountains,  pas- 
sages, canons,  gullies,  cocoa-tree  groves,  inclosures,  etc., 
which  are  excellent  places  for  surprise. 

‘‘Rainy  days  and  nights  are  the  best  to  allow  a party 
to  approach  the  enemy  without  being  discovered;  dark- 
ness shall  add  to  the  confusion  in  the  enemy’s  ranks, 
and  they  may  finish  by  fighting  each  other. 

“It  is  a good  plan  to  prepare  an  ambuscade  when 
night  is  to  overtake  the  enemy  while  on  the  march,  or 
even  to  surprise  detachments  of  fifty  men  in  their  own 
quarters,  when  they  are  least  prepared  for  an  attack. 

“Ambijscades  can  be  prepared  by  infantry,  cavalry, 
or  combined  forces.  The  great  point  is  always  to  have 
plenty  of  forces  on  hand.  As  we  are  the  attacking  party, 
our  forces  should  be  superior  in  number  to  those  we 
intend  to  attack;  in  that  way  our  soldiers  shall  feel  confi- 
dent of  success,  and  such  a feeling  is  a great  advantage. 
If  we  have  a strong  chance  of  succeeding,  the  soldier 
shall  not  be  impatient  or  become  scared,  and  fire  before 
ordered  to. 

“In  order  not  to  be  discovered  inopportunely,  the 


Madrid  School  of  Assassination.  249 

men  shall  be  forbidden  to  fire  before  the  order  of  their 
officer.  At  the  order  of  ‘^Fire!”  a general  volley  shall 
be  fired,  and  the  men  shall  rush  on  the  enemy  with 
bayonets  and  bolos,  to  take  advantage  of  the  first  mo- 
ments of  confusion.  And  nothing  can  add  more  to  the 
confusion  than  a vigorous  mixup  with  bolos  and  ma- 
chetes. If  the  ambuscade  consists  of  cavalry,  it  shall 
rush  upon  the  rear  guard,  the  flank,  and  the  vanguard, 
or  on  several  distinct  points  at  once,  throwing  every- 
thing into  confusion  by  the  attack  and  preventing  the 
enemy  from  forming  again. 

‘‘In  a combined  ambuscade  by  the  two  arms  the 
cavalry  shall  rush  into  the  foe,  the  infantry  keeping  its 
position  and  firing,  at  the  same  time  serving  as  a reserve 
and  base  of  action. 

"‘In  case  of  victory,  our  guerrillas  shall  not  be  al- 
lowed to  throw  'themselves  altogether  on  the  spoils,  as 
an  officer  of  the  enemy  might  rally  his  forces  and  change 
the  victory  to  disaster;  a large  part  of  the  guerrillas  shall 
preserve  their  formation,  to  serve  as  a support  to  the 
party  which  is  pursuing  and  disarming  the  enemy. 

“Cavalry  is  very  useful  for  sudden  ambuscades,  with 
the  purpose  of  arresting  the  progress  of  the  enemy  when 
they  are  pursuing  us.  In  such  cases  the  cavalry  is  hid- 
den while  the  enemy  marches  past,  and  makes  its  attack 
on  the  flanks  or  on  the  rear  guard. 

“To  surprise  a convoy  the  best  moment  is  when  the 
enemy  are  off  their  guard,  as,  for  instance,  when  they  are 
watering  and  feeding  the  cattle,  when  they  have  broken 
ranks  to  rest,  or  when  they  are  r^ost  tired. 

“The  most  favorable  points  are  rough  and  hilly 
places,  bridges,  fords,  gullies,  woods,  etc.,  where  the 


250 


Madrid  School  of  Assassination. 


escort  can  not  easily  deploy,  and  has  to  fight  on  a re- 
duced front. 

‘‘If  our  forces  outnumber  the  escort,  we  could  attack 
by  the  front  and  flanks,  and  occupy  the  two  ends  of  a 
defile,  to  make  a complete  haul.  But  it  shall  be  prudent 
for  our  chiefs  not  to  attempt  front  attacks  on  troops  as 
well  organized  as  the  Yankees. 

‘‘Even  with  inferior  numbers  we  can  be  successful 
if  we  know  how  to  take  advantage  of  our  positions, 
because  the  enemy  is  aware  that  surprising  forces  are 
generally  superior  in  numbers  to  the  attacked  party;  he 
shall  suppose  that  our  numbers  are  vastly  superior,  and 
shall  be  ready  to  run  for  it,  especially  so  if  our  first  volley 
has  caused  serious  losses — for  which  purpose  the  best 
shooters  are  to  be  chosen. 

“It  is  better  to  attack  a convoy  by  the  flank,  and,  if 
our  forces  are  too  small,  we  should  attack  by  the  rear, 
to  take  hold  of  the  wagons  which  will  surely  be  left 
behind.  A front  attack  shall  be  made  when  it  is  neces- 
sary to  cut  off  the  advance  of  the  enemy. 

“An  attack,  by  surprise  or  ambuscade,  must  be  de- 
termined and  perseverant.  Our  chiefs  shall  never  allow 
their  soldiers  to  dispute  over  and  take  the  stock  of  the 
spoils  before  everything  has  been  placed  in  safety. 

“For  the  ambuscades  to  give  good  results,  a good 
service  of  spies  must  be  organized  to  avoid  falling  into 
some  trap  prepared  by  the  enemy;  before  preparing  a 
surprise  it  shall  be  necessary  to  know  exactly  the 
strength  of  the  party  which  is  to  be  surprised,  what 
forces  might  come  to  Jiis  assistance,  and  what  are  the 
distances  between  the  different  forces  of  the  enemy. 


Madrid  School  of  Assassination, 


251 


'‘III. — Combats. 

“In  order  to  give  or  accept  combats,  it  is  essential 
to  have  a plan  of  tactics,  to  thoroughly  reconnoiter  the 
ground  in  order  to  take  every  advantage  of  its  con- 
ditions, and  to  know  the  strength  of  the  enemy. 

“A  reconnoissance  shall  always  be  made,  if  only  a 
brief  one,  as  it  would  be  an  act  of  temerity  to  engage  an 
unknown  enemy,  or  to  escape  when  there  might  have 
been  a chance  of  beating  him. 

“When  two  hostile  columns  accidentally  meet,  there 
is  always  a moment  of  astonishment  and  of  expectancy. 
We  must  avail  ourselves  of  that  moment  of  indecision 
to  reconnoiter  and  beat  the  enemy  before  he  has  made 
up  his  mind,  if  we  have  fair  chances  of  success;  or  to 
escape  in  time,  in  the  other  case. 

“Want  of  foresight  is  a cause  of  disasters,  as  is  also 
the  perplexity  of  a chief  who  does  not  know  how  to  take 
a decision  on  the  spot  and  avail  himself  of  opportunities. 

“Victories  raise  the  spirits  and  defeats  lower  them, 
so  that  we  must  not  engage  raw  and  unseasoned  troops 
without  strong  probabilities  of  a triumph,  especially  so 
when  our  object  is  only  to  protract  the. war,  as  in  the 
actual  campaign;  good  care  must  also  be  taken  to  sup- 
port the  recruits  with  a number 'of  veterans. 

“Artillery,  cavalry,  and  infantry  shall  be  combined 
so  as  not  to  interfere  with  their -respective  actions,  but  to 
support  each  other;  the  sweeping  fire  of  the  artillery 
prepares  the  ground  or  defends  our  positions;  the  in- 
fantry sustains  the  brunt  of  the  fight,  and  the  cavalry 
breaks  the  enemy’s  ranks,  and  follows  in  pursuit,  or 
keeps  him  busy  while  we  retreat. 


o 


252  Madrid  School  of  Assassination. 

'‘The  troops,  before  the  combat,  shall  occupy  the 
best  positions,  in  their  proper  order  of  battle,  and  exe- 
cute the  necessary  marches  according  to  tactics. 

“It  is  essential  to  choose  a strong  position,  well  pro- 
tected from  the  enemy’s  fire,  and  presenting  obstacles 
which  shall  be  in  his  way  when  he  charges.  On  the  ex- 
treme flanks  of  the  position  a place  shall  be  cleared  so 
as  to  allow  our  troops  to  maneuver  freely. 

“Above  all,  look  out  for  the  key  of  the  position,  and 
re-enforce  it  when  necessary.  In  all  positions  we  must 
consider  the  line  of  attack,  the  flank,  the  front,  the  space 
occupied  by  our  troops,  and  the  line  of  retreat. 

“The  lines  of  attack  shall  be  interrupted  as  much  as 
possible  by  ravines,  hills,  and  woods,  where  we  can  place 
a few  outposts  to  check  the  onward  rush  of  the  enemy. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  we  are  the  attacking  party,  we  shall 
choose  a line  free  from  any  obstacles  which  might  delay 
our  onslaught. 

“Let  us  see  that  our  flanks  are  well  protected,  either 
by  natural  obstacles,  or  by  breastworks  and  trenches 
placed  in  good  positions,  well  hidden  and  well  defended; 
our  men  shall  feel  more  confident  if  they  know  that  the 
flanks  are  safe. 

“At  the  same  time  .an  outlet  must  be  disposed  on 
each  flank  to  allow  our  troops  to  sally  suddenly  and 
crush  the  battalion  which  may  be  attacking  the  extreme 
points,  if  any  opportunity  should  present  itself,  as  we 
must  not  always  remain  on  the  defensive,  but  take  the 
offensive  as  soon  and  often  as  possible,  in  order  to  better 
repel  the  assaults  of  the  enemy.  We  must  not  forget 
that  the  tactics  of  the  foreigners  consist  nearly  always 
of  flank  attacks,  so  that  good  ambuscades  shall  always 


Madrid ‘School  of  Assassination.  253 

be  prepared  to  surprise  the  enemy  when  he  comes  up  on 
our  flanks. 

"‘It  is,  of  course,  understood  that  our  front  must  be 
as  strong  as  possible,  and  dominate  all  lines  of  attack. 
Outside  of  its  natural  defenses  our  front  shall  be  pro- 
tected by  trenches,  breastworks,  and  rifle-pits.  Inside 
the  position  the  ground  shall  be  cleared  to  allow  the  de- 
fending forces  to  maneuver  easily. 

‘‘And,  finally,  every  position  must  be  supplied  with 
an  excellent  line  of  retreat,  with  plenty  of  obstacles  to 
hinder  the  advance  of  the  enemy  when  he  comes  after  us. 

“We  shall  dispose  our  forces  according  to  the  nature 
of  the  ground,  giving  each  arm  the  most  suitable  ground 
for  its  action;  the  different  parties  of  guerrillas  shall  be 
so  combined  that,  although  acting  independently,  they 
shall  support  each  other  and  concur  in  the  proper  exe- 
cution of  the  plan  agreed  on.  We  shall  always  have 
sufffcient  reserves  to  support  the  troops  that  may  require 
help,  or  to  take  a decisive  action  in  case  of  victory. 

' “We  have  said  that  the  troops  of  the  different  arms 
-should  be  disposed  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
ground;  generally  the  infantry  occupies  the  center,  the 
cavalry  the  wings  or  a position  behind  the  infantry,  and 
the  artillery  is  placed  in  advance,  in  echeloned  batteries, 
separated  by  250  meters  (or  300  varas). 

“The  regular  order  of  battle  should  be  in  three  con- 
secutive lines,  so  as  to  present  a reduced  front  to  the 
good  Yankee  cannons  and  facilitate  our  movements. 

“The  first  line,  deployed  as  skirmishers,  is  intended 
to  resist  the  first  onslaught  of  the  enemy,  when  on  the 
defensive,  and,  in  the  offensive,  to  charge  resolutely,  and 
throw  him  out  of  his  positions. 


254  Madrid  School  of  Assassination. 

“The  second  line,  formed  in  column,  and  concealed 
by  the  sinuosities  of  the  ground,  shall  be  the  support  of 
the  first  line,  relieving  it  when  necessary  and  filling  up 
the  blanks  caused  in  the  files. 

“The  third,  or  reserve,  shall  consist  of  picked  men 
of  the  different  arms,  under  the  orders  of  the  general  in 
chief,  who  shall  throw  them  forward  to  decide  the  vic- 
tory or  protect  the  retreat. 

“We  repeat  that  we  must  not  give  or  accept  combats 
with  such  a powerful  foe  if  we  have  not  the  greatest 
chances  of  success,  as,  even  should  we  rout  him  three 
times,  or  five  times,  at  a heavy  loss  for  ourselves,  the 
question  of  our  independence  would  not  be  solved.  Let 
us  wait  for  the  deadly  climate  to  decimate  his  files,  and 
never  forget  that  our  object  is  only  to  protract  the  state 
of  war,  altho.ugh,  of  course,  we  shall  avail  ourselves  of 
every  opportunity  to  do  all  the  harm  we  can  to  the 
enemy. 

“The  first  thing  to  be  done  before  a combat  is  to 
reconnoiter  the  weak  points  of  the  enemy;  next,  after 
ascertaining  these  points,  we  shall  occupy  his  attention 
on  other  points,  and,  when  he  least  expects  it,  we  shall 
make  a vigorous  attack  on  the  weak  points,  with  all  the 
forces  which  we  have  prepared  beforehand.  The  prin- 
ciple of  a combat  is  at  first  a mere  reconnoissance;  if 
the  results  are  good,  the  column  of  attack  shall  be 
strengthened;  if  not,  the  first  plan  shall'  be  rectified  as 
may  be  necessary;  in  case  of  retreat,  our  reserves  shall 
protect  it  in  order  to  avoid  a disaster. 

“To  resume,  the  essential  point  in  case  of  combat  is 
to  choose  a strong  position  and  to  prevent  all  recon- 
noitering  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  and,  if  necessary  for 


Madrid  School  of  Assassination.  255 

/ 

that  purpose,  to  oblige  him  to  deploy  his  forces  before 
we  decidedly  accept  the  battle ; to  decoy  him  into  places 
where  ambuscades  have  been  prepared  by  us,  and  to 
occupy  his  attention  wherever  it  may  be  necessary,  in 
order  to  facilitate  our  movements.” 

Evidently  this  system  of  warfare  has  been  wrought 
with  a great  deal  of  devotion  and  considerable  intelli- 
gence. It  is  the  hand  of  Spain,  using  the  Filipinos  for 
revenge  on  us  for  ending  the  colonial  scandals  in  Amer- 
ica of  the  Spaniards.  We  repeat  the  figures  of  the 
casualty  lists  in  the  course  of  nine  months  of  this  organ- 
ized assassination  after  civilized  war  was  over.  There 
were  killed:  Americans,  268;  killed  of  guerrillas,  3,227; 
or  twelve  guerrillas  killed  to  one  soldier.  It  is  a horrible 
business,  but  it  does  not  appear  to  be  encouraging  to 
the  professors  and  performers  of  irregular  warfare. 

The  words  of  General  MacArthur  on  these  results 
are  full  of  thoughtful  encouragement : 

“In  the  Philippines  there  is  no  dynasty  to  destroy; 
no  organized  system  of  feudal  laws  to  eradicate;  no  prin- 
ciples inconsistent  with  republicanism,  which  have  sol- 
idly insinuated  themselves  into  the  national  life,  to  dis- 
place; no  adverse  aspects  of  nature  to  overcome.  On 
the  contrary,  nature,  which  is  exuberant,  balmy,  and 
generous,  has  nourished  into  existence  several  millions 
of  sensitive  and  credulous  people,  without  allegiance  to 
any  existing  institutions,  but  animated  by  certain  in- 
choate ideas  and  aspirations,  which  by  some  unfortunate 
perversion  of  thought  they  conceive  to  be  threatened 
by  America.  These  people,  fortunately,  are  intelligent, 
generous,  and  flexible,  and  will  probably  yield  quickly 
and  with  absolute  confidence  to  tuition  and  advice  when 


256  Madrid  School  of  Assassination. 

thoroughly  informed  of  American  institutions  and  pur- 
poses. 

‘‘As  a future  thought  in  the  same  direction,  it  may 
be  suggested  that  the  Aryan  races  are  making  their  way 
back  into  the  old  continent,  which  as  a consequence  is 
likely,  within  a generation  more,  to  become  the  theater 
of  gigantic  political  activities.  Up  to  this  time  the  prac- 
tical effect  of  republican  institutions  has  not  been  con- 
sidered in  this  connection;  but  the  rapid  extension  of 
republican  civilization  in  these  islands,  which  is  not  only 
possible,  but  probable,  must  of  necessity  exert  an  active 
and  potential  influence  upon  the  affairs  of  Asia;  which, 
under  the  inspiration  of  American  ideas,  transmitted 
through  Filipinos,  may  yet  exhibit  the  greatest  of  po- 
litical wonders.” 

A close  examination  of  the  official  dispatches  and 
summaries  shows  that  the  greater  part  of  the  fighting  of 
the  guerrillas  is  forced  by  our  troops  taking  the  initi- 
ative, and  pushing  things.  For  example,  this  “Mention” 
contains  familiar  names  of  “Yankees,”  as  the  Madrid 
Committee  call  Americans : 

“June  II,  1900. — Brigadier-General  F.  D.  Grant,  U.*S.  V. 
(accompanied  by  Brigadier-General  F.  Funston, 
U.  S.  V.),  commanding  a column  consisting  of 
Troops  H and  G,  Fourth  U.  S.  Cavalry,  two  guns 
of  Battery  E,  First  U.  S.  Artillery,  nine  companies 
Twenty-second  U.  S.  Infantry,  detachment  Thirty- 
fourth  Infantry,  U.  S.  V.,  six  companies  Thirty- 
fifth  Infantry,  U.  S.  V.,  Company  M and  scouts 
Forty-first  Infantry,  U.  S.  V.,  scouts  of  Fourth 
and  Fifth  districts,  and  one  company  of  Macca- 


Madrid  School  of  Assassination. 


257 


bebe  scouts  attacks  five  hundred  insurgents  under 
Colonel  Claro,  occupying  fortified  positions  on 
Mount  Bulubad  and  two  adjacent  hills,  near  Sibul, 
province  of  Bulacan,  Luzon,  P.  L,  and  forces  them, 
with  great  loss  in  dead  and  wounded,  to  evacuate 
the  positions  which  had  been  considered  impreg- 
nable. Twenty-three  buildings  are  destroyed, 
great  quantities  of  rice  captured,  and  growing  corn 
pulled  from  the  ground.  The  United  States  forces 
lose  one  man  wounded.’’ 

This  is  different,  but  not  radically  so : 

“July  12,  1900. — Six  hundred  insurgents  attack  Oro- 
quieta,  Mindanao,  P.  L,  garrisoned  by  Company 
I,  Fortieth  Infantry,  U.  S.  V.,  under  First  Lieu- 
tenant K.  C.  Masteller,  and  are  repulsed  with  a 
loss  of  eighty-nine  killed  and  twelve  wounded,  who 
are  captured.  The  United  States  forces  lose  one 
sergeant  killed,  one  sergeant  wounded,  and  a 
sailor  on  the  U.  S.  S.  Callao,  which  rendered  valu- 
able assistance  during  engagement,  . mortally 
wounded.” 

The  inhabitants  of  the  Philippines  suffer  even  more 
seriously  in  property  than  in  casualties  in  the  operations 
of  the  guerrillas,  who  run  away  as  soon  as  they  can  get 
off,  leaving  the  country  devastated.  Aguinaldo’s  con- 
nection with  this  system  of  destruction  is  direct,  inti- 
mate, and  official.  He  is  individually  and  functionally 
responsible,  and  it  is  a matter  of  discretion  as  to  the 
application  of  the  laws  of  war  and  what  civilization  owes 
to  itself.  The  importance  of  the  capture  of  Aguinaldo 
17 


258  Madrid  School  of  Assassination. 

is  increased  in  the  understanding  of  the  extent  of  the 
scenes  of  fire  and  slaughter. 

In  bringing  this  crowning  affliction  upon  his  people, 
Aguinaldo  has  displayed  his  accustomed  indifference  to 
their  welfare.  The  condition  of  things  in  the  Philip- 
pines when  the  Taft  Commission  arrived  is  displayed  in 
the  news  given  in  the  page  of  official  summary  of  intel- 
ligence, as  follows : 

“June  I,  1900. — Captain  Ambrosio  Sandoval,  with  one 
lieutenant,  twenty-nine  men,  twenty-six  rifles,  four 
revolvers,  and  seven  hundred  rounds  of  ammu- 
nition, surrenders  at  Cuyapo,  P.  L,  to  Second 
Lieutenant  F.  J.  McConnell,  Twelfth  U.  S.  In- 
fantry. 

Major  E.  Z.  Steever,  commanding  Troop  E,  Third 
U.  S.  Cavalry,  strikes  a band  of  insurgents  at 
Mount  Parayan,  near  Badoc,  P.  L,  and  kills 
twenty-seven.'  The  troop  loses  one  man  killed  and 
two  wounded. 

“June  3,  1900. — Eighteen  men  of  Company  A,  Thirty- 
fifth  Infantry,  U.  S.  V.,  First  Sergeant  Donald  W. 
Strong  commanding,  while  scouting  near  Bustos, 
P.  L,  engage  a band  of  ladrones,  killing  its  cap- 
tain, severely  wounding  one  man,  and  capturing 
three  rifles. 

Philippine  Commission  arrives  at  Manila,  P.  L,  on  trans- 
port Hancock.  ' 

“June  4,  1900. — Detachment  of  thirty-five  men  of  Com- 
pany E,  Thirty-fifth  Infantry,  U.  S.  V.,  under 
Second  Lieutenant  Allan  Lefort,  encounters,  four 
miles  northeast  of  Norzagaray,  P.  L,  a party  of 


Madrid  School  of  Assassination.  259 

insurgents,  and  loses  four  men  wounded,  one  mor- 
tally. Insurgent  casualties  unknown. 

‘‘June  5,  1900. — The  insurgent  Captain  Versola  turns  in 
four  rifles  at  Cuyapo,  P.  L,  and  Lieutenant  Quin- 
son,  at  same  place,  brings  in  thirteen  insurgents, 
eight  rifles,  and  some  ammunition.  Three  rifles 
are  surrendered  at  Aguila,  P.  1. 

“June  6,  1900. — Insurgent  Captain  Mendoza  surrenders, 
at  Cuyapo,  P.  I.,  ten  guns,  and,  on  same  date,  ten 
rifles  and  three  shotguns  are  surrendered  at  Ca- 
miling,  P.  I. 

“June  7,  1900. — Captain  John  P.  Grinstead,  command- 
ing twenty  men  of  Company  A,  Thirty-second  In- 
fantry, U.  S.  V.,  on  an  expedition  into  the  foot- 
hills northwest  of  Mariveles,  P.  L,  encounters  an 
insurgent  outpost,  and  kills  one  insurgent.  Fol- 
lowing direction  taken  by  insurgents,  their  bar- 
racks are  found  and  destroyed. 

“June  23,  1900. — First  Lieutenant  Frank  S.  Burr,  Fif- 
teenth U.  S.  Infantry,  with  twenty-three  scouts. 
Fifth  District  Scouts,  finds  and  destroys  in  moun- 
tains west  of  Mabalacat,  P.  L,  an  insurgent  strong- 
hold and  magazine  containing  twenty  tons  of 
ordnance  stores,  machinery  of  all  kinds  for  manu- 
facturing ordnance,  chemicals  for  making  explo- 
sives, and  twenty-four  cases  of  two  hundred 
pounds  each  of  powder. 

“June  24,  1900. — Twenty-two  men,  under  First  Lieu- 
tenant James  M.  McManus,  Company  G,  Thirty- 
fifth  Infantry,  U.  S.  V.,  scouting  near  Santa  Maria, 
Bulacan,  Luzon,  P.  L,  engage  twenty  insurgents, 
and  defeat  them,  killing  five,  wounding  four,  and 


26o 


Madrid  School  of  Assassination. 


taking  five  prisoners  and  seven  guns.  No  casual- 
ties to  detachment. 

Detachments  of  Companies  E,  E,  and  H,  Twenty- 
fourth  U.  S.  Infantry,  commanded  by  First  Lieu- 
tenant William  P.  Jackson,  encounter  a party  of 
insurgents  near  the  junction  of  the  Agno  and 
Amburayang  Rivers,  and  scatter  it,  killing  six, 
wounding  four,  and  capturing  nine  rifles  and  three 
ponies  equipped.” 

This  is  an  average  page,  and  shows  the  presiding  fact 
to  be  that  the  Americans  are  as  superior  to  the  Filipinos 
in  guerrilla  warfare  as  in  the  regular  form  of  proceeding. 
Killing  twelve  guerrillas  for  one  American  soldier  killed 
by  guerrillas,  and  destroying  ten  times  the  military  prop- 
erty of  the  bands  following  the  Madrid  rules  and  Agui- 
naldo’s  commands,  affords  a sufficient  explanation  of  the 
great  solicitude  of  the  natives  to  stop  fighting  with  the 
close  of  the  war,  and  that  Aguinaldo’s  captivity,  so  much 
lamented  in  Spain,  promotes. 


CHAPTER  XXIL 


AGUINALDO’S  ZENITH  AND  DECLINE. 

His  Wonderful  Influence  and  Power  when  He  Opened 
War  upon  Americans — Rabid  Selfishness  when  He 
Knew  He  could  not  Win — Forced  His  People  to 
go  on  with  a Hopeless  Fight — His  Cruelty — A 
Craze  for  Revenge,  and  Path  of  Ruin — Sorrows 
He  Brought  upon  His  Countrymen — Himself  a 
Fugitive. 

IWl  AJOR-GENERAL  OTIS,  describing  the  situ- 
I V 1 ation  immediately  before  the  clash  of  arms  in  the 
environs  of  Manila,  says  of  the  forces,  military  and 
moral,  that  Aguinaldo  had  at  command,  he  was  at  the 
zenith  of  his  power.  He  had  recently  repressed  rebel- 
lion which  had  raised  its  head  in  Central  Luzon.  He 
had  assembled  a pliant  Congress,  many  members  of 
which  had  been  appointed  by  him  to  represent  far  dis- 
tant congressional  districts,  and  which  had  voted  him 
the  Dictator  of  the  lives  and  fortunes  of  all  the  inhab- 
itants of  the  Philippines.  He  dominated  Manila,  and 
when  he  ordered  that  the  birthday  of  the  martyred  Rizal 
should  be  appropriately  observed  there,  business  was 
paralyzed,  and  not  a native  dared  to  pursue  his  accus- 
tomed daily  labors.  Not  a province  had  the  courage 
to  oppose  his  appointed  governors,  backed  by  their 
Tagalo  guards,  although  a few  of  those  governors  had 
previously  sufYered  martyrdom  for  the  zeal  exhibited 


262 


Aguinaldo’s  Zenith  and  Decline. 


in  collecting  money  and  sequestering  private  property. 
The  southern  islands  were  obedient.  The  appointed 
governor  for  one,  and  that  one  not  eager  for  independ- 
ence, wrote  in  January: 

“To  the  Honorable  President  of  the  Revolutionary  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Philippines: 

“Honorable  Sir, — This  Government  has  received  the 
respected  communication  from  the  Presidency  under 
your  command,  ordering  that  under  no  pretext  what- 
ever are  American  or  other  foreign  troops  to  be  per- 
mitted to  land  on  this  island,  which  order  it  will  be  my 
pleasant  duty  to  comply  with  as  far  as  the  scanty  forces 
under  my  command  will  permit.  I have,  under  to-day’s 
date,  ordered  the  officials  under  my  command  in  charge 
of  the  towns  of  this  province  to  follow  the  same  instruc- 
tions, under  pain  of  the  most  severe  penalties. 

“I  have  the  honor  to  reply  as  above  to  the  communi- 
cation before  cited.  God  guard  you  for  many  years  for 
^ our  liberty  and  independence !” 

He  was  hailed  from  Europe  as  the  savior  of  his  coun- 
try and  as  first  of  “the  generous  and  noble  Tagalo  peo- 
ple,” and  was  assured  of  “the  sympathy  of  all  liberal 
and  noble  nations.”  He  was  called  upon  to  take  a 
prominent  part  in  United  States  politics,  and  those  ex- 
tending the  invitation  said : 

“President  Aguinaldo: 

“Dear  Sir, — In  the  interest  and  welfare  of  the  Eili- 
pino  Republic,  I take  the  liberty  to  write  you  regarding 
an  educational  work  to  be  published  in  this  country  rep- 


Aguinaldo’s  Zenith  and  Decline.  263 

resenting  the  views  of  the  anti-expansion  party,  who 
wish  to  see  a free  and  independent  Philippine  Republic. 

‘^The  object  of  this  work  is  to  increase  public  senti- 
ment against  annexation  of  the  Philippines.  Therefore, 
believing  that  some  facts  from  the  pen  of  Your  Honor 
would  strengthen  the  cause,  I am  authorized  to  ask 
certain  questions.” 

There  seemed  to  be  a considerable  number  of  per- 
sons having  a mania  of  this  nature.  Here  and  there 
minds  presumptively  sound  and  disposing  were  dark- 
ened. In  the  Philippines,  in  December,  1899,  there  was 
observed  in  Luzon  a fanatical  lunacy,  in  its  character 
supposed  to  be  religious,  a feature  of  which  was  proph- 
ets who  declared  themselves  revealing  and  proclaiming 
new  creeds  which  were  quite  markedly  variable  in  origin 
and  nature,  and  were  collecting  converts  in  Bulacan, 
Pampanga,  and  Pangasinan.  In  a secluded  spot  a few 
miles  from  Calumpit,  a sect  numbering  several  hundred 
had  located  itself  and  erected  several  nipa  buildings, 
where  it  practiced  its  rites  and  incantations.  It  was  dis- 
persed by  our  troops,  and  its  chief  prophet  sent  to  Ma- 
nila. He  proved  to  be  an  individual  who  earlier  had  set 
up  an  establishment  in  that  city,  from  which  he  was 
taken  by  the  police  and  sent  to  prison,  where  he  was 
kept  in  confinement  several  months  for  illegal  money 
exactions  from  the  more  ignorant  natives. 

Intelligent  Filipinos  had  for  some  time  been  warning 
the  military  officers  of  the  United  States,  and  giving 
various  accounts,  of  this  queerness.  Some  attirbuted  it 
to  the  terrors  and  intensities  of  the  war;  others  to  the 
tendencies  of  the  natives  to  return,  under  stress  of  emo- 


264  Aguinaldo’s  Zenjth  and  Decline. 

tions,  to  the  superstitions  that  existed  before  the  Span- 
iards came;  and  still  others  to  the  effect  of  religious  lib- 
erty when  the  Church,  which  had  been  powerful  in  the 
Government,  was  no  longer  stronger  than  the  State 
itself.  There  were  several  manifestations  of  peculiar 
excitement  that  was  visionary,  and  the  fact  that  the 
war  consisted  of  widespread  skirmishing,  and  the  fight- 
ing between  small  organizations  but  an  unbalancing 
intensity  to  the  experiences  of  those  who  participated. 

One  of  the  closest  and  most  judicious  observers 
who  have  visited  the  Philippines,  with  the  purpose  of 
giving  the  people  true  facts  and  fair  information,  is  Mr. 
Theodore  W.  Noyes,  who  made  the  journey  as  the  edi- 
torial correspondent  of  the  Washington  Star.  While 
he  was  interviewing  General  Otis,  a dispatch  was  handed 
the  General,  saying'  “that  Aguinaldo’s  wife  and  sister 
had  just  been  made  prisoners  in  North  Luzon,  and  that 
Aguinaldo  himself  was  being  chased  from  rancherio  to 
rancherio,  with  some  prospects  of  his  capture.  Prac- 
tically all  of  Aguinaldo’s  people  are  now  in  custody,  and 
only  his  presence  here  is  needed  for  a happy  family  re- 
union in  Manila.  Many  of  Aguinaldo’s  Cabinet  officers 
aiid  his  civil  and  military  lieutenants  have  also  been 
captured.” 

The  date  of  this  was  New-YeaPs  Day,  1900,  and  the 
family  reunion  has  occurred,  whether  happy  or  not.  In 
reply  to  questions  by  Mr.  Noyes  concerning  Aguinaldo’s 
character  and  influence  and  the  importance  of  his  asso- 
ciates, General  Otis  said: 

“Aguinaldo’s  prestige  and  influence  with  the  Fili- 
pinos have  been  very  great.  Even  now  the  lowest  class 
endow  him  with  superhuman  attributes,  including  im- 


Aguinaldo’s  Zenith  and  Decline.  265 

munity  from  bullets;  but  his  hold  has  weakened  among 
the  more  intelligent  Filipinos,  and  he  has  been  de- 
nounced among  them  as  a mountebank.  From  the  time 
that  he  returned  to  Cavite  in  May,  1898,  and  became 
subject  to  Mabini’s  inspiration,  he  had  never  the  inten- 
tion of  co-operating  faithfully  with  the  United  States, 
except  in  so  far  as  the  Republic  would  be  useful  to  him 
in  holding  Spain  helpless  while  he  worked  his  scheme 
of  self-aggrandizement.  Some  of  his  associates  were 
mere  mercenaries;  others  were  ambitious  for  power. 
Mabini  was  the  master  spirit,  able,  radical,  uncompro- 
mising. He  furnished  the  brains  which  made  Agui- 
naldo’s  Cabinet  formidable.  He  was  brought  before  me 
recently,  paralytic  and  a prisoner.  I offered  him  his 
freedom  on  parole  not  to  stir  up  trouble;  he  hesitated, 
and  said,  ‘I  have  not  changed  my  convictions.' 

“I  told  him  that  I did  not  respect  him  the  less  on 
that  account,  and  repeated  the  offer. 

‘I  have  no  means  of  support;  I- can  not  put  my 
freedom  to  any  use,’  he  replied. 

“Buencamino  is  a professional  turncoat,  everything 
in  turn  and  nothing  long.  He  has  been  an  officer  in  the 
Spanish  army,  and  was  Secretary  of  State  in  Aguinaldo’s 
Cabinet  when  he  was  captured. 

“Paterno,  who  is  not  yet  in  custody,  has  played  a 
curious  role.  He  arranged  the  treaty  by  which  Spain 
bought  off  Aguinaldo  and  his  associates  in  the  revolu- 
tion of  1896.  He  demanded  from  Spain  money  and  a 
title  of  Castile,  prince  or  duke,  as  the  price  of  his  achieve- 
ment. After  the  United  States  intervened  he  again  ap- 
peared as  the  agent  of  Spain  in  a proclamation  which 
pronounced  monarchy  the  fitting  government  for  the 


266 


Aguinaldo's  Zenith  and  Decline. 


Filipinos,  and  advised  them  to  side  with  Spain  against 
the  United  States.’' 

The  following  is  a letter  from  Aguinaldo  four  weeks 
before  the  fighting  at  Manila,  warning  a friend  of  his  to 
leave  the  city.  It  is  in  carefully-chosen  words,  and  the 
photograph  is  something  understood  to  have  a special 
meaning  : 

“ [Presidency.  Personal.  ] 
“Revolutionary  Government  of  the  Philippines, 
“Malolos,  January  7,  1899. 

“My  Dear  Don  Benito, — I write  this  to  ask  you  to 
send  to  this  our  Government  the  photograph  you  have 
in  your  house,  and  I will  pay  you  for  whatever  price 
you  may  ask.  Also  please  buy  me  everything  which 
may  be  necessary  to  provide  the  said  photograph. 

“I  beg  you  to  leave  Manila  with  your  family,  and 
to  come  here  to  Malolos;  but  not  because  I wish  to 
frighten  you — I merely  wish  to  warn  you  for  your  satis- 
faction, although  it  is  not  yet  the  day  or  the  week. 

“Your  affectionate  friend,  who  kisses  your  hands, 
“EMILIO  AGUINALDO. 

“Sr.  D.  Benito  Legarda.” 

The  only  interpretation  of  this  that  can  be  consid- 
ered is,  that  the  Dictator,  who  was  in  a wild  state  with  his 
favorite  proposition  to  bring  the  civilized  world  to  him, 
was  to  strike  those  who  were  in  disagreement  with  him 
by  wiping  out  Manila  with  fire.  He  had  a grand  pas- 
sion about  this.  He  did  not  reason  it  out. 

It  was  a part  of  the  Filipino  pomp  presenting  Agui- 
naldo as  a supernatural  being,  that  his  soldiers  would 
not  allow  him  to  take  the  risk  of  personally  taking  part 


Aguinaldo’s  Zenith  and  Decline.  267 

in  combats.  However,  if  General  MacArthur  was  not 
mistaken,  the  Tagalog  chief  was  nearly  under  fire  in  a 
skirmish  at  Santa  Maria  during  the  Malolos  cam- 
paign. In  an  official  account  of  the  affair,  this  pas- 
sage occurs : 

“Opened  on  the  enemy  with  machine  guns,  and^ at- 
tacked him  with  infantry,  deployed  in  the  extended 
order,  and  drove  him  in  flight  in  the  direction  of  Santa 
Maria  and  east  of  Bocaue. 

“Found  that  there  had  been  a spirited  combat  at 
Bocaue,  and  that  the  four  companies  of  infantry  in  the 
vicinity  had  preserved  the  railroad  intact,  and  had  in- 
flicted loss  upon  the  enemy.” 

General  MacArthur  reported  later : 

“General  Wheaton  displayed  on  this  occasion  a 
splendid  warlike  ferocity,  the  practical  results  of  which 
can  not  be  overestimated  m classifying  officers  for  hon- 
orable mention  or  substantial  reward,  as  it  is  probable 
that  his  emphatic  methods  had  a great  deal  to  do  with 
inspiring  the  pertinacious  and  rapid  action  which  was 
manifested  by  the  commands  engaged,  and  which  was 
indispensable  to  the  situation.” 

If  Aguinaldo  was  within  sight  of  this  fight,  he  was 
not  sufficiently  animated  with  “warlike  ferocity”  to  get 
into  it,  and  the  glimpse  he  may  be  presumed  to  have 
had  was  not  encouraging.  General  MacArthur  has  a 
way  of  giving  praise  for  conduct  in  action  with  delight- 
ful emphasis. 

Senor  Pedro  Paterno  was  the  arbitrator  of  peace, 
which  Aguinaldo  consented  to  because  his  resources 
were  scant.  There  was  money  offered  and  other  in- 
ducements. This  man  of  peace  became  very  violent 


268 


Aguinaldo’s  Zenith  and  Decline. 


toward  the  Americans;  June  226.  issued  a proclamation 
of  resentment,  because  Americans  did  not  make  war  or 
peace  like  Spaniards;  and  crying,  *‘To  war,  then,  beloved 
brothers!”  and  proceeded: 

“The  God  of  war,  in  whom  we  have  put  our  faith 
and  hope,  is  helping  us.  Interior  and  international  dis- 
sensions and  conflicts  rend  the  invading  army.  Its  vol- 
unteers, being  aware  that  we  are  in  the  right,  fight  with- 
out enthusiasm,  and  only  in  compliance  with  their  forced 
military  duty.  Within  the  American  Nation  itself  a 
great  political  party  asks  for  the  recognition  of  our 
rights,  and  Divine  Providence  watches  over  the  justice 
of  our  cause. 

“Viva  the  Filipino  soverign  people ! 

“Viva  national  independence  I 

“Viva  the  liberating  army! 

“Viva  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  President  of  the  Re- 
public !” 

“[Republica  Filipina,  Arsenal  of  Gerona. 

No.  316 — Section  C.] 

“On  this  day,  and  in  compliance  with  superior 
orders,  I have  forwarded  to  the  headquarters  of  the 
army  six  dynamite  bombs,  with  a letter,  of  which  this  is 
a correct  copy: 

“ Tn  compliance  with  your  orders  about  dynamite 
bombs,  I send  six  to  your  headquarters,  ready  with  their 
anvils,  pistons,  and  cartridges  of  dynamite,  for  loading 
at  the  proper  moment.  Sr.  Manuel  Rovirosa,  who  is  in 
charge  of  them,  carries  them  and  directions  for  their  use. 
As  soon  as  others  are  ready  I shall  send  them.  I need 
pistons  for  these  last.’ 


Aguinaldo's  Zenith  and  Decline.  269 

“I  have  the  honor  to  notify  these  headquarters  for 
their  information  and  action. 

“May  God  keep  you  many  years! 

“AURELIO  RUSCA, 

“The  Lieutenant-Colonel  in  Charge.” 

“This  gentleman”  got  into  Manila  with  his  bombs, 
but  was  “obliged”  to  refrain  again  because  his  chosen 
occupation  was  found  too  dangerous  to  himself. 

It  is  to  be  observed  as  a guide  to  conduct  in  dealing 
with  Filipinos  that  they  are  quite  facile  with  their  solem- 
nities. The  marriage  vow  of  a woman  the  men  hold 
to  be  especially  binding  and  sacred,  and  they  are  re- 
vengeful and  relentless  when  she  breaks  it;  but  they 
give  their  word  of  honor  freely  and  lightly.  Eugenio 
Blanco,  at  Cavite,  July  i,  1898,  wrote  Aguinaldo  that 
he  desired  to  serve  the  Philippines.  The  whole  letter 
is  of  exceeding  interest. 

“Sr.  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo, 

President  of  the  Filipine  Republic : 

“Respectable  Sir, — He  who  signs  this,  desiring  to 
employ  his  small  ability  for  the  service  of  the  Filipines, 
of  whch  he  solemnly  declares  himself  to  be  a son,  desir- 
ing to  show  that  it  was  only  on  account  of  exceptional 
circumstances  that  he  was  forced  to  adhere  to  the  Span- 
ish cause,  he  asks  that  he  may  be  given  liberty  in  order 
that  he  may  go  to  Manila  and  impress  upon  General 
Augustin  the  necessity  of  surrendering  the  place. 

“I  declare  and  solemnly  swear  upon  my  word  of 
honor  that  whatever  the  result  of  the  negotiation  may 
be  I shall  return  to  this  town  to  place  myself  anew  at  the 


270  Aguinaldo’s  Zenith  and  Decline. 

disposition  of  the  revolutionary  Government  as  a pris- 
oner of  war;  and  if  I violate  this  oath  without  just  cause 
I shall  submit  to  the  punishment  imposed  upon  me  by 
the  said  Government,  renouncing  all  rights  and  guaran- 
tees which,  according  to  international  law,  I may  claim. 

“EUGENIO  BLANCO. 

“Cavite,  July  i,  1898.’' 

It  is  evident  on  the  face  of  this  letter,  and  the  outside 
proof  is  conclusive,  that  this  man  was  inviting  an  en- 
gagement to  do  a work  of  treachery,  and  was  very 
ready  and  easy  in  swearing  on  his  word  of  honor. 

Aguinaldo  issued  instructions  to  a society  of  mur- 
derers in  Manila,  9th  of  January,  1899,  preaching  treach- 
ery as  a virtue,  and  recommending  savagery  in  war. 
The  instructions  are  express  and  cunning  provisions  for 
systematic  assassination.  The  document  was  written  in 
Tagalo,  not  Spanish,  and  headed,  “Instructions  to  the 
brave  soldiers  of  Sandatahan,  of  Manila.”  In  this  paper 
in  the  midst  of  most  barbarous  gibberish  there  are 
parenthetically  appeals  to  the  most  elevated  sentiments, 
with  sentences  interspersed  of  protecting  the  people 
from  banditti. 

The  inflexibility  of  Aguinaldo  in  self-assertion  gave 
way  to  force,  and  he  was  pleased  in  his  phrases  to  do 
that  which  was  unavoidable.  When  his  armies  that  he 
thought  sufficient  to  beat  the  Americans  gave  way  and 
were  so  demoralized  it  was  not  practicable  to  maintain 
the  appearance  of  organization,  he  issued  orders,  stating 
that  “not  many  men  were  needed”  under  their  system 
to  remain  in  the  army,  and  he  had  so  much  confidence 
in  “his  brave  men”  that  he  was  glad  they  had  returned 


Aguinaldo’s  Zenith  and  Decline.  271 

to  their  homes,  and  begged  them  to  be  in  as  good  rela- 
tions as  possible  with  the  Americans.  It  was  better  to 
see  them.  . . . The  reason  for  pressing  themselves  upon 
Americans  was  to  plot  their  destruction,  and  the  red 
savages,  whose  hunting-grounds  we  of  North  America 
possess,  would  have  scrupled  to  be  treacherous  as  the 
wily  Malays,  who  had  no  sense  of  dignity  to  control 
their  craft  or  limit  their  malice.  And  yet  the  London 
Saturday  Review  is  one  of  the  most  sorrowful  sheets 
out  of  America  to  complain  that  there  was  a trick  played 
on  Aguinaldo — gross  treachery.  'Then  the  dark  mud 
adder  was  beaten  by  his  own  tactics.  The  Review 
proceeds : 

^‘He  gave  the  Americans  invaluable  assistance  in  the 
capture  of  Manila  and  in  the  previous  maneuvers.  He 
proved  a faithful  ally  until,  partly  owing  to  a change 
of  policy  in  Washington  and  partly  to  a want  of  tact  . . . 

The  conclusive  answer  to  this  is  that  Aguinaldo  did 
not  give  the  Americans  any  assistance  before  Manila, 
but  had  written  himself  the  partner  of  Spain  before  an 
American  soldier  landed  in  the  Philippines. 

Still  it  is  to  Americans  almost  incredible  that  the 
man  posing  as  the  master  of  the  islands  and  prancing  in 
that  character  as  our  misunderstood  friend,  was  com- 
mitted to  the  Spaniards  at  this  time,  and  had  been  so 
for  two  months,  before  the  fall  of  Manila,  writing  long 
letters  of  philosophy  and  afifection  to  Consul  Williams, 
and  communicating  through  secret  channels  with  the 
Spanish  in  the  city  the  Americans  besieged.  There  is 
no  serious  questioning  now  of  the  fact,  and  the  weight 
of  evidence  is  that  there  was  a plot  to  combine  the 
powers  of  Spaniards  and  Filipinos  against  the  Amer- 


272  Aguinaldo’s  Zenith  and  Decline.  * 

icans;  that  there  were  machinations  lacking  to  a tri- 
angular fight  in  Manila — the  Spaniards  and  Filipinos 
against  the  Americans — a proposition  supported  by  a 
mass  of  information;  but  there  are  two  doubts  to  be  dis- 
cussed on  the  evidence.  First,  whether  Aguinaldo  was 
sure  he  had  then  sufficiently  overcome  the  partiality  of 
the  Philippine  population  to  risk  assailing  Americans 
openly.  Second,  whether  the  better  opportunity  would 
be  during  the  assault  of  two  armies,  with  advantages  of 
surprise,  against  one;  or  to  wait  until  there  would  be 
“joint  occupation  of  the  city,’’  and  the  streets  and  houses 
used  as  ambuscades  and  fire-traps.  Aguinaldo  prepared 
and  issued  elaborate  instructions  for  the  private  murder 
of  Americans  who  were  alone  and  unsuspecting,  and 
the  tactics  of  guerrilla  war  therein  displayed  that  comes 
to  us  now  from  Madrid  is  the  same  in  principle  and 
characteristics,  and  differs  from  the  masterpieces  of  the 
Dictator  only  in  detail. 

Colonel  Jewett,  of  New  Albany,  Indiana,  Judge- 
Advocate  of  the  Eighth  Army  Corps,  was  acquainted 
with  Aguinaldo,  and  what  he  says  is  of  much  interest: 

“Aguinaldo’s  hold  on  the  Filipinos  was  largely  a 
matter  of  superstition.  Ignorant  ones  believed  him 
to  be  ‘anting  anting,’  which  is  their  way  of  describing 
one  who  bears  a charmed  life.  Before  he  left  Cavite, 
in  July,  1898,  it  was  currently  reported  and  believed 
among  these  people  that  he  underwent  the  ordeal  of 
having  a volley  of  rifle-balls  fired  at  his  breast  at  close, 
range,  and  was  unharmed. 

“His  mother,  a pure  Filipino  woman,  was  of  dark- 
brown  color,  with  straight  black  hair,  and  absolutely 
devoted  to  and  proud  of  her  son.  She  was  very  cour-  ^ 


GENERAL  MaCARTHUR, 

Commander-in-Chief  United  States  Troops 
IN  THE  Philippines. 


AGUINALDO'S  ZeNITH  AND  DECLINE. 


2/3 


teous  to  strangers,  and  I was  several  times  under  obli- 
gations to  her  for  a cigar  and  a light  from  the  burning 
end  of  her  own  cigar. 

'‘My  own  notion  is  that  Aguinaldo  is  glad  to  be 
captured.  The  Filipinos  thoroughly  understand  the 
humane  treatment  which  our  people  accord  to  even  the 
worst  criminals,  and  I imagine  that  in  his  captivity 
Aguinaldo  will  become  reconciled  to  American  domi- 
nation, and  even  hope  that  he  may  be  of  great  service 
to  his  own  people  in  reconciling  them  to  a Government 
that  can  not  fail  to  be  advantageous  to  them.  All  the 
stories  about  Aguinaldo  going  to  and  from  Manila  dur- 
ing the  American  occupation  are  a mistake.  He  was 
never  in  Manila  from  the  time  he  was  exiled  by  the 
Spaniards,  in  1897,  until  Funston  brought  him  in.” 

The  Colonel  is  to  be  credited  with  the  best  sketch 
that  has  been  written  of  Aguinaldo’s  mother,  but  he 
does  Aguinaldo  injustice  in  saying  the  Captive  is  glad 
he  was  caught.  No  doubt  he  is  playing  contentment 
to  the  best  of  his  ability;  but  he  is  a tameless  creature, 
and  would  take  the  chances  of  an  escape  in  an  instant 
and  run  or  fight  for  liberty.  He  has  recommended  as- 
sassination as  no  other  warrior  chief,  not  an  utter  bar- 
barian, ever  has  done.  There  are  horrors  in  his  direc- 
tions to  burn  towns  and  kill  Americans,  such  as  can 
not  be  found  in  the  utterances  of  any  other  desperado, 
and  he  sandwiched  them  between  precepts  of  humanity 
and  adorable  phrases  cultivating  the  sweetness  of  civil- 
ization. 

This  was  a time  of  much  perturbation  among  the 
peacemakers,  and  the  natives  who  were  seriously  desirous 

to  open  ways  for  peace  had  the  hardest  of  times.  The 
18 


274  Aguinaldo’s  Zenith  and  Decline. 

experience  of  one  who  was  encouraged  not  to  weary 
in  well-doing,  at  the  time  of  the  first  bloody  collision 
between  the  United  States  troops  and  Filipinos,  is  thus 
related  by  General  Otis,  and  is  illustrative  of  the  despotic 
caprice  which  was  a feature  of  Aguinaldo  at  his  highest 
point  as  an  insurgent. 

Judge  Torres,  the  present  attorney-general  of  the 
islands,  who  had  recently  arrived  from  Cebu,  where  he 
had  filled  a judicial  position  under  the  Spanish  Govern- 
ment, immediately  upon  his  arrival  in  Manila  exerted 
himself  to  the  maintenance  of  peace,  and  offered  his  serv- 
ices to  Aguinaldo  to  assist  in  bringing  about  friendly 
conditions.  On  January  9th,  Aguinaldo  had  appointed 
him  senior  member  of  what  was  termed  his  Peace  Com- 
mission. He  was  at  his  home  in  Manila,  February  5th, 
and  visited  me  on  the  evening  of  that  day,  praying  that 
I would  propose  to  the  insurgent  authorities  the  estab- 
lishment of  a neutral  zone,  that  terms  for  peace  might 
be  considered.  He  was  informed  that  as  the  war  was  the 
act  of  the  insurgents  we  would  not  initiate  proceedings, 
but  that  it  must  continue  until  they  (the  insurgents)  were 
ready  to  submit  propositions.  He  then  asked  that  a 
fellow-member  of  his  insurgent  commission.  Colonel 
Arguelles,  who  was  in  the  city,  might  be  permitted  to 
pass  through  the  lines  in  order  to  visit  Malolos  and 
confer  with  Aguinaldo  and  his  principal  advisers.  This 
was  granted,  and  Arguelles  was  taken  by  Colonel  Kil- 
bourne,  of  the  Pay  Department,  to  that  portion  of  Gen- 
eral MacArthuPs  line  of  battle  opposite  Caloocan.  It 
being  quite  late  in  the  evening  when  he  arrived  there, 
he  concluded  to  return  to  the  city  and  recommence  the 
journey  early  the  following  morning,  which  he  did.  He 


Aguinaldo's  Zenith  and  Decline.  275 

was  passed  through  the  lines  under  flag  of  truce,  was 
absent  two  or  three  days,  when  he  returned,  and  was 
properly  received  by  a party,  which  was  viciously  fired 
on  by  the  insurgents  as  soon  as  their  flag  of  truce  had 
withdrawn  a short  distance.  The  firing  caused  our  party 
to  retreat  quickly,  Arguelles  leading  it  and  anathematiz- 
ing his  countrymen. 

The  destructiveness  of  barbarism  breaks  out  in  the 
insurgent  forces  when  driven  from  Malolos.  In  an  offi- 
cial summary  this  appears: 

“14.  The  enemy’s  line  of  retreat,  all  the  way  from 
Caloocan  and  Malabon  to  Malolos,  had  been  made,  by 
his  own  act,  literally  a pathway  of  incendiary  fire  and  a 
scene  of  needless  desolation.” 

Burning  all  things  inflammable  seemed  to  be  the 
popular  form  of  keeping  up  declining  courage  and  mend- 
ing fallen  fortunes.  In  the  isle  of  Cebu,  Pablo  Mejia, 
a prominent  American  sympathizer,  was  assassinated  in 
front  of  his  own  door.  It  was  alleged  that  this  was  due 
to  his  friendliness  to  the  Americans,  and  that  his  name 
headed  a “black-list”  of  sixty  who  were  to  be  assassi- 
nated, all  of  whom  had  received  warning  to  that  efifect. 
Those  were  of  the  natives  who  had  been  avowedly 
friendly  to  the  occupation  of  the  United  States. 

In  May,  ’99,  Lawton’s  fiery  spirit  flashed  in  mes- 
sages as  annexed : 

“Baliuag,  May  6,  1899. 

“Scouts  sent  from  here  day  before  yesterday  send  in 
report  as  follows:  ‘Destroyed  about  forty-eight  thou- 
sand bushels  rice,  seven  tons  sugar,  large  quantities  cloth 
from  which  uniforms  are  made,  a lot  of  shoulder-straps, 
gold  lace,  buttons,  etc.,  for  same;  a quantity  of  ammu- 


J276  Aguinaldo’s  Zenith  and  Decline. 

nition,  large  lot  of  empty  shells,  three  sets  of  reloading 
tools.  Killed  officer  mounted  on  fine  horse;  got  horse. 
This  A.  M.  destroyed  about  twenty  thousand  bushels 
rice,  said  by  natives  to  belong  to  Captain  Ambrosio,  of 
insurgent  army.’  Scouts  will  continue  their  work. 

“LAWTON,  Major-General.” 

“Baliuag,  May  7,  1899. 

“Chief  of  Scouts, — Move  all  your  scouts  as  quickly 
as  possible  to  Norzagaray,  near  which  place  on  the  road 
to  San  Jose  you  will  find  the  mounted  troop  of  cavalry. 
It  is  reported  that  a strong  force  of  insurgents  is  coming 
over  that  trail  toward  Angat.  There  are  troops  at  San 
Rafael  and  at  Angat.  Assist  the  cavalry  all  you  can,  and 
make  it  as  hot  as  possible  for  the  advance  of  the  insur- 
gents. There  are  said  to  be  two  generals  with  them — 
Geronimo  and  Pio  del  Pilar.  Get  one  or  both  if  you 
can.  Look  out  for  five  pack-mules  lost  near  San  Rafael 
when  we  came  up,  H.  W.  LAWTON.” 


CHAPTER  XXIIL 

EXTRAORDINARY  MARCHES  OE  TROOPS. 

Very  Remarkable  vScouting’ — Our  Troops  Storm  Am- 
buscades, and  Rush  Exploring  Expeditions — Af- 
fairs in  Northeastern  Luzon — The  Corner  of  the 
Country  in  which  Aguinaldo  was  Run  Down  and 
Taken — The  Brilliant  Runaway  of  Major  Batch- 
elor— Orders  could  not  Overtake  Him,  and  well 
they  Could  Not. 

WHILE  our  devoted  troops,  with  unrelaxing  en- 
ergy, pressed  the  ever-retiring  and  dispersing 
enemy,  it  is  a part  of  the  story  that  Manila  was  a hot- 
bed of  rebellious  treachery  throughout  the  serious  times 
of  the  war,  allowing  no  relaxation  of  vigilance  at  any 
time,  until  the  guerrilla  nests,  as  well  as  the  actually 
organized  and  armed  forces  were  shattered.  Our  offi- 
cers write  in  a consensus  of  impressions  that  the  time 
when  a real  state  of  war  existed  was  eight  months,  dating 
from  the  first  fighting  in  the  suburbs  of  Manila;  and  then 
the  insurgent  leaders  were  active  in  procuring  recruits 
for  mere  village  and  neighborhood  raids,  but  the  Amer- 
ican authorities  in  Manila  were  not  allowed  to  believe 
they  were  living  with  native  friends.  Among  the  signs 
that  a new  order  of  things  in  the  capital  was  expected, 
was  the  flight  of  all  the  native  servants  from  the  Mala- 
' canan  Palace,  the  hea"dquarters  of  the  commander-in- 
chief. These  people  would  have  been  offended  if  called 
Ladrones  (thieves),  and  yet  they  robbed  the  officers  with 

277 


2yS  Ex.traordinary  Marches  of  Troops. 

great  care,  circumspection,  and  discrimination.  One 
of  them  drove  off  with  the  carriage  and  horses  of  the 
adjutant-general,  and  turned  over  the  outfit  to  the  out- 
side insurgents. 

There  was  a Junta  in  Manila,  composed  of  “shrewd 
Filipinos,”  and  the  General-in-Chief  gives  this  account 
of  the  mercy  shown  to  offenders  against  the  peace  and 
dignity  of  the  United  States: 

“They  were  watched,  but  not  restrained  of  their 
liberties  until  the  early  spring,  as  no  decided  hostile  act 
of  commission  could  be  proven  against  them.  When 
arrested  they  professed  to  be  the  most  loyal  of  Amer- 
ican subjects,  claimed  to  be  working  incessantly  for 
American  supremacy,  and  expressed  a desire  to  take  at 
once  the  oath  of  allegiance.  The  principal  was  placed 
in  confinement.  The  others  took  the  oath,  and  were 
released. 

“The  captured  insurgent  correspondence  shows  that 
this  principal  was  in  very  frequent  communication  with 
the  authorities  from  whom  he  received  his  appointment. 
In  a communication  of  August  15th  he  was  informed 
from  Tarlac  of  the  receipt  there  of  many  of  his  letters, 
and  was  assured  ‘that  there  is  nothing  to  fear  from  those 
who  are  at  the  front  of  our  Government,  nor  from  the 
people.’  ” 

On  the  same  authority — the  highest — this  rests : 

“The  presidente  of  one  of  the  cities,  wealthy  in 
landed  estates,  was  reported  to  be  contributing  to  a 
leading  insurgent  officer  who  was  still  engaged  in  active 
hostilities.  Upon  investigation,  his  friends,  who  were 
trusted  men,  asserted  that  he  could  not  do  otherwise; 
that  he  was  very  anxious  for  the  success  of  the  Amer- 


Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops.  279 

ican  arms  and  the  peace  of  the  country,  and  was  doing 
all  he  could  to  effect  it,  but  that  he  was  under  painful 
duress  and  obliged  to  contribute  of  his  means  upon  In- 
surgent demand  in  order  to  retain  any  portion  of  his 
property.  Thus,  as  was  ascertained,  many  citizens  of 
friendly  intent  were  situated.” 

It  was  ascertained  that  the  insurgents  in  Manila  were 
in  close  communication  with  the  active  belligerents  on 
- the  south  side  of  the  bay,  and  supplied  them  with  stores 
of  contraband  character,  even  to  the  materials  for  manu- 
facturing cartridges,  and  so  many  people  were  depend- 
ent for  food  obtained  by  free  intercourse,  the  offenders 
were  let  off  lightly,  for  otherwise  there  would  have  been 
famine  in  the  densely-populated  districts.  Manila  was 
a Grand  Hotel  for  rebel  refugees,  who  considered  it  a 
nice  place  in  hard  weather,  and  yet  did  not  abate  their 
hostility.  There  was  continued  free  trade  for  specified 
and  approved  articles. 

The  fighting  was  to  be  done  in  the  distance,  and  the 
American  columns  made  rapid  and  searching  marches, 
chasing  the  bands  of  belligerents,  leaving  no  spot  un- 
touched that  it  was  believed  harbored  a foe.  There 
never  was  as  difficult  a job  done  as  by  the  scouts  of  our 
army.  The  scouting  task  was  far  more  dangerous  and 
wearing  than  that  of  the  British  in  South  Africa,  and 
more  successful.  A letter  from  an  unfortunate  man, 
Albert  Sonnichsen,  formerly  quartermaster  on  the  trans- 
port Zealandia,  made  prisoner  in  the  Malolos  advance,  is 
an  inside  disclosure  of  conditions: 

“We  are  about  to  march  to  the  northward — where, 
we  do  not  know.  Up  to  Lieutenant  Gilmore’s  arrival 


28o  Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops. 

we  have  been  treated  in  a most  barbaric  manner,  starved, 
beaten,  and  bound;  but  since  the  advance  of  the  United 
States  troops  our  treatment  has  been  a trifle  better.  We 
have  been  living  on  five  cents  a day,  and  most  of  us  are 
nearly  naked.  The  Spaniards  have  been  treated  even 
worse  than  us,  being  tortured  in  the  stocks  and  starved. 
Some  hundreds  are  dying  of  dysentery  and  various  other 
diseases,  but,  whether  incapable  or  not  caring,  the  Gov- 
ernment does  nothing  for  them.  The  bearer,  Senor 
Ramon  Rey,  has  been  a true  friend  to  us;  in  fact,  had 
it  not  been  for  him  and  his  countrymen  we  should  prob- 
ably have  been  starved  to  death  on  the  retreat  from 
Malolos. 

‘‘For  God’s  sake,  can  .nothing  be  done  for  us?  We 
have  been  starving,  abused,  and  treated  like  animals. 

“The  bearer  has  been  a true  friend  to  us,  and  de- 
serves the  best  consideration  of  every  American. 

“Respectfully,  ALBERT  SONNICHSEN.” 

This  was  the  humanity  of  the  insurgents  when  Agui- 
naldo  did  not  desire  to  advertise  his  civilization,  as  in 
the  case  of  Lieutenant  Gilmore  himself. 

The  general  situation  in  April  (26th),  1899,  given 
In  a letter  by  Lawton,  “in  the  field  at  Norzagaray,” 
says,  “the  enemy  are  disintegrating,”  as  small  de- 
tachments are  wandering  all  over  the  country,  and 
there  seems  to  be  little  organization.”  Bufifalo  carts 
were  out  of  the  question,  except  on  smooth  roads,  and 
there  were  none  such.  Therefore,  “the  soldier  was  taxed 
to  his  utmost  capacity,  to  carry  his  rifle,  ammunition,  and 
blanket  roll,  without  being  yoked  into  a cart  to  haul 
supplies  as  we  have  been  obliged  to  do.”  The  General 


Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops.  281 


adds,  ^^that  was  what  the  soldiers  were  doing  at  that 
moment.”  He  had  been  trying  bulls,  and : 

‘'A  number  of  our  bulls  have  died;  I can  not  ascer- 
tain accurately  how  many,  but  ten  or  more,  and  the 
men  pull  along  the  carts. 

‘‘These  bulls  have  died  from  exhaustion,  and  not 
from  any  disease.  The  four-mule  teams  have  done  very 
well  with  help  over  bad  places  and  on  the  hills,  but  the 
two-horse  and  mule  teams  could  not  more  than  pull  the 
empty  wagon. 

‘T  have  therefore  no  transportation,  even  after  the 
reduction  of  weight  by  consumption ‘of  rations. 

“We  have,  however,  traveled  over  a rough  country 
with  no  road.  I hope,  when  I get  my  transportation  in, 
to  replace  dead  bulls  with  others  found  in  the  country, 
and  readjust  and  arrange  it  so  that  it  can  continue  over 
good  roads  and  make  short  marches  each  day.  The 
fifty  pack-mules  will  give  us  very  little  material  assist- 
ance, as  they  will  not  carry  one  day’s  rations  for  the 
whole  command,  and  I must  still  rely  upon  the  bull- 
teams.  I can,  however,  give  the  pack-train  to  the  squad- 
ron of  cavalry,  including  the  mounted  troop,  and  it  will 
carry  ten  days’  rations  for  the  whole  squadron,  and  I 
can  use  them  for  flank  or  rapid  movements,  and  they 
will  be  strong  enough  to  maintain  themselves  anywhere. 

“My  suggestion,  then,  is  to  let  me  move  west  down 
the  river  by  both  banks  to  or  near  Baliuag,  where  I 
should  be  met  by  a supply  train  with  ten  days’  rations. 
Then  let  me  move  north  along  road  through  San  Ylde- 
fonso  to  San  Miguel,  and  let  MacArthur  move  over  the 
road  to  the  west  of  the  swamp  along  the  river.  I can 
keep  my  cavalry  squadron  on  my  right  flank  and  in 


282  Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops. 

communicating  distance,  and  thus  the  whole  country 
between  the  mountains  on  the  east  and  the  Rio  Grande 
on  the  west  will  be  covered.  I believe  the  movement 
will  disintegrate  the  insurgent  army  in  that  section,  and 
I gather  from  the  information  received  that  the  roads 
suggested  are  very  good. 

“The  signal  officer  has  reported  it  impossible  to. 
maintain  the  telegraph  line,  it  having  been  cut  many 
times  between  San  Jose  and  Novaliches.  He  has  sent 
out  twice  or  oftener  each  day  to  repair  it,  but  as  often  it 
is  cut,  and  the  last  time  a long  section  was  removed,  and 
he  did  not  have  wire  enough  to  repair  it.  I suggest  that 
it  be  taken  up  from  the  Manila  end  toward  Novaliches, 
and  I will  send  out  and  take  up  from  this  end  as  far  as 
possible;  and  then  that  a line  be  laid  out  to  me  with  a 
supply-train  if  it  be  sent.  LAWTON.’" 

General  Lawton  repeatedly  said,  “Our  trouble  Is 
transportation.”  The  next  day  after  writing  the  above 
letter  Lawton  heard  from  Manila  headquarters: 

“Now  that  MacArthur  will  soon  shake  off  the  insur- 
gents at  Calumpit,  and  as  it  is  necessary  for  you  to  rest 
your  worn-out  troops,  it  is  believed  that  you  will  not 
precede  MacArthur  more  than  one  day,  if  at  all,  and  the 
march  on  Baliuag  becomes  practicable.  At  that  point 
I have  looked  for  concentration  of  insurgent  troops; 
but  should  MacArthur  force  them  up  the  line  of  rail- 
road, they  will  not  be  able  to  make  a concentration 
before  reaching  San  Miguel. 

“We  can  not  ascertain  as  yet  whether  the  road 
north  and  to  the  west  of  the  swamp  and  along  the  Rio 
Grande  is  practicable  for  wagons.  If  MacArthur  can 


Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops.  283 

determine  that  it  is,  he  can  move  by  that  route;  other- 
wise he  must  move  on  the  road  by  Baliuag,  and  thence 
on  the  same  road  north  to  San  Miguel,  after  having 
joined  your  column.  I have  lost  all  confidence  in  any 
map  which  I have  yet  seen.” 

Here  the  same  place  and  the  same  date  of  that  of 
Lawton’s  letter,  Major  Eastwick,  of  the  Second  Ore- 
gon, made  a reconnoissance : 

“The  command  moved  forward  in  a generally  north- 
erly direction,  following  the  crest  of  the  range  of  hills 
which  tend  in  a north  and  south  line,  with  flankers 
thrown  out  when  the  nature  of  the  growth  permitted, 
though  for  the  most  part  it  was  necessary  to  move  in 
column  of  files^  with  flanks  unprotected.  At  pearly 
every  prominent  point  was  a small  lookout  station,  and 
pile  of  brush  for  signal  lights,  which  we  burned.  At  the 
head  of  the  creek,  where  the  bridge  turns  sharply  to  the 
west,  our  advance  party  was  again  fired  upon  by  the 
insurgents  from  a ravine  some  four  hundred  yards  to 
the  northeast.  The  fire  was  returned  with  some  effect, 
driving  the  insurgents  into  the  brush.  The  command 
followed  the  ridge  to  the  west  to  a point  overlooking 
the  river.” 

The  day  was  enlivened  with  several  skirmishes,  and 
the  report  continues: 

“At  12.45  P-  again  taking  up  the  march,  ascended 
the  next  ridge,  where  the  advance  guard  was  met  by  a 
volley  from  some  five  insurgents  in  the  valley  on  the 
other  side.  Returning  the  fire,  they  were  driven  beyond 
range.  These  insurgents  were  dressed  in  red  uniforms, 
and  armed  with  Mausers  and  Remingtons.  From  this 
point  could  be  seen  many  natives  moving  north.  The 


284  Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troors. 

command  then  proceeded  on  the  ridge  and  to  the  ford 
half  a mile  north  of  Angat.  The  water  here  was  three 
feet  deep  at  this  ford,  and,  crossing  at  the  point,  a halt 
of  forty-five  minutes  was  made.  The  command  then 
returned  to  the  point  by  the  road  on  the  west  side  of  the 
river,  arriving  at  four  P.  M. 

“In  numerous  places  in  the  hills  stores  of  rice,  corn, 
and  sugar  were  found,  and  also  some  few  bolos,  but  no 
fire-arms.  It  is  estimated  that  about  six  or  seven  insur- 
gents were  killed,  and  nine  prisoners  were  taken  and  are 
now  in  confinement.  Distance  traveled  estimated  at 
ten  miles. 

“Attached  hereto,  marked  ‘Exhibit  A,’  is  .a  sketch 
of  the  country  traversed,  and  Exhibit  B consists  of  some 
correspondence  found  in  a house  previously  occupied  by 
the  insurgents.  Exhibit  C consists  of  insurgents’  tele- 
graphic dispatches  concerning  the  uprising  in  Tondo 
of  February  23,  1899.” 

The  March  telegrams  from  the  front  contain  the 
following : 

“Indang,  March  18,  1900. 
“Adjutant-General  Wheaton’s  Brigade: 

“Lieutenant  Ely,  commanding  G,  Aniadeo,  reports 
that  at  one  o’clock  this  morning  volleys  were  heard 
south  of  Amadeo.  At  five  o’clock  man  from  Soledad, 
a barrio  three  miles  south  of  Amadeo,  reported  that  a 
band  of  Ladrones,  only  thirty  of  whom  had  rifles,  de- 
manded money  of  the  place,  and  being  refused  carried 
off  all  the  men  ^and  women  in  the  place.  He  reports 
that  the  people  of  Amadeo  now  admit  that  General 
Trias  was  east  of  Amadeo,  near  Minontoc,  ten  days  ago, 
and  that  he  is  thought  to  have  carried  off  rifles  which 


Extraordinary  Marches -of  Troops.  285 

had  been  hidden  between  Amadeo  and  Silang,  and  that 
he  went  to  mountains  east  of  Santo  Tomas,  where  a 
force  is  gathering.  I am  sending  a company  at  once 
to  Mendez  Nunez,  and  more  men  to  Lieutenant  Ely  at 
Amadeo,  to  chase  the  band  seen  early  this  morning  near 
Soledad.  The  detachment  yesterday,  to  co-operate  with 
Colonel  Schuyler,  reached  Buena  Vista  last  night.  Will 
move  toward  Silang  and  return  to-morrow. 

‘‘JOHNSTON,  Major.” 

The  expedition  of  Major  Batchelor,  of  the  Twenty- 
fourth  Infantry,  was  an  unauthorized  movement,  pro- 
ceeding step  by  step,  going  on  with  great  good  luck  and 
exposure,  privation  and  weariness,  from  Tayug  to 
Aparri;  that  is,  from  a town  on  the  only  railroad  to 
one  on  the  north  coast  of  Luzon.  Efforts  were  made 
to  stop  the  Major  with  his  battalion  and  Maccabebe 
scouts;  but  the  slender  column  was  not  overtaken, 
and  met  no  ambush.  General  Lawton  was  indignant 
that  such  risks  should  be  undertaken  in  so  informal  a 
way,  but  concluded  that  it  was  a good  thing.  The 
reg’ion  is  given  celebrity  by  Eunston’s  surprising  scout- 
ing, and  capture  of  Aguinaldo.  Here  is  the  stirring- 
report  that  first  aroused  curiosity  and  apprehension : 

“Headquarters  First  Division, 

“In  the  Field,  Tayug,  November  30,  1899. 

“Chief  of  Staff, — I send  yon  with  this  latest  received 
from  Castner  and  Batchelor,  crossing  trail  Bayonbong,  • 
received  last  night.  Supplies  are  being  sent  to  them  by 
native  carriers. 

“ ‘Camp  near  A])oat  River,  November  26,  1899. — To 


^86  Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops. 

Major-General  Lawton,  Tayug:  Left  San  Nicolas  about 
five  A.  M.,  November  24th.  Met  Private  Schick  and 
sixteen  Tagalos  about  three  miles  from  town  with  two 
prisoners.  Sent  him  ahead  up  trail,  which  turns  to  left, 
up  steep  hillside  through  thick  bamboo.  For  about  five 
miles  trail  is  excellent.  Muth  little  improvement  bull- 
carts,  not  too  heavily  loaded,  can  go  over  it  with  ease. 
Trail  for  this  distance  follows  sides  of  mountains  with 
easy  grades,  much  labor  having  been  expended  on  it. 
At  end  of  five  miles  trail  becomes  too  narrow  and' too 
steep  for  bull  carts.  Continued  to  cuartel  formerly  used 
by  Spanish  troops,  about  twelve  miles  from  San  Nicolas. 
Found  it  burned,  and  no  insurrectos.  Recent  occupa- 
tion and  sign  on  trail  of  passage  of  many  ponies,  carabao, 
and  people.  Continued  on  until  about  eight  P.  M.; 
trail  got  very  narrow.  Several  bridges  on  roads  at 
ravines.  Pony  train  attempted  to  follow  me,  but  seven 
ponies  fell  over  hillside,  about  three  hundred  feet,  to 
creek  bottom.  It  was  too  dark  for  even  a man  to  walk 
over  the  trail  safely.  Two  ponies  had  to  be  killed. 
Made  about  sixteen  miles.  Men  very  tired,  and  had  to 
go  to  bed  without  anything  to  eat.  Next  morning  got 
some  food,  very  little,  and  started  ahead.  Trail  was  very 
steep,  and  went  over  mountain  about  five  thousand  feet 
high.  Men,  particularly  Tagalos,  were  so  exhausted 
from  hard  climbing,  had  to  make  a long  halt  at  noon, 
and  cook  a little  rice,  which  Twenty-fourth  Infantry  had 
when  they  came  up.  All  were  very  weak  from  lack  of 
food.  Camped  about  two  miles  from  Knapo.  Tagalo 
scouts  at  that  place.  Twenty-fourth  Infantry  made  a 
dry  camp  about  three  miles  behind  me.  Reached  Knapo 
about  8.30  to-day.  Only  a cuartel.  Evidence  of  recent 


Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops.  287 

occupation  by  iiisurrectos.  Eeft  Twenty-fourth  Infantry 
cooking  breakfast.  Marched  to  this  point,  about  twelve 
miles  from  Knapo.  Trail  good  and  well  defined,  but 
over  very  high  mountains.  Tagalo  scouts  should  be  in 
Santa  Cruz  to-night;  estimated  six  miles  from  this  camp. 
Believe  Twenty-fourth  Infantry  did* not  move  from 
Knapo,  as  the  trail  behind  them  has  many  stragglers 
on  it,  and  the  command  is  much  exhausted  from  hard 
climbing  and  lack  of  food.  My  ponies  are  with  me,  but 
quite  worn.  Have  three  more  days  of  food,  but  can 
make  it  last  six  days.  Insurrectos  left  no  ponies  or 
carabaos  on  trail.  Kind  the  natives  call  it  three  days 
from  San  Nicolas  to  Bayonbong,  but  they  are  good 
mountaineers,  carry  a little  rice,  and  make  from  twenty- 
five  to  thirty  miles  a day.  Believe  it  is  a good  five-days’ 
march  for  our  troops,  unused  to  anything  but  mud  and 
bogs.  Nothing  of  importance  has  happened.  No  peo- 
ple save  a few  old  men  and  women  in  the  country. 
Should  be  in  Bayonbong  day  after  to-morrow.  Pack- 
trains  or  native  carriers  only  means  of  transportation 
which  will  work  over  trail.  Men  in  good  condition. 
Only  one  Tagalo  behind;  he  should  reach  us  to-night. 
Tagalos  ahead  seem  entirely  confident  and  trustworthy. 
Hope  the  train  I sent  back  can  get  rations,  ammunition, 
and  return  at  once. 

‘‘Saw  a few  deer  on  trail;  no  other  game.  Pligh  grass 
everywhere;  not  much  timber.  Very  cold  weather  in  the 
mountains.  Streams;  apparently  no  fish.  Insurrectos 
can  not  live  in  these  mountains  without  bringing  in  food 
with  great  labor.  Believe  they  are  hiding  about  one- 
half  day’s  jouney  from  the  valleys.  Believe  much  plun- 
der is  still  hidden  at  San  Nicolas.  Immediate  advance 


288  Extraordinary  Marches  .of  Troops. 

toward  Bayonbong*  prevented  me  from  investigating 
trails  near  San  Nicolas.  Barrio  of  Santa  Maria  near 
there  is  hot-bed  of  insurrectos,  so  my  Tagalos  report. 
Am  doing  all  I can  to  push  forward,  but  do  not  wish  to 
drive  my  men  and  land  them  in  the  valley  of  the  Rio 
Magat  too  weak  and  worn  for  any  use.  Have  marched 
about  forty  miles  by  trail  in  three  days — equal  to  seventy 
miles  in  level  country.  Pony  train  has  worked  well. 
Twenty-fourth  Infantry  have  not  seen  their  ponies  since 
leaving  San  Nicolas.  All  maps  I have  seen  of  the  coun- 
try are  erroneous,  and  give  no  idea  of  the  trail  at  all. 
Mdll  be  off  as  soon  as  I can  see  the  road  to-morrow, 
and  hope  to  reach  Bayonbong  the  day  after.  Very  re- 
spectfully, (signed)  Castner.’  - 

‘Near  Santa  Rosa,  November  27th. — Adjutant- 
General  First  Division:  I reached  this  point  Avithout 
opposition  of  any  sort.  Scouts  are  in  my  front.  The 
trail  is  much  harder  than  Avas  reported  at  San  Nicolas. 
My  pony  train  has  not  been  seen  since  leaAung  San  Nic- 
olas, but  bearers  employed  there  have  kept  me  supplied 
Avith  rice.  I have  seen  cattle  but  once,  and  think  there 
are  practically  none  in  the  mountains.  The  trail  Avinds 
so  badly  can  not  give  distance  marched.  I aa^ouM  esti- 
mate it  at  thirty-five  miles.  I still  have  tAvo  hard  marches 
to  Bambang.  I have  captured  sixteen  of  Aguinaldo's 
men  going  to  Bayonbong  to  join  him.  They  seem 
greatly  dispirited,  and  Avere  hungry.  I sent  them  back 
Avith  orders  to  go  to  San  Nicolas  and  get  food.  Will 
probably  need  ammunition.  Will  get  food  of  some  sort. 
Command  folloAving  will  need  guides  at  Cuyapo.  I have 
been  obliged  to  make  one  dry  camp  and  to  shorten  my 


AGUINALDO  AS  A CHINESE  SAILOR. 


■? 


( 


Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops.  289 

inarch  two  days  on  account  of  water;  first  water  beyond 
Cuyapo,  next  this  side  nine  miles.  I wrote  from  latter 
point.  Very  respectfully,  (signed)  Jos.  B.  Batchelor, 
Jr.,  Twenty-fourth  Infantry,  commanding  First  Bat- 
tallion.' 

• “LAWTON,  Major-General.’’ 

December  3d,  General  Lawton  reported  to  head- 
quarters at  Manila : 

“I  repeat  to  you  message  just  received  from  Batch- 
elor, commanding  battalion  Twenty-fourth  Infantry  at 
Bayonbong.  His  instructions  did  not  in  any  contin- 
gency contemplate  an  advance  down  river  valley  below 
Bayonbong.  However,  the  raid  may  not  be  a bad  move. 
Wire  immediately  such  instructions  -as  you  wish  sent 
him.  I will  try  to  have  them  reach  him  in  time.  Orders 
to  Baldwin’s  battalion  Twenty-second  Infantry  to  re- 
turn do  not  seem  to  have  reached  him. 

“ ‘Bayonbong,  December  2,  1899. — To  Adjutant- 
General,  First  Division : I have  the  honor  to  report  my 
arrival  at  this  town  without  opposition.  The  governor 
of  the  province,  General  Fernando  Canon,  yesterday 
surrendered  the  province — three  cities,  one  hundred  and 
ten  Spanish  and  ten  American  prisoners,  and  about  sixty 
rifles;  delivery  not  yet  completed — to  Lieutenants  Cast- 
ner  and  IMunro,  who  arrived  at  the  same  time.  Castner, 
though  senior,  accorded  reception  of  surrender  to 
Munro  in  consideration  of  negotiations  already  carried 
on  by  latter.  I have  directed  people  not  to  be  molested. 
Liberated  surrendered  insurrectos,  and  have  general  and 
his  officers  at  liberty  in  the  town,  but  preparing  to  go  to 


19 


290  Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops. 

Manila.  I am  informed  that  in  Isabela  there  are  about 
one  thousand  insurrectos  and  about  the  same  number  in 
Cagayan,  and  about  two  hundred  American  prisoners 
-in  latter  province.  General  Canon  informs  me  he  has 
a letter  from  Manaoag,  near  Dagupan,  strongly  infer- 
ring presence  there  on  November  20th  of  Aguinaldo 
and  his  family.  The  latter  was  to  follow  the  treasure 
train  and  their  baggage,  but  on  learning  of  the  capture 
turned  back  and  went  to  Villavis  and  thence  to  Manaoag. 
I have  heard  a rumor  that  Aguinaldo  was  making  a new 
trail  for  himself  from  near  Trinidad  toward  the  east.  I 
find  little  to  eat  in  the  country;  no  sugar,  scarcely  any 
cattle,  plenty  of  coffee  and  tobacco.  My  whole  com- 
mand greatly  needs  clothing,  shoes,  etc.  There  is  no 
-salt,  and  I hesitate  to  advance  without  it.  Bacon  all 
gone.  I shall  go  up  to  the  mouth  of  Rio  Grande  unless 
stopped  by  orders.  Start  in  that  direction  to-morrow. 
I expect  to  reach  Hagan  in  about  five  days,  and  Aparri 
on  or  about  December  12th.  There  is  an  insurrecto 
general  there  with  a reported  force  of  nine  hundred. 
If  any  of  these  people  make  serious  resistance  I may 
need  ammunition  bad.  I have  heard  that  the  navy  had 
a force  of  some  sort  off  Aparri.  The  Rio  Grande  is 
usually  navigable,  according  to  report,  and,  judging 
from  the  volume  of  the  Magat,  up  to  Hagan.  Can  not 
they  bring  me  some  salt  and  ammunition  on  a small 
gunboat?  There  is  nothing  to  stop  them  to  Hagan.  I 
shall  presumably  go  down  the  river  in  .cascoes.  Please 
so  inform  navy  officer  in  charge  of  suggested  gunboat. 
It  would  be  a great  relief  to  get  some  clothing.  Some 
of  my  men  are  marching  barefooted;  all  without  stock- 


Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops.  291 

ings,  and  some  without  trousers.  I hope  my  next  orders 
will  reach  me  at  Aparri  by  gunboat.  Very  respectfully, 
Jos.  D.  Batchelor,  Captain  Twenty-fourth  Infantry, 
commanding  First  Battalion.’ 

‘XAWTON,  Major-General.” 

It  adds  interest  to  the  accounts  of  this  march  to 
note  that  this  province  of  Isabela  was  the  one  in  which 
Aguinaldo  took  refuge,  and  where  he  was  caught,  and 
that  the  Twenty-fourth  United  States  Infantry  is  of  sol- 
diers of  color,  and  reported  to  be  of  uncommon  stature. 
The  regiment  gave  an  excellent  account  of  itself  at 
Santiago. 

A headquarters  dispatch  from  Manila,  December 
3d,  ordered:  “Arrest  Batchelor’s  advance  north  down 
the  Magat  and  Rio  Grande  Rivers,  if  possible.  Ration 
his  column  at  Bayonbong,  where  he  will  remain  until 
further  orders.” 

General  Wheaton  succeeded  Uawton  at  Tayug, 
Lawton  being  called  south  to  look  after  the  insurgents 
gathering  there  in  small  detachments.  Wheaton  tele- 
graphed December  5th,  “Messenger  has  been  sent  to 
stop  Batchelor.” 

“Tayug,  December  2,  1899. 

“Chief  of  Staff,  Manila: 

“The  following  received  at  10.15  A.  M. : 

“ ‘Bayonbong,  November  29,  1899. — Major-General 
Lawton : I have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report 
of  operations  since  my  last,  dated  November  27th: 
Marched  all  day,  November  28th,  over  mountains 
through  small  barrio  of  Santa  Cruz,  and  down  Aboat 


292  Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops. 

River  to  Bambang,  twenty-two  miles,  trail  crossing  river 
many  times.  Tagalo  scouts  captured  three  insurgents 
on  trail.  One  major  and  two  captains  captured  in  Bam- 
bang. Learned  here  that  eight  cavalrymen  had  come  in 
from  Dupax  and  left  few  hours  before  our  arrival,  also 
that  their  commander  was  treating  through  a peace 
commission,  so-called,  in  Bambang,  consisting  of  Span- 
ish prisoners,  with  the  governor-general  of  Nueva  Viz- 
caya, Bayonbong,  for  a surrender.  This  has  been  going 
on  for  several  days.  Peace  commissioners’  story  was 
mixed,  and  I determined  to  march  early  on  Bayonbong, 
fearing  there  some  chance  for  treachery.  Lieutenant 
Munro  met  me  on  the  road,  and  we  entered  Bayonbong. 
As  he  had  already  commenced  negotiations  with  these 
people,  I deemed  it  best  to  give  him  the  honor  of  re- 
ceiving the  surrender  and  let  him  furnish  his  terms,  as 
they  seemed  satisfactory  and  covered  the  gTOund  there. 
The  people  here,  if  telling  the  truth,  knew  nothing  of 
Aguinaldo.  They  say  he  was  headed  here,  but  never 
reached  this  valley.  Will  look  about  me  and  try  to 
learn  of  his  whereabouts  if  he  is  in  the  valley.  Twenty- 
fourth  Infantry  are  not  yet  here,  though  we  arrived 
about  nine  A.  M.  My  pack-train  is  with  me.  People 
are  very  good  to  us,  and  we  can  subsist.  Will  hold  on 
here  until  Captain  Batchelor  arrives.  Inhabitants  tell 
me  that  Aguinaldo  is  not  on  good  terms  with  these 
people,  and  would  have  hard  work  to  live  in  this  country. 
No  doubt  many  native  troops  could  be  raised  in  this 
province  who  would  serve  us  well.  . . . Very  re- 

spectfully, J.  C.  Castner,  First  Lieutenant,  Fourth  In- 
fantry, commanding  Lowe’s  scouts.’ 

‘‘LAWTON,  Major-General,” 


Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops.  293 

‘‘Manila,  December  3,  1899. 
“Commanding  General,  Tayug: 

“Department  commander  does  not  approve  of  the 
suggestion  Lieutenant  Castner  makes  in  his  report  to 
General  Lawton  of  November  29th,  that  about  two  hun- 
dred of  the  best  of  those  soldiers  (insurgents)  who  re- 
cently surrendered  > at  Bayonbong  be  armed  and 
equipped.  SCHWAN,  Chief  of  Staff.” 

“Headquarters  First  Division, 
“Tayug,  December  2 and  3,  1899. 
“Chief. of  Staff,  Manila: 

“General  Wheaton  has  arrived.  We  have  arranged 
the  transfer  of  commands  satisfactorily.  I will  start 
south  in  the  morning,  taking  six  troops  Fourth  Cavalry, 
and  six  companies  Thirty-fourth  Infantry;  latter  to  start 
as  soon  as  relieved  by  Thirteenth  Infantry,  which  has  not 
yet  arrived.  “LAWTON,  Major-General.” 

“Santa  Rosa,  December  9,  1899. 

“Chief  of  Staff: 

“I  repeat  for  your  information  message  just  received 
from  Kennon,  at  San  Jose.  Castner  with  his  scouts  led 
advance  over  trail  from  Bayonbong  to  San  Nicolas.  He 
was  followed  by  Batchelor  with  battalion  Twenty-fourth 
Infantry,  who  was  followed  by  Baldwin  with  a bat- 
talion Twenty-second  Infantry.  Two  days  later,  on  re- 
ceipt of  information  that  Bayonbong  would  surrender 
to  Munro,  messenger  was  sent  to  recall  Baldwin.  Cast- 
ner or  Batchelor  had  no  instructions  to  go  farther  than 
Bayonbong  or  vicinity.  His  departure  for  Aparri  was 
as  much  of  a surprise  as  though  he  had  started  for  San 


294  Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops. 

Francisco.  A messenger  was  sent  with  all  haste  with 
orders  to  him  to  remain  at  Bayonbong.  Baldwin  did 
not  return,  and  it  is  not  known  whether  or  not  mes- 
senger to  Batchelor  reached  him.  The  enthusiasm  and 
desire  on  the  part  of  all  officers  to  do  something  has 
led  many  of  them  to  unauthorized  conduct,  which  em- 
barrassed me  greatly.  I have  wired  Kennon  to  ascertain 
definitely  situation  at  Bayonbong,  and  report  facts  direct 
to  you.  He  should,  I think,  report  to  Wheaton. 

“ ‘San  Jose,  December  8,  1899. — Filed  8.20  P.  M. — 
Colonel  Edwards,  Santa  Rosa : Continued  reports 
reached  me  of  force  of  party  in  mountain  near  Bayon- 
bong and  also  Aguinaldo’s  treasures.  Outrages  fol- 
lowed departure  of  Munro  from  Dupax.  Batchelor  has 
gone.  Baldwin  was  at  Bayonbong  on  3d;  present  where- 
abouts unknown.  Aguinaldo  reported  near  Bayambang, 
disguised  as  Chinaman.  Some  force  needed  at  Bayon- 
bong, if  Nueva  Vizcaya  is  to  be  held.  Effect  of  de- 
parture of  troops  bad.  Baldwin  undoubtedly  has  re- 
ceived his  orders  to  return  by  this  time.  His  departure 
will  leave  Nueva  Vizcaya  bare.  People  reported  very 
friendly,  but  afraid  of  armed  insurgents.  To-morrow 
morning  scouting  party  leaves  here  for  Bayonbong. 
Telegraph  operator  at  Carranglan  can  communicate 
with  one  at  Bayonbong  without  repairs.  Probably  very 
little  work  needed  to  put  line  in  first-class  condition 
from  native  source.  -Batchelor  reported  to  have  had 
fight  near  boundary  Nueva  Vizcaya  and  Isabela.  These 
conditions  are  reported  for  information  of  division  com- 
mander. Unless  further  instructions  are  received  to- 
night scouting  party  will  leave  at  daylight  to-morrow.’ 

“EAWTON.” 


Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops.  295 


'‘Tayiig’,  December  9,  1899. 
‘'General  Schwan,  Chief  of  Staff,  Manila: 

“Native  scout  came  in  from  Baldwin  this  morning. 
Baldwin  was  at  Bayonbong  the  5th,  and  had  received 
no  orders.  Batchelor  had  gone  north.  Letter  from 
Batchelor,  dated  the  3d,  reports  action  with  the  insur- 
gents at  Cordon,  three  days’  march  north  of  Bayonbong. 
Insurgents  defeated  and  fled.  All  natives  receive  Amer- 
icans with  great  rejoicing.  Both  Baldwin  and  Batchelor 
report  need  everything,  especially  money,  but  do  n’t  ask 
for  re-enforcements.  I do  not  understand  why  orders 
sent  by  Lawton  had  not  reached  Baldwin  by  the  5th. 
Anything  going  to  Bayonbong  should  go  via  San  Jose. 

“WHEATON,  Brigadier-General.” 

“Manila,  December  10,  1899. 
“General  Wheaton,  Tayug: 

“Kennon  reports  scouting  party  left  for  Bayonbong 
over  Carranglan  trail  yesterday.  He  wants  money.  I 
have  asked  him  if  5,000  could  not  be  sent  with  25,000 
to  be  sent  to  you  to  San  Fabian  in  couple  of  days.  Could 
you  not  transport  it  together  with  tools  to  repair  Car- 
ranglan trail,  to  Tayug  and  thence  on  to  him  at  San 
Jose?  He  thinks  Carranglan  practicable  with  little 
work.  A battalion  must  be  maintained  at  Bayonbong, 
and  with  that  end  in  view  call  for  whatever  you  require. 
Large  naval  force  reaches  Aparri  to-day. 

“SCHWAN,  Chief  of  Staff.” 

“Puncan  (via  San  Jose),  December  13,  1899. 
“General  Schwan,  Chief  of  Staff: 

“Complying  with  orders  received  here  last  night,  I 
will  return  to-day  to  Carranglan,  and  thence  proceed 


2^6  Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops. 

with  two  companies  to  Bayonbong.  I arrived  at  Bayon- 
bong  on  the  2d  of  December,  and  was  received  by  the 
governor  of  the  province  with  great  cordiality.  He  was 
delighted  that  American  troops  had  arrived.  The  Span- 
ish priest  left  after  my  arrival,  and  the  Filipino  priest 
asked  concerning  religious  affairs.  I informed  him  to 
resume  throughout  the  province  religious  services,  and 
that  he  would  be  protected  and  respected  in  all  religious 
matters.  He  and  the  governor  asked  permission  to 
have  church  on  the  morrow  for  the  purpose  of  giving 
thanks  to  God  for  the  surrender  of  the  province  without 
bloodshed.  I informed  him  that  permission  was  not 
necessary  to  have  church,  and  that  I and  all  my  officers 
would  attend  mass  at  the  hour  set  by  him,  which  we  did, 
thus  showing  him  and  the  people,  as  I told  them,  that 
we  were  a Christian  people,  and  respected  and  protected 
every  one’s  religion.  After  the  services  the  city  band  es- 
corted us  to  the  government  buildings,  where  the  gov- 
ernor led  in  giving  ^Viva  Americanos,’  and  in  a neat 
speech  told  me  of  his  pleasure  in  getting  rid  of  the  insur- 
gents and  his  desire  for  peace,  and  for  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  to  own  the  islands.  I presented  the 
governor  with  a small  American  flag  donated  by  one  of 
my  officers.  In  the  evening  Governor  Ramon  Ariola 
gave  a banquet  at  his  home  to  myself  and  all  my  offi- 
cers, at  which  all  his  officials  were  present,  and  the  Amer- 
ican flag  was  displayed  from  a vase  of  flowers.  All  the 
officials  of  Nueva  Vizcaya  province  are  honestly  and 
sincerely  desirous  of  peace,  and  are  thoroughly  glad  to 
come  under  American  rule.  The  present  governor  was 
forced  to  take  the  position  by  the  insurgents,  but  still 
is  an  able  man,  and  can  be  used  to  great  advantage  in 


Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops.  297 

behalf  of  our  Government.  He  has  rendered  gladly  and 
zealously  all  possible  assistance  to  our  troops.  He  says 
the  people  wish  for  the  Americans,  for  the  insurgents 
robbed  them  of  everything,  forced  them  to  contribute, 
killed  some  of  their  men  to  obtain  money,  and  in  some 
instances  raped  their  women.  He  says  the  province  of 
Isabela  is  very  anxious  to  become  American,  and  that 
no  trouble  will  be  experienced  there,  except  from  roving 
bands.  The  Igorrotes  at  Bagabag  have  been  acting  ugly. 
He  further  says  the  province  of  Cagayan  is  insurgent, 
but  will  be  American  when  insurgents  are  driven  out; 
that  there  are  something  like  a thousand  insurgents  in 
that  province  under  General  Tirona,  and  troops  will 
meet  with  resistance.  There  are  now,  to  the  best  of  my 
information,  many  small  bands  of  insurgents  in  the 
mountains.  In  my  opinion,  a full  battalion  is  the  small- 
est force  advisable  at  Bayonbong  to  operate  by  scouting 
through  the  various  towns.  The  people  have  never 
heard  of  the  President’s  proclamation,  and  know-nothing 
about  the  purpose  of  the  United  States.  I would  recom- 
mend that  copies  be  sent  for  general  distribution.  The 
Spanish  and  insurgents  have  compelled  people  to  fur- 
nish supplies,  promising  to  pay,  but  not  doing  so.  I 
would  recommend  that  troops  be  supplied  with  money, 
whereby  confidence  and  faith  can  be  established  among 
the  people,  thus  inspiring  them  with  respect  for  the 
Americans.  BALDWIN, 

‘‘Major  Twenty-second  Infantry.” 

“Tayug,  December  5,  1899. 
“General  Schwan,  Palace,  Manila : 

“Information  from  Batchelor,  November  30th. 
Starts  north  December  ist,  and  would  attack,  unless 


298  Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops. 

surrendered,  garrison  at  Isabela.  He  will  repair  tele- 
graph line  north  from  Bayonbong.  Intends  to  enlist 
auxiliaries,  and  arm  them  with  captured  Mausers. 
Urges  that  disbursing  officer  be  sent  to  pay  all  claims 
quickly.  Wants  five  hundred  dollars  sent  in  small 
change  to  make  purchases.  Deputies  from  Bagabag  in, 
and  tender  submission.  People  cheering  American  flag. 
Wants  vessel  sent  to  mouth  of  river  with  stores,  cloth- 
ing, and  rations.  I am  trying  to  stop  him,  but  he  can 
not  be  overtaken  if  he  left  on  the  ist. 

“WHEATON,  Brigadier-General.’^ 

“^Manila,  December  13,  1899. 
“General  Wheaton,  Tayug: 

“Entire  province  of  Cagayan  surrendered  by  insur- 
gent authorities  to  Captain  McCalla,  commanding  naval 
force  recently  landed  at  Aparri,  who  also  received  from 
them  arms  and  other  munitions  of  war.  Captain  Batch- 
elor’s battalion  is  reported  as  in  good  condition,  and  to 
be  making  good  progress  in  its  march  toward,  and  to  be 
not  very  far  from,  Aparri. 

“SCHWAN,  Chief  of  Staff.” 

The  remarks  of  Major-General' Otis  on  the  events  in 
Northeastern  Luzon  are  of  the  deepest  interest,  and 
show  the  triumphs  that  followed  the  energy  and  bravery 
of  our  soldiers,  at  once  explorers  and  conquerors : 

“General  Lawton  was  in  person  at  Tayug,  where  he 
did  not  have  the  advantage  of  complete  telegraphic 
communication.  He  was  impressed  with  the  belief  that 
Aguinaldo  would  succeed  in  moving  eastward  from  the 
Benguet  province  of  Northwestern  Luzon  to  Bayon- 


Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops.  299 

bong,  his  recently-designated  capital,  and  he  proposed 
to  attack  him  by  the  very  difficult  Carranglan  and  Tayug 
trails,  while  General  Young  should  pursue  him  from  the 
westward.  With  this  end  in  view  he  was  endeavoring 
to  supply  General  Young  with  the  needed  troops  and 
supplies  while  assembling  small  columns  to  proceed  over 
the  above-named  mountain  routes.  The  experience  of 
the  Fourth  Cavalry  detachments  in  their  operations 
north  of  Carranglan,  and  the  direction  of  General 
Young’s  pursuit  of  Aguinaldo  indicated  that  the  insur- 
gents could  not  move  as  General  Lawton  anticipated, 
and  he  was  so  informed  as  soon  as  he  could  be  com- 
municated with. 

“In  the  meantime,  Castner’s  Tagalo  scouts  and 
Batchelor’s  battalion  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Infantry, 
followed  by  Baldwin’s  battalion  of  the  Twenty-second, 
had  started  from  Tayug  for  Bayonbong,  with  instruc- 
tions to  proceed  to  that  city.  Having  reached  it  after 
the  surrender  of  the  insurgent  military  governor  of  the 
province  in  which  Bayonbong  is  situated  to  Lieutenant 
Monro  of  the  Fourth  Cavalry,  who  had  marched  by  the* 
Carranglan  trail,  Captain  Batchelor  conceived  the  idea 
of  proceeding  northward  by  the  Magat  and  Cagayan 
Rivers  to  Aparri,  which  he  proceeded  to  do  without  any 
definite  knowledge  of  the  country  over  which  he  in- 
tended to  pass  or  the  force  with  which  he  might  be 
obliged  to  contend.  Every  effort  possible  was  made  to 
arrest  him,  but  without  avail.  Taking  Castner’s  scouts 
and  his  battalion  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Infantry,  he  pro- 
ceeded on  this  perilous  journey,  short  of  rations,  cloth- 
ing; and  ammunition,  after  having  sent  back  a request 
to  have  the  navy  supply  him  at  the  head-waters  of  launch 


300  Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops. 

navigation  on  the  Cagayan  River.  This  movement  ne- 
cessitated the  holding  at  Bayonbong  of  the  battalion 
of  the  Twenty-second  Infantry,  which  was  needed  at 
other  points,  and  gave  great  concern  for  the  safety  of 
Batchelor’s  men,  who  could  hardly  escape  destruction 
if  the  Insurgents  of  the  Cagayan  Valley  should  press 
hostilities.  The  only  hope  of  their  arrival  at  Aparri, 
except  as  prisoners,  lay  in  the  belief,  as  has  been  stated 
in  the  former  portions  of  this  report,  that  General  Ti- 
rona,  commanding  the  insurgent  forces  stationed  in  the 
valley,  would  surrender  upon  invitation.  Admiral  Wat- 
son, who  was  requested  to  send  a naval  force  to  Aparri, 
the  headquarters  of  Tirona,  when  information  of  Batch- 
elor’s movements  was  received,  responded  with  alacrity. 
He  dispatched  the  naval  vessels  Newark  and  Helena, 
Captain  McCalla  commanding,  as  soon  as  supplies  for 
Batchelor’s  command  could  be  placed  on  board.  Cap- 
, tain  McCalla  proceeded  with  great  tact,  and  received  the 
surrender  of  Tirona,  who  turned  over  to  him  all  of  his 
artillery  and  more  than  nine  hundred  stand  of  arms  of 
improved  patterns. 

‘‘Captain  Batchelor  reached  the  town  of  Hagan,  Isa- 
bela province,  about  December  8th,  having  encountered 
some  opposition  on  his  march,  especially  at  Naguilan, 
where  he  was  obliged  to  cross  his  troops  over  "the  river 
and  attack  an  insurgent  force  which  had  intrenched  itself 
there  to  bar  his  progress.  He  quickly  routed  the  enemy, 
who  left  four  dead  and  four  mortally  wounded  in  the 
trenches.  His  loss  was  one  man  drowned  and  four 
wounded.  His  men  suffered  from  lack  of  sufficient  food 
and  clothing,  but  were  greatly  assisted  by  the  inhab- 
itants of  the  towns  and  barrios  through  which  they 


extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops.  301 

passed.  He  continued  to  descend  the  river,  and  re- 
ceived the  supplies  sent  for  him  by  the  navy  at  the  head- 
waters of  river  navigation.  Shortly  thereafter  orders 
were  issued  directing  the  return  of  his  battalion  to  the 
San  Jose  country  and  the  headquarters  of  the  regiment, 
proceeding  by  boat  to  Dagupan.  Castner’s  scouts  were 
ordered  to  Vigan  to  recuperate  and  increase  their  nu- 
merical strength. 

“This  march  from  Bayonbong  to  Aparri  will  remain 
memorable  on  account  of  the  celerity  of  its  execution, 
the  difficulties  encountered,  and  the  discomforts  suf- 
fered by  the  troops.  It  proved  beneficial  to  our  inter- 
ests, as  it  gave  us  some  practical  knowledge  of  the  char- 
acter of  that  portion  of  Luzon  and  the  condition  of  the 
inhabitants.  It  also  informed  the  inhabitants  of  our 
pacific  intentions,  relieved  them  from  Tagalo  rule,  from 
which  they  had  suffered,  and  prepared  them  to  receive 
kindly  the  detachments  of  troops  which  subsequently 
passed  into  that  section  to  establish  permanent  stations. 
On  his  descent  of  the  rivers.  Captain  Batchelor  had  re- 
ceived the  surrender  of  the  country  from  the  civil  gov- 
ernor of  one  of  the  provinces,  while  General  Tirona,  the 
insurgent  military  governor  of  the  entire  valley,  had 
made  surrender  to  the  commanding  officer  of  the  naval 
force  present,  who,  for  the  great  assistance  he  had  ren- 
dered, had  appointed  him  civil  governor  subject  to  the 
approval  of  the  military  governor  of  the  islands.  The 
appointment  was  not  confirmed,  as  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  United  States  troops  which  were  sent  soon 
thereafter  to  take  possession  bf  the  territory  was  called 
upon  to  exercise  such  civil  functions  of  government  as 
conditions  demanded. 


302  Extraordinary  Marches  of  Troops. 

“General  Lawton,  who  while  at  Tayug  had  been  di- 
rected to  effect  the  release  of  the  Spanish  and  American 
prisoners  held  by  the  insurgents  in  the  northwestern 
Luzon  provinces,  had  determined  to  proceed  northward 
and  join  his  advance,  which  General  Young  was  conduct- 
ing, as  soon  as  he  could  make  the  necessary  combina- 
tions of  troops  and  provide  for  their  subsistence.  All 
insurgent  resistance  on  the  Tayug  line,  excepting  that 
northeast  of  Carranglan,  and  northeast  of  Cabanatuan 
on  the  Bayonbong  road,  had  practically  ceased.  The 
disorganized  troops  of  the  enemy  to  the  westward  of 
Carranglan  which  had  been  employed  in  the  north  were 
endeavoring  to  pass  in  small  detachments  southward  to 
their  homes  in  the  central  portion  of  the  island,  with  the 
exception  of  the  small  bodies  which  General  Young  was 
severely  handling  and  driving  northward.  Nearly  all 
of  that  portion  of  Aguinaldo's  army,  which  had  formerly 
occupied  the  line  of  the  Manila  and  Dugapan  railway, 
and  which  still  retained  organization,  v/as  being  pressed 
continually  by  General  MacArthur  back  into  the  moun- 
tains of  Zambales  and  Bataan.  It  had  already  lost  by 
capture  its  artillery,  its  supplies,  a large  number  of  its 
rifles,  and  much  of  its  ammunition.” 

It  is  a fact  of  great  interest  that  the  mountaineers, 
into  whose  fastnesses  Aguinaldo  was  compelled  to  take 
refuge,  were  not  devoted  to  his  fortunes.  He  had  not 
been  able  to  terrorize  them,  and  the  fact  increases  the 
estimation  of  the  share  the  natives  had  in  his  capture  in 
that  part  of  the  country. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 


HISTORY  OF  WAR  WRITTEN  ON  THE 
FIELD.  ^ 

How  the  Telegraphic  Dispatches  Tell  the  Tale — It  is 
History  Writing  by  Instantaneous  Photography — 
Scenes  and  Incidents — The  Personalities  of  Actual 
Active  Service — The  Strenuous  Life  of  Lawton — 
The  American  Soldier  a War  Wonder. 

ONE  of  our  soldier  explorers,  after  making  the  ac- 
quaintance of  the  greater  of  the  islands,  stated  in 
few  words  what  was  known  about  them : ‘‘They  number 
more  than  one  thousand,  and  the  Archipelago  is  longer 
from  north  to  south  than  our  Great  Lakes  to  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico;  it  is  wider  from  east  to  west  than  from  New 
York  to  Pittsburg;  certain  of  the  islands  are  as  big  as 
certain  of  our  greatest  States.  Luzon,  at  the  north, 
about  equals  New  York  in  area,  and  Mindanao,  at  the 
south,  is  almost  as  big  as  Ohio.  Panay  and  Mindoro 
are  much  larger  than  Connecticut,  and  Negros,  Leyte, 
and  Cebu  would  each  cover  one  of  oiir  smaller  States.” 

The  struggle  began  with  the  Filipinos,  through  the 
favor  shown  them  by  the  victorious  Americans,  who 
separated  the  islands  forever  from  Spain,  within  a week 
from  the  declaration  of  war,  by  destroying  the  Spanish 
fleet.  Then  came  intrigue,  falsehood,  conspiracy, 
treachery,  malice,  and  all  the  Orientalism  of  demagogy; 

303 


304  History  of  War  Written  on  the  Field. 

and  the  very  deference  ^vith  which  we  treated  the  rights 
of  the  natives,  and  the  referendum  to  the  people  of  the 
United  States  as  to  what  should  be  done  with  the 
Philippines,  our  possession,  and  the  tedious  negotiations 
and  debates  on  ratification  of  the  treaty  at  last  made, 
and  our  long  waiting  under  the  poisoned  arrows  of 
]\Ialay  insolence — all  was  turned  against  us.  Lincoln 
was  not  more  forbearing,  when  he  did  not  order  the  guns 
of  Sumter  fired  at  those  who  were  building  batteries 
around  the  fort,  than  McKinley  when  he  restrained 
the  soldiers  of  our  united  country  from  fighting  until 
they  had  to  defend  themselves.  The  war  was  long, 
bloody,  and  exceedingly  difficult,  and  the  several  cam- 
paigns were  such  splendid  achievements,  there  are  new 
names  in  our  constellation  of  heroes  that  are  radiant 
as  stars. 

We  are  fortunate,  considering  that  the  warfare  was 
so  far  away  in  so  strange  a country,  that  military  his- 
tory is  now  automatically  written;  for  the  wires  go  with 
the  columns,  and  those  who  have  responsibility  talk 
over  them,  and  their  words  are  recorded  imperishably, 
letters  of  fire  that  never  fade  after  they  are  transmitted, 
and  so  the  actors  are  the  writers  of  their  own  deeds  in 
their  own  words.  The  telegram  comes  to  us  from  the 
fields  of  strife  charged  with  all  the  veracities.  There  is 
lacking  the  formal  measure  of  the  solemnities  of  his- 
tory, but  each  telegram  is  a chapter  of  truth.  When 
many  and  man}^  a year  has  rolled  away,  the  readers  of 
the  stories  of  the  war  in  the  Philippines  will  scan  with 
emotion  the  words  that,  were  wired  by  Lawton — mes- 
sages flashing  from  his  brain  like  the  lightning  from  the 
clouds.  The  hardest  work,  the  most  dangerous  that  fell 


History  of  War  Written  on  the  Field.  305 

to  the  lot  of  Americans,  in  clearing  the  jungles  of  the 
Filipino  swarms,  crouching  in  ambuscades  armed  with 
long-range  rifles,  was  that  of  the  scouts;  and  Lawton’s 
appreciation  of  a brave  man’s  devotion  was  instanta- 
neous. He  was  not  only  brave,  but  generous.  He  con- 
ducted an  expedition  in  the  provinces  of  Bulacan,  Nueva 
Ecija,  and  Pampamga,  covering  the  period  April  21  to 
May  30,  1899. 

The  object  was  to  operate  in  the  country  north  of 
Manila,  between  the  mountains  on  the  east  and  the  Rio 
Grande  de  Pampamga  on  the  west,  with  San  Miguel 
as  the  first  objective.  His  chief  of  scouts  was  wounded; 
and  here  in  telegrams  is  one  hero’s  history  of  a hero, 
written  unconsciously  as  he  breathed,  and  not  a line  of 
it  can  be  spared : 

“In  the  Field,  Angat,  Luzon,  April  30,  1899. 
“Chief  Quartermaster  of  the  Division: 

“Sir, — The  major-general  commanding  directs  that 
you  employ  William  PI.  Young  as  a guide  and  scout 
during  this  expedition  at  the  usual  compensation. 

“Very  respectfully, 

“CLARENCE  R.  EDWARDS, 

“Assistant  Adjutant-General.” 

“Baliuag,  May  13,  1899. 
“Colonel  Summers,  San  Ildefonso : • 

“Mr.  Young,  chief  of  scouts,  is  reported  wounded. 
He  is  a brave,  gallant  man,  and  I desire  everything  pos- 
sible be  done  for  his  -welfare  and  comfort. 

“LAWTON, 

“Major-General  Volunteers.” 


20 


3o6  History  of  War  Written  on  the  Field. 

'‘Hdqrs.  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps, 

“In  the  Field,  Baliuag,  May  13,  1899. 
“Major  Crosby,  First  Reserve  Hospital,  Manila : 

“Mr.  Young,  chief  of  scouts,  my  command,  seriously 
wounded  yesterday.  Send  to  your  hospital  this  A.  M. 
He  is  a man  of  unusual  courage  and  character.  He  has 
been  very  valuable  to  me,  and  yesterday  successfully  led 
a most  desperate  charge  against  odds  of  more  than  ten 
to  one.  As  a personal  favor,  I ask  every  possible  con- 
sideration for  him.  LAWTON,  Major-General.” 

“Hdqrs.  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps, 

“In  the  Field,  Baliuag,  May  14,  1899. 
“Adjutant  General  Department  of  the  Pacific: 

'“Mr.  Young,  chief  of  scouts,  was  seriously  wounded 
while  leading  his  men  in  a desperate  but  successful 
charge  against  odds  of  more  than  ten  to  one.  Mr.  Young 
is  a man  of  intelligence,  unusual  courage,  and  character. 
He  has  been  valuable  to  me,  and  his  example  has  been 
inestimable.  As  a personal  favor,  I solicit  the  general’s 
interest  in  his  case.  His  wound  will  doubtless  result  in 
permanent  disability.  I would  be  glad  if  he  could  be 
given  a commission  in  the  volunteers  to  date  from  yes- 
terday. LAWTON,  Major-General  Volunteers.”' 

“Hdqrs.  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps, 

“In  the  Field,  Baliuag,  May  14,  1899. 
“Dear  Major  Crosby: 

“We  are  sending  you  to-day  Mr.  W.  H.  Young, 
chief  of  our  scouts,  wounded  yesterday  in  capture  San 
Miguel,  one  of  the  bravest  and  most  gallant  men  sol- 
diers ever  knew.  General  Lawton  directed  me  to  write 


History  of  War  Written  on  the  Field.  307 

a personal  note,  and  beg  of  you,  as  a personal  favor  to 
him,  that  you  would  show  this  man  every  attention  that 
could  be  given  the  most  deserving  of  ‘ours/  We  do 
hope  his  leg  can  be  saved. 

“Sincerely  yours, 

“CLARENCE  R.  EDWARDS.’^ 
“[Telegram.] 

“Palace,  Manila,  May  14,  1899. 

“General  Lawton : 

“Telegraph  fully  about  Mr.  Young — age,  national- 
ity, former  occupation.  How  long  known  to  you; 
where  you  found  him,  and  how  you  came  to  hire  him. 
Also  what  compensation  he  is  receiving,  and  what  force 
of  scouts  he  has  charge  of,  and  status  of  scouts. 

“By  command  Major-General  Otis: 

“BARRY,  Assistant  Adjutant-General.’’ 

“Hdqrs.  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps, 

“In  the  Field,  Baliuag,  May  14,  1899. 
“Major  Crosby,  First  Reserve  Hospital: 

“Kindly  elicit  and  wire  me  following  information 
concerning  Mr.  Young,  chief  scout,  sent  in  wounded  to 
you  this  morning:  Age,  nationality,  former  occupation. 
“LAWTON,  Major-General  Volunteers.” 

“[Telegram.] 

“First  Reserve  Hospital,  May  14,  1899. 
“General  Lawton : 

“Young’s  age,  forty-one;  nationality,  American; 
former  occupation,  miner.  He  will  probably  not  lose 
his  leg,  but  have  a stiff  knee.  CROSBY,  Major,” 


3o8  History  of  War  Written  on  the  Field. 

‘'[Telegram.] 

“Hdqrs.  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps, 

“In  the  Field,  Baliuag,  May  14,  1899 — 9 P- 
Adjutant-General  Department  Pacific : 

“Mr.  Young  now  in  First  Reserve  Hospital.  Age, 
forty-one;  nationality,  American;  Vermont;  former  oc- 
cupation, miner;  was  with  North  Dakota  regiment.  At- 
tention called  to  him  by  hearing  of  his  exploits  scouting 
with  parties  sent  out  whenever  chance  offered.  Saw  him 
first  day  of  reconnoissance  toward  San  Rafael.  He  was 
in  advance  of  flankers.  Ordered  him  called  in.  In- 
tended to  send  him  to  rear  of  column.  His  appearance 
and  explanation  pleased  me.  I wished  information  con- 
cerning country,  and  asked  him  to  go  forward  and  cap- 
ture a citizen  and  bring  him  to  me.  Five  minutes  later 
he  returned  with  rifle  and  bag  of  ammunition,  having 
found  enemy’s  picket,  killed  one  and  brought  back  his 
arms;  also  developed  fact  that  enemy  was  close  to  our 
front,  as  we  found.  Prevented  our  running  on  to  them 
unprepared.  Sent  for  him  next  day;  talked  with  and 
satisfied  myself  as  to  his  qualifications.  Informed  him 
I desired  his  services,  and  would  employ  him  as  scout 
and  guide.  Said  he  would  be  glad  to  serve,  but  did  not 
care  particularly  for  pay.  He,  however,  accepted  em- 
ployment; no  rate  fixed.  He  was  to  receive  the  cus- 
tomary salary,  which  was  not  known  to  me.  He  was 
permitted  to  select  twenty-five  men  whom  he  knew  to 
be  good,  cool-headed  men  of  courage,  and  they  were 
detailed  as  scouts  and  served  under  his  leadership.  The 
result  was  most  satisfactory;  their  work  has  been  in- 
valuable. They  fell  naturally  under  the  influence  of 
Mr.  Young,  as  he  is  a natural  leader,  cool,  deliberate, 


History  of  War  Written  on  the  Field,  309 

and  even  tempered.  They  have  all  become  much  at- 
tached to  him.  Eight  of  them  volunteered  to  escort 
him  from  San  Miguel  to  this  place  last  night,  arriving  at 
midnight.  Mr.  Young  has  won  the  respect  of  all  offi- 
cers and  men.  He  with  his  detachment  went  out  from 
this  place  to  seek  the  enemy’s  storehouses.  Were  gone 
four  days  without  rations.  Lived  on  the  country.  Dr. 
Crosby  telegraphs  me  he  will  not  lose  his  leg,  but  will 
have  a stiff  joint.  When  he  recovers  I will  be  glad  to 
have  him  again,  and  if  we  have  guerrilla  warfare  he  will 
be  very  useful,  but  will  probably  be  obliged  to  go 
mounted.  He  could  undoubtedly  enlist  company  of 
scouts  from  mustered-out  volunteers. 

^‘LAWTON,  Major-General.” 

''[Telegram.] 

"Hdqrs.  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps, 

"In  the  Field,  San  Miguel,  May  16,  1899. 
"W.  H.  Young, 

"Chief  of  Scouts,  First  Reserve  Hospital,  Manila: 

"Harrington  killed  to-day  at  the  head  of  the  scouts, 
doing  his  duty  like  the  brave  and  noble  soldier  he  was. 
I hope  you  are  getting  along  well. 

"LAWTON,  Major-General  Volunteers.” 

Not  only  is  there  nothing  to  spare  in  this,  but  noth- 
ing to  add,  except  to  say  the  scout  got  well  and  con- 
tinued to  distinguish  himself. 

At  this  time  Aguinaldo  was  reported  by  insurgents 
located  at  San  Isidro  in  Malolos,  and  May  17th  at 
Cabanatuam,  eighteen  miles  north,  and  that  the  Govern- 
ment was  at  Tarlac. 


310  History  of  War  Written  on  the  Field. 


On  May  19th  the  following  orders  were  published: 

'‘General  Field  Orders, 

"No.  10. 

"Hdqrs.  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps, 

"In  the  Field,  San  Isidro,  Luzon,  May  19,  1899. 

"The  following' telegram  received  from  corps  head- 
quarters is  published  for  the  information  of  this  com- 
mand : 

" 'The  Palace,  Manila,  May  19,  1899. 

" ‘To  General  Lawton : 

" ‘The  following  has  just  been  received,  and  will  be 
published  to  your  command. 

"‘By  command  of  Major-General  Otis: 

" ‘BARRY.^ 

" ‘Hot  Springs,  Va.,  May  18,  1899. 

" ‘Otis,  Manila : 

" ‘Convey  to  General  Lawton  and  the  gallant  men  of 
his  command  my  congratulations  upon  their  successful 
operations  during  the  past  month,  resulting  in  the  cap- 
ture this  morning  of  San  Isidro.  ' “ 

" ‘WILLIAM  McKinley.’ 

"The  above  will  be  read  to  the  several  organizations 
composing  this  division  at  retreat  on  the  day  it  is  re- 
ceived. 

"By  command  of  Major-General  Lawton : 

"CLARENCE  R.  EDWARDS, 
"Assistant  Adj utant-General. ’ ’ 


History  of  War  Written  on  the  Field.  311 

(Appendix,  p.  256.) 

For  the  movement  from  San  Isidro  the  following 
was  issued : 

“Hdqrs.  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps, 

‘‘In  the  Field,  San  Isidro,  Luzon,  May  19,  1899. 
“Circular. 

“Unless  orders  to  the  contrary  are  received,  this 
command  will  march  at  five  o’clock  A.  M.  to-morrow, 
the  20th  instant. 

“By  command  of  Major-General  Lawton: 

“CLARENCE  R.  EDWARDS, 
“Assistant  Adjutant-General.” 

The  riches  of  the  country  fought  over  appear  here : 

“In  the  Field,  Baliuag,  May  4,  1899. 
“Adjutant-General  Department  of  the  Pacific : 

“Examination  of  thirty-seven  storehouses  gives  by 
conservative  estimate  over  one  hundred  thousand  bush- 
els of  rice  and  one  hundred  and  sixty  tons  of  sugar 
stored  in  them.  About  seven  storehouses  not  examined. 
To  burn  them  would  be  to  burn  the  town;  besides  they 
are  mostly  fireproof,  being  of  stone  with  iron  roofs.  In- 
structions requested. 

“LAWTON,  Major-General  Volunteers.” 

“The  Palace,  May  5,  1899. 

“General  Lawton : 

“Regarding  stores  of  sugar  and  rice  at  Baliuag  re- 
ported by  you,  it  is  evident  that  they  are  insurgent  war 
supplies,  and  must  be  confiscated.  Unless  you  can  as- 


312  History  of  War  Written  on  the  Field. 

certain  that  a portion  of  these  supplies  are  private  stores, 
all  should  be  destroyed,  although  it  might  be  well  to 
distribute  them  as  far  as  possible  to  families  residing 
there  and  in  vicinity  who  desire  to  receive  them.  Take 
the  whole  matter  under  further  consideration  before  pro- 
ceeding to  final  action. 

‘‘By  command  of  Major-General  Otis: 

“BARRY,  x\ssistant  Adjutant-General.'' 

This  is  Lawton's  official  report : 

“Large  quantities  of  rice  and  sugar  were  found  in 
Baliuag,  much  of  it  in  storehouses  said  to  belong  to  the 
enemy.  A conservative  estimate  of  the  contents  of 
storehouses  not  manifestly  private  was  no  less  than  one 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  bushels  of  rice  and  two  hun- 
dred and  sixty-five  tons  of  sugar,  which,  with  the  quan- 
tities not  included,  but  none  the  less  available,  would 
undoubtedly  be  sufficient  to  subsist  all  troops  of  the 
enemy  for  at  least  six  months.  A large  storehouse  of 
the  tax  collector  was  opened,  and  the  contents  issued 
to  the  natives,  who  claimed  to  have  been  robbed  of  their 
rice  by  the  insurgents,  and  were  now  in  a famishing  con- 
dition. Under  the  careful  supervision  of  the  provost 
marshal  this  distribution  was  continued  at  the  sugges- 
tion of  the  department  commander  to  families  residing 
at  Baliuag  and  vicinity." 

Much  annoyance  was  caused  by  the  Chinese  coolies, 
furnished  by  the  quartermaster  department  as  litter- 
bearers  and  laborers,  wandering  from  the  organizations 
to  which  they  were  attached  and  committing  many 
minor  depredations,  necessitating  the  issue  of  the  fol- 
lowing : 


History  of  War  Written  on  the  Field.  313 

“General  Field  Orders, 

“No.  7. 

“Hdqrs.  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps, 

“In  the  Field,  Baliuag,  May  4,  1899. 

“Hereafter  each  Chinese  cooly  with  this  command 
will  be  required  to  wear  upon  his  hat,  or  other  conspic- 
uous part  of  his  clothing,  a tag  which  will  be  legibly 
marked  in  English  the  name  of  the  organization  to 
which  the  wearer  is  assigned  or  belongs. 

“Commencing  to-morrow,  the  5th  instant,  all  such 
camp  followers  found  without  the  identification  tag 
above  required  will  be  arrested  and  turned  over  to  the 
provost  guard. 

“No  cooly  wearing  such  an  identification  tag  will  be 
required  to  perform  labor  for  individuals  or  organiza- 
tions than  that  to  which  he  is  assigned  or  belongs,  and 
no  unauthorized  person  will,  in  any  way,  interfere  with 
any  Chinaman  not  misconducting  himself. 

“Commanding  officers  of  organizations  are  charged 
with  the  prompt  execution  of  the  above  orders,  and  will 
be  held  strictly  accountable  for  the  conduct  of  the  coolies 
assigned  or  belonging  to  their  respective  commands. 

“By  command  of  Major-General  Lawton: 

“CLARENCE  R.  EDWARDS, 
“Assistant  Adjutant-General.” 

“General  Lawton : '*99- 

“The  troops  sent  you  to  San  Miguel  took  march  for 
Baliuag  this  rqorning.  Near  Ildefonso  attacked  by  in- 
surgents, whom  they  drove  a mile  beyond  the  • city. 


314  History  of  War  Written  on  the  Field. 

Known  insurgent  loss:  eight  killed,  six  wounded;  nine 
guns,  and  one  horse.  Our  casualties : two  men 
wounded.  Troops  now  resting  at  Ildefonso.  Expect 
to  continue  march  soon.  BARRY.” 

‘‘San  Fernando,  Alay  26,  1899. 

“General  Lawton: 

“Sorry  you  can  not  come  up.  Try  to  come  before 
you  go  to  the  city.  Can’t  look  after  Baliuag  end  of  line 
just  now.  All  I can  attend  to  here.  Three  fights  in 
three  days,  and  more  coming.  Recommended  three 
days  ago  a general  officer  to  command  that  part  of  line 
with  headquarters  at  Malolos;  no  action  yet  upon  recom- 
mendation, which  I have  renewed  to-day.  In  the  mean- 
time, until  such  an  arrangement  is  made,  I have  asked 
department  headquarters  to  look  out  for  safety  of  Bali- 
uag, which  seems  to  me  very  much  exposed. 

“MacARTHUR.” 


“Malolos,  May  27,  1899. 

“General  MacArthur: 

“Will  make  another  effort  to  see  you  to-day. 

“LAWTON,  Major-General.” 

“In  Field,  Malolos,  May  26,  1899. 

“Commanding  Officer,  Baliuag: 

“Direct  companies  to  proceed  with  great  caution. 
Be  careful  not  to  be  drawn  into  ambush,  nor  to  proceed 
so  far  that  they  can  not  return  this  evening. 

“LAWTON,  Major-General  Commanding.” 


History  of  War  Written  on  the  Field.  315 


“Captain  Walcutt: 

“Message  received;  mules  very  soft;  hard  to  make 
pack-mules  stand  up;  will  try  to  get  train  out  within 
half  an  hour;  have  to  leave  some  of  the  rations.” 

“Both  signed  ‘Devol,  Quartermaster.’ 

“This  seems  to  be  the  condition  at  this  hour,  and  is 
not  very  encouraging. 

“LAWTON,  Major-General.” 

“Hdqrs.  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps, 

“In  the  Field,  Baliuag,  May  5,  1899. 

“All  persons  are  forbidden  to  in  any  way  interfere 
with  bearer,  an  aged  servant  of  Sehor  Gonzales,  of  this 
town,  so  long  as  he  remains  on  his  master’s  premises. 
The  pony  he  has  in  charge,  as  well  as  the  stores  on  the 
premises,  are  not  to  be  removed  except  by  order  from 
these  headquarters. 

“By  command  of  Major-General  Lawton : 

“CLARENCE  R.  EDWARDS, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General.” 

^ “Cross  Roads,  May  17,  1899. 

“Adjutant-General  First  Division: 

“Men  are  pretty  tired  from  yesterday,  but  are  good 
for  a short  march  still.  Good  water  at  former  telegraph 
station,  two  and  one-half  miles.  HANNAY.” 

“[Telegram.]  . 

“Cross  Roads,  May  17,  1899. 
“Adjutant-General  First  Division: 

“Will  stop  to  get  water  about  fifteen  minutes. 

“HANNAY.” 


3i6  History  of  War  Written  on  the  I^ield. 

''[Telegram.] 

"Malolos,  May  25,  1899. 
"Adjutant-General  Eighth  Army  Corps,  Palace: 

“I  understand  that  a train  is  on  the  way  out  here 
with  forage.  We  have  none.  Need  some  badly.  Re- 
quest authority  to  take  some  from  train  as  it  goes 
through.  LAWTON,  Major-General  Volunteers.’' 

"[Telegram.] 

"Hdqrs.  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps. 
“Major  Devol:  “May  25,  1899. 

'‘We  are  camped  here,  and  can’t  get  any  distilled 
water.  W on’t  you  please  have  a couple  of  cans  sent  out 
on  next  train  for  General  Lawton,  with  orders  to  give 
it  to  no  one  else? 

"EDWARDS,  Assistant  Adjutant-General.” 

"[Telegram.] 

"Hdqrs.  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps. 

"In  the  Field,  Baliuag,  May  13,  1899. 
"Captain  Case,  Ildefonso: 

"The  General  desires  you  and  Birkhimer  to  pick 
three  or  four  nice  houses  for  our  headquarters.  He 
wishes  a careful  provost  of  the  town,  and  that  the  citi- 
zens shall  not  be  disturbed  nor  their  property  confis- 
cated nor  injured.  If  he  receives  no  orders  to  the  con- 
trary, he  will  move  his  headquarters  to  San  Miguel 
to-morrow  morning. 

"He  congratulates  you,  Captain  Birkhimer,  and  the 
other  officers  and  men  engaged  in  the  morning's  splen- 
did work. 


History  of  War  Written  on  the  Field.  317 

“The  General  much  regrets  Young’s  injury.  Do 
everything  you  can.  Telegraph  line  should  be  rushed 
to  San  Miguel. 

“EDWARDS,  Adjutant-General.” 

“Quingua,  May  5,  1899. 
“Adjutant-General  First  Division : 

“I  recommend  upper  ford  one-half  mile  above  here. 
Water  is  four  inches  deep  in  ambulance  bed,  and  is 
falling  one-half  inch  per  hour.  Have  sent  detail  for 
large  banca,  and  telegraphed  Walcutt  for  rope  and 
pulley  blocks  to  be  used  if  river  rises.  Current  is  easy 
and  approaches  fair;  bottom  good.  Have  you  any  fur- 
ther instructions  for  me  here? 

“CASE,  Acting  Engineer.” 

“[Pass.] 

“Hdqrs.  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps. 

“In  the  Field,  Baliuag,  May  5,  1899. 

“Let  the  bearer,  a native,  pass  out  of  our  lines  to-day 
only  to  bring  his  family. 

“CLARENCE  R.  EDWARDS, 

“Assistant  Adjutant-General.”- 

“Hdqrs.  First  Division,  Eighth  Army  Corps. 

“In  the  Field,  San  Isidro,  May  17,  1899. 

“Captain  Hannay,  Cross  Roads: 

“When  did  you  arrive?  What  is  condition  of  your 
men?  Is  there  any  good  water  in  your  vicinity?  Desire 
you  to  rest  until  three  or  four  o’clock. 

“LAWTON,  Major-Gieneral  Commanding.” 


3i8  History  of  War  Written  on  the  Field. 


‘'[Telegram.] 

“San  ]\Iiguel,  May  19,  1899. 
“Adjutant-General  First  Division: 

“Just  arrived.  Slow  progress  due  to  ponies  being 
hot.  Have  pony  carriages  here,  but  will  have  to  take 
ambulance  to  Baliuag.  Expect  to  go  faster  from  now 
on.  Everything  all  right.  “KING,  Aide.” 

“San  Miguel,  May  14,  1899. 
“(Received  at  Baliuag,  8.16  A.  M.) 
“Adjutant- General  First  Division: 

“Am  interviewing  native  residents  for  information 
regarding  roads,  etc.  Aguinaldo  reported  in  hiding. 
Sentiment  of  natives  seems  friendly.  Xo  news  of  Pio 
del  Pilar  and  his  four  thousand.  EveiA’thing  quiet  here. 
“CASE,  Captain,  Acting  Engineer  Officer.” 

“[Telegram.] 

“Opposite  Candaba,  P.  I.,  on  Rio  Grande  la  Pampanga, 

May  23,  1899. 

“Assistant  Adjutant-General,  First  Division,  Eighth 
Army  Corps,  in  the  Field: 

“I  have  the  honor  to  report  as  follows:  At  the 
trenches  bordering  the  stream  where  we  had  an  engage- 
ment with  the  enemy,  where  bridge  was  partially  burned, 
just  south  of  San  Isidro,  I was  attracted  by  the  unusual 
appearance  of  a dead  Filipino.  This  caused  me  to  ex- 
amine in  a careful  manner  his  physique  and  clothing. 
The  latter  would  class  him  as  an  officer.  He  was  attired 
with  scrupulous  neatness;  the  hose,  shoes,  and  clothing 
generally  indicated  one  in  an  officer's  station.  I then 


History  of  War  Written  on  the  Field.  319 

scrutinized  his  features,  and  was  surprised  to  find  them 
of  a perfect  Spanish  type,  of  which  I have  seen  no  better 
among  the  Spanish  officers  at  Manila,  and  precisely  of 
their  style.  I will  only  add  that  I took  some  precautions 
during  this  examination  as  to  preclude  mistake  regard- 
ing points  I have  mentioned.  Press  of  other  matters  ^ 
momentarily  arising,  as  well  as  failure  at  first  to  appre- 
ciate the  possible  importance  of  this  incident,  have  de- 
layed my  mentioning  the  matter  before. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

‘‘W.  E.  BIRKHIMER, 
''Captain  Third  Artilley,  Judge-Advocate.” 

"San  Isidro  Road,  May  16,  1899. 
"Adjutant-General  First  Division: 

"Have  moved  two  miles.  Troops  resting  a few  min- 
utes. The  roads  are  getting  worse,  and  a little  rain 
would  make  them  absolutely  impassable  for  wheeled 
vehicles.  No  enemy  visible.  The  insurgent  telegraph 
line  completely  demolished.  McKENNA.” 

This  from  General  MacArthur  was  a cheery  good- 
night from  him  to  Lawton,  when  there  was  to  be  music 
very  early  in  the  morning: 

"My  own  arrangements  are  all  ready  to  commence 
operations  to-morrow,  and  expect  to  be  fully  engaged 
4.30  A.  M.  If  you  are  at  San  Jose  you  may  hear  some 
of  the  noise.  Good  luck  and  hearty  good  wishes  for  the 
best  success  in  every  direction.” 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

HIDE-AND-SEEK  OF  AGUINALDO. 


Increase  of  His  Fury  as  Fortune  Faded — The  Pursuit 
of  Him  was  Swift  and  Fierce,  and  His  Flight  Adroit 
and  Furtive — Mac  Arthur  Reports  Eighteen  Boxes 
of  Records  in  One  Capture — The  Rehearsal  in  the 
Mountains  by  Funston  of  His  Capture  of  Agui- 
naldo — How  He  Happened  to  Know  the  Country 
so  Well. 


HE  pursuit  of  Aguinaldo,  when  he  realized  that 


1 flight,  and'not  fighting,  must  be  his  occupation  and 
that  of  his  followers,  was  interesting  as  a fox-hunt.  He 
probably  owed  his  escape  from  the  columns  that  surged 
around  him  to  the  stratagem  of  circulating  reports  as 
to  his  presence  that  were  calculated  to  mislead.  There 
was  no  apparent  lack  of  intelligence  about  him — there 
was  too  much.  At  one  place,  however,  he  and  his  escort 
were  seen,  hatless,  covered  with  mud,  with  horses  in  the 
last  stages  of  dilapidation,  November  22,  1899.  Young 
occupied  Aringay  on  19th  instant,  which  place  it  was 
reported  Aguinaldo  and  two  hundred  followers  had  quit 
on  the  17th,  heading  for  Bayonbong.  Young,  with 
three  hundred  Maccabebes,  was  pursuing  him,  and  Cast- 
ner’s  scouts,  northeast  from  San  Nicolas,  endeavoring 
to  cut  off  movement  east.* 

* Colonel  Mallory,  with  Colonel  Fiebeger,  a professor  at  West 
Point,  called  on  Aguinaldo  at  his  private  residence  in  Manila,  April 
2ist,  and  he  said: 

“I  was  often  very  close  to  the  Americans.  I expected  to  make 


Hide-and-Seek  of  Aguinaldo.  321 

The  American  soldiers,  officers  and  enlisted  men,  all 
grades  from  commanding  generals  to  the  privates,  have 
not  had  the  credit^  in  military  history  or  the  general 
comprehension  of  the  people  they  deserve,  for  the 
strenuous  and  well-directed  efforts,  after  the  insurgent 
armies  were  stricken  and  driven  with  great  losses,  until 
broken  up,  to  do  the  work  with  strong  columns  at  last 
performed  by  a company  of  Maccabebes  and  five  Amer- 
icans, including  General  Funston — the  capture  of  Agui- 
naldo. The  destruction  of  the  enemy  was  so  thorough 
that  most  of  the  individuals  deserted  their  organizations, 
and  made  way  to  their  homes,  where  they  mingled  with 
the  friendly  inhabitants  who  greeted  our  troops  as 
amigos.  Aguinaldo  had  nearly  ten  thousand  men  that 
he  called  the  Army  of  the  North,  where  he  had  expecta- 


my  greatest  stand  at  Calumpit.  When  I abandoned  Tarlac,  I com- 
manded fifteen  hundred  riflemen.  I anticipated  General  Wheaton’s 
landing  at  San  Fabian.  I planned  to  retreat  to  Nueva  Vizcaya,  but 
was  frustrated  by  the  brave  General  Lawton.  I slipped  through  the 
cordon  with  two  hundred  and  fifty  men  only  four  hours  before  the 
landing  party  came  ashore.” 

In  response  to  a question  concerning  his  opinion  of  the  Ameri- 
can troops,  he  said : 

“How  terrible  are  the  Americans!  They  are  splendid  and  fero- 
cious fighters.  I no  sooner  built  arsenals  and  barracks  than  they 
destroyed  them.  Colonel  March  chased  me  in  the  most  lively  man- 
ner for  two  months  in  the  western  mountains  until  I worked  east- 
ward with  thirty  horses  and  eighty  men.  I crossed  to  Cagayan, 
and  lived  on  the  east  coast  for  eight  months.  My  outposts  often 
saw  the  Americans,  but  I did  not  participate  in  a single  engage- 
ment, though  I once  commanded  40,000  riflemen.  The  watchful- 
ness of  the  army  and  navy  practically  destroyed  filibustering  to 
Luzon. 

“I  do  not  desire  to  discuss  insular  politics.  I am  undecided  as 
to  my  future  plans.  I believe  that  the  Federals  will  be  strong  agents 
in  the  pacification  of  the  Archipelago.” 

21 


322  Hide-and-Seek  of  Aguinaldo. 

tions  of  preventing  the  advance  of  the  United  States 
troops.  The  Northern  insurgent  force  was  smashed  in 
action,  and  lost  all  their  artillery  supplies.  The  extent 
to  which  the  enemy  were  disarmed  appears  in  a telegram 
from  General  MacArthur,  dated  Bautista,  December  ii, 
1899: 

“The  property  captured  at  Mangatai'em  and  vicinity 
has  been  delivered  at  this  point.  It  consists  of  seventeen 
cannon,  one  hundred  small  arms,  a quantity  of  tools 
from  the  arsenal,  some  eighteen  boxes  of  records,  post- 
age and  other  stamps,  making  altogether  several  tons. 
I propose  to  retain  it  here  under  guard  until  the  railroad 
is  open  through  to  Manila.” 

Uawton  was  a formidable  leader,  fearless  in  floods 
as  under  fire.  He  telegraphed  in  the  height  of  the  chase 
from  the  West  Agno  River:  ‘T  have  been  water-bound 
here  for  two  days,  streams  both  sides  of  me  being  un- 
fordable;  it  distresses  me  to  report  the  death  by  drown- 
ing of  Lieutenant  Luna,  Thirty-fourth  Infantry,  who 
was  my  acting  aide,  while  following  me  through  Agno 
River,  three  P.  M.,  15th  instant;  also  two  men  of  my 
escort,  as  follows:  Privates  Holter  and  Bass,  Troop  I, 
Fourth  Cavalry;  it  has  rained  almost  constantly  since 
leaving  San  Isidro,  and  I must  again  recur  to  thejorti- 
tude,  courage,  endurance,  and  cheerfulness  of  the  whole 
command;”  and  made  his  contribution  to  the  cheery 
conditions  in  this  form:  “Were  it  not  for  enemy’s  stores 
we  would  be  in  desperate  straits.  As  it  is,  we  are  wet, 
filthy,  and  cheerful.  We  are  fearfully  strung  out,  but 
the  enemy  seems  demoralized,  and  I have  no  serious 
misgivings.  The  wind  shifted  to  the  west  this  A.  M., 


Hide-and-Seek  of  Aguinaldo.  323 

and  I hope  the  rain  will  cease.  Two  days  good  weather, 
and  we  will  be  on  our  feet.” 

There  is  no  art  of  descriptive  writing  that  conveys 
as  many  true  pictures  of  the  scenes  and  struggles  of 
active  military  service  as  the  short,  sharp,  vivid  busi- 
ness telegrams  of  the  officers  who  are  on  the  fire-lines 
and  absorbed  in  duties — this  for  example: 

‘Taterno  left  Tarlac  with  insurgent  treasury  8th  in- 
stant; Buencamino  and  Aguinaldo  on  night  13th.  Bu- 
encamino  now  here.  He  says  Aguinaldo  started  out 
with  two  thousand  men  from  Dagupan  and  Bayambang, 
but  only  got  through  with  small  party.  It  is  not  thought 
that  he  can  cross  to  Bayonbong.  Certainly  he  can  not 
do  it  with  his  transportation.” 

Chief  of  Staff  telegraphed  Lawton,  November  26th: 

“The  report  that  I wired  you  that  Aguinaldo  left 
Bayambang  going  westward  is  now  known  to  be  er- 
roneous.” 

Lawton  wired  from  road  beyond  San  Jose,  Novem- 
ber 14th: 

“Leave  all  transportation  here.  Half  of  it  is  now 
at  San  Jose  under  Lieutenant  Ripley.  The  insurgents 
are  reported  strongly  intrenched  at  Binalonan  with  one 
thousand  men.  No  bridges.  I leave  First  Sergeant 
Mancy  in  charge  with  one  company  and  sick.  I need 
rations  and  ammunition,  but  I shall  not  stop  on  that 
account.  I am  liable  to  run  against  Aguinaldo’s  army, 
and  would  like  Sergeant  Mancy’s  company  sent  to  me 
as  soon  as  it  can  be  done,  also  such  other  re-enforce- 
ments  as  you  can  spare  me.  (Signed,)  Ballance. 

“LAWTON,  Major-General.” 


324  Hide-and-Seek  of  Aguinaldo. 

“San  Fabian,  November  27,  1899. 
“General  Schwan,  Manila: 

“To  prevent  the  murder  of  Aguinaldo’s  mother  and 
his  little  son  by  the  natives  about  Cabaruan,  I have 
brought  them  here,  and  placed  them  in  the  care  of  the 
padre  at  San  Fabian. 

“WHEATON,  Brigadier-General.” 

“Manila,  November  27,  1899. 
“General  Wheaton,  San  Fabian : 

“The  mother  and  son  of  Aguinaldo  are  to  be  sent  to 
Manila  under  proper  care  by  first  available  steamship. 
Report  their  departure  by  telegraph. 

“SCHWAN,  Chief  of  Staff.” 

“In  Field,  Tayug,  November  24,  1899. 
“Chief  of  Staff,  Manila: 

“There  appears  to  be  no  organized  force  of  insur- 
gents east  of  the  railroad  south  of  the  mountains  and 
north  of  San  Isidro.  It  is  evident  that  the  property  of 
the  insurgent  Government  went  over  the  trail  from  San 
Nicholas;  that  some  troops  passed  that  way;  also  that 
it  was  the  rear  end  of  the  train  that  was  captured  by 
Young;  that  Aguinaldo  intended  to  pass  by  this  road, 
but  that  he  was  cut  off  by  Young.  Many  of  the  in- 
surgents are  returning  individually.  The  people  of  this 
country  are  disaffected  toward  Aguinaldo,  and  there  is 
little  trouble  in  securing  information  and  assistance.  I 
do  not  think  the  insurgents  can  .remain  north  of  the 
mountains.  We  can  now  more  readily  distinguish  them 
from  the  natives,  who  will  not  conceal  them. 

“LAWTON,  Major-General.” 


Hide-and-Seek  of  Aguinaldo.  325 

Lawton,  Nov.  24th,  wired  headquarters  at  Manila: 

“I  hope  the  information  wired  me  concerning  Agui- 
naldo’s  whereabouts  is  correct,  but  doubt  it.  (The  in- 
formation was  that  Aguinaldo  was  south  of  Manila. 
Lawton  was  right,  the  fugitive  had  fled  north.)  There 
is  no  information  that  he  came  to  Tayug,  although  he 
doubtless  started  for  this  place,  and  his  property  and 
baggage  came  here  and  was  captured.  There  is  infor- 
mation that  Aguinaldo  was  in  Urdaneta,  and  that  his 
wife  was  at  Asingan,  where  she  spent  the  night.  I was 
shown  the  house  in  which  she  slept.  Cut  off  from 
Tayug,  Aguinaldo  passed  through  Binalonan  to  Pozor- 
rubio,  where  he  spent  the  night  of  the  14th,  passing 
north  via  Alava,  as  has  before  been  explained.  I was 
skeptical  of  all  this  information  until  I heard  the  state- 
ment of  Senor  Luis  Perez  from  his  own  lips,  that  Agui- 
naldo was  in  Pozorrubio  on  the  night  of  the  14th.  There 
are  other  items  of  corroboration  too  long  to  explain. 
Still,  it  may  have  been  prearranged  deception.  Agui- 
naldo, with  plunder,  reported  to  have  left  Tarlac  No- 
vember 1st  for  Bayonbong.  Now  time  for  your  column 
to  move  up  railway  with  celerity.” 

General  Otis  explains  this  in  these  words : 

^'General  MacArthur  was  poorly  provided  with  trans- 
portation at  this  time — a large  part  of  his  wagon-train, 
which  he  had  placed  in  good  condition,  having  been  sent 
to  General  Lawton  under  an  emergency.” 

Lawton  telegraphed: 

“On  Road  beyond  San  Jose,  November  14,  1899. 
“Chief  of  Staff,  Manila: 

“I  am  pressing  on  to  join  Young  as  fast  as  possible. 
Roads  are  impassable  for  teams  or  carts,  and  it  is  useless 


326  Hide-and-Seek  of  Aguinaldo. 

to  think  of  getting  them  through  in  time.  I will  push 
three  troops  of  cavalry  through  to-night,  if  possible. 
Everything  behind  will  be  forced  along  as  fast  as  pos- 
sible.” 

' MacArthur  in  the  last  stages  of  the  war,  reporting 
one  of  Bell’s  fine  dashes,  referred  to  insurgent  generals 
running  away  with  not  more  than  a dozen  men  each, 
and  “Officers  as  well  as  soldiers  are  reported  as  dis- 
gusted at  the  continuation  of  the  war.  The  generals  are, 
however,  trying  to  carry  out  the  Aguinaldo  policy,  and 
are  making  a desperate  effort  to  hold  their  men  a little 
longer,  and  are  shooting  officers  who  tender  their  resig- 
nations. This  action  has  terrified  many.” 

The  inhabitants  who  gave  any  information  about  in- 
surgent forces  were  treated  with  severity,  often  killed 
on  the  spot;  and  any  answer  would  cause  an  appropri- 
ation or  destruction  of  property. 

The  trouble  was  with  the  roads.  A chief  of  staff, 
telegraphed  from  Caranatnan,  November  21,  1899: 

“Erwin  just  returned,  and  reports  roads  utterly  im- 
practicable for  wagons  loaded  as  his  were  with  but  2,200 
pounds.  Told  him  to  reduce  to  1,200,  and  push  on  to 
San  Jose.  Am  pushing  bull-carts  over  now.  We  are 
having  much  trouble  with  ferry,  so  decided  not  to  cross 
our  headquarters  for  fear  of  blocking  the  moving  of 
supplies  on  carts.  Will  cross  first  chance,  but  am  fear- 
ful we  can  not  get  over  till  to-morrow  night.  Roads 
are  frightful.” 

MacArthur  put  his  plan  of  campaign  in  a few  words, 
following  the  railroad. 

“My  purpose  is  to  rush  the  track  at  such  speed  as  to 
prevent  destruction,  and  have  locomotive  with  cars 


Hide-and-Seek  of  Aguinaldo.  3^7 

following  up  on  the  firing-line  with  fifteen  or  twenty 
days’  rations  and  the  necessary  material  for  repairing 
track  which  the  insurgents  destroy  after  I start  to  rush 
them.  To-day  the  reconnoitering  party  went  nearly 
seven  miles  up  the  track,  drove  in  a small  insurgent 
party,  and  heard  locomotives  in  the  town.  They  are  un- 
doubtedly carrying  off  the  stufl’,  but  it  indicates  that  the 
railroad  line  north  of  Gerona  is  still  intact.  My  purpose 
will  be  to  let  them  alone  in  Gerona  for  the  present,  so 
as  to  encourage  them  to  continue  their  service  till  the 
very  last  minute,  and  thus  keep  the  railroad  intact  until 
we  can  make  our  arrangements  to  seize  the  whole  thing 
by  a stroke  of  hand.  The  rails  found  by  Captain  Bell, 
of  the  Thirty-sixth,  yesterday,  number  2,500,  making 
approximately  five  miles  of  track.  The  water  pump  and 
tank  in  the  railroad  yard  is  all  right,  and  there  is  con- 
siderable wood  fuel,  as  there  is  at  several  points  on  line.” 

The  military  maps,  giving  the  movements  of  the 
columns  of  American  invaders  after  the  insurgents  were 
whipped  away  from  Manila,  show  the  thoroughness  of 
the  scouting,  and  that  hard  work  was  not  spared.  The 
traces  of  columns  in  the  provinces  tell  of  the  condition 
described  by  the  Aguinaldo  commands  when  ^‘the  sound 
of  the  American  rifles  was  heard  on  all  sides,  and  there 
was  no  place  to  go !”  The  numbers  of  the  natives  were 
not  taken  into  account,  nor  was  the  equipment  consid- 
ered a serious  matter.  Wherever  the  Americans  found 
detachments  of  armed  men  standing  or  skulking,  they 
charged  and  drove  them.  All  sorts  of  modern  guns 
seemed  to  be  useless  in  the  hands  of  the  Tagalos,  who 
had  often  pretty  good  fighting  stomachs,  but  not  strik- 
ing faculties. 


3^8  Hide-and-Seek  of  Aguinaldo. 

Colonel  Howze,  Thirty-fourth  Regiment  United 
States  Volunteers,  in  his  vigorous  scouting,  said  the 
pluck  of  his  officers  and  men  in  traveling  rapidly  ‘‘over 
impassable  trails  was  remarkable.”  He  added: 

“Inhabitants  here  say  that  it  is  impossible  for  the 
enemy  to  get  through  the  mountains;  but  they  have 
gone  there  and  will  probably  get  through,  as  they  have 
plenty  of  food  for  the  small  command  that  they  have. 
With  all  this  work.  General,  you  can  understand  the 
condition  of  my  command.  Send  me  one  hundred  fresh 
men  with  good  shoes,  or  send  me  shoes  for  my  men, 
and  I ’ll  drive  the  enemy  through  these  mountains.” 

Those  were  the  delectable  mountains  in  which  Agui- 
naldo was  caught.  The  date  of  this  incursion  was  De- 
cember, 1899. 

Insurgents  formerly  maintained  quite  a force  at 
Baler.  It  was  here  that  they  had  captured,  several 
months  before,  a detachment  from  the  U.  S.  S.  York- 
iown,  consisting  of  an  officer  and  several  sailors,  while 
in  a small  launch  it  was  reconnoitering  in  that  vicinity, 
and  it  was  supposed  that  they  retained  there  a few  of 
their  troops.  They  were  still  practicing  guerrilla  war- 
fare west  of  the  mountains  along  the  Bongabong  and 
Pantabangan  road,  and  it  was  necessary  to  send  out  a 
proper  number  of  men  to  successfully  march  to,  capture, 
and  place  a permanent  garrison  at  Baler,  and  have  an 
organization  of  sufficient  strength  to  protect  itself  in 
making  the  return  journey  to  the  place  of  departure. 
The  three  companies  of  the  Thirty-fourth  Infantry  were 
deemed  adequate  for  all  purposes.  General  Funston 
was  directed  to  take  charge  of  and  accompany  the  bat- 
talion, station  two  of  the  companies  at  Baler,  and  to 


Hide-and-Seek  of  Aguinaldo. 


329 


return  to  his  headquarters  at  San  Isidro  with  the  third. 
Supplies  for  the  troops  were  to  be  sent  in  small  coast- 
ing steamer  from  Manila  by  the  water  route  through  the 
Strait  of  San  Bernardino,  thence  north  to  the  Baler 
coast.  The  command  left  San  Isidro  on  February  13th, 
and  Pantabangan  on  the  15th,  expecting  to  reach  the 
objective  point  on  the  19th.  The  vessel  was  sent  from 
Manila  to  arrive  at  Baler  on  the  last-named  date,  and 
the  troops  were  directed  to  communicate  with  it  as  soon 
as  it  should  appear  off  the  coast,  since  it  was  not  con- 
sidered safe  for  it  to  enter  the  harbor  without  assistance 
from  the  shore.  The  expedition  as  planned  was  suc- 
cessful throughout.  The  enemy  had  withdrawn  from 
the  town,  and  no  very  serious  opposition  was  encoun- 
tered on  the  march. 

Following  received  from  Major  March: 

“Cayan,  P.  I.,  December  7,  1899. — General  Young 
or  commanding  officer  at  Candon : I have  destroyed 
Aguinaldo’s  body-guard,  and  killed  General  Gregorio  del 
Pilar.  General  Concepcion  and  staff  have  surrendered 
to  me,  and  will  be  sent  to  the  seacoast.  Five  hundred 
and  seventy-five  Spanish  prisoners,  including  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  friars,  have  been  liberated,  and  the  prov- 
ince of  Lepanto  cleared  of  insurgents.  Aguinaldo  has 
been  driven  to  mountains,  a fugitive  without  a com- 
mand, and  is  making  toward  Bayonbong.  My  loss  is 
two  killed  and  nine  wounded.  Insurgent  loss  in  battle 
of  Tila  Pass,  fifty-two  killed  and  wounded.  (Signed,) 
March,  commanding.” 

“Major  Sirmyer,  Thirty-third  Infantry,  has  just  ar- 
rived from  Dolores.  Colonel  Hare  marched  from  Pidi- 
gan,  via  Pilar  and  Manaba,  to  San  Jose;  captured  vice- 


330  Hide-and-Seek  of  Aguinaldo. 

presidente  of  Bocay  with  three  hundred  dollars  and  let- 
ter to  Aguinaldo  addressed  to  Cayan.  Three  insurgents 
captured  with  arms  and  ammunition  state  that  many 
insurgents  are  escaping;  and  that  they  had  been  without 
food  for  three  days.  Colonel  Hare,  with  one  hundred 
picked  men,  is  on  Howze’s  trail,  leaving  two  hundred 
and  seventy  men  in  Bangued.  He  captured  second  mes- 
senger with  letter  to  Aguinaldo,  which  states  that  they 
would  concentrate  at  Bannajin,  I locos  Norte.  Colonel 
Hare  left  San  Gregorio,  December  9th.  Navy  landed 
force  at  Laoag  to-day,  consisting  of  one  hundred  men, 
also  Captain  Koehler,  Thirty-seventh  Infantry,  with  one 
gun.  Major  Swigert,  with  one  hundred  cavalry,  should 
reach  Batac,  on  coast  road,  to-morrow,  with  instruc- 
tions to  reconnoiter  Bannajin  to  the  east.  The  one  hun- 
dred men  landed  at  Laoag  include  fifty  men  from  the 
U.  S.  S.  Wheeling,  and  fifty  men  sent  by  me  with  one 
gun  from  this  point — all  that  could  be  spared.  Leave 
to-morrow  morning  on  Samar  with  twenty  men  of  my 
escort  for  Laoag.” 

The  extracts  above  are  of  exceeding  interest,  as  they 
show  where  and  how  Funston  picked  up  the  plan  of 
finding  and  trapping  Aguinaldo.  It  is  all  the  more 
creditable  to  the  Kansas  hero  that  his  ‘‘climax”  of  au- 
dacity was  not  successful  through  luck. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 


CHARACTER  SKETCH  OE  AGUINALDO. 

A Study  of  his  Motives  and  Men — His  Style  and  the 
Tagal  Tongue — Aguinaldo  Remote  from  the  Peo- 
ple— His  Environment  and  Ambition  Despotic — 
The  Caprices  of  his  Fortunes — Has  he  a Chance 
yet  to  Repair  Ruins? — The  Destiny  we  Face. 

The  study  of  the  life  of  Aguinaldo,  ascertaining 
clearly,  as  one  may,  the  results  of  historical  experi- 
ments, the  clay  of  the  pit  from  which  he  was  digged, 
finds  him  a sarcasm  on  the  boasted  civilization  of  the 
age,  a burlesque  of  the  advancement  of  his  generation. 
We  behold  him  far  from  the  schools,  and  of  an  illiterate 
tribe,  knowing  well  only  the  Tagalog  dialect,  which  is 
written,  but  has  not  made  important  contributions  to 
prose  or  poetry.  It  has  vigor,  the  strength  of  coarse- 
ness. Men  of  ideas,  it  is  said,  find  it  a clever  medium 
of  expression.  The  witness  against  Aguinaldo  that  he 
does  not  command  Spanish  as  he  would  like,  is  himself. 
He  states  the  fact  in  friendly  correspondence.  After 
dividing  among  the  secretaries  and  interpreters,  those 
who  have  ,surrounded,  promoted,  and  exploited  the 
Tagal  leader,  all  that  can  be  reasonably  bestowed,  we 
find  in  the  mass  of  publications  that  go  with  the  name 
Emilio  Aguinaldo  a considerable  remainder  of  marked 
individuality  to  be  charged  to  somebody,  and  plainly 
identified  with  the  name  it  bears.  The  man  is  singularly 

331 


332  Character  Sketch  of  Aguinaldo. 

destitute  of  a great  deal  of  intelligence  that  is  of  the 
commonplace.  There  are  many  things  it  is  astonishing 
he  does  not  know,  but  he  rises  to  poetic  inspirations. 
How  he  picked  up  his  style  we  can  not  tell;  but  the 
puzzle  as  to  where  the  unexpected  is  revealed  in  a boy 
who  has  all  the  earthly  disadvantages,  is  not  a new  one. 
There'  is  vitality  in  the  Filipino  blood — and  ought  to  be; 
for  there  is  a greater  variety  in  it,  and  perhaps  brain 
also,  than  is  found  anywhere  else.  We  of  the  United 
States  find  that  no  strain  of  blood  we  have  got  from  the 
East  has  proved  a detriment,  and  the  African  is  not  to 
be  excepted.  The  Philippines  call  on  the  Asian  races 
that  look  to  the  rising  sun  for  that  which  is  new,  as  we 
look  that  way  for  the  old. 

When  General  Anderson  and  Aguinaldo  exchanged 
a few  letters,  perhaps  neither  of  them  thought  of  it,  but 
they  were  representative  of  the  hemispheres  that  we 
style  the  Old  and  the  New — the  Asian  and  the  Amer- 
ican. The  Orient  and  the  Occident  burned  in  their 
correspondence.  Here  was  another  irrepressible  con- 
flict. It  was  education  in  conflict  with  egotism.  The 
opposing  forces  are  distant — opposite  as  the  poles. 
Both  have  gained  their  conquests  in  the  torrid  zone — 
Anderson  of  the  temperate  clime,  and  Aguinaldo  of  the 
tropics;  Anderson  of  the  schools  and  camps,  the  trees 
made  hardy  by  frost — his  antagonist  of  the  rice-fields 
and  the  palms,  the  thorny  thicket  and  rasping  grass. 
It  was  the  corn  and  wheat  and  the  apple  against  the 
orange,  the  alligator-pear,  and  the  citron.  The  con- 
duct of  Aguinaldo,  through  the  deep  depravity  of  it,  ac- 
cording to  Europe’s  standard,  has  been  but  slowly  re- 
vealed, was  hateful  in  the  extreme;  but  the  calm 


Character  Sketch  of  Aguinaldo.  333 

audacity  of  the  Tribal  representative,  confronting  one 
of  the  mighty  peoples,  had  in  it  the  something  that  was 
in  some  of  the-  impassive  and  implacable  natives  of 
North  American  forests,  and  such  leadership  as  arose 
before  Pizarro  and  Cortes  came,  in  the  Andes  of  Peru 
and  the  lofty  plains  of  magnificent  Mexico. 

Anderson  was  not  slow  to  read  the  book  before  him, 
and  apply  a lesson.  Pie  said : 

‘T  submit,  with  all  deference,  that  we  have  hereto- 
fore underrated  the  native.  They  are  not  ignorant, 
savage  tribes,  but  have  a civilization  of  their  own;  and 
although  insignificant  in  appearance,  are  fierce  fighters, 
and  for  a tropical  people  they  are  industrious.’’ 

General  Merritt,  looking  upon  the  Pasig  River  from 
the  windows  of  the  palace  where  Aguinaldo  tries  to 
meditate,  witnessed  a scene  of  much  animation,  and 
said  of  the  endless  processions  of  boatmen,  gliding  to 
and  fro  in  canoes  carrying  loads  of  forage  like  stacks 
of  hay,  balancing  their  fickle  burdens  with  swift-shifting 
and  delicate  touches  of  a single  oar,  that  none  of  them 
ever  seemed  to  be  troubled  with  his  task.  There  is 
something  in  it  that  reminds  one  of  the  fanatical  in- 
dustry of  the  Chinese,  and  the  eternal  toil  of  the  Japa- 
nese over  their  fisheries  and  the  walled  garden  terraces 
that  lead  up  their  mountains  by  gigantic  steps. 

The  business  of  boats  on  the  Pasig  is  not  barbaric. 
It  is  going  to  and  pulling  from  market.  The  Tagalo 
Malays  are  fishermen  and  the  farmers  of  the  rice 
swamps.  The  Spaniards  claim  to  have  taught  the  tribes 
to  cultivate  hemp,  rice,  coffee,  and  sugar,  to  have  raised 
them  from  savagery;  but  they  found  a hardy  race,  helped 
them  help  themselves;  but  did  not  take  the  cruelty  out 


334  Character  Sketch  of  Aguinaldo. 

of  them.  And  the  various  races  and  tribes  are  more 
cruel  to  each  other  than  to  all  others.  They  have  a 
passion  for  revenge,  and  recreation  in  the  torture  of 
the  unfortunate.  They  have  their  educated  class — not 
large;  their  musicians — they  are  all  musical — their  so- 
ciety; their  prejudices  of  nameless  ferocity;  their  super- 
stitions rank  as  in  darkest  Africa;  they  are  thoroughly 
believers  that  they  are  brave,  honorable,  and  respectable. 
They  are  not,  however,  fierce  for  utter  truth-telling,  or 
readily  repentant  of  the  guilt  of  flagrant  deception,  nor 
quick  to  repudiate  and  condemn  the  phases  of  falsifica- 
tion. The  inherent  value  of  truth  has  not  been  im- 
pressed upon  them  from  infancy,  to  bear  in  maturity 
the  fruit  that  is  more  than  golden,  and  the  self-respect 
in  sacrifice  that  is  more  precious  than  silver  and  gold, 
or  the  pebbles  that  sparkle  with  unquenchable  fire.  It 
is  rather  an  unwarranted  pride  of  caste  or  condition,  or 
the  product  of  many  millenniums,  that  the  Asiatics, 
whether  by  the  shores  of  the  elder  Continent,  according 
to  our  own  accepted  records,  or  on  the  islands  that  dot 
the  huge  Pacific,  are  satisfied  with  their  own  teachers 
and  literature,  theology  or  politics,  and  that  they  are 
not  reformers,  not  trying,  so  far  as  they  know,  to  better 
the  world  or  change  religious  culture  or  spiritual  influ- 
ence of  any  dominions,  to  magnify  morals,  or  cast  down 
thrones.  They -lose  no  time  in  setting  up  or  throwing 
over  Republican  forms  of  government.  Monarchical  in- 
stitutions are  held  to  be  everlastingly  according  to  hu- 
man nature — a settled,  indisputable,  and  enduring  state 
of  affairs;  and  as  for  self-governing  people,  none  exist 
in  Asia.  They  are  an  unknown  quantity  there.  Agui- 
naldo must  have  been  a daring  hypocrite  when  he  prom- 


Character  Sketch  of  Aguinaldo.  335 

ised  to  be  a Republican  as  soon  as  his  despotism  was 
completely  established.  Asia  contains  no  example  of 
government  of  the  people  by  the  people.  When  he 
speaks  of  a “stable  form  of  government,”  he  must  mean 
a Government  by  himself  and  for  his  own  sake,  for  that 
is  the  one  shape  that  stands.  He  never  seems  to  have 
had  a thought  that  all  or  any  one  of  his  decrees  should 
be  referred  to  the  people.  The  referendum  is  a feeble 
fantasy.  He  got  thirteen  votes  for  President  of  a Junta 
in  an  English  colony,  and  upon  that  his  claim  in  every 
hour  of  his  life  since  that  he  is  the  true  and  only 
master  of  nine  millions  of  people,  and  all  of  them 
owe  him  implicit  obedience.  He  picked  men  out  and 
put  them  in  office.  Nobody  voted  for  anybody,  unless 
in  a committee,  and  there  was  no  complaint  about  the 
right  of  suffrage.  A hundred  years  of  American  pre- 
dominance might  give  these  people  the  first  lessons  for 
ruling  themselves.  Now  the  application  of  the  theory  of 
the  rights  of  man,  as  set  forth  in  the  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence, is  incomprehensible,  is  lost  on  Filipinos. 

Seldom  in  the  rise  and  fall  of  men  of  public  affairs 
has  there  been  an  enterprise  less  promising,  a scheme 
less  hopeless,  than  that  of  Aguinaldo  setting  forth  on 
the  dispatch  boat  McCullough  from  Hong  Kong  for 
Cavite,  to  pit  himself  and  followers,  seventeen  in  num- 
ber, against  the  fortunes  of  two  Nations,  fighting  be- 
yond seas  and  continents,  in  the  East  Indies,  as  the 
greater  nations  of  Europe — Great  Britain,  France,  and 
Spain — contested  with  battleships,  and  transports  that 
carried  regiments,  the  possession  of  the  West  Indies 
for  two  hundred  and  fifty  years. 

Aguinaldo  had  no  nation,  never  had  an  army,  or 


33^  Character  Sketch  of  Aguinaldo. 

directed  one  in  a fight.  He  was  for  a time  an  inmate 
of  a famous  fortress  the  Spaniards  could  not  take,  and, 
therefore,  bought  it.  Aguinaldo  sold  it  and  acquired 
capital,  but  no  glory.  Once  he  was  thought  a hero  and 
a patriot.  Now  all  know  he  was  neither.  He  has  been 
compared  with  the  great  and  good  revolutionists  of  high 
repute  in  history.  His  cause  was  not  that  of  liberty, 
but  of  a personal  despotism,  himself  the  despot.  He 
was  chosen  for  the  distinction  by  himself.  He  had  not 
a good  cause  in  any  way.  It  was  not  honest.  His  first 
intercourse  with  the  United  States  was  making  to  the 
Government  dishonorable  proposals.  He  had  done  by 
contract  written,  with  the  Split  Rock  fortress,  of  which 
he  was  commander,  what  Benedict  Arnold  did  with 
West  Point;  and  did  what  Arnold  did  not,  sold  the  guns 
and  the  men  too,  and  carried  off  transfer  tickets  for 
pieces  of  silver.  There  was  a dispute  over  the  division 
of  the  spoil.  Only  two  specific  sums  of  the  $400,000 
the  Spaniards  paid,  before  the  fraud  was  exposed,  have 
since  been  accounted  for.  Artacho  got  $5,000,  and 
Aguinaldo  $50,000.  That  which  remained  vanished. 
Aguinaldo  had  many  uses  for  money,  and  it  is  unlike 
his  people  to  be  disturbed  about  the  details  of  book- 
keeping. 

Aguinaldo  bought  by  Spain,  snubbed  by  the  United 
States,  discredited  by  his  own  associates  and  people, 
with  the  exception  of  those  who  departed  from  their 
country  with  the  cash  paid  for  their  consent  to  deporta- 
tion, he  admitted  at  the  meeting  of  the  Junta,  in  which 
he  had  his  first  Presidential  experience,  that  he  sold 
himself  to  the  Spaniards,  saying  if  he  fought  them  the 
money  paid  him  for  himself  and  companions  could  be 


Character  Sketch  of  Aguinaldo.  . 337  - 

attached  and  held  away  from  him  by  English  law,  if 
the  Spaniards  claimed  that  he  was  their  property  and 
had  sold  his  liberty  to  fight  them,  and,  therefore,  vio- 
lated the  contract  as  soon  as  he  opposed  them  in  war. 
That  was  his  reason  for  not  wanting  to~ go  to  see  Dewey, 
unless  he  had  a contract  for  a ‘‘divided  armament”  with 
the  admiral  signing,  sealing,  etc.,  for  the  United  States. 

He  gave  up  to  go,  but  what  he  said  May  4,  1898,  was  a 
pronunciamento  of  war  to  a finish  with  the  United 
States.  His  first  days  at  Manila  were  disheartening. 
Then  each  day  did  marvelous  things  for  him.  He  did 
nothing  for  himself,  except  to  see  that  the  Americans 
were  the  strong  men  and  the  great  Nation,  and  that  his 
chance  for  empire  was  to  beat  them.  His  first  work  of 
diplomatic  art  was  to  have  a series  of  irritating  troubles 
with  the  United  States.  He  was  clearly  against  them, 
playing,  however,  a double  part.  That  is  not  merely 
asserted  or  alleged.  The  captured  documents  contain 
absolute  proof.  There  is  no  known  fact  in  Spanish 
colonial  wars  that  is  more  prominent.  It  will  soon  be 
a work  of  malevolence  or  indifference  to  truth  to  ques- 
tion that. 

Fancy  the  small,  brown  young  man,  age  thirty  years, 
educated  under  the  auspices  of  all  evil  fortunes,  except 
bad  health  with  morbid  modesty.  He  did  not  seem  to 
be  calculated  for  conquests,  or  even  for  serious  con- 
tentions. But  he  was  unflinching  in  all 'sorts  of  self- 
assertions.  He  referred  to  Manila  and  all  the  cities  and 
villages  and  to  the  Philippines,  as  though  he  had  a quit- 
claim deed  for  all  the  islands  with  their  rivers  and  for- 
ests and  their  millions  of  men.  It  was  funny  in  a way  to 
observe  the  small  man  bear  himself  with  confident  gran- 
2.2 


338  Character  Sketch  of  Aguinaldo. 

cleur,  such  that  insignificance  was  self-expanded  to  im- 
mensity. He  had  as  much  faith  in  himself  as  Moham- 
med. He  had  been  allowed  to  come  under  the  Stars 
and  Stripes;  and  there  was  such  magic  in  it  for  him  as 
no  Americans  ever  enjoyed.  It  was  not  for  them, 
though.  He  was  the  beneficiary.  Legions  had  arisen 
from  the  soil  for  him,  and  he  had  not  stamped  it  with  his 
small  boots.  An  army  was  raised  by  his  foes  and  put 
in  his  hand,  and  he  accepted  it  as  if  it  was  an  inheritance. 
He  betrayed  those  who  were  forcing  his  fortunes  beyond 
the  understanding  of  all  but  believers  in  dreams,  and 
yet  they  served  him,  and  he  moved  not,  yet  waxed  daily 
and  hourly,  and  became  one  of  the  phenomena.  The 
small,  brown  man,  in  white  clothes,  slender,  thin  in  the 
legs,  with  hair  that  could  not  do  other  than  stick  up 
straight  and  stiflf, — with  diminutive  hands  and  feet,  his 
pride  shaded  with  a touch  of  humility  that  meant  any- 
thing else,  behaved  as  if  he  might  be  a Roman  emperor 
of  the  age  of  Caesar  Augustus,  with  the  world  between 
his  little  legs.  Everything  was  “my’’  that  was  not  “1.” 
“My  people,”  “my  Government,”  “my  orders,”  “my 
army,”  “my  capital.”  He  repaid  the  informal  call  of 
Dewey  and  Anderson  by  arresting  an  American  officer 
who  passed  a Filipino  sentinel  without  deference.  He 
refused  to  help  Anderson,  or  to  allow  his  “my  people” 
to  give  aid  to  furnish  camps  without  his  order.  He  de- 
manded to  know  whether  Anderson  would  recognize  his 
“my  Government.”  He  referred  soberly  to  “the  two 
nations” — Philippine  and  American.  He  said  it  was 
“necessary”  to  save  trouble  for  the  Americans  to  tell 
him  what  they  came  for  and  were  going  to  do.  His 
people  would  grow  hostile,  he  said,  if  they  were  not 


Character  Sketch  of  Aguinaldo.  339 

I 

recognized.  He  had  something  on  the  fire  all  the  time, 
told  fairy  tales  about  his  military  operations,  and  be- 
guiled even  the  veterans  who  disbelieved  in  all  Oriental- 
ism. He  extracted  compliments  from  Dewey  and  An- 
derson, and  made  haste  to  tackle  General  Merritt,  and 
give  him  provocation  enough  to  have  ordered  him  off 
the  premises;  but  he  wanted  the  admiral  to  carry  Ma- 
nila— no  doubt,  for  the  joint  use  of  himself  and  the 
Spaniards — and  talked  about  the  blood  and  toil  and 
money  spent  by  him  and  his  army  besieging  the  city. 
He  became  responsible  for  a fabrication,  that  one  of 
his  generals,  Norvel,  had  regained  six  field-pieces  taken 
from  the  Americans  by  the  Spaniards,  when  the  nearest 
approach  made  to  that  was  the  flight  of  the  same  Nor- 
vehs  men  from  a trench  when  there  was  a smart  fire^ 
though  the  natives  were  in  the  way  of  the  Americans, 
who  held  their  own  on  the  inner  line  and  never  had  a 
thought  of  its  abandonment,  while  the  natives  ran  a fast 
race  to  the  rear.  At  last,  he  wanted  the  captain-gen- 
eral’s palace  that  General  Merritt  occupied.  The  Amer- 
icans thought  rather  well  of  themselves  and  what  they 
had  to  do,  but  that  was  nothing  to  the  rapture  of  satis- 
faction the  Filipinos  took  in  the  fictitious  splendor  of 
their  feats  of  arms,  for  the  first  fighting  they  did  worth 
a mention  was  with  Americans. 

If  the  Americans  have  a weakness  about  their  rela- 
tions to  mankind,  it  is  that  of  holding  as  inferior  to 
themselves  the  descendants  of  all  Europeans,  except  of 
the  races  and  nations  to  whom  our  several  citizens 
trace  their  ancestry;  and  people  of  labor,  black  or  white, 
red  or  brown,  are,  the  white  American  is  sure,  of  an  in- 
ferior order;  and  if  there  is  any  color  held  to  be  more 


340 


Character  Sketch  of  Aguinaldo. 


objectionable  than  the  black,  it  is  the  brown  and  the 
mixtures  of  red,  yellow,  copper,  and  brown — the  last, 
perhaps,  the  most  alarming  discovered.  There  was  a 
little  brown  man,  thirty  years  old,  weight  one  hundred 
pounds,  and  perhaps  a few  ounces,  legs  that  if  attached 
to  an  American  would  cause  him  to  be  rejected  as  an 
applicant  for  enlistment  at  any  recruiting  office  as  a 
private  soldier;  and  the  brown,  small  person,  with  a 
dusky,  coppery  tinge  in  his  face,  was  going  up  and  down 
playing  tragedy,  acting  a great  part  in  a great  drama, 
playing  himself  alone,  and,  come  to  think  of  it,  playing 
it  rather  well,  beating  lago  at  his  own  double-faced  per- 
sonation, and  holding  within  his  slender  self  the  mockery 
that  no  matter  which  killed  the  other,  made  his  game; 
and  he  was  watching  and  waiting  to  secure  the  chances 
of  '‘joint  occupation,”  and  put  in  his  treacherous,  blade- 
for  a ready,  fatal  stroke.  This  young  man  knew  enough 
not  to  indulge  his  hate  and  treason  until  he  had  im- 
proved the  time  the  Americans  lost  in  Paris  and  Wash- 
ington, in  restoring  centralization  from  the  outer 
trenches  around  Manila,  facing  inward,  and  harvesting 
provinces  to  come  to  his  help,  assailing  the  Americans 
with  falsification,  and  maligning  them  with  malice,  never 
abating  in  the  least  his  portentous  presumption,  pro- 
testing in  final  defeat  that  he  knew  it  was  coming,  for 
he  had  not  miscalculated  resources,  but  declaring  that 
from  the  beginning  he  had  foreseen  military  discom- 
fiture; but,  as  for  him,  he  would  not  live  a slave,  and 
he  had  taken  oaths  that  compelled  him  to  wage  war 
while  he  had  breath  in  his  body.  So  sacred  were  his 
vows,  that  he  would  free  his  country  or  perish  in  the 
effort;  and  now,  captured  and  prisoner,  he  has- con- 


Character  Sketch  of  Aguinaldo.  341 

eluded  he  could  still  permit  himself  to  live,  and  bear 
the  stings  of  unredeemed  oaths;  that,  as  for  himself,  his 
duty  was  to  die  or  free  his  beautiful  country;  and  he  has 
sworn  once  again  that  he  will  “true  allegiance  bear”  to 
the  Government  of  the  United  States,  which  he  has 
been  saying  and  swearing  for  years  was  slavery. 

When  the  play  is  over,  whatever  may  be  the  closing 
scene,  this  great  actor  will  have  played  many  parts,  and 
we  may  trust  the  lesson  of  his  life  will  aid  his  people  to 
know  that  it  was  a happy  fortune  for  them  when  Amer- 
icans landed  on  their  shores  and  liberated  them  from 
odious  tyranny;  and  that  all  shall  know,  too,  that  when 
assailed  treasonably  they  were  triumphant  in  arms,  and 
generous  in  purpose,  as  invincible  in  power,  and  able  by 
their  wisdom  of  teaching  by  example  to  found  a Repub- 
lican form  of  Government  even  on  Asian  soil,  with 
Asiatic  people,  grounded  by  the  teachings  and  height- 
ened by  the  glories  of  the  great  North  American  Re- 
public, whose  heads,  hearts,  and  hands  have  builded 
an  Empire  of  Liberty,  that  will  be  a splendid  gateway 
for  the  procession  of  Progressive  Mankind,  that  has 
marched  ever  westward,  until  it  enters  upon  the  Con- 
quest of  Asia. 

Aguinaldo  offers  a difficult  problem.  It  would  be 
unlike  him  if,  in  the  school  of  adversity,  he  is  taught 
there  are  better  ways  and  means  than  he  has  tried,  and 
find  at  last  the  wisdom  of  a sacrifice  of  self  in  the  healing 
and  building  of  nations.  If  that  is  what  his  oath  to  bear 
true  allegiance  to  the  country  whose  destiny  he  could 
not  change  means  to  him,  God  bless  him  and  help  him 
to  keep  it  loyally,  and  win  in  peace  victories  denied  in 
war,  and  do  works  to  repair  ruins  he  has  wrought.  It 


342  Character  Sketch  of  Aguinaldo. 

is  not  impossible  that  the  strong  hand  that  has  chastised 
him  may  be  kindly  in  its  guidance;  but  it  needs  still 
strength  to  strike  or  sustain.  It  is  better  to  uplift  than 
to  put  down,  and  it  may  not  be  too  late,  for  the  Tagalog 
leader  may  be  influential  for  the  good  of  his  countrymen. 
That  can  not  be  by  the  impersonation  of  tyrannous  prin- 
ciples. If  he  is  worthy,  he  may  have  a recognition  in 
a better  way  and  with  a broader  bearing,  than  he  coveted 
in  his  strife  to  be  a conqueror.  His  career,  as  an  enemy, 
self-appointed,  of  the  United  States,  closed  in  captivity. 
All  our  countrymen  should  bear  in  remembrance  that 
^‘this  country  of  ours”  is  the  foremost  of  the  nations 
in  its  interests,  powers,  opportunities,  on  the  shores  and 
islands  of  the  greater  ocean  of  the  globe;  and  from  this 
supreme  situation  we  face  the  future  that  we  have  done 
our  duty  in  accepting  the  destiny  to  go  forward  with 
confidence. 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 


AGUINAEDO’S  PARENTAGE  AND  EARLY 
DAYS. 

What  His  Friends  Say,  and  the  First  Adventure  as  an 
Insurgent — The  Singapore  Incident — The  Cap- 
tured Documents  Destroy  Filipino  Fables. 

I 

IT  is  not  a novel  experience  of  one  who  has  suddenly 
attained  great  notoriety,  to  find  that  the  recollections 
of  friends  of  his  early  days  are  difficult  to  reconcile,  and 
that  his  foes  are  equally  contentious  as  to  the  steps  he 
took  before  he  walked  in  a strong  light.  We  are  fortu- 
nate in  undertaking  the  labor  of  writing  a first  life  of 
Aguinaldo,  to  find  that  the  European  who  was  his  ear- 
liest friend  has  given,  from  personal  knowledge,  a state- 
ment of  his  parentage  and  boyhood,  and  gives  particu- 
lars of  his  first  distinction  as  an  insurgent. 

The  man  is  Mr.  Howard  W.  Bray,  and  the  form  of 
his  testimony  is  a letter  addressed  to  Mr.  W.  T.  Stead, 
of  London.  Mr.  Bray  is  so  fiercely  a partisan  of  Agui- 
naldo, and  so  forcible  in  resolute  praise  of  him,  that  in 
order  to  give  his  version  of  facts  fair  play,  it  is  necessary 
to  eliminate  his  fault-finding  with  others.  Mr.  Bray  is 
an  extremist.  He  says  he  was  the  only  European  who 
before  the  Hispano-American  War  could  claim  the  ac- 

343 


344  Aguinaldo’s  Parentage  and  Early  Days. 

quaintance  and  friendship  of  Aguinaldo.  Mr.  Bray 
states : 

“I  enjoyed  the  hospitality  of  his  father’s  house  in 
Cavite  Viejo  as  far  back  as  the  year  1883,  when  the  sub- 
ject of  the  sketch  quoted  by  you  from  the  American 
Review  of  Reviews  was  a boy  of  thirteen.  I am  certainly 
the  only  foreigner  who  has  enjoyed  the  confidence  of 
the  Filipino  leaders  both  before  and  during  the  rebellion 
against  Spain,  and,  above  all,  I was  the  medium  through 
which  Aguinaldo  was  brought  into  relations  with  the 
American  Government  in  Singapore  last  April.  I was 
residing  temporarily  in  Singapore  owing  to  the  dis- 
turbed state  of  the  Philippines,  especially  in  the  province 
where  my  estate  is  situated,  when  General  Aguinaldo 
came  down  from  Hong  Kong  to  consult  with  me  on  the 
situation.  The  American  consul-general  there,  Mr. 
Spencer  Pratt,  at  once  requested  me  to  arrange  an  inter- 
view, which  I did,  at  the  same  time  acting  as  interpreter 
when  the  conditions  of  Aguinaldo’s  co-operation  with 
Admiral  Dewey  were  settled,  which  President  McKinley 
has  since  repudiated,  under  the  pretext  that  the  consul- 
general  was  not  authorized  to  act. 

“Emilio  Aguinaldo  was  born  on  March  22,  1870,  in 
the  town  of  Cavite  Viejo,  not  only  of  pure  Filipino,  but 
also  of  pure  Cavite  blood.  He  is  neither  the  ‘offspring 
of  a Spanish  general’  nor  a ‘dissolute  Jesuit,’  but  born 
in  lawful  wedlock  of  an  old  patriarchal  family  who  have 
resided  there  for  generations.  His  parents  were  in  com- 
fortable circumstances,  and  owned  considerable  landed 
property.  His  father  was  imprisoned  for  supposed  com- 
plicity with  the  rebellion  of  1872,  but  was  afterwards 


Aguinaldo’s  Parentage  and  Early  Days.  345 

liberated  because  proved  to  be  innocent.  He  was  the 
youngest  of  three  children,  and  was  educated  first  at  the 
school  in  his  native  town,  afterwards  at  the  College  of 
San  Juan  de  Letran,  in  Manila,  under  charge  of  the 
Dominican  Friars.  There  are  no  Jesuit  priests  in  Cavite, 
consequently  he  could  never  have  been  a ‘house-boy’ 
with  one,  and  his  father  was  sufficiently  well  off  to  edu- 
cate his  son  himself  without  such  extraneous  aid  as  your 
report  suggests.  He  neither  studied  medicine  nor  the- 
ology, but  left  the  college  of  San  Juan  in  the  fourth  year 
of  his  studies  owing  to  the  death  of  his  father,  in  order 
to  assist  his  mother  in  the  management  of  the  family 
property.” 

This  would  bear  higher  stamp  of  veracity,  if  the  col- 
oring matter  were  not  so  florid.  Mr.  Bray  discredits  his 
judgment  when  he  states  as  true  the  gossips  of  the 
Tagalo  believers  in  the  theatricals  and  the  evident  fables, 
such  as  ignorance  fancies  and  makes  a faith  in  the  adula- 
tion of  ambition.  We  are  told  his  father  was  probably 
the  victim  of  a monkish  poisoner,  and  that  the  Span- 
iards made  attempts  to  kill  him  with  arsenic.  It  was  a 
part  of  Aguinaldo’s  game  to  cultivate  such  stories.  It 
is  important  in  Asia  for  a man  with  imperial  aspirations 
to  give  himself  a surrounding  of  superstition.  The  shel- 
ter of  a fog  is  wanted.  That  the  Church  of  Rome  is 
opposed  to  Freemasonry  is  not  news,  and  that  the 
frightful  character  of  the  Katapuna  brotherhood  in 
Luzon  intensified  antagonisms  is  of  record.  That  young 
Aguinaldo  was  a Mason  and  rebelled  first  against  the 
Church  is  true.  He  became  mayor  of  his  native  village, 
Cavite  Viejo,  and  was  in  that  position  when  the  insur- 


34^  Aguinaldo’s  Parentage  and  Early  Days. 

rectioii  of  1896  broke  out.  Mr.  Bray  is  a competent 
witness  of  the  fact.  Aguinaldo  became  a “suspect/’  and 
finding  he  was  about  to  be  arrested,  took  the  initiative, 
and  captured  Imus.  Mr.  Bray  gives  this  account  of  that 
incident : 

“Imus,  the  headquarters  of  the  civil  guard  of  the 
province,  where  the  Recoleto  friars  have  a fine  fortified 
estate  house.  Here  the  civil  guard  had  intrenched 
themselves,  and  the  first  resistance  was  met  with;  but 
Aguinaldo,  with  nothing  but  a revolver  and  a whip  in 
hand,  scaled  the  walls  at  the  head  of  his  troops  and  cap- 
tured the  whole  place  amidst  a storm  of  bullets.” 

This  is  very  interesting,  but  not,  save  in  outline, 
reliable,  for  Bray  knows  no  better  than  to  believe  in  the 
accusations  of  the  bad  faith  of  Admiral  Dewey,  who  has 
recently  said: 

“When  all  of  the  documents  are  published,  it  will  be 
perfectly  clear  that  no  obligation  rested  upon  the  Amer- 
ican forces  to  treat  the  Filipinos  as  allies.” 

The  proof  was  furnished  long  ago  in  the  character 
and  the  professional  intelligence  of  the  admiral  and  his 
official  correspondence. 

An  interview  was  had  with  Mr.  Aguinaldo  at  his 
private  residence  in  Manila,  April  21st.  He  said  he  was 
“learning  English  and  studying  the  American  Govern- 
ment,” and  he  “greatly  desired  to  visit  the  United 
States,”  but  was  “at  the  disposition  of  the  authorities;” 
and  he  “generally  indorsed  the  acts  of  the  Philippine 
Commission.”  He  considered  for  days  “whether  he 
would  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  or  be  deported  to 
Guam;  but  since  he  has  taken  the  oath  he  accepts  Amer- 


Aguinaldo’s  Parentage  and  Early  Days.  347 

ican  rule  unconditionally,  and  asks  guidance  with  seem- 
ing childlike  faith.”  ‘‘Childlike  and  bland,”  perhaps. 

Mr.  Bray  is  too  extravagant  to  be  trusted  with  the 
truth;  and  it  is  evident  he  has  said  much  he  would  unsay 
if  he  could  revise  his  writings  in  the  broad  daylight  of 
the  Captured  Documents. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 


MANILA  AS  AN  EXTINCT  VOLCANO. 

The  Ancient  City  the  World’s  Storm-center — Three 
Armies  and  Three  Fleets  Assembled — The  Con- 
flict of  Races  and  Ages — Aguinaldo’s  Represent- 
ative Character  — The  First  American  Blood 
Shed — The  Monroe  Doctrine  Beyond  Seas — Con- 
trast between  Cuban  and  Philippine  Questions — 
Key  to  the  Career  of  the  Tagal  Tyrant — An  As- 
tonishing Personification — The  Burning  Mountain 
in  the  Lake — Dewey’s  Candor  a War  Declaration, 
but  his  Duty — Doom  of  Defeat  Visited — Prisoner 
in  a Palace  a Lesson  for  Tyrants. 

The  writer  does  not  need  to  go  further  than  his  own 
experiences  to  find  reasons  why  the  Americans  and 
Filipinos  fail  to  perform  their  appointed  tasks  in  the 
Philippines  harmoniously.  I had  usual  advantages  to 
be  correctly  informed  as  to  what  was  going  on  there 
when  I arrived,  and  yet  that  the  elements  contained  that 
which  threatens  storms  was  erroneously  estimated,  and 
there  were  many  things  I took  for  granted  about  which 
afterward  it  was  clear  that  I was  mistaken. 

I landed  with  General  Otis,  and  drove  with  him 
through  the  strange  old  Spanish  city — it  was  two  hun- 
dred years  old  before  the  British  army  sailed  away  from 
New  York.  As  we  entered  the  harbor  made  famous 
the  world  round  by  the  battle  in  which  the  American 
fleet  destroyed  that  of  Spain — the  news  came  to  us  by 

348 


Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano.  349 

a ''winged  boat,  a bird  afloat,”  that  the  American  army, 
under  General  Merritt,  possessed  the  city — that  the 
Spaniards  had  surrendered  on  easy  terms,  and  that  there 
were  propositions  in  the  form  of  a protocol  promising 
peace.  The  crowd  of  soldiers  on  the  steamer  did  not 
like  the  news.  They  were  far  from  home,  and  hungry 
for  adventure.  That  there  was  to  be  peace  all  of  a sud- 
den was  the  last  of  their  thoughts  and  the  least  of  their 
desires. 

There  were  great  throngs  of  people  on  the  streets 
and  in  all  public  places.  In  and  about  Manila  there  were 
three  armies  and  three  fleets.  The  Spaniards  were  held 
captive  within  the  walled  city,  filling  the  enormous 
churches,  two  thousand  soldiers  in  the  Cathedral  alone. 
There  were  ten  thousand  American  soldiers  quartered 
in  the  city  and  immediate  vicinity,  and  on  the  outside  of 
it  unnumbered  groups  of  insurgent  Filipinos.  They 
came  in  unarmed  to  view  the  town.  There  was  difficulty 
about  wearing  side-arms,  for  there  was  a disposition  to 
use  them  somewhat  recklessly  and  indiscrimately. 

The  first  of  the  fleets  in  prominence  and  import  were 
the  warships  of  the  United  States — the  safe  basis  of 
operations  for  the  American  army.  Dewey  was  in 
snowy-white  raiment,  adorned  with  a few  little  gold 
buttons,  on  the  quarter  deck  of  the  famous  flagship. 
There  were  two  grim,  uncouth  monsters,  monitors — 
iron  citadels  afloat.  This  was  where  authority  was 
seated  and  power  was  exhibited.  There  was  anotfier 
fleet  that  was  wrecked,  and  only  partially  visible — a few 
ragged  scraps  and  broken  sticks  standing  out  of  the 
water.  The  third  fleet  was  that  of  the  American  trans- 
ports that  had  brought  the  army  from  the  United  States 


350  Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano. 

— the  foreign  warships — Germany  the  most  consider- 
ably represented;  and  an  array  of  idle  merchantmen. 

In  the  City  Hall  were  tens  of  thousands  of  rifles 
corded  up,  walnut  stocks  and  steel  barrels  to  be  returned 
to  the  Spaniards  if  we  were  not  going  to  stay.  Here 
was  unfortunately  the  first  note  of  uncertainty,  which 
-grew,  as  time  passed,  more  and  more  discordant.  What 
should  the  treaty  be?  The  Commission  of  treaty-makers 
was  soon  to  meet  in  Paris.  The  eyes  of  General  Otis 
keenly  searched  the  animated  scenes  on  all  sides,  as  our 
driver,  with  sturdy  and  swift  ponies  found  the  mysteri- 
ous clues  to  the  Manila  labyrinth.  All  was  queer,  every- 
thing interesting,  much  was  charming;  and  there  was 
something  that  caused  thoughtfulness.  Here  was  a con- 
vention of  mysteries — puzzles — the  end  of  which  no  man 
could  see.  I think  the  first  thing  General  Otis  said  was : 
‘‘Shall  we  have  to  give  these  people,  as  Charles  Sumner 
would  say,  the  ballot — aye,  sir,  the  ballot?”  I ’m  afraid 
I said,  “A  lot  of  them  look  as  though  you  shall  have  to 
give  them  the  bullet  first.”  There  was  an  agreement 
that  “there  are  problems  here.”  We  had  been  having 
hints  from  a good  many  people  at  home  that  there  were 
problems  there — perhaps  these  also  were  a part  of  those. 
We  had  not  been  in  town  until  lunch-time  before  several 
statements  were  made  about  Aguinaldo  that  were  not 
of  a reassuring  character,  and  were  provoking.  What 
should  a little  fellow  like  that  have  to  do  with  us?  Curi- 
ous thing,  was  n’t  it,  that  he  must  be  bothering  himself 
about  what  we  were  there  for,  and  how  could  he  dare  to 
impertinently  insist  until  he  got  peremptory  orders  not 
to  interfere  with  the  locality  and  the  activity  of  our  army 
and  the  policy  of  our  military  administration?  The 


Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano.  351 

tendency  was  to  American  ang-er,  but  there  was  a shade 
of  amusement  about  it  that  such  insignificance  should 
be  so  intolerable  in  presumption.  It  was  worse  than 
being  pestered  by  a pagan  from  China. 

We  had  heard  of  this  man  as  the  leader  of  the  in- 
surgents before  leaving  home,  and  there  the  universal 
disposition  had  been  to  treat  him  considerately  and  make 
him  useful.  But  here  he  was  taking  the  initiative  to 
treat  us  insolently,  give  us  trouble  to  assert  himself  as 
the  indisputable  monarch  of  the  islands.  Certainly  we 
had  not  calculated  upon  it  that  he  was  to  be  other  than 
subordinate,  and,  in  fact,  we  all  knew  he  never  would 
have  got  there  at  all  if  he  had  not  most  solemnly  prom- 
ised three  several  American  consuls  that  he  would  be  a 
good  Christian  and  a good  American;  that  first,  and, 
above  all,  he  would  be  strictly  obedient  and  submissive 
to  Admiral  Dewey.  And  here  he  was  set  up  as  a Dic- 
tator, and  he  had  set  himself  up.  Nobody  had  voted 
for  him.  Himself  had  appointed  himself.  That  was  n’t 
the  worst  of  it — he  was  insisting  upon  dictating.  The 
stories  that  left  their  color  on  memory  were  that  he  was 
of  ugly  behavior — that  he  acted  in  a troublesome,  ex- 
asperating, tormenting  way — and  who  but  he  had 
started  a Government  of  his  own;  erected  a pedestal, 
and  climbed  upon  it  like  a monkey  on  a stump,  and  was 
claiming  the  country  and  all  worth  having,  from  the 
center  all  around  to  the  seas,  as  his  very  own;  was 
issuing  proclamations  that  he  held  were  laws  of  the 
land  from  the  moment  he  signed  them,  and  that  all  men 
had  to  obey  them ! This  was  not  all : he  had  an  army 
more  numerous  than  that  of  Spain  or  of  the  United 
States.  This  seems  serious  now  when  it  is  written;  but 


352  Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano. 

then  it  was  a dramatic  surprise — a farce  being  played 
as  a tragedy,  and  nobody  discovered  a war-cloud  as  big 
as  a man’s  hand.  There  was  a tropical  vapor,  though! 

One  of  the  quick  questions  was.  What  did  Dewey 
say  about  this?  And  the  prompt  reply  was,  that  the 
admiral  said  Aguinaldo  had  the  “big  head,”  and  would 
need  a new  hat.  This  did  not  add  momentously  to 
knowledge,  but  it  was  rather  reassuring.  In  a few  days 
I ascertained  that  there  was  no  spirit  of  levity  about 
what  the  admiral  said.  Indeed,  that  he  and  General 
Anderson  were  the  men  who  did  not  think  that  all  was 
well — that  he  wanted  more  soldiers  and  more  ships  of 
war.  Did  n’t  think  he  had  battleships  enough — wanted 
a squadron  that,  could  smash  any  other  in  those  seas, 
for  there  was  no  telling  what  mischief  might  be  afoot; 
that  we  were  not  on  new  ground  or  in  fresh  water,  but 
in  a novel  situation,  and  the  wind  might  blow  four  ways 
before  long,  and  waltz  off  into  a cyclone,  called  in  that 
country  a typhoon.  Dewey  was  the  man  aloft  with  a 
big  glass  to  his  eye,  who  studied  the  barometer  and 
could  see  the  wrinkle  on  the  water  far  away,  and  the 
tinge  in  the  sky  that  tells  that  a whirlwind  is  gathering, 
and  there  is  to  be  expected  on-e  of  the  terrors  of  the  sea 
of  China — one  of  the  mighty  spinning  bubbles,  to  be 
formed  and  whirled  away  to  meet  the  sun,  and  blot  it 
out  for  a while  on  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

The  President  had  informally  invited  the  admiral  to 
go  to  Paris  and  instruct  the  Commission,  but  he  did 
not  care  for  that  task,  said  he  was  not  ready  to  go, 
wanted 'things  settled  first.  General  Anderson,  I was 
told,  had  been  stirring  Aguinaldo  up  by  writing  letters 


GENERAL  >1ACA|®mUp^^EAD9^»iAKTERS 
AT  VIASHLA,  CONPIjNEO 


^^t,UJNAL005 


.MonfE-R 


Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano.  353 

to  him,  and  Aguinaldo  had  nothing  to  do  but  write 
letters  to  Anderson;  and  there  were  others  who  thought 
that  Anderson  had  been  mistaken  in  noticing  him — that 
he  ought  to  be  treated  with  silent  contempt,  or  some- 
thing to  that  effect.  Of  course,  it  seemed  that  in  the 
Tagalog  we  had  on  hand  we  might  have  caught  a Tartar, 
and  certainly,  whatever  he  was,  he  was  rising  up  a good 
deal,  if  much  talk  about  him  was  good  evidence  of  an 
increase  of  altitude.  Noticeably  there  was  intense  curi- 
osity about  the  man.  He  had  been  manifesting  himself  in 
ways  that  were  dark  as  those  of  the  “Heathen  Chinee.” 
At  any  rate,  he  was  interesting  to  a journalist.  He  was 
only  ten  miles  away,  across  the  bay,  and  I soon  had  an 
engagement  to  go  and  see  him.  He  was  told  that  I had 
been  in  Cuba  at  the  time  of  Weyler’s  Administration-^- 
had  written  the  story  of  Cuba,  a big  book — and  knew 
something  about  Spanish  colonization,  its  mysteries  and 
miseries,  and  he  was  interested  about  this  “veteran  ob- 
server,” who  desired  to  pay  his  respects.  The' day  was 
appointed,  and  the  hour.  I was  to  have  an  interview 
with  the  Dictator  in  the  middle  of  the  day,  August  the 
25th.  General  J.  F.  Bell,,  then  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of 
Information,  was  going  with  me.  Incidentally,  Bell  was 
doing  an  important  work  of  justice  and  benevolence  in 
investigating  the  cases  of  Filipinos,  and  let  go-  those 
who  were  under  arrest  for  political  crimes,  as  they  called 
it,  the  proceedings  of  insurgents.  Suddenly  there  came 
news  that  there  had  been  fighting  and  bloodshed  on  the 
picket  lines  between  Cavite  and  Bacoor.  An  all  night’s 
ride  was  before  General  Bell,  over  a wretched  road,  to 
get  from  General  Merritt’s  headquarters  to  General 


23 


354 


]\Ianila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano. 


Aguinaldo's  headquarters,  to  ascertain  the  truth  about 
the  fighting.  The  story  is  told  in  this  correspondence: 

“[Telegram  received  from  Aguinaldo,  5.13  A.  M., 
August  25,  1898.] 

“General  Merritt: 

“Concerning  trouble  between  Philippine  and  Amer- 
ican forces  at  Cavite,  I have  received  notice  of  the  death 
of  one  American  soldier  and  three  wounded.  It  is  said 
that  this  happened  by  their  being  drunk.  They  fired  in 
the  air  in  the  beginning,  but  afterwards  fought  among 
themselves.  General  Anderson  says  death  has  been  oc- 
casioned by  my  people,  on  account  of  which  I have 
ordered  investigations  to  ascertain  the  truth  and  demon- 
strate that  the  Filipinos  try  to  be  in  harmony  with  the 
Americans.  If  I shall  find  any  one  of  my  people  guilty, 
I shall  order  severe  punishment. 

“Yours  respectfully,  AGUINALDO.” 

“[Reply  to  telegram  received  from  Aguinaldo,  5.13 
A.  ]M.,  August  25,  1898.] 

“[Telegram.]  . 

‘Alalacanan,  August  25,  1898 — 8.05  A.  M. 
“General  Aguinaldo, 

“Commanding  Philippine  Forces,  Bacoor: 

- “Thanks  for  your  telegram.  I am  glad  to'  learn  of 
your  intention  to  investigate  fully.  I am  desirous  with 
you  that  harmony  should  prevail,  and  request  you  al- 
ways, in  event  of  trouble,  to  communicate  directly  with 
me,  as  you  have  so  wisely  done  this  time. 

“MERRITT.” 


Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano.  355 

General  Bell  and  I called  on  Aguinaldo  on  the  27th. 
Bell  was  grave  on  the  subject  of  the  trouble  near  Cavite, 
and,  as  he  had  official  responsibility,  not  talkative.  It 
was  a delicate  theme.  The  dispatch  of  Aguinaldo  was 
the  account  his  men  gave.  His  accusation  that  the 
affair  grew  out  of  the  drunkenness  of  American  soldiers 
was  a facile  slander.  There  was  a keen  feeling  of  resent- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  Americans,  that  a comrade 
should  have  been  slaughtered  and  others  hurt,  and  it  was 
understood  that  we  were  not  in  the  habit  of  getting 
killed  without  taking  pretty  good  toll  of  the  killers. 
Americans,  as  they  subsequently  proved  again,  are  com- 
petent to  get  value  received,  and  to  have  something  to 
show  for  their  powder  burnt  when  the  casualty  lists 
came  in.  Now,  Aguinaldo  had  been  incredibly  imperti- 
nent in  arresting  an  American  officer  of  Anderson’s  staff 
the  very  day  of  his  landing,  and  the  “little  Tag”  had 
been  otherwise  adroitly  playing  the  part  of  an  enemy, 
and  that  with  a thin  disguise  of  cynical  affability.  An- 
derson, on  the  4th  of  July,  had  written  Aguinaldo  that 
he  “had  the  honor  to  ask  him  not  to  interfere  with  my 
officers  in  the  performance  of  their  duties,  and  not  to 
assume  that  they  can  not  visit  Cavite  without  asking 
permission.”  This  is  pleasantly  worded,  unless  the 
words  are  subjected  to  scrutiny.  There  is  that  in  it  that 
is  angry.  There  is  a likeness  between  this  caper  of  the 
Tagalog — the  bloodshed  on  our  picket  line — to  the 
method  of  Aguinaldo’s  troops  after  a good  deal  that 
was  tentative  in  hostility,  when  they  forced  the  fighting 
on  the  4th  of  February  following;  and  there  was  an 
ominous  note  of  warning  in  General  Merritt’s  telegram ; 
“Always  in  event  of  trouble,  communicate  directly  with 


35^  Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano. 

me,  as  you  have  so  wisely  done  this  time.”  The  edge 
of  things  was  getting  fine.  It  was  easy  to  get  up  a fight- 
ing temper.  There  was  a chance  for  a sudden  and  great 
flame  to  be  kindled. 

It  was  the  skirmish  on  the  picket  line,  with  the  cas- 
ualty list  on  the  American  side,  one  killed  and  three 
wounded,  that  was  in  the  air  when  I crossed  the  bay 
and  had  an  interview  with  “His  Excellency.”  It  was 
said  to  be  agreeable  to  him  to  be  called  so,  and  nobody 
minded  much  what  they  called  him.  He  was  very  sorry, 
of  course,  that  such  a disaster  had  happened,  and  his 
good  offices  could  be  depended  upon  to  prevent  any- 
thing of  the  sort  occurring  again.  At  this  time  few  had 
never  heard  of  the  Biac-na-Bato  treaty.  Mr.  Williams, 
our  consul  at  Manila,  had  mentioned  it  as  a “cash  bribe,” 
but  did  not  give  names.  If  I had  known  that  Aguinaldo 
had  avowed  to  his  committee  at  Hong  Kong,  May  4th, 
that  'he  proposed  to  get  from  the  Americans,  to  arm 
the  natives,  and  then  to  use  the  arms  against  us  if  he 
could  not  get  what  he  wanted  by  a “written  contract” 
for  a “division  of  armament,”  and  as  for  himself,  that  he 
should  be  established  as  a tyrant  in  his  own  country, 
with  the  friendly  co-operation  of  the  United  States,  the 
atmosphere  would  have  been  changed  in  and  around 
his  headquarters.  What  we  now  know  he  had  done  at 
that  time,  that  which  declared  him  our  enemy  then,  and 
always  since,  for  there  was  no  possibility  of  consenting 
to  what  he  with  unyielding  pertinacity  claimed.  He  had, 
two  months  and  two  weeks  before  I saw  him,  opened 
correspondence  with  the  Spanish  Captain-General 
Rivera  to  tender  his  services  to  Spain,  and  on  frequent 
occasions  referred  to  Spain  as  “Our  old  Mother  Coun- 


Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano. 


357 


try,”  and  professed  an  affectionate  interest  in  her  wel- 
fare. He  was  a vigorous  and  ready  habitual  letter- 
writer,  and  when  I sent  my  card  to  him,  the  reply  was, 
the  General  was  ''writing  a letter  to  General  Merritt,” 
who  for  some  days  Had  been  subjected  to  his  unwelcome 
attentions.* 

One  thing  I ascertained  before  leaving*  his  house 
that  is  pertinent  now-^he  had  a policy  that  he  did  not 
call  in  terms  then  in  conversation,  one  of  "divided  arma- 
ment,” but  he  mentioned  it  and  said  to  me,  in  reply  to  a 
question,  he  wanted  a Protectorate — an  American  Pro- 


* It  was  the  impertinent  letter  of  Aguinaldo,  August  27,  1898, 
to  General  Merritt,  that  he  was  dictating  when  I called  on  him  with 
General  Bell.  A portion  of  its  impertinences  follow : 

“I  can  not  do  less  than  manifest  my  surprise  at  knowing  that 
you  have  formed  the  idea  that  my  commissioners  compromised 
themselves  in  the  conference  of  the  15th,  to  retire  my  troops  outside 
of  the  line  that  j'ou  would  designate.  .» 

“I  understood,  and  still  understand,  as  well  as  the  Commission- 
ers, that  the  evacuation  of  my  troops  of  the  posts  that  they  occupy 
to-day  on  the  outskirts  of  the  city  would  take  place  when  the  pro- 
posed conditions  were  accepted  by  you,  among  which  figured  the 
condition  that  the  agreement  (treaty)  should  be  in  writing  to  be 
valid;  for  which  reason,  not  yet  having  accepted  some  of  the  propo- 
sitions made  at  the  time,  nor  those  that  were  substituted  in  my 
previous  communication,  I do  not  think  that  up  to  now  I have  con- 
tracted said  obligation. 

“ If  I have  permitted  the  use  of  the  water  before  the  formaliza- 
tion of  the  treaty,  it  was  more  to  demonstrate  that  I am  disposed 
to  sacrifice  to  friendship  everything  that  does  not  prejudice  too 
much  the  rights  of  the  Philippines.  I comprehend  as  well  as  your- 
self the  inconvenience  of  a double  occupation  of  the  city  and  its 
suburbs,  given  the  condition  stipulated  in  the  capitulation  with  the 
Spaniards ; but  you  ought  to  understand  that,  without  the  long  siege 
sustained  by  my  force,  you  might  have  obtained  possession  of  the 
ruins  of  the  city,  but  never  the  rendition  of  the  Spanish  forces,  who 
could  have  retired  to  the  interior  towns.” 


35^  Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano. 

tectorate.  By  that  he  meant  the  use  of  our  navy  to  see 
that  no  European  Power  interfered  with  schemes  to 
make  himself  the  Ruler  of  his  country.  This  was  in  per- 
fect consistency  with  that  which  he  said  to  his  com- 
-mittee  before  his  departure  for  Cavite.  He  did  not 
speak  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  that  name,  but  what 
he  said  meant  its  application  to  the  Philippines  as  well 
as  to  Cuba.  He  was  willing  to  divide  armament,  and 
by  that  he  meant  the  armed  national  sovereignty.  He 
was  free  of  tongue  about  ‘'the  two  nations;”  one  was 
his  personal  perquisite,  the  Philippines;  the  other  was 
the  United  States,  and  assuming  equality,  at  least,  for 
his  end  of  the  earth,  he  was  willing  to  prescribe  what 
should  be  done  by  “both  nations.”  He  was  perfectly 
composed  when  he  talked  of  wanting  all  ashore,  and 
admitting  casually  that  we  could  float  in  the  water  out- 
side, and  drive  away  all  disagreeable  persons  who  should 
dare  attempt  colonization,  and  thereby  the  extension  of 
monarchical  rule  on  American  soil.  It  was  Aguinaldo 
who  laid  that  egg,  and  a goose-egg  it  was,  early  in  the 
season.  He  had  his  imitators  and  followers  in  that,  as 
in  other  things.  His  language  is  not  quoted  here,  but 
his  meaning  given. 

The  Americans  had  expected  to  find  in  the  Philip- 
pines the  product  of  a mixture  of  Spaniard  and  Malay, 
under  the  policies  being  pursued  with  her  colonies,  and 
they  were  aware  of  a Spanish  army,  largely  native. 
Aguinaldo  ought  to  have  credit  for  originating  the 
fashion  of  referring  to  our  Cuban  policy  as  perfectly 
applicable  to  that  of  the  Philippines.  He  neglected 
some  matters  of  the  highest  consequence  in  order  to 
draw  that  parallel.  The  Cubans  are  one  people,  though 


Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano. 


359 


a mixed  race.  They  are  of  one  Church,  while  the  Philip- 
pines have  a mingling  of  nearly  all  races  and  religions — 
great  communities  of  Mohammedans,  tribes  that  know 
nothing  either  of  Christ  or  Mohammed;  a thousand  in- 
habited inslands  instead  of  one;  three  distinct  races,  and 
forty  tribes;  such  a variety  of  humanity  as  exists  only 
there.  One  notable  distinction  between  the  two  colonies 
of  the  Spaniards  under  comparison  is,  that  the  Spanish 
army  in  the  Philippines  was  largely  native.  There  is 
nothing  of  that  in  Cuba,  where  the  Peninsular  and  In- 
sular Spaniards  were  hereditary  and  inveterate  enemies. 
In  Cuba  there  are  no  original  natives.  The  gentle  race 
Columbus  found  perished  in  slavery,  of  hardship,  cruel- 
ties, and  the  contagions  of  disease  that  poison  civiliza- 
tion. The  native  Cubans  were  exterminated — totally 
removed.  In  Cuba  is  an  immense  African  impression. 
The  blood  of  the  Dark  Continent  is  ineradicable  there. 
In  the  Philippines  there  were  no  Africans  until  the 
Americans  introduced  them — the  first  seen  was  a 
servant  of  General  Greene.  Philip,  who  imposed  his 
personality  and  his  name  upon  the  gift  of  Magellan) 
prohibited  the  introduction  of  Africans,  and  they  were 
rigidly  excluded  accordingly.  The  African  slave-trade 
could  make  no  landings  there,  while  in  Cuba  it  fur- 
nished the  labor,  and  brought  over  from  the  Congo 
coast  the  sharks  with  the  slaves.  The  frightful  tigers 
of  the  sea  were  lured  across  the  Atlantic  by  the  bodies 
of  the  blacks  that  died  during  the  fatal  voyage,  and  were 
thrown  overboard.  The  conditions  in  Cuba  were,  aside 
from  racial  and  religious  questions,  not  those  of  Luzon. 
The  only  similarity  was  that  the  capital  cities  of  Ha- 
vana and  Manila  were  Spanish;  and  this  difference  to 


360  Manii^a  as  an  Extinct  Volcano. 

remark : Havana  has  been  frequently  and  awfully 
scourged  with  the  yellow-fever,  and  it  has  never  ap- 
peared in  Manila.  It  may  be  added  of  Manila,  that 
neither  from  Bombay  nor  from  Hong  Kong  nor  any 
other  seaport  where  the  ghastly  fever  has  prevailed,  has 
it  ever  been  infected  with  the  plague.  The  elementary 
civilizations  of  Cuba  and  Manila  differ.  In  Cuba  the 
Spaniards  of  later  generations,  and  for  the_  advantages 
they  believed  of  sending  over  the  favorites  of  the  gov- 
erning class  for  a course  of  spoliation,  to  extort  from 
the  people,  themselves  of  predominating  Spanish  origin, 
their  substance  from  the  golden  soil  through  ofhce- 
holding,  and  the  monopoly  of  the  better  class  of  situ- 
ations in  business.  This  was  privileged  plunder.  The 
Spaniards  came  and  departed  in  swarms  with  the  regu- 
larity of  the  seasons,  each  harvesting  corruption  and 
fattening  on  the  marvelous  riches  of  the  island,  taking 
homeward  with  them  ill-gotten  gains,  leaving  the  native 
Cubans  poor,  proud,  and  trained  in  idleness,  almost  as 
helpless  as  resentful.  Nearly  half  of  the  Spanish  soldiers 
in  the  Philippines  were  natives,  and  very  few  and  far 
between  natives  in  Cuba  got  into  the  army.  Youngs 
men  of  the  Philippines  took  to  the  Spanish  army  as  an 
occupation  and  aristocracy,  and  were  good  soldiers,  as 
the  Spaniards  were  in  the  habit  of  saying,  when  under 
the  master  race  as  officers.  In  Cuba  the  temporary  resi- 
dents, the  “Peninsulars”  that  immigrated  to  crowd  the 
“Islanders,”  formed  a special  corps  of  troops,  the  “Vol- 
unteers,” held  to  be  superior  in  material,  stronger  and 
better  drilled  than  the  regulars.  They  were  not  made 
up  of  collections  of  conscripted  boys.  The  volunteers 
were  the  terror  of  the  island,  foremost  in  most  of  the 


Manila,  AS  an  Extinct  Volcano.  361 

tragedies  that  distinguished  the  Spanish  rule,  playing 
first  and  last  an  important  part  in  the  military  drama. 
They  added  to  the  military  strength  of  Spain  more  than 
forty  thousand  rifles.  They  were  between  the  regular 
Spanish  Peninsular  regiments  and  the  Cuban-Spaniards, 
and  had  a domineering  propensity  toward  both.  In  the 
Philippines  there  were  regulars  only,  but  the  ranks  filled 
largely  with  natives,  and,  as  the  story  ran,  they  were  reli- 
able as  the  northern  races  of  India  as  soldiers  of  Eng- 
land. It  does  not  appear  whether  Aguinaldo  or  Amer- 
ican statesmen  inclined  to  be  sympathetic  with  him  have 
taken  into  account  this  dissimilarity  between  the  popu- 
lations of  the  Spanish  possessions  in  the  East  and  the 
West  Indies. 

It  is  the  key  of  the  career  of  Aguinaldo  that  the 
Spanish  army  was  in  its  fighting  men  half  Spanish  and 
half  Malay.  Aguinaldo  him.self,  after  his  first  exile,  be- 
cause he  was  an  enemy  of  the  Church,  managed  to  be 
trained  in  the  army  and  navy  of  China — a most  unusual 
course  of  instruction — and  then  served  as  a Spanish  sol- 
dier, so  that  he  did  not  fail  of  practical  military  instruc- 
tion suitable  for  the  ranks  and  capable  of  petty  positions, 
and,  that  far  along,  a smart  man  is  a smart  man,  for  a' 
that.  When  we  consider  the  proportions  and  the  forces 
of  the  several  races  and  their  training,  between  the  Span- 
iards and  the  Malays  and  Americans  in  the  Philippines, 
we  perceive  the  certainty  of  conflict  between  the  new- 
comers and  the  older  occupants  of  the  islands,  with 
a'  tendency,  in  spite  of  all  that  had  happened  under 
Spanish  misgovernment,  to  bring  the  inhabitants  who 
had  had  generations  of  experience  together  in  opposing 
those  who  had  so  recently  presented  themselves,  and 


362  Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano. 


were  proud  of  praise  as  liberators.  There  was  friction 
so  fiery  in  this  contact  that  an  explosion  of  war  could 
be  calculated  upon  as  confidently,  at  least,  as  the  patient 
prophecies  of  the  weather  bureau.*  The  evidence  easily 
admitted  scientific  attention  and  application,  with  ex- 
amples of  illustration. 

There  are  plain  common  causes  for  the  phenomenon 
that  goes  by  the  name  of  Aguinaldo.  He  is  not  as  pe- 
culiar as  representative.  There  are  millions  discern- 
ible to  be  in  a degree  like  him.  Otherwise  he  would  not 
be.  Great  men  are  not  so  different  from  small  men,  as 
it  is  the  popular  way  to  feel  and  to  say.  Much  depends 
upon  how  they  are  taken  from  the  mines — what  human 
ore  is  in  the  parent  pit?  As  the  world  goes  on  we  strike 
streaks  of  commonplace  development.  Men  who  are 
of  extraordinary  endowment  resemble  others  important. 
Men  do  not  create — they  stand  for  creation.  The  Span- 
ish army  of  the  Philippines  was  more  and  more  made 
up  of  Aguinaldos.  He  got  an  advertisement  when 
distinguished  by  the  confidence  of  the  Spaniards  in  mak- 
ing him  the  bearer  of  silver  appropriated  for  peace  into 
exile.  It  may  be  a sordid  view  to  take,  but  there  could 
have  been  no  more  conclusive  proof  of  confidence  by 
the  Spaniards  than  they  gave  Aguinaldo  in  his  letter  of 
credit  for  money  alleged  to  have  been  earned  by  him  as 
peace-promoter.  It  was  the  stamp  of  old  Spain  on  a 
young  native  that  he  was  worth  buying  that  made  him 
the  leader  of  his  people.  If  it  had  not  been  for  that 
bribe,  some  other  nobody  would  have  been  a great  man; 
that  is,  would  have  been  caught  at  the  front  of  the  move- 
ment that  the  American  war  started,  and,  in  accordance 
with  the  Asiatic  man-worshiper’s  mania,  hailed  as  en- 


Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano.  363 

dowed  with  the  supernaturalism  of  the  deeply-dyed 
superstitions  of  torrid  lands.  There  would  have  been  no 
trouble  finding  an  Aguinaldo  of  another  name — not,  of 
course,  the  identical  creature,  but  the  same  in  the  end. 

It  has  been  held  by  Americans  _at  large  that  it  is 
improbable  Aguinaldo  was  a triple  traitor,  grossly 
bribed,  false  to  obligation,  untrue  to  race  and  country, 
ignorant  to  the  extent  of  not  knowing  the  functions  and 
offices  of  the  governments  of  civilized  peoples;  that  he 
could  have  been  so  friendly  and  laudatory  to  the  Span- 
iards at  Biac-na-Bato  as  to  lift  a glass  of  wine  to  his  lips 
at  the  banquet  following  his  consent  to  sell  the  arms  of 
his  men  and  dismiss  those  he  had  commanded,  to  toast 
on  that  happy  occasion  the  royal  family  of  Spain;  that 
he  should  have  proposed  to  bribe  American  officers  of 
honorable  repute  with  percentages  of  contracts,  and  the 
American  Government  and  Nation  with  the  proffer  of 
Philippine  provinces,  and  to  divide  the  world  into  sov- 
ereignties of  land  and  water,  and  as  he  had  not  a navy 
take  the  land  to  himself,  and  give  the  watery  waste  to 
Americans;  that  he  should  have  approached  Captain- 
General  Augustin,  who  came  when  Rivera  was  gone, 
and  entered  into  corrupt  speculations  with  one  as  the 
other;  that  he  took  the  bribe  money  into  his  possession 
as  personal,  and  by  an  act  of  prestidigitation  caused  the 
sacred  public  funds  to  vanish  in  his  private  pocket,  not 
without  remonstrance,  but  without  reproach;  that  he 
should  have  appointed  himself  President,  Commander- 
in-Chief,  Chief  of  State,  Head  of  the  Army,  Dictator, 
and  appointed  also  all  the  Cabinet  officers  and  military 
chiefs  that  pertain  to  a great  Power;  that  he  wrote  about 
Washington  in  the  style  of  Napoleon,  and  yet  did  not 


364  Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano. 

know  that  the  consuls  of  our  country  were  not  empow- 
ered to  treat  and  contract  by  themselves  at  their  pleasure 
with  nations,  and  to  bind  and  loosen  the  Powers  from 
written  contracts;  that  he  should  seem  to  be  so  imbecile 
as  to  go  to  Wildman,  of  Hong  Kong,  and  Pratt,  of 
Singapore,  and  Williams,  of  Manila,  as  august, 'over- 
bearing authorities,  and  then  to  Dewey,  Anderson,  Mer- 
ritt, and  Otis  in  succession,  to  administer  as  he  should 
direct  the  Government  of  the  United  States  for  his 
honor  and  profit, — all  this  is  set  down  as  beyond  belief; 
but  it  is  all  true,  and  means  that  Aguinaldo  is  an  imagi- 
native and  representative  man,  and  like  goes  with  like. 

His  fancy  flew  far  with  him,  and  his  egotism,  the 
very  faculty  of  irresponsible  command,  was  exalted. 
The  talent  of  command  and  execution  was  strong  within 
him.  Modesty”  never  embarrassed  him,  and  his  inordi- 
nate, indurated,  exclusive,  selfishness  far  exceeded,  for 
the  purposes  of  his  ambition,  intelligence  and  intellec- 
tuality. There  must  have  been  centuries  of  preparation 
for  such  an  individuality  to  arise  on  Philippine  soil  in 
the  shadows  and  the  airs,  the  burning  blood  and  brood- 
ing brain  of  Asia. 

The  Spanish-Americaii  War  came  oh,  and  found 
Aguinaldo  in  exile  and  far  away  from  his  exile’s  home. 
He  was  exiled  with  his  own  consent,  and  was  absent  on 
his  own  business.  He  knew  he  had  taken  and  offered 
bribes,  and  Avas  not  ashamed  or  sensitive  about  it.  He 
was  planning  to  cajole  and  cheat  the  Americans  and  the 
Spaniards,  turn  about,  and  was  not  the  friend  of  either, 
but  the  foe  of  both,  with  the  lofty  conceit  in  him  that  he 
could  drive  them  as  a tandem  team  attached  to  a Tagalo 
chariot.  He  respected  himself  as  much  as  he  ever  did. 


Manii.a  as  an  Extinct  Votcano.  365 


and  aspired  more  than  ever  and  babbled  about  his  ideals 
in  his  proclamations,  to  be  himself  idealized  by  millions 
of  the  Americans  he  adored,  envied,  and  despised. 

Such  personifications  come  and  go,  and  are  costly, 
according  to  circumstances,  and  the  eccentric  attracts 
the  essential,  the  mystical,  the  material;  but  the  Dic- 
tators, -no  matter  how  they  arrive  and  depart,  are  never 
the  friends  of  freedom.  An  Asiatic  despot  does  not 
found  a government  of  the  people.  If  through  such 
teachers  the  arts  of  self-government  are  taught,  the 
object-lesson  that  corrects  all  before  it  must  be  the 
overthrow  of  the  idols — the  breakage  of  the  system  of 
dynastic  personality.  Aguinaldo  was  not  in  methods  a 
man  for  men.  He  was  typical  of  tyranny.  The  Govern- 
ment that  he  formed  he  spoke  of  in  the  first  person 
singular.  His  “My  Government”  was  not  with  the  “con- 
sent of  the  people,”  and  was  even  without  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  people.  The  fundamental  'dogma  of  his 
political  faith  was,  if  the  people  would  give  him  all  for 
liberty,  he' would  return  to  them  what  it  might  please 
him  to  hold  was  good  for  them.  This  was  his  New 
Republic.  It  was  an  old  one,  and  had  perished  many 
times  long  before  he  was  born.  Wisdom  had  known  it 
as  imposture,  vanity  of  vanities,  at  best  self-deception, 
thousands  of  years  ago,  and  only  acceptable  at  all  be- 
cause organization  is  better  than  anarchy. 

The  combination  of  explosives  at  Manila,  when  the 
Americans  held  the  Spaniards  in  captivity  with  one 
hand,  and  with  the  other  thrust  aside  the  Filipinos,  send- 
ing Spain  to  the  churches  and  hotels,  and  repelling  the 
congregation  of  tribes,  whose  homes  were  on  the  islands, 
back  to  the  villages  and  the  jungles,  was  as  fascinating 


366  Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano. 

in  its  possibilities  and  its  certainties  as  any  chemistry 
of  the  century  then  close  to  the  end  of  its  chapter.  In 
the  Great  Century  there  were  two  such  centers  of  incan- 
descence of  the  world — the  fermentation  of  France  that 
we  call  the  Revolution,  the  crater  of  which  was  Paris; 
and  the  dwelling  of  Americans  of  the  States  upon  the 
simmering  volcano,  after  earthquakes  had  shaken  and 
lightnings  illuminated  the  land  with  the  outburst  of 
the  stored  energies  of  devastation,  in  and  around  Wash- 
ington City.  The  Manila  peril  was  not  early  obvious 
to  the  common  sight,  and  American  officers  and  students 
of  history  sailed  away  for  their  happy  homes,  believing 
all  was  well,  and  celebrating  victory  and  peace  with 
honor  when  there  was  but  a thin  and  trembling  shell 
over  an  abyss  of  fire.  A bottomless  pit  was  under  the 
sod,  and  the  crust  hot  under  the  hurrying  feet  of  the 
children  of  all  the  continents.  The  city  and  harbor 
witnessed  a War  Congress  of  Nations,  summoned  to 
arms  by  the  thunder  of  guns  and  the  thrill  of  the  bugles 
that  gave  orders  in  martial  music. 

In  a lake  near  Manila  is  a low,  scorched,  and  rent 
mountain,  that  is  silent  so  long  at  times  that  it,  as  a vol- 
cano, is  forgotten  save  in  fading  tradition,  so  that  confi- 
dence grows  in  its  extinction.  But  in  the  midst  of 
forgetfulness  that  scarred  hill  is  again  tottering  and 
bursting,  the  skies  flame  and  the  steeples  tumble,  and 
there  is  another  revelation  of  the  fiery  heart  of  our 
planet — ‘‘lest  we  forget”  that  “the  earth  hath  bubbles  as 
the  water  hath,”  and  is  itself  a bubble  floating.  This 
mountain  that  hides  its  fires  may  be  accepted  as  like 
Manila  in  ’98. 

Aguinaldo  knew  the  Americans  were  stronger  than 


Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano.  367 

the  Spaniards,  therefore  the  people  in  his  way,  and  he 
hated  them  for  their  power,  and  sought  a ground  of 
common  cause  with  the  Spaniards.  He  had  the  in- 
stinct to  be  sure  Spain  had  fallen  in  the  Philippines,  to 
rise  no  more,  and  wanted  them  to  aid  him  repel  the 
Americans.  If  there  was  to  be  a Philippine  Empire  for 
him,  he  would  be  willingly  under  the  protection,  but 
not  the  sovereignty,  of  the  United  States.  He  wanted 
to  be  guarded  by  the  American  fleet;  but  the  presence 
of  the  American  army  he  felt  as  a menace.  This  very 
policy  was  set  forth  in  the  Hong  Kong  Conference, 
May  4,  ’98,  with  almost  frankness.  His  key-words  were, 
“Divided  armament.”  Writing  to  the  Secretary  of.the 
Navy,  June  27,  ’98,  Admiral  Dewey  said  of  Aguinaldo, 
now  famed  for  marvels  in  cunning,  and  matchless  in  du- 
plicity: “Established  self  Cavite,  outside  arsenal,  under 
the  protection  of  our  guns,  and  organized  his  army.  I 
have  had  several  conferences  with  him,  generally  of  a 
personal  nature.  Consistently  I have  refrained  from 
assisting  him  in  any  way  with  the  force  under  my  com- 
mand, and  on  several  occasions  I have  declined  requests 
that  I should  do  so,  telling  him  the  squadron  could  not 
act  until  the  arrival  of  the  United  States  troops.” 

Then,  and  in  this  way,  mortal  antagonism  appeared. 
No  divided  armament  was  possible  without  breaking  the 
peace.  Dewey  did  not  understand  Aguinaldo’s  am- 
bition. It  was  absurd  as  it  was  logical.  It  was  accord- 
ing to  nature,  at  least  in  the  tropics.  Aguinaldo  had 
no  occasion  to  be  philosopher  or  statesman.  He  knew, 
and  others  did  no't,  what  he  wanted,  and  lost  no  moment 
of  movement  on  the  line  he  marked  out  for  his  path. 
He  was  for  a while  the  only  man  touching  the  events 


368  Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano. 


in  Manila  with  a lamp  to  guide  his  steps.  He  was  not  a 
silly  child  with  clouded  thoughts,  but  an  Oriental 
dreamer  with  an  inspiration  he  had  faith  in,  that  he  had 
only  to  will,  to  be;  the  way  clear,  and  the  vision  a reality. 

From  the  moment  Dewey  told  him  he  could  not  act 
with  the  squadron  “until  the  American  troops  came”  a 
state  of  war  existed — existed  in  principle.  Dewey  was  a 
candid  sailor.  Aguinaldo  put  on  the  manner  and  em- 
ployed the  words  of  friendliness,  but  between  the  lines 
he  wrote  his  firm  purpose  was  visible,  and  through  all 
crookedness  and  hypocrisy  his  works  progressed,  and 
in  his  plans  the  greater  one  was  to  inflict  a catastrophe 
to  dismay  Americans  and  appall  Spaniards — use  the  city 
of  Manila  as  a burnt-offering,  and  mingle  with  its  de- 
struction the  slaughter  of  the  American  army.  He 
could  do  without  it,  for  it  was  a bulk  of  civilization, 
and  was  simply  to  be  sacrificed  to  the  ideal  Filipino 
Empire  that  must  begin  in  a victory  of  barbarism. 

How  marvelous  it  is  that  the  Spaniards  trained  an 
army  of  Filipinos  for  Aguinaldo;  that  the  Americans  de- 
stroyed the  Spanish  navy  for  him;  that  the  Spaniards 
gave  him  money  to  pay  the  expenses  of  his  journeys 
of  intrigue;  that  the  Americans  took  him  home  from 
exile  under  their  flag  that  was  dazzling  his  countrymen 
with  its  glories,  and  gave  him  the  prestige  of  triumph 
to  enlist  them  for  his  cause;  that  the  Americans,  though 
they  drove  him  out  of  Manila,  allowed  him  to  besiege 
the  camps  of  the  conquerors,  and  use  the  central  seat  of 
authority  over  the  Archipelago,  to  propagate  the  mis- 
sion of  the  Tagalos  to  rule  in  all  the  provinces! 

After  all,  when  the  Day  of  Destiny  came  for  the 
stern  trial  of  arms,  the  doom  of  defeat  was  visited  upon 


Oeo^l^^O'l 
I //)///e  z^/e/d 


(jEN,FUl^ST()r«/.* 

in  Potiyue  uniforn\c) 

4 


(dngres5/////// , 

Fur/sto/^, 
f/ie  Genera/s  , 
Fc(f/fe/r  \ 


' A/rs. 

I F/ffG^Zf/CZZ 
; Fga/JToM 


Manila  as  an  Extinct  Volcano.  369 

him,  the  Malay  youth  who  attempted  the  role  of  the 
Corsican  Emperor,  found  his  Waterloo  and  his  St. 
Helena — his  fatal  battlefield  of  Manila,  and  his  prison- 
house  the  palace  where  he  claimed  he  was  master.  At 
last  he  was  throttled  and  caged  like  a wild  animal.  That, 
too,  was  the  logic  of  his  life — a lesson  for  tyrants 
forever. 


24 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 
MR.  AGUINAEDO. 


What  Shall  His  Harvest  be? — Policy  for  our  Colonies 
and  Constitution  — Aguinaldo  an  Advertisement 
with  Millions  in  it — Let  Him  Quit  Business,  and 
go  into  Opulent  Private  Life — Can  He  be  Trusted? 
— Let  Him  take  an  Office  in  Wall  Street. 

There  is  nothing  in  the  personal  character  or  the 
racial  antecedents  of  Aguinaldo  that  permits  the 
people  of  the  United  States  to  rely  upon  him  for  any 
other  public  service  than  may  be  given,  by  a man  all 
men  know,  beyond  that  of  an  example  of  prosperous 
citizenship.  Two  things  related  to  his  condition  may 
be  held  assured — the  inhabitants  of  the  Philippines  will 
not  for  a century  be  capable  of  governing  themselves, 
and  the  Archipelago  will  not  for  that  time  be  fit  for  a 
State. 

The  success  of  the  English  in  bringing  order  out  of 
the  Malay  States’  confusions,  and  the  engaging  sur- 
roundings that  belong  with  stability,  are  the  symptom 
in  current  experience  that  offers  encouragement;  but 
we  have  not  in  the  Philippines  homogeneity  to  begin 
with.  If  all  the  tribes  of  the  Philippines  were  Malays, 
and ‘if  we  could  be  confident  of  as  good  administration 
as  the  English  of  this  generation  have  in  their  colonies, 
we  would  know  what  to  depend  on.  Thus  far  our  knowl- 
edge does  not  add  to  confidence  enthusiasm. 

It  has  been  found  that  for  purposes  of  military  man- 


Mr.  Aguinaldo.  371 

agement  the  Philippines  divide  conveniently  into  four 
departments,  and  the  precedent  vrill  have  influence  in 
fixing  upon  the  division  of  the  thousand  inhabited 
islands  into  territories.  We  could  not  well  arrange  at 
the  start  better  than  to  repeat  the  military  divisions. 

As  there  is  one  island,  Luzon,  larger  than  Ohio, 
and  one,  Mindanao,  large  a's  Indiana,  and  half  a dozen 
equal  in  area  to  Delaware,  the  task  will  be  too  scattered 
for  one  territorial  governor,  if  a part  of  his  duty  is  to 
make  himself  acquainted  with  affairs. 

We  can  not  now  take  into  business  consideration  the 
parting  with  any  of  the  islands;  but  it  will  be  an  inno- 
cent speculation  if  we  should  find  Mexico  willing  to  part 
with  Sonora  and  Lower  California,  “contiguous  terri- 
tory,’’ in  exchange  for  Mindanao  and  perhaps  a fringe 
of  southern  islands,  and  find  enough  to  try  on  our  “open 
door”  for  commerce  and  our  professional  statesmanship 
in  civilization.  Mexico  is  not  a foreign  monarchy,  but 
the  nearest  and  best  sister  Republic.  It  would  not 
harm  any  version  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine Ave  have  yet 
heard  of,  if  Mexico  acquired  a few  islands  in  the  South 
Pacific,  or  even  in  the  West  Indies.  Mexico  was  for  a 
long  time  an  agency  of  Spain  for  the  Government  of  the 
Philippines,  but  lost  her  labor  in  that  line  when  she 
became  independent  of  the  Peninsular  thralldom. 

It  does  not  seem  to  one  who  ventures  beyond  the 
commonplace  in  speculative  politics  impossible  that  we 
may  find  a way  to  limit  citizenship  that  will  not  conflict 
with  the  susceptibilities  of  the  strict  constructionists  of 
the  Constitution,  especially  in  the  States  that  have  made 
the  strongest  efforts  to  assert  the  supreme  sovereignty 
of  the  several  States, 


372  Mr.  Aguinaldo. 

The  construction  and  adjusting  administration  of 
the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  amendments  of  the  Consti- 
tution have  not  been  perfectly  satisfactory,  and  the 
States  where  the  color  and  labor  questions  are  most 
acutely  developed  together  have  found  within  them- 
selves methods  of  construction  of  universal  citizenship 
and  suffrage  that  only  need  adjudication  to  the  effect 
that  the  two  war  amendments  were  arranged  so  radically 
that  they  nullify  each  other,  to  solve  a very  considerable 
problem;  and  there  are  those  of  conservative  education 
in  the  schools  of  experience,  the  great  alumni  of  which 
are  of  the  highest  and  broadest  potentiality,  when  told 
if  we  are  to  part  with  either  of  the  amendments  that,  as 
the  case  exists,  automatically  nullify  each  other,  that  we 
could  the  better  part  with  the  fifteenth,  because  the 
fourteenth  has  a clause  that  permits,  with  a penalty,  the 
abatement  of  the  suffrage  extension  that  has  been  found 
distressing  in  communities  containing  majorities  of 
human  beings  who  require  ripening  without  too  much 
responsibility,  before  endowed  with  unrestrained  self- 
government.  If  there  is  a derelict  clause  of  the  Consti- 
tution afloat,'  bottom  upward,  that  may  be  struck  in 
some  stormy  vo)^age  by  the  Ship  of  State,  and  in  the 
night,  to  the  detriment  of  her  sailing  on,  it  should  be 
removed,  and  north  and  south,  far  west  and  far  east, 
within  the  Valley  of  the  Mississippi  and  beyond  seas, 
may  open  upon  a great  policy  that  will  commend  itself 
to  the  people,  who,  in  the  fine  imperative  and  rotund 
Spanish  phrase,  ‘‘Order  and  command.” 

Mr.  Aguinaldo — it  is  not  now  disrespectful  to  omit 
the  “Excellency”  or  “General”  since  he  “never  set  a 
squadron  in  the  field”  of  war  personally,  unless  it  was 


Mr.  Aguinaldo. 


373 


when  the  Boys  in  Blue  ran  after  him  in  the  woods,  form- 
ing according  to  swiftness  trying  to  catch  him.  Mr. 
Aguinaldo  can  not  be  wanted  in  any  United  States 
executive  capacity,  for  he  has  very  liberally  construed 
administering  oaths  of  the  most  serious  form,  and  taken 
them  himself  with  the  utmost  solemnity.  More  than 
this,  he  has  had  a habit  of  changing  forms  of  govern- 
ment that  would  prove  inconvenient  under  our  system. 
It  is  not  too  far  away,  as  we  nowadays  travel,  to  say 
that  Mr.  Aguinaldo  has  been  too  frivolous  in  every  re- 
spect, except  his  respect  for  himself,  which  has  amounted 
to  the  elephantiasis  of  vanity  in  the  estimation  of  public 
responsibilities;  but  we  may  add  that  there' is  a sphere  of 
usefulness  that  it  is  to  be  believed  may  be  congenial,  in 
which  he  may  be  fortunate,  and  confer,  with  good  will, 
good  luck  upon  his  co-partners  or  fellow-organizers, 
stockholders,  and  trustmen. 

Mr.  Aguinaldo  is  not  merely  a history-maker — he  is 
a money-maker,  and  the  cause  of  others  making  and 
losing  money.  He  has  shown  comprehension  of  the 
art,  talent,  and  utility  of  cash,  but  must  be  cared  for  in 
all  attentions  paid  him,  with  a view  to  his  welfare.  He 
has  had  a good  deal  of  the  shadow  of  human  greatness 
over  him,  though  the  fame  he  has  sought  has  not  car- 
ried him  as  a living  organism  to  the  cannon’s  mouth. 
He  has  enjoyed  exceedingly  the  bubble  reputation,  how- 
ever, and  now  he  may  have  a turn  of  thought  curving 
away  for  the  primrose  paths  that  invite  the  young  men 
of  our  age  to  seek  the  substantials  according  to  the 
yellow  gold  standard. 

The  first  item  in  the  newspapers  about  Aguinaldo 
was  about  money.  It  was  a telegram  from  Hong  Kong 


374 


Mr.  Aguinaldo. 


that  attracted  attention  in  England,  stating  one  Artacho 
had  brought  suit  against  Aguinaldo  for  a share  of  a 
Spanish  “dotation”  or  “concession  in  cash,”  dotated, 
conceded,  and  paid  Philippine  patriots,  of  whom  he  was 
one  at  that  time,  to  depart  from  their  native  land — they 
called  it  deported — that  it  might  be  thoroughly  pacifi- 
cated  by  their  absenteeism — and  perhaps  much  better 
and  smoother  stated  in  that  unmistakable  and  well- 
known  old  Spanish  style  so  favored  with  familiarity  in 
all  countries  redeemed  from  Spain,  of  sheathing  the 
sword  and  drawing  the  purse.  All  the  while  of  the  war, 
Aguinaldo  was  never  discovered  without  pocket  money. 
The  Filipino  Cabinet  officers  and  their  secretaries  and 
interpreters  were  always  when  traveling  supplied  with 
abundant  liquors — choice  wines  in  decorated  bottles — 
cigars  equal  to  Havanas,  cash  competent  for  contin- 
gencies. The  Imperial  Dictatorial  Presidential  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  and  Captain-General  must  have  had  a 
liberal  civil  list,  or  he  could  not  have  afforded  such  large 
liberality.  The  dignitaries  wore  diamonds  on  their  left- 
hand  little  fingers,  and  pointed  out  things  with  pride, 
using  that  finger.  When  the  wife  of  Aguinaldo  was 
taken  prisoner  she  had  nearly  ten  thousand  dollars  in 
gold  coin.  When  she  was  traveling  she  was  too  wise 
to  depend  on  the  silver  standard  or  paper  multiple.  It 
was  said  in  jest  by  a high  officer  at  the  headquarters 
of  the  army  of  the  United  States  in  Manila — the  mother 
and  wife  of  the  Dictator  having  arrived  as  prisoners, 
and  being  made  safe  and  comfortable  where  they  would 
be  respected,  when  the  remark  was  made,  as  the  ladies 
seemed  rather  cheerful  for  prisoners — that  nothing  was 
lacking  to  a happy  family  reunion  of  the  Aguinaldos 


Mr.  Aguinaldo. 


375 


but  the  presence  of  Emilio.  The  missing  link  has  been 
supplied,  the  aching  void  filled.  Emilio  has  arrived  in 
the  bosom  of  his  household,  and  shown  himself  suscep- 
tible to  the. calls  of  affection.  It  is  already  in  evidence 
that  he  has  inclined  his  ears  to  the  voice  of  his  country, 
which  has  been  whipped  in  war  in  all  branches,  civilized 
and  guerrilla.  He  heard  a voice  say,  “Let  us  have 
peace.”  He  has  heard  the  opinions  of  his  many  gen- 
erals and  some  of  his  home-guard  of  statesmen,  and  all 
begged  him  pathetically,  as  Nero  is  solicited  in  the  Quo 
Vadis  play,  to  care  for  his  tenor  notes — to  be  good  to 
himself — and  he  has  reconsidered  all  the  old  oaths  he  has 
taken,  and  has  sworn  again — sworn  off,  as  it  were, 
as  Old  Rip  did,  meaning  well — reformed  himself,  by 
taking  oath  enough  to  swallow  all  the  rest — Moses’  rod 
like — and  now  he  is  redeemed,  if  not  regenerated  or 
disenthralled.  He  is  a sworn  vassal  of  the  United  States. 
He  should  be  removed  from  the  environment  and  perils 
of  some  of  the  temptations  of  official  public  life,  and  go 
into  business. 

He  would  be  a fine  figure-head  for  a business  house, 
a palatial  and  colossal  establishment,  in  Manila — to  go 
into,  and  get  out  too,  at  the  right  time — gold,  oil,  the 
twenty  kinds  of  native  hardwoods,  the  tobacco,  hemp, 
rice,  sugar,  coffee — anything,  everything,  a thousand 
tropical  islands  afford.  He  can  have  branches  in  San 
Francisco,  Denver,  Omaha,  St.  Louis,  Chicago,  Cincin- 
nati, Cleveland,  New  York,  London,  and  Hong  Kong. 
The  latter  is  the  greatest  city  he  ever  saw.  Agoncillo 
can  tell  him  better  than  to  make  up  his  mind  until  he 
sees  Paris.  Sixto  Lopez  can  tell  him  of  Boston.  There 
can  be  gigantic  developments  of  resources — promotions 


376 


Mr.  Aguinaldo.  . 


of  gilt-edged  stock,  trust  combinations,  all  the  million- 
aire’s machinery  of  this  age  of  the  world.  He,  as  an 
advertisement,  can  make  millions  for  himself  and  others. 
He  can  have  an  office  in  Wall  Street — a splendid  apart- 
ment in  a sky-scraper — participate  in  the  Waldorf  func- 
tions; have  special  wires  from  his  private  office  in  the 
twentieth  story  to  forty  cities;  be  interviewed  every  day; 
see  his  portraits  in  the  papers  more  and  more;  go  to 
Washington  and  see  how  great  the  influence  of  consuls 
at  the  ends  of  the  earth  is  in  the  State  Department — 
make  the  acquaintance  of  the  real  diplomats;  pay  his 
respects  to  the  real  President,  twice  elected,  of  a real 
Republic — millions  of  free  votes  given  him;  visit  Eu- 
rope; be  as  great  a man  as  Oom  Paul;  find  that  there 
are  gold-mines  in  the  governments  of  our  municipalities 
surpassing  in  certainty  those  in  vSouth  Africa.  He  can 
have  a partnership  with  the  Tammany  Tiger,  and, with 
sleeker  animals  in  other  cities;  select  an  island  in  the 
summer  seas,  far  off  west  or  east  as  men  may  sail  or 
steam  over  the  blue  convexities  of  the  gigantic  ocean, 
and  then  go  in  for  a private  residence  with  cloud-capped 
towers;  build  a palace  surpassing  that  of  the  stately 
dome  in  Xanadu, 

“ Where  Alph  the  sacred  river  ran,” 

and  provide  for  his  private  capital  a city  of  the  castles 
of  Spain,  his  beloved  and  revered  old  mother;  summon- 
ing the  high  Art  Architects  to  outbuild  for  him  the 
cathedrals  of  Europe  and  the  temples  of  India. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 


THE  CAPTIVE  IN  THE  PALACE. 


The  Pathos  of  Aguinaldo’s  Case — The  Part  He  Played 
was  According  to  His  Make-up — He  was  Not  a 
Napoleon — Not  a Corsican,  but  a Tagalo — He 
Knew  what  Superior  Force  was  before  he  was  a 
Prisoner — His  Guerrilla  War  Responsibility — His 
Address  of  Surrender  to  the  United  States,  and 
its  Construction — He  has  Rented  a House — Fitz- 
hugh  Lee  on  Fred  Funston — Beautiful  Speech  of 
Fred’s  Father — Put  it  in  the  Schoolbooks; 

HE  story  of  Aguinaldo  a prisoner  in  the  palace 


1 where  the  rulers  of  his  native  land  have  lived  in 
pomp — and  he  had  for  a little  time  fought  to  succeed 
them — is  not  lacking  in  pathos;  for  as  he  came  into  the 
world  and  found  it,  he  is  not  to  be  tried  by  the  tests, 
when  his  conduct  is  characterized,  applicable  with  se- 
verity to  those  of  cooler  climes,  fairer  hopes,  broader 
chances,  better  schools,  and  brighter  scenes.  He  was  a 
poor  boy  of  a subordinated  race.  The  civilization  that 
dawned  upon  a land  where  there  was  darkness  had  for 
representatives,  taskmasters  whose  teaching  of  human 
rights  was  in  the  interest  of  the  few.  The  stars  did  not 
seem  to  shine  for  the  many.  The  army  and  the  Church 
told  the  same  cloudy  story  for  manhood.  While  the 
fields  and  forests  bloomed,  there  was  a darkened  firma- 


37^  The  Captive  in  the  Palace. 

ment.  Whittier  wrote  the  Prayer  and  Song  of  the 
Black  Man : 

“We  pray  the  Lord  He  show  us  signs 
We  some  day  shall  be  free; 

The  north  wind  told  it  to  the  pines, 

And  the  wild  duck  to  the  sea.” 

There  was  a white  light  from  the  East  shining  in 
America  that  touched  the  black  man’s  uplifted  eyes, 
but  the  Great  Country  that  faced  over  the  oceans  the 
rising  and  setting  suns,  welcomed  the  children  of  the 
East,  but  not  of  the  West;  and  the  Yellow  and  Brown 
men  dwelling  in  the  sunset  lands,  the  majority  of  the 
human  race,  were  restrained  of  liberty  of  emigration  to 
the  Morning  Country,  where  the  rule  of  the  majority  of 
men  was  the  law,  the  tradition,  and  the  boast. 

The  Portugese  navigator,  voyaging  west,  found 
the  farthest  Archipelago  of  the  Pacific;  and  as  he  had 
sailed  from  the  sun,  it  fell,  by  the  arbitraton  of  the  later 
and  greater  Rome,  under  the  sovereignty  of  Spain. 
Centuries  passed,  and  war  in  the  West  Indies  kindled 
war  in  the  East  Indies.  A fleet  came  from  the  land 
Columbus  found,  to  disinherit  Spain;  the  prows  of  the 
warships  of  America  plowed  the  Orient  that  held  the 
treasures  of  which  Columbus  dreamed;  and  the  ships 
from  the  East  met  the  ships  that  came  from  the  West. 
Then  the  squadron  of  the  Spaniard  was  not.  The  mighty 
hand  of  the  American  Republic  was  laid  upon  the  islands 
of  Asia,  and  was  a power  on  the  shores  of  the  Ancient 
Mother  Continent.  Unhappily  the  young  man  des- 
tined to  become  conspicuous  in  revolutionary  war — the 
first  between  a kingdom  and  a Republic  in  Asia — failed 
in  his  understanding  that  the  welfare  of  his  race  and 


The  Captive  in  the  Palace. 


379 


the  millions  that  dwelt  on  the  thousand  islands  of  Philip 
was  largely  confided  to  him,  not  for  further  fostering  of 
tyranny,  but  to  open  a door  in  the  venerable  walls  that 
sheltered  immemorial  dynasties,  and  prepare  the  way 
for  liberty,  for  the  founding  of  an  Asiatic  Republic. 

The  young  man  of  the  shadow-tinged  blood  of  the 
Orient  failed  to  comprehend  the  one  opportunity  of 
thousands  of  years,  and  confide  in  the  flag  of  the  Stars 
• of  America.  There  was  an  army  and  a province  in  his 
hand,  gained  by  no  virtue  or  strength,  no  act  of  his 
own — an  army  that  should  have  been  for  freedom;  but 
when  the  parting  of  the  ways  was  reached,  Emilio  Agui- 
naldo  was  not  a Republican,  not  a Democrat,  but  a Dic- 
tator, and  for  Spain  as  against  America — forAhe  dead, 
rather  than  the  living.  This  mad  choice  was  not  made 
through  any  mistake  as  to  duty  that  keeping  faith  with 
the  people  imposed — it  was  the  way  chosen  for  a motive 
.utterly  personal.  Aguinaldo  was  not  for  the  people, 
but  for  himself.  He  conspired  and  fought  against  Lib- 
erty. He  was  not  informed  of  the  forces  changing  the 
face  of  the  earth.  More  than  a year  he  had  been  in 
hiding — a hunted  man — when  a strong  hand,  unex- 
pected as  though  it  had  been  on  an  arm  reaching  from 
the  sky,  seized  him,  and  drew  him  to  the  palace  a Cap- 
tive. There  his  wife  and  mother  came  to  him  free.  The 
wife  had  fled  with  gold,  and  could  not  vanish  in  the 
jungles,  or  walk  with  her  burden  in  darkness,  and  had 
been  sheltered  in  Manila  under  the  flag  of  that  freedom 
which  has  meant  a change  of  the  course  of  destiny 
for  our  new  possession,  from  one-man  rule  to  all-men 
rulers. 

That  which  prevented  Aguinaldo  from  being  the 


380  The  Captive  in  the  Palace. 

friend  and  ally  of  Americans,  that  he  professed  and 
promised  to  be,  was  the  ambition  he  and  his  friends  had 
to  be  what  Spain  had  been,  master  of  millions  to  im- 
poverish industries,  oppress  the  people,  and  be  spoilers 
of  the  land.  The  Filipinos  have  merits  that  appeal  to 
the  kindliness  of  those  who  have  for  generations  had 
more  light,  breathed  air  that  imparted  manly  vitality 
and  the  immortal  inspirations.  The  Filipino  is  indus- 
trious, he  has  intelligence;  but  he  is  a Malay  imitation 
of  a tropical  Spaniard,  and  the  fatality  that  is  in  his 
blood  and  education  is  that  when  he  is  empowered  and 
has  authority,  he  does  as  he  thinks  a Spaniard  would  do 
in  his  place.  The  model  is  not  excellent,  and  the  im- 
personation an  evil  mockery.  Aguinaldo  has  acted  up 
to  his  teachings.  He  sought  to  place  himself  so  that 
he*  could  get  the  winnings  of  the  war,  and  it  was  accord- 
ing to  his  sense  of  honor  that  he  should  cheat  the  com- 
batants and  betray  both  for  the  realization  of  his  own 
purposes.  His  idea  of  patriotism  was  that  he  should 
please  and  help  himself.  He  brought  terrible  losses 
upon  his  people.  He  had  power,  and  used  it  as  a ruth- 
less, remorseless  tyrant.  He  is  superstitious,  and  had 
no  other  conception,  when  he  found  an  army  commanded 
by  himself,  than  that  he  was  a man  born  to  be  Imperial. 
He  said  he  could  not  refuse  the  oflerings  of  Providence. 
As  an  Asiatic,  he  could  not  well  know  better.  He  would 
have  been  the  rarely  glorious  man  of  an  age  and  race, 
if  he  could  have  been  superior  to  his  surroundings.  He 
could  not;  and  felt  he  had  fought  the  fights  appointed 
for  him,  and  as  he  could  not,  a prisoner,  make  terms, 
he  could  find  justification  for  sparing  scenes  of 
slaughter.  His  language  is,  he  submits  to  an  ‘hrresist- 


The  Captive  in  the  Palace.  381 

ible  power,”  and  no  man  so  confronted  can  do  other- 
wise than  he,  unless  moved  by  the  invincible  spirit  of 
sacrifice,  that  is  taught  and  teaches  the  way  to  gain  all 
is  to  cast  away  all  It  was  Hebrew  wisdom  of  slow 
growth  through  thousands  of  years  that  reached  that 
altitude.  It  was  an  impossibility  for  one  of  Malay  and 
Chinese  blood.  In  his  prison,  Aguinaldo  was  agitated, 
consulted  his  friends,  and  for  a time  was  obdurate.  The 
evidence  was  the  time  had  come  for  him  to  submit. 
The  mystics  who  respect  nothing  else  revere  superior 
force.  Probably  he  knew  little  of  Napoleon.  He  was 
easily  possessed  of  a few  commonplaces  about  Washing- 
ton, but  he  was  too  conscious  of  himself  to  play  the 
part  of  another.  Presumably,  he  had  heard  of  Na- 
poleon, the  most  imperious  of  intellectual  emperors, 
but  not  enough  to  parallel  his  own  situation  with  that 
of  the  Conqueror,  who  parceled  out  kingdoms  at  his 
pleasure  and  carved  Europe  with  his  sword.  The  time 
came  when  the  Caesar  of  his  thousand  years,  the  man 
of  the  Star  and  the  Eagles,  the  Cocked  Hat  and  Gray 
Coat,  felt  that  even  he  must  surrender  for  the  sake  of 
France;  that  the  highest  duty  was  to  make  peace.  Agui- 
naldo’s  procrastination  of  surrender  is  not  an  imitation, 
but  it  is  like  the  bulletin  of  submission  to  fate,  when 
Napoleon  appealed  to  generosity,  and  was  given  St. 
Helena. 

Aguinaldo  has  rented  a house  in  Manila,  and  there 
will  be  well  guarded  for  his  personal  protection  and  the 
public  safety.  He  would  not  now  have  ability  to  revive 
rebellion  if  he  cared  or  dared  to  do  it.  The  address  he 
issued  April  19th  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Philippines 
possesses  a certain  consonance  with  the  heretofore.  It 


382  The  Captive  in  the  Palace. 

is  not  the  first  time  the  Ex-Dictator  has  made  his  obeis- 
ance to  sheer  force.  He  has  had  education  in  force. 

The  insults  he  inflicted  upon  Americans,  and  pre- 
sumptions asserted  repeatedly,  were  unbearable,  and  he 
was  checked  in  turn  by  Anderson,  Merritt,  and  Otis 
with  stern  warnings.  Two  days  after  the  surrender  of 
Manila,  General  Merritt  directed  his  adjutant-general, 
Babcock,  in  regard  to  the  aggressive  attitude  of  the 
Tagalos,  to  “make  them  understand  that  they  must  not 
hold  a line  encircling  the  city.  The  commanding  gen- 
eral will  not  tolerate  a line  of  troops  or  works  which 
would  give  the  appearance  that  our  troops  were  hemmed 
in  by  a besieging  force.”  It  was  stated  that  the  insur- 
gents might  billet  their  commands  in  the  villages,  but 
“under  no  circumstances  will  they  be  allowed”  to  sur- 
round the  American  army.  There  was  only  one  thing 
to  do  with  Aguinaldo  from  the  first,  after  he  had  turned 
over  to  him  the  native  Spanish  troops,  and  that  was  to 
use  force  to  drive  him  back,  peaceably  if  possible, 
forcibly  if  necessary.  We  know  now  what  was  not 
known  then — that  Aguinaldo  was  in  the  Spanish  in- 
terest; not  our  ally,  but  enemy;  that  his  policy  was  to 
subordinate  the  United  States  by  commanding  both 
fleet  and  army,  or  to  support,  with  motives  of  his  own, 
the  sovereignty  of  Spain  in  the  islands;  that  his  part  in 
the  siege  of  Manila  was  a fraud,  his  troops  a nuisance; 
and  that  all  statements  to  the  contrary,  naval,  military, 
or  civil,  were  not  based  upon  information,  but  were  the 
filtration  of  the  falsehoods  of  the  insurgents,  and  mili- 
tary courtesies  that  were  strained  to  sustain  the  primacy 
of  the  policy  of  peace.  There  was  not  one  of  our  offi- 
cers who  did  not  exercise  the  greatest  forbearance 


The  Captive  in  the  Palace.  383 

toward  and  attempt  to  humor  the  frantic  little  pretender, 
and  treat  his  vanities  as  one  affects  to  admire  the  adorn- 
ment of  painted  savages.  The  Americans  for  some  time 
failed  to  realize  that  they  were  themselves  objected  to, 
that  the  Tagalo  policy  was  to  drive  them  out  of  the  land 
and  over  the  sea.  Even  now  the  anxieties  of  peace 
of  our  countrymen  and  their  civilities,  meant  to  abate 
the  piratical  propensities  of  the  insurgents,  are  quoted 
as  proof  that  the  marauding  greed  of  the  men  Spain 
had  bought  and  was  using,  should  have  been  submis- 
sively summarily  recognized  as  the  true  expression  of 
National  Republican  Sovereignty,  according  to  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  and  Constitution  of  the 
United  States. 

The  attacks  upon  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  for  the  Philippine  Administration  have  been  di- 
rected first  of  all,  and  with  the  greatest  perseverance 
and  indulgence  of  animosities,  to  the  assertion  that  it 
was  the  duty  of  our  officers  to  placate  the  natives  and 
win  them  to  our  side,  and  it  is  pointed  out  that  in  the 
beginning  inhabitants  were  all  with  us.  The  terse  truth 
is,  that  they  would  have  remained  our  friends  to  the 
end  if  they  had  been  capable  of  self-government.  That 
they  were  incapable  was  demonstrated  by  the  influence 
of  Aguinaldo.  He  had  to  deceive  the  mass  of  his  own 
countrymen,  to  arouse  them  against  the  United  States. 
They  were  led  to  accept  him  as  their  leader,  because 
the  native  troops  of  the  Spaniards  found  him  and  sur- 
rendered to  him,  and  then  he  quarreled  purposely  and 
made  himself  offensive  with  all  Americans  with  whom 
he  came  in  contact.  His  demands  were  not  tolerable. 
' The  only  way  of  pacificating  him  was  to  recognize  his 


384 


The  Captive  in  the  Palace. 


Dictatorship  as  a true  national  Republic.  He  would 
have  been  the  friend  of  the  United  States  before  he  was 
crushed,  only  on  the  condition  that  our  ships  and  men- 
of-war  should  aid  him  in  establishing  an  Empire.  There 
was  no  other  Avay.  There  was  no  American  officer  in 
contact  with  the  Aguinaldo  pretension  who  was  not 
insulted,  and  driven  to  announce  that  force  would  be 
used  if  continuance  in  a studied  course  of  overbearing 
vindictiveness  was  not  prevented. 

The  most  delicate  question  in  the  case  of  Aguinaldo 
was  his  identification  with  guerrilla  warfare,  and  his 
personal  ferocity  in  the  directions  given  for  the  murder 
of  sentinels.  General  MacArthur,  November  23,  1899, 
wrote  to  the  headquarters  of  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
saying,  “The  so-called  Filipino  Republic  is  destroyed;” 
and  he  added,  “It  is  a fugitive,”  and  the  guerrilla  war- 
fare would  be  the  irresponsible  acts  of  men  proposing 
to  lead  small  detachments  “without  a shadow  of  author- 
ity from  a de  facto  Government.”  They  would  neces- 
sarily act  on  “individual  whims.”  This  was  “individual 
action.”  The  Filipino  army  “as  an  organization  had  dis- 
appeared,” and  those  keeping  the  field  “became  simply 
leaders  of  banditti,  and  in  this  view  how  would  it  do  to 
issue  a proclamation  at  an  early  date  offering  complete 
amnesty  to  all  who  surrender  within  a stated  time,  with 
a payment  of  thirty  pesos  to  every  soldier  who  gives  up 
a rifle,  and  declare  with  emphasis  that  after  the  date 
fixed  the  killing  of  American  soldiers  would  be  regarded 
as  murder,  and  that  all  persons  concerned  therein  would 
be  regarded  as  murderers,  and  treated  accordingly? 
Such  a proclamation  would  have  the  effect  of  forcing 
the  generals  to  consider  the  expediency  of  continuing 


The  Captive  in  the  Palace.  385 

a hopeless  struggle  which  would  commit  them  irrevoc- 
ably to  death  or  life-long  expatriation.” 

The  objections  to  carrying  out  this  weighty  recom- 
mendation were,  that  it  could  not  be  published  so  as  to 
bring  it  ‘‘within  the  knowledge  of  the  ignorant  masses, 
from  which  the  insurgent  armed  force  was  drawn.”  The 
policy  would  have  to  be  uniform,  and  months  were  taken 
for  news  to  pass  from  one  island  to  another.  There  were 
American  soldiers  held  as  prisoners,  and  five,  thousand 
Spanish  subjects,  “upon  whom  the  insurgents  would 
retaliate  should  we  publicly  proclaim  an  intended  en- 
forcement of  the  law  in  all  its  rigor.  Our  mission  was 
to  pacify  the  inhabitants  by  acquainting  them  with  a 
knowledge  of  our  pacific  intentions,  which  a proclama- 
tion drawn  upon  lines  the  circumstances  warranted 
would  certainly  have  misled.  The  insurgent  leaders, 
civil  and  military,  were,  as  I knew  from  the  confessions 
of  those  captured  or  who  had  surrendered,  fully  aware 
of  the  penalties  they  invoked  by  adopting  guerrilla 
methods  of  warfare,  and  our  own  officers  had  a keen 
appreciation  of  conditions.  It  was  not  therefore 
thought  to  be  prudent  to  openly  proclaim  to  our  sol- 
diers that  all  Filipinos  still  bearing  arms,  whether  col- 
lectively or  individually,  merited  the  fate  of  robbers  or 
murderers  caught  red-handed,  for  fear  that  barbarities 
might  result,  or  at  least  that  too  great  a license  might  be 
practiced.” 

The  prudence  of  General  Otis  in  avoiding  extreme 
severities  will  meet  with  commendation,  but  General 
MacArthur  had  much  provocation.  The  guerrilla  ban- 
dits infested  the  country,  and  the  people  were  merci- 
lessly persecuted — the  ladrones  (thieves)  plundered  them 
25 


386  The  Captive  in  the  Palace. 

without  mercy,  adding  torture  and  murder  when  their 
extortionate  demands  were  not  promptly  complied  with. 
The  wealthy  inhabitants,  those  possessed  of  estates,  were 
in  a precarious  condition.  The  scattered  insurgent 
forces,  which  still  retained  some  form  of  organization, 
called  upon  them  for  contributions  to  the  insurgent 
cause,  promising  upon  compliance  to  protect  them  from 
the  cruelties  of  the  robber  bands.  They  demanded  of 
the  city  authorities,  appointed  by  our  own  officers,  the 
imposition  and  collection  of  taxes  and  the  sale  of  in- 
surgent cedillas  for  insurgent  uses,  on  penalty  of  con- 
fiscation or  destruction  of  private  property. 

Aguinaldo’s  address  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Philip- 
pines, issued  April  19,  1901,  was  in  these  words: 

'T  believe  I am  not  in  error  in  presuming  that  the 
unhappy  fate  to  which  my  adverse  fortune  has  led  me 
is  not  a surprise  to  those  who  have  been  familiar  with 
the  progress  of  the  war.  The  lessons,  taught  with  a full 
meaning,  and  which  have  recently  come  to  my  knowl- 
edge, suggest  with  irresistible  force  that  a complete 
termination  of  hostilities  and  lasting  peace  are  not  only 
desirable,  but  absolutely  essential  to  the  welfare  of  the 
PJiilippine  Islands.  The  Filipinos  have  never  been  dis- 
mayed at  their  weakness,  nor  have  they  faltered  in  fol- 
lowing the  path  pointed  out  by  their  fortitude  and  cour- 
age. The  time  has  come,  however,  in  which  they  find 
their  advance  along  this  path  to  be  impeded  by  an  irre- 
sistible force  which,  while  it  restrains  them,  yet  enlight- 
ens their  minds  and  opens  to  them  another  course, 
presenting  them  the  cause  of  peace.  This  cause  has 
been  joyfully  embraced  by  a majority  of  my  fellow- 
countrymen,  who  have  already  united  around  the  glori- 


The  Captive  in  the  Palace.  387 

ous  sovereign  banner  of  the  United  States.  In  this 
banner  they  repose  their  trust  and  belief  that,  under  its 
protection,  the  Filipino  people  will  attain  all  those  prom- 
ised liberties  which  they  are  beginning  to  enjoy.  The 
country  has  declared  unmistakably  in  favor  of  peace. 
So  be  it.  There  has  been  enough  blood,  enough  tears, 
and  enough  desolation.  This  wish  can  not  be  ignored 
by  the  men  still  in  arms  if  they  are  animated  by  a desire 
to  serve  our  noble  people,  which  has  thus  clearly  mani- 
fested its  will.  So  do  I respect  this  will,  now  that  it  is 
known  to  me.  After  mature  deliberation,  I resolutely 
proclaim  to  the  world  that  I can  not  refuse  to  heed  the 
voice  of  a people  longing  for  peace,  nor  the  lamentations 
of  thousands  of  families  yearning  to  see  their  dear  ones 
enjoying  the  liberty  and  the  promised  generosity  of  the 
great  American  Nation.  By  acknowledging  and  accept- 
ing the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States  throughout 
the  Philippine  Archipelago,  as  I now  do,  and  without 
any  reservation  whatsoever,  I believe  that  I am  serving 
thee,  my  beloved  country.  May  happiness  be  thine 

This  document  bears  internal  evidence  that  it  was 
hammered  out  with  toil  and  care.  Aguinaldo  consulted 
many  friends;  among  them  General  Trias,  held  to  be 
second  in  command,  and  the  address  is  the  product  of 
much  anxious  deliberation.  Professor  Schurman,  of 
Cornell  College,  the  head  of  the  Peace  Commission 
when  the  war  was  on,  states  the  important  points,  as 
follows : 

''First,  Aguinaldo's  recognition  that  a complete 
termination  of  hostilities  is  absolutely  essential  to  the 
welfare  of  the  Philippines;  second,  his  confession  that 
the  Filipinos  have  declared  unmistakably  for  peace,  and 


388  The  Captive  in  the  Palace. 

that  a majority  of  them  have  hopefully  accepted  Amer- 
ican sovereignty;  third,  his  assurance  that  his  country- 
men already  enjoy  some  of  the  liberties  promised  by  the 
Americans,  and  confidently  expect,  with  improved  con- 
ditions, to  enjoy  them  all;  and,  fourth,  Aguinaldo’s  own 
acceptance  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States.” 

A Manila  dispatch  gave  this  detail : 

“When  told  that  ninety  per  cent  of  the  population 
were  in  favor  of  peace,  he  responded,  ‘Even  so,  my  lot 
is  yet  with  those  upholding  the  cause  of  the  insurgents. 
With  their  consent  I would  quit,  but  otherwise  how 
can  I?  By  the  trickery  of  the  Americans  I was  cap- 
tured. Now  that  I am  a prisoner  I must  consider  what 
is  best.  Liberty  is  sweet,  but  those  whom  I deserted 
would  hate  me.  Hard  is  my  situation.  I would  respect 
my  word,  but  sometimes  I think  exile  and  imprisonment 
would  be  preferable.’  ” 

Another  correspondent  says: 

“It  is  said  that  Aguinaldo  is  strongly  adverse  to 
reverting  from  his  former  attitude,  but  that  he  must  re- 
gard the  best  interests  of  the  Filipino  people.  The  sis- 
ters of  Dr.  Barcelona  have  called  upon  him,  bringing  a 
plentiful  supply  of  linen.  Aguinaldo  is  well  supplied 
with  money.  He  celebrated  his  thirty-second  birthday 
the  day  before  he  was  captured.  The  birthday  festivities 
were  prolonged,  and  only  terminated  on  the  arrival  of 
General  Funston.” 

The  scene  of  the  acceptance  by  Aguinaldo  of  the 
conditions  that  constrained  him  is  sketched  in  a special 
cable,  thus: 

“Aguinaldo’s  consent  was  won  only  after  patient 
effort  by  Arellano,  who  pointed  out  to  the  Insurgent 


The  Captive  in  the  Palace.  389 

chief  the  laws  that  have  been  enacted  for  the  Filipinos 
by  the  Americans.  When  Arellano  had  convinced  him 
of  the  justice  of  these  measures,  Aguinaldo  said: 
‘Enough.  I am  satisfied  with  America.’  ” 

It  appears  that  the  ignorance  of  the  Ex-Dictator  of 
American  history  and  institutions  is  inconsistent  with 
his  literary  reputation  being  the  work  of  his  own  head 
and  hands.  He  consulted  a dictionary  a great  deal 
while  writing,  and  no  doubt  was  lost  without  his  able 
staff;  for  a captured  letter  of  his  to  Sandico  shows  he  is 
bothered  to  speak  and  write  Spanish,  the  Tagalog  being 
his  native  speech,  and  it  is  not  a refined  language,  but 
has  a fine  ring  when  rendered  well  into  Spanish.  One 
of  his  ways  of  soothing  his  restlessness  was  to  walk  hur- 
riedly about  his  room,  running  his  fingers  through 
his  hair. 

Forgetfulness  of  the  kind  of  enemy  he  has  been  to 
the  United  States  would  not  be  pardonable.  He  has 
rather  been  the  will  than  the  brains  of  his  rebellion. 
His  greatest  shrewdness  was  in  taking  full  advantage 
of  knowing  what  he  wanted,  and  going  with  resolution 
and  energy  to  gain  it,  while  we  were  in  an  unready  state 
as  to  duty,  and  fell  into  delays  that  lasted  six  months 
longer  than  they  should  before  we  had  a treaty.  Every 
moment  of  this  time  was  employed  by  the  Tagalogs  in 
doing  mischief. 

He  moved  to  his  house  near  the  palace  occupied  by 
General  MacArthur,  the  military  governor,  and  is  chap- 
eroned by  Colonel  Mallory,  a young  officer,  of  a family 
of  distinction  of  Virginia.  The  first  correspondent  who 
called  on  the  former  Filipino  Generalissimo  says: 

“He  appeared  to  be  considerably  worried.  He  has 


390  The  Captive  in  the  Palace. 

aged  considerably  since  he  assumed  the  Dictatorship  at 
Bacoor  in  1898.  He  refused  to  say  anything  for  publi- 
cation. He  is  afraid  that  his  statements  might  be  mis- 
construed. He  is  extremely  uncommunicative  even 
with  his  friends.” 

This  indicates  a change  of  mood,  for  it  is  the  manner 
of  his  days  of  ordering  and  commanding  to  follow  the 
Spanish  formula  of  supreme  executive  power. 

The  full  particulars  of  the  capture  of  Aguinaldo  show 
that  the  hearty  recognition  given  the  Captor  by  General 
MacArthur  was  not  too  strongly  drawn,  that  the  words 
were  those  of  discretion  as  well  as  enthusiasm.  General 
Funston  had  made  a study  of  the  subject,  scouted  the 
province ‘of  Isabela,  and  knew  what  the  people  were. 
General  Fitzhugh  Lee,  in  San  Francisco,  gave  this  inci- 
dent, the  most  interesting  that  has  been  given  to  the 
public  of  the  Kansas  hero,  and  it  is  a good  story  on  Gen- 
eral Lee  himself,  though  he  did  not  say  as  much  of  his 
own  generous  act  as  another  would  say : 

“I  remember  Funston  very  well,”  said  Lee.  “One 
morning  when  I was  consul-general  in  Havana  a hun- 
gry, hunted-looking  chap  appeared  in  my  office.  He 
said  his  name  was  Funston,  and  that  he  had  been  fight- 
ing with  the  insurgents  for  a year  and  a half,  and  that 
he  was  sick  and  wounded,  with  a Mauser  bullet  through 
his  lungs,  his  hip  broken  by  his  horse  being  shot  under 
him,  and  his  constitution  shattered  by  fever.  He  had 
made  his  way  to  the  coast.  I bought  him  a ticket  to 
New  York,  and  also  fitted  him  out  with  some  clothing. 
When  Funston  arrived  in  New  York,  January  17,  1898, 
a blizzard  was  howling  through  the  streets,  and  he  must 
have  shivered  as  he  limped  down  the  gang-plank.  After 


The  Captive  in  the  Palace.  391 

his  return  to  Kansas,  war-talk  was  in  the  air.  He  was 
appointed  colonel  of  a regiment,  and  you  know  the 
rest” 

The  marriage  of  the  General  took  place  during  the 
interval  between  the  Cuban  and  Spanish  war.  He  was 
with  the  insurgents  in  Cuba  and  against  the  insurgents 
in  the  Philippines,  and  has  a firm  belief  that  he  was  all 
the  time  on  the  right  side,  and  that  the  side  of  his 
country. 

The  speech  his  father  made  to  the  neighbors,  who 
came  two  hundred  strong  with  a band  of  music,  was  very 
happy,  and  had  the  substance  of  good  things  in  it  so 
handsomely  that  it  should  find  its  way  into  the  school- 
books. Mr.  P'unston,  Senior,  tried  to  avoid  speech- 
making, but  had  to  stand  up  in  full  view,  and  then  he 
said  that  which  will  have  long  life : 

‘‘My  Friends  and  Neighbors:  I am  sure  that  your 
presence  here  to-night  is  exceedingly  agreeable  to  my- 
self and  wife.  It  is  the  climax  of  our  lives.  And  when 
I say  that,  I do  not  forget  my  own  life,  which  has  not 
been  without  its  successes.  But  when  the  sun  is  setting 
low  in  the  life  of  a parent,  nothing  brings  such  deep  and 
unmixed  joy  to  the  heart  as  honors  to  one’s  child. 

“I  want  to  say  for  Fred  that  he  has  always  been  a 
good  son.  I do  not  mean  that  he  has  lived  a life  pre- 
scribed by  his  dear  mother  and  myself,  but  that  there 
has  been  no  little  meannesses  in  his  life;  his  ideals  have 
always  been  high.  His  associates  have  been  picked  for 
their  virtues,  and  he  has  sought  to  accomplish  some- 
thing in  the  world,  something  worth  doing,  not  some- 
thing merely  that  would  bring  notoriety.  I know  the 
boy’s  character  thoroughly — and  I say  he  was  always  a 


392  The  Captive  in  the  Palace. 

good  boy.  The  success  which  has  crowned  his  life 
might  well  teach  a lesson  to  young  men,  to  have  an  aim 
in  life,  and  make  that  aim  high. 

“And  so  this  glorious  news  comes  to  us,  and  is 
doubly  welcome.  It  is  welcome  to  us  because  it  has 
brought  acknowledgment  from  you,  his  neighbors,  and 
from  the  people  of  his  State  and  country  that  you  are 
proud  of  him.  And,  furthermore,  it  is  welcome  because 
it  comes  on  the  happy  birthday  of  his  little  mother,  who 
to-day  celebrates  her  fifty-eighth  year.’' 

Mrs.  Funston  stood  by  his  side  as  he  spoke  from  the 
veranda,  and  as  he  closed,  three  cheers  were  given  for 
the  “Little  Mother  and  the  brave  little  General.”  Just 
then  some  one  in  the  house  started  “America”  on  the 
piano,  and  for  half  an  hour  patriotic  songs  floated  out 
the  open  door  and  were  taken  up  by  the  throngs  out- 
side. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 


CAPTURED  DOCUMENTS  HIGHEST  AU- 
THORITY. 

Inner  Eight  on  Disputed  History — What  the  Captured 
Documents  are,  and  What  They  Prove  about  Agui- 
naldo — Themselves  Conclusive,  they  are  Corrob- 
orated by  Environment  and  Coincidence — Tagalo 
Treachery  and  Spanish  Co-operation — The  Truth 
of  the  Insurrection  Comes  to  Us  with  the  End  of 
it — There  is  One  Record  of  a Ballot  in  the  Junta, 
with  Thirteen  Votes — The  Attitude  and  Evidence 
of  American  Consuls — The  Outlook  of  Our  Orient. 

HE  captured  documents  in  the  possession  of  the 


1 War  Department  of  the  United  States  Government 
stand  for  what  they  say.  There  are  many  of  them,  vary- 
ing in  importance  from  those  that  give  clear  light  where 
there  has  been  darkness,  to  mention  of  matters  that  are 
trivial.  They  consist  of  private  and  confidential  letters 
written  by  Emilio  Aguinaldo  and  others,  without  re- 
serve, interpreting  public  papers  and  acts.  These,  to 
be  conclusive,  must  be  corroborated  to  fit  into  circum- 
stances and  give  local  coloring  and  characteristics,  so 
as  to  fix  themselves  firmly  in  association. 

In  the  case  of  Aguinaldo  there  have  been  heated 
discussions  as  to  his  motives  and  the  spirit  of  his  actions, 
the  integrity  or  criminality  of  his  conduct,  and  there 
have  been  broad  and  bitter  disagreements  and  contro- 
versies that  have  affected  the  public  opinion  of  our 

393 


394 


Captured  Documents. 


country.  The  captured  documents  that  are  of  the 
greatest  moment  are  not  letters,  but  the  carefully-writ- 
ten and  thoroughly-authenticated  “minutes’’  of  sessions 
of  the  Filipino  Junta  of  Hong  Kong,  and  they  are  the 
“Book  of  Acts.”  The  Spanish  of  committee  is  “Junta.” 
Insurrections  against  Spain,  at  home  or  abroad,  have 
always  been  in  the  hands  of  committees;  and  there  have 
been  not  infrequently  conflicts  of  jurisdiction  between 
rival  committees — wars  of  Junta  with  Junta.  Hong 
Kong  was  the  great  city  nearer  than  any  other  to  the 
shores  and  the  hearts  of  the  Filipinos.  It  is  an  English 
colony,  safe  from  Spanish  oppression,  free  from  the  mas- 
terly inertia  of  China,  or  the  hatefulness  for  the  Filipinos 
of  the  dominance  of  Chinese.  There  is  rancor  between 
the  races,  and  yet  those  of  mixed  Filipino  and  Chinese 
blood  are  the  most  fortunate  of  men  in  that  part  of  the 
world  in  making  and  keeping  money. 

For  a long  time  there  have  been  Filipino  colonies 
in  the  great  cities  on  the  shores  of  Asia  and  adjacent 
islands — the  principal  one  at  Hong  Kong — and  that 
man  of  the  blood  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Filipines 
who  grew  to  independent  fortune  was  happy  if  he  could 
make  money  in  his  native  land,  salt  away  capital  in 
securities  beyond  the  grasp  of  Spain,  and  follow  his 
money  to  live  in  Hong  Kong.  The  Hong  Kong 
colony  had  the  reputation  of  wealth,  and,  of  course, 
were  enemies  of  the  colonial  system  of  the  Spaniards. 
A Junta,  disposed  to  dabble  in  revolution  to  sympathize 
with  insurgents,  was  the  inevitable  product  of  that  soil 
and  air.  Hong  Kong  was  the  place  in  which  to  look 
for  a Junta,  and  in  the  Junta  to  find  a leader  of  insurrec- 
tions against  Spain.  There  are  few  things  proven  about 


Captured  Documents. 


395 


the  youth  of  Aguinaldo,  beyond  the  origin  of  him  in  the 
province  of  Cavite  and  his  boyhood  in  the  town,  but  one 
may  believe  the  statement  made  without  prejudice  or  to 
asperse,  that  he  was  in  the  service  of  the  army  and  navy 
of  China,  and  got  into  China  through  Hong  Kong;  and 
it  is  easy  to  agree  that  this  was  the  better  part  of  his 
education.  The  first  appearance  of  Aguinaldo’s  name 
in  a cable  dispatch  was  touching  the  attachment  suit 
of  Artacho  against  Aguinaldo.'*'  The  former  sought  to 
prevent  the  latter  from  disposing  of  certain  moneys  paid 
by  Spain  to  certain  persons,  who  had  agreed  for  a con- 
siderable sum,  and  collateral  promises  of  various  kinds, 
to  stop  an  insurrection  which  was  not  of  a very  serious 
nature,  but  served  the  Spanish  officers  in  charge  of  the 
Colony  to  make  money  out  of  the  Mother  Country; 
and  they  gave  a part  of  what  they  got  to  pacify  the 
insurgents,  the  manager  of  the  transaction  being  Pedro 
Paterno,  and  the  principals  in  the  agreement  and  hand- 
ling the  cash,  Captain-General  Rivera  and  General  Cap- 
tain Emilio  Aguinaldo.  At  the  time  the  Hong  Kong 
Junta  of  Filipinos  became  historical,  nearly  all  the  great 
men  of  it  had  been  participants  in  the  Biac-na-Bato 
treaty,  and  the  President  of  it  was  the  man  who  had  the 

* London,  Friday,  April  29,  1898. 

A dispatch  to  the  Daily  Mail  from  Hong  Kong,  dated  Friday,  says : 

“A  few  weeks  ago,  before  the  Hong  Kong  Supreme  Court,  Arta- 
cho, the  Minister  of  the  Interior  in  the  provisional  government, 
applied  for  an  injunction  to  restrain  Aguinaldo  (the  insurgent 
leader)  from  parting  with  $400,000  that  had  been  remitted  here  by 
the  Spanish  Government  for  distribution  among  the  leaders  of  the 
late  insurrection. 

“Other  members  of  the  Council  propose  issuing  disclaimers 
against  Artacho’s  action,  and  expressing  confidence  in  Aguinaldo. 
He  and  his  colleagues  have  devised  a plan  of  going  to  Manila  in 
their  own  vessel  and  have  a large  supply  of  arms  and  ammunition.” 


396  Captured  Documents. 

V 

money  in  two  banks,  the  custodian  of  the  money  the 
Spanish  conceded. 

When  war  arose  in  the  Philippines,  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Filipinos,  there  were  captured 
during  the  flight  of  the  army  of  the  insurrection  from 
the  second,  third,  or  fourth  Capital  of  the  Aguinaldo 
Government,  the  number  depending  on  the  turn  of  the 
question,  whether  Cavite  and  Manila  were  first  to  be 
counted,  or  the  beginning  admitted  -to  be  Bacoor.  The 
war  Capital,  at  any  rate,  was  Malolos,  and  precious 
papers  were  carried  away  in  haste,  and  the  retreating 
army  burned  the  houses  to  show  how  desperate  they 
were.  The  fate  that  befell  the  family  of  Aguinaldo 
overtook  the  papers  of  the  Junta.  They  were  saved. by 
falling  into  the  hands  of  Americans,  who  appreciated 
them.  The  ^‘minutes”  of  the  meetings  of  the  com- 
mittee, when  action  was  taken  in  the  matter  of  the 
Artacho  suit,  backed  as  it  was  by  the  Paterno  petition 
for  an  equitable  division  of  the  funds,  was  signed  by  eight 
of  the  participants  in  the  “cash  bribe”  treaty.  Agui- 
naldo was  sustained  by  the  majority,  for  the  greater 
number  of  the  patriots  agreed  to  give  up  guns  and  dis- 
banded the  immediate  command  of  the  “Chief”  as  he 
officially  sailed  abroad  with  the  money.  The  dissatis- 
fied, with  the  exception  of  Artacho,  remained  in  their 
native  land,  and  he  did  not  stay  long  in  China.  At 
this  rneeting  the  secret  history  of  the  sale  of  arms  by 
Aguinaldo  and  the  deposit  and  defense  of  the  money 
was  given. 

There  was  another  meeting,  the  “minutes”  of  which 
have  been  preserved — -the  meeting  at  which  Aguinaldo, 
returning  from  Singapore,  assumed  his  permanent  Presi- 


Captured  Documents. 


397 


dency  of  the  Junta,  and  pleaded  that  he  should  not  go  to 
Cavite  to  see  the  American  admiral,  without  making  a 
treaty,  a “written  contract,”  with  him.  Here  we  have 
the  only  record  that  exists  of  the  number  of  votes  cast 
in  founding  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines.  This  Junta 
was  it!  At  this  meeting  of  the  Junta  there  was  certainly 
a full  attendance,  for  the  President  had  returned  from 
Singapore,  the  Spanish- American  War  had  broken 
out,  the  Spanish  fleet  was  no  more.  Agoncillo  had  been 
President  during  the  absence  of  Aguinaldo,  who  was  re- 
elected and  to  be  reinaugurated.  A Vice-President  was 
to  elect  and  to  inaugurate.  The  minutes  declare  that 
when  the  votes  were  counted,  Don  Galicano  Apacible 
had  ten  votes,  Don  Rosario  had  two  votes,  Don  Luchan 
one  vote,  in  all  thirteen.  ,Now  this  was  the  only  appeal 
ever  made  to  the  people  to  voice  their  patriotic  purpose 
of  converting  a foreign  committee  to  a Republic  beyond 
the  Sea  of  China.  It  was  at  this  meeting  the  committee 
became  the  Republic  that  Aguinaldo  wanted  recognized, 
and  raged  about  the  injustice  of  nations  in  not  welcom- 
ing the  new  Power.  This  meeting  was  held  May  4th, 
1898,  fifteen  days  before  Aguinaldo  met  Admiral  Dewey, 
and  the  minutes  of  the  meeting  furnish  the  proof  that 
he  was  then  the  enemy  of  the  United  States  and  the 
friend  of  Spain  against  the  United  States.  Read  the 
proceedings  of  the  Filipino  Committee,  in  Hong  Kong, 
24th  of  February,  1898,  and  May  5,  1898.  This  volume 
contains  both  in  full.  When  the  latter  meeting  was  held, 
there  was  a temporary  President  in  the  chair,  who  stated 
that  Aguinaldo  had  just  arrived  from  Singapore,  and 
“must  now  take  possession  of  the  office  to  which  he  had 
just  been  elected.”  We  see  further  along  that  when 


398 


Captured  Documents. 


Aguinaldo  took  the  oath  of  office,  ‘‘Don  Dilipe  Agon- 
cillo  turned  over  the  Presidency  to  Don  Emilio,’’  who 
wanted  a committee  to  go,  and  was  brought  to  change 
his  mind  by  his  predecessor  in  the  Presidency. 

Agoncillo  thought  the  time  was  then  to  “arm 
themselves  at  the  expense  of  the  A}nericans”  That  is  what 
they  did.  Agoncillo  added,  “The  Filipino  people,  un- 
provided with  arms,  will  be  the  victim  of  the  demands 
and  exactions  of  the  United  States.”  This  shows  the 
anticipation  of  a difficulty  with  the  United  States,  and 
the  policy  that  prevailed  over  the  objections  of  Agui- 
naldo to  go  himself,  was,  that  the  chance  to  get  arms 
was  then;  and  to  do  it  at  the  expense  of  the  United 
States,  to  fight  against  the  States  with  the  arms.  The 
next  sentence  of  Agoncillo  was,  “Provided  with  arms 
[the  Filipino  people]  will  be  able  to  oppose  themselves 
to  them  [to  the  United  States],  and  struggle  for  their 
independence.”  The  Hong  Kong  documents  prove  that 
the  “President,”  Aguinaldo,  and  his  staff  of  seventeen, 
were  conspirators  against  the  United  States,  contem- 
plated, discussed,  and  decided  upon  a course  of  trickery 
toward  the  United  States,  that  could  mean  but  one 
thing — a profession  of  being  “allies,”  and  to  play  that 
game  to  get  arms  from  us,  and  then  to  fight  against  us 
for  independence.  The  inevitable  end  of  this  was  an 
alliance  with  the  Spaniards,  and  the  use  of  the  two 
armies — the  Spanish  and  the  Filipino — to  defeat  the 
Americans.  That  was  all  they  knew  about  our  country; 
but  hereafter  such  mistakes  will  not  be  made. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  sent  the  “min- 
utes” of  the  meeting  referred  to,  direct  to  the  Senate  of 
the  United  StateSj,  on  a call  for  the  papers  by  the  Senate, 


Captured  Documents. 


399 


March  27,  1900,  as  ^^copies  of  English  translations  of 
minutes  of  insurgent  meetings,  held  at  Hong  Kong, 
China,  February  24  and  May  5,  1898,  and  of  a certain 
other  paper  appended  hereto,  marked  ‘‘I,’’  said  docu- 
ments being  found  in  insurgent  public  records,  recently 
captured  by  our  troops  in  the  Philippine  Islands.”  The 
paper  marked  ‘T”  relates  to  the  “contract”  made  at 
Biac-na-Bato,  December  19,  1897.*  There  is  no  more 
carefully  and  responsibly  authenticated  official  docu- 
ment in  the  archives  of  the  United  States. 

In  Chapter  XV  of  this  book  “the  first  proof  of  Agui- 
naldo’s  treachery”  is  one  of  the  most  striking  and 
strange  papers  ever  “captured”  for  publicity.  It  is 
Senate  Document  208,  Part  3,  Fifty-sixth  Congress, 
First  Session,  containing  a letter  signed  “1-1-9-6-1-M,” 
“written  on  paper  used  in  the  private  office  of  the  Presi- 
dent,” and  “M,”  the  letter  at  the  end  of  it,  the  first 
letter  in  the  word  “Miong,”  and  “Miong”  in  the  Philip- 
pine Presidential  cipher  is  “Emilio.”  Captain  John 
R.  M.  Taylor,  Fourteenth  Infantry,  “in  charge  insur- 
gent records,”  Manila,  February  16,  1900,  certified  a 
translation  of  this  letter  to  be  “correct  to  the  best  of  my 
ability.”  . . . “The  handwriting  of  it,  as  of  other 
official  documents  accompanying,  is  that  of  A.  Valarde.” 

This  document  should  receive  most  searching  and 

*This  is  given  as  the  date  of  the  contract;  and  yet  Consul  Wild- 
nian  reported  he  remembered  the  arrival  of  Aguinaldo  and  party  at 
Hong  Kong  in  September,  1897;  and  the  Agoncillo  proposal  of  a 
treaty  was  November  3,  1897.  The  dates  are  a puzzle  if  the  contract 
was  not  made  until  forty-six  days  later,  unless  the  gun  contract  and 
two  provinces  tender  was  before  the  cash  had  been  paid.  Perhaps 
the  reconciliation  of  the  discrepancy  is  by  way  of  the  fact  of  two 
payments  of  |20o,ooo  (Mexican)  each,  that  the  first  was  an  advance 
on  account. 


400 


Captured  Documents. 


scrupulous  attention.  It  is  addressed  to  General  Diego 
Rios,  who  surrendered  the  Spanish  garrison  he  com- 
manded to  the  Aguinaldo  forces,  and  that  was  the  heav- 
iest and  most  embarrassing  shock  the  Americans  ever 
received  in  the  Philippines.  In  reading  the  letter  care- 
fully (pages  163,  164,  165,  166,  “Aguinaldo  and  His 
Captor”),  we  perceive  it  draws  the  line  on  which  the 
surrender  to  the  Filipinos,  rather  than  to  the  Americans, 
was  made.  This  is  the  stronger  showing,  because  the 
Spaniards  had  notified  General  Otis  of  their  readiness  to 
submit,  and  he  had  dispatched  an  expedition  to  take 
possession.  The  submission  to  Aguinaldo’s  forces, 
rather  than  to  the  fieet  and  army  of  the  United  States, 
shows  there  had  been  a “treaty,”  or,  as  the  Filipinos 
would  say,  “a  contract,”  with  the  Spaniards.  The  sur- 
render of  the  second  city  of  the  Archipelago,  on  one  of 
the  richest  of  the  islands  of  the  sea,  to  the  insurgent 
natives,  was  like,  under  such  aggravating  circumstances, 
the  loss  of  a battle  by  the  Americans.  It  was  a dis- 
tinct disaster  to  the  cause  of  our  country,  and  a victory 
for  all  our  enemies,  that  they  rejoiced  over  greatly.  It 
was  Aguinaldo’s  one  victory  as  against  us.  It  was  all  the 
more  disturbing  and  burdensome,  mortifying,  scandal- 
ous, and  disastrous,  because  we  were  not  at  war  with  the 
natives,  nor  had  we  made  a treaty  with  Spain.  It  was  a 
traitorous  intrigue  that  caused  it.  We  could  not  bom- 
bard the  town,  for  we  were  not  formally  and  actively  at 
war  with  any  organized  force  in  it.  There  was  a com- 
munity 61  good  feeling  and  bad  feeling  between  the 
Spaniards  and  Tagalogs,  and  we  were  held  up  as  a mark 
for  the  insolence  of  the  insignificant,  as  our  soldiers  were 
when  they  were  treated  to  the  baboonery  of  the  Tagalo 


Captured  Documents.  401 

tribe  and  their  allies  before  Manila  until  the  fighting 
began. 

We  presume  there  will  be  no  honest  question  of  the 
verity  of  this  letter  as  coming  from  Aguirialdo.  It  is 
framed  in  circumstances  that  assert  its  authorship.  One 
of  the  evidences  that  it  is  from  him  is  that  it  is  false  in 
itself.  The  plain  proposition  on  the  face  of  the  letter, 
and  in  every  line,  and  between  the  lines  of  it,  is  that  it 
was  written  by  an  ^‘ally”  of  Spain.  He  had  the  hope 
of  preserving  “from  the  shipwreck  the  sovereignty  of 
Spain  on  these  islands.”  That  is  the  kind  of  an  ally  he 
was  of  the  United  States.  Possibly  he  may  not  have 
thought  he  could  win  at  that,  but  in  the  event  of  loss 
he  expected  to  be  able  to  compel  the  Americans  to  pay 
a high  price  for  his  favor;  and  the  Spaniards  might  turn 
over  the  islands  to  him,  and  they  had  bought  him  and 
knew  the  argument  that  would  get  him.  Spain  had  not 
yet  ceded  and  sold  the  islands  to  us.  They  were  for  sale 
to  somebody,  however,  and  Spain  might  get  her  revenge 
for  her  awful  defeat,  by  helping  the  Filipinos  into  war 
with  us.  The  letter  would  have  been  of  much  interest 
and  import  if  it  had  referred  to  the  Iloilo  matter  only. 
It  goes  further,  and,  as  events  were  running,  far  back  to 
June  9th,  when,  he  says,  naming  General  Augustin,  in 
a letter  to  him  of  “June  9th  last.”  Now  the  conspiracy 
thickens,  and  the  treason  is  rank!  The  letter-writer 
takes  pains  to  say  Augustin  paid  no  attention  to  his 
June  9th  letter.  That  is  a smooth  way  of  not  offending- 
one  Spanish  officer,  while  attempting  and  succeeding  in 
beguiling  another.  Aguinaldo  and  Augustin  had  been 
communicating  by  way  of  Legarda  in  Manila  during 
the  siege,  the  Spaniards  getting  fresh  meat  through  the 
26 


402 


Captured  Documents. 


lines  of  the  Filipinos  on  double  passes.  Aguinaldo’s 
name  was  the  one  that  carried  the  meat  to  the  Spanish 
lines. 

The  letter  to  Augustin  was  written  on  the  very  day 
he  found  himself  in  possession  of  the  province  of  Cavite 
and  seven  thousand  guns!  Just  then  he  was  armed 
according  to  the  Hong  Kong  program,  and  turned  the 
arms  against  those  who  gave  him  free  passage  home  as 
a devoted  friend  of  the  United  States.  The  captain- 
general  who  negotiated  the  Split  Rock  treaty  and  helped 
divide  the  cash,  and  had  promised  to  stay  and  carry  out 
impossible  reforms,  was  in  ^ladrid,  and  it  was  time  for 
the  Filipino  salesman  to  arrange  a “contract”  for  mutual 
advantages  with  the  captain-general  of  the  period.  The 
conduct  of  Aguinaldo  has  uniformly,  from  then  until 
now,  sustained  this  explanation  of  his  character,  and  the 
cultivation  of  his  personal  ambition  and  greediness  for 
cash  in  bank. 

In  Chapter  XXI  we  give  the  full  text,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  a few  sentences  that  are  introductions,  and 
do  not  signify,  of  the  guerrilla  book  of  tactics,  prepared 
by  the  Filipino  Revolutionar}'  Committee  located  in 
Madrid,  Aguinaldo's  dear  “old  Mother  Countr}\”  That 
is  what  he  called  the  bloody  monster. 

The  Filipinos  have  a school  of  the  art  of  assassina- 
tion, under  the  disguise  of  warfare.  Madrid  is  the  place 
for  the  enemies  of  the  United  States  to  find  sympathy. 
This  book  of  “tactics”  is  not  a captured  document.  It 
is  a proclamation  of  the  adaptability  of  the  methods  of 
murder,  according  to  the  talent  and  traditions  of  the 
Spanish,  that  for  such  service  may  be  part  of  scientific 
education. 


Captured  Documents.  403 

There  is  another  document  not  captured,  or  secret 
or  lacking  in  fame,  kindred  of  the  Madrid  school  of 
assassination  with  Filipino  professors.  It  is  the  'Tn- 
structions  to  the  Brave  Soldiers  of  Sandatahan,  of  Ma- 
nila,’’ the  opening  feature  that  Aguinaldo  himself  de- 
signed in  preparations  to  destroy  the  Americans  in 
Manila  and  the  city  also.  This  document  is  dated 
Malolos,  9th  of  January,  1899.  The  Sandatahan  is  an 
organization  for  secrecy  in  crimes  of  bloodshed.  It  is 
supposed  to  be  the  most  intense  form  of  Malay  love  of 
country.  The  self-governing  Tagalos  have  the  idea  of 
very  private  proceedings  in  public  matters  deeply  im- 
planted, and  their  leader,  Aguinaldo,  was  at  the  trouble 
to  prepare,  as  a painstaking  labor  of  love,  a manual  of 
arms  for  murderers,  who  were  to  do  their  work  after 
the  manner  of  sneak  thieves.  Killing  their  enemies 
craftily  was  their  game.  One  of  the  consummate  artist 
touches  in  this  work  of  the  head  and  hands  of  Aguinaldo 
is  stated  in  very  simple  language.  This  statesman  says, 
^^One” — meaning  one  of  the  “Brethren  of  Blood” — 
“One  should  go  alone  in  advance  to  kill  the  sentinel.” 
That  is  not  hard  to  remember.  It  is  a case  of  perspi- 
cacity. In  order  to  do  this  with  ease  and  grace  and 
humane  purpose,  with  the  highest  motives,  this  should 
be  read  from  Article  4,  “They  should  not,  prior  to  the 
attack,  look  at  Americans  in  a threatening  manner.” 
Of  course,  this  is  a hint  to  be  friendly  with  those  who 
are  marked  for  murder,  to  be  pleasant  and  a lover  of 
Americans,  just  to  put  no  one  on  guard.  Then  comes 
the  nice,  stealthy  strategy  of  “one  man”  going  alone  to 
neatly  and  quietly  “kill  the  sentinel” — that  the  “attack 
on  the  barracks  by  the  Sandatahan  should  be  a com^ 


Captured  Documents. 


404 

plete  surprise.”  There  we  have  Aguinaldo’s  Washing- 
tonian plan  of  campaign ! Here  are  a few  points  that 
will  bear  repetition,  for  we  give  the  whole  paper  in  this 
volume,  Chapter  XVII. 

‘‘Article  2.  All  of  the  chiefs  and  Mipino  brothers 
should  be  ready  and  courageous  ’for  the  combat,  and 
should  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity  to  study  well 
the  situation  of  the  American  outposts  and  headquar- 
ters, observing  especially  secret  places  where  they  can 
approach  and  surprise  the  enemy.” 

There  is  to  be  a chief  of  the  bloody  brethren,  and  he 
should  “send  in  first  four  men  with  a good  present  for 
the  American  commander.  Immediately  after  will  fol- 
low four  others,  w’ho  will  make  a pretense  of  looking  for 
the  same  officer  for  some  reason,  and  a larger  group  shall 
be  concealed  in  the  corners  or  houses  in  order  to  aid 
the  other  groups  at  the  first  signal.  This,  wherever  it 
is  possible  at  the  moment  of  attack.” 

These  are  delicate  touches  by  Aguinaldo  himself, 
and  sketches  of  him,  therefore.  It  is  this  sort  of  warfare 
on  “Yankees”  that  is  taught  under  Spanish  auspices  at 
Madrid — it  is  a specialty  of  tropical  civilization. 

A few  days  before  the  news  of  the  climacteric 
achievement  of  the  Kansas  hero,  Funston,  there  ap- 
peared in  one  of  our  important  illustrated  papers,  that 
has  made  the  utmost  of  the  picturesque  in  the  Philip- 
pines, an_  account  of  Aguinaldo  at  Singapore  by  Mr. 
Pratt,  the  American  consul  then  there  when  the  Span- 
ish-American  W ar  came  to  pass.  One  of  the  mysterious 
episodes  of  the  life  of  Aguinaldo  was  his  visit  to  Singa- 
pore, under  the  evident  auspices  of  Mr.  Bray,  an  Eng- 
lishman, There  was  a certain  state  about  this  excursion, 


Captured  Documents. 


405 


associated  with  a ludicrous  display  of  caution,  perhaps 
meant,  in  the  minds  of  the  managers,  to  magnify  the 
proportions  of  the  mysterious,  great  man,  so  carefully 
guarded,  and  yet  so  eagerly  written  up  and  profusely 
published  by  Mr.  Bray.  Mr.  Pratt’s  enthusiasm  was  so 
warm  it  was  kept  within'  am  affectation  of  diplomatic 
restraint  only  by  subjecting  it  to  a great  strain  of  sup- 
pression that  soon  gave  way;  and  presently  the  consul 
was  called  to  order  with  an  unaccustomed  accent  of 
reproach  from  the  State  Department.  He  explained  his 
conduct  like  a gentleman,  who  felt  he  had  been  impru- 
dent with  excessive  attention  to  public  business.  Mr. 
Pratt  took  the  precaution  to  have  Aguinaldo  inter- 
viewed, so  as  to  know  just  what  to  depend  upon,  and 
then  gave  the  young  Malay  a fatherly  talking  to  about 
the  duty  he  owed  to  civilization  and  to  the  Americans, 
and,  above  all,  to  put  himself  submissively  into  the  hands 
of  Admiral  Dewey  and  obey  his  orders  in  everything; 
and  then,  as  a farewell  mark  of  the  highest  consideration 
given  the  most  famous  great  men — Aguinaldo  and  his 
staff — who  did  not  then  want  any  comforting  of  a pe- 
cuniary character,  but  were  very  dignified  and  self- 
sustaining,  they  were  smuggled  aboard  a steamer  under 
assumed  names,  and  hurried  off  to  see  Dewey  “at  once,” 
and  go  right  to  “co-operate”  with  him.  If  there  was 
anything  Aguinaldo  wanted,  it  was  to  co-operate.  The 
great  chief,  who,  as  now  appears'  was  in  funds,  for  he 
had  drawn  $50,000  on  personal  account  from  the  holy 
patriotic  fund  of  Spanish  silver  (“Mex.”),  arrived  at 
Hong  Kong  the  day  after  the  battle  of  Manila,  and  then 
did  not  want  to  see  the  victorious  admiral  at  all  until 
he  had  a “written  contract”  with  him,  signed  and  sealed 


4o6  Captured  Documents. 

and  recorded  in  the  ‘‘Book  of  Acts’’  of  the  Hong  Kong 
Committee,  which  is  the  only  form  of  Republican  Gov- 
ernment that  ever  passed  through  two  summers  in  Asia- 
The  reading  of  Ex-Consul  Pratt’s  paper  on  Aguinaldo 
was  like  the  Singapore  episode  a few  days  before  a revo- 
lutionary event.  The  Singapore  incident  immediately 
preceded  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  fleet,  and  the 
Pratt  paper  in  Collier  got  out  in  time  to  confront  the 
news  that  Aguinaldo  was  a captive  and  no  longer  dis- 
guised, and,  one  ought  to  be  able  to  add,  knowm  in  his 
true  colors,  which  were  Spanish ! Mr.  Pratt’s  paper  is 
an  agreable  bit  of  writing — there  is  nothing  in  it  and 
that  is  well  done.  We  are  told  of  the  fact  that  Agui- 
naldo was  a pleasing  personage  for  the  American  consul 
to  meet,  and  one  would  have  expected  that,  for  our  con- 
suls were  all  more  or  less  moved  by  the  climate  and  con- 
ditions of  responsibility,  and  took  comfort  in  the  passing 
shows.  Mr.  Pratt  remembers  still  how  his  distinguished 
friend  had  a room  with  a big  window  in  it  that  looked 
out  on  a grove  of  palms — a very  tempting,  but  not  un- 
usual, sight  in  the  tropics — and  he  had  a wonderment 
about  the  treatment  of  the  good  man  by  our  Govern- 
ment, and  complains  a good  deal  for  Aguinaldo — as  a 
great  man  lost  to  us.  Our  State  Department  did  not 
seem  to  take  so  kindly  to  the  mysterious  Malay  as  the 
consuls,  who  were  in  a condition  of  inflammation  of  the 
brain  about  their  various  senses  of  duty — their  fault 
being  that  they  could  not  let  anything  alone.  They 
were  all  right  except  they  were  too  warm-hearted,  con- 
fiding, and  simple  in  their  manners,  and  overdoing  in 
their  dutifulness,  as  they  comprehended  their  several 
vast,  various,  and  solemn  responsibilities.  With  the  ex- 
ception of  Mr.  Pratt,  they  had  not  been  accustomed  to 


Captured  Documents. 


407 


the  airs  of  Asia,  and  he,  perhaps,  had  had  a breath  or 
two  more  of  them  than  was  good  for  his  system.  They 
were  all  honest  and  patriotic  men,  who,  with  opportuni- 
ties to  do  a good  deal  of  mischief,  did  only  a little,  and 
that  in  the  old  line  of  trying  to  do  too  much,  and  doing 
it  at  an  abnormal  temperature.  Their  little  slips  on 
paper  with  ink  have  been  amusing,  even  a little  amaz- 
ing, but  not  injurious,  save  as  they  have  led  some  of  our 
politicians,  who  are  powerful  in  the  production  of  ideals, 
into  false  estimates  of  amateur  official  word-painting. 
Our  consuls  involved  in  the  Asiatic  end  of  the  war  were 
imprudently  zealous,  and  said  things  they  did  not  know 
with  an  unbecoming  assumption  of  the  higher  walks  of 
international  excellence.  They  designed  better  than 
they  did.  They  have  been  quoted  a great  deal,  and  in- 
terpretations placed  upon  their  utterances  quite  to  their 
disadvantage,  but  in  no  case  the  color  of  dishonor. 
Wildman  of  Hong  Kong,  Williams  of  Manila,  and  Pratt 
of  Singapore,  undertook  to  be  monitors  for  the  head 
of  the  Hong  Kong  Filipino  Club,  who  had  appointed 
himself  President  of  the  Philippines  in  a mass-meeting 
of  thirteen  committeemen,  and  recognized  himself  as 
holding  the  office,  and  also  took  cognizance  of  his  Gov- 
ernment as  that  of  a Great  Power,  offering  to  find  the 
United  States  navy  employment  to  check  European 
monarchical  colonization  in  Asia,  under  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  This  was  the  best  he  could  do.  It  was  not 
bad,  but  it  was  barbarous.  Mr.  Wildman,  when  bribes 
were  offered  out  of  the  Spanish  Peace  Fund,  and  Arta- 
cho  attached  the  bank  account,  wrote  the  whole  outlay 
to  the  State  Department,  and  though  he  had  a few  days 
of  deception  as  to  Aguinaldo,  early  in  the  strenuous 
season  described  the  Filipino  cobra  as  he  moved  in  a 


4o8 


Captured  Documents. 


shining  coil  with  a swollen  head,  and  told  the  silly  side 
of  the  wisdom  of  the  serpent.  Mr.  Williams  had  the 
weakness  of  credulity,  and  was  frank  to  fearlessness  in 
his  familiar  hold  on  the  handles  of  the  world.  Mr.  Pratt 
had  a happy  way  of  avoiding  the  bottom  of  the  facts 
that  were  not  suitable  to  his  idealities,  but  skimmed  off 
the  bubbles  of  the  fountains,  was  pleased  with  his  own 
affability,  and  came  out  strong  on  the  4th  of  July  for  ' 
the  United  States  and  the  Philippine  Republic,  with  its 
strongly  American  Hong  Kong  President;  and  he  was 
unaffectedly  surprised  when  the  Third  Assistant  Secre- 
tary of  State,  severe,  sensible,  and  exact,  dispatched  him 
a specimen  of  artificial  ice,  with  ammonia  and  other 
burning  fluids  in  it,  to  be  used  when  the  romantic  ten- 
dencies of  the  torrid  clime  that  tease  the  north  temper- 
ate imagination  set  in.  He  made  no  grave  mistakes 
beyond  believing  in  the  grandeur  of  the  Tagalo  tribe  of 
]\'Ialays  that  had  crossed  the  Sea  of  China,  after  starting 
a Republic  with  conspicuous  omen,  but  unlucky  num- 
ber, the  same  number  of  citizens  that  we  had  of  original 
States.  He  actually  believed  in  their  self-government 
and  the  republican  form  of  it,  gotten  up  by  the  immortal 
thirteen,  and  when  he  ceased  to  be  in  the  civil  service  of 
the  United  States,  he — it  is  our  misfortune— lost  in- 
terest in  current  history,  or  he  did  not  go  so  far  into 
it  as  to  assimilate  the  news  as  it  flew  around  the  world. 
He  does  not  know  any  more  now  about  Aguinaldo  than 
he  did  three  years  ago — he  closed  his  mind  and  books 
and  papers  on  the  subject.  Those  years  have  been  a 
blank  to  him  in  Philippine  affairs.  He  has  not  read  the 
captured  documents.  He  does  not  know  that  it  was 
soon  after  Spain  had  lost  her  navy,  Aguinaldo  was  will- 
ing to  give  up  Spain  for  the  sake  of  accepting  as  a 


Captured  Documents.  409 

present  that  of  the  United  States^  to  stand  off  the  navies 
of  Europe,  but  that  otherwise  he  was  a Spanish  sympa- 
thizer; and  Mr.  Pratt  does  not  shed  a ray  of  light  upon 
the  reasons  for  the  visit  of  the  Tagal  chief  to  Singapore. 
That  has  never  been  stated  with  the  purpose  or  the  per- 
mission to  tell  the  truth.  Perhaps  Aguinaldo  may  now 
state  the  facts.  Mn  Pratt  seems  to  be  shy  of  fresh  sup- 
plies of  truth. 

Now  that  there  is  no  partisan  politics  in  the  Philip- 
pine question,  within  the  common  senses  of  sight  and 
touch  of  the  strong-handed  and  clear-headed  people, 
there  will  be  no  sufficient  inducement  for  the  formation 
and  combative  assertion  of  false  theories  and  the  per- 
version of  plain  facts.  The  captured  documents  are  as 
authentic  as  any  official  papers  that  could  be  assorted 
as  specimens  for  the  historical  material  of  our  country. 
The  papers  found  in  Major  Andre’s  boots  by  the  card- 
playing cowboys  at  Tarry  town  were  not  more  authentic 
than  those  taken  in  Aguinaldo’s  baggage,  and  in  the 
cave  that  was  chosen  as  a safe  deposit  by  the  fugitive 
Filipinos.  Disputation  about  the  curved  lines  Agui- 
naldo followed  will  cease,  for  it  will  no  longer  serve  him 
to  be  a falsifier  on  his  own  account.  He  will  explain 
that  he  had  a right  to  prefer  his  “old  mother  country 
Spain”  to  the  new  and  mighty  master,  the  United  States. 
He  can  say  it  was  his  privilege  to  make  choice  of  the 
continuance  of  the  first  swarm  that  lit  on  the  islands, 
and  fearing  the  Peninsular  Spaniard  might  be  better 
(according  to  his  political  and  moral  philosophy  and 
military  ambition,  and  apprehensive  that  the  Yankees 
might  have  great  appetites)- — might  be  better  than  the 
continental  North  Americans. 

Aguinaldo’s  proclamation  of  his  own  surrender  is 


4^0  Captured  Documents. 

not  inconsistent  with  his  career.  He  has  known  how  to 
recede  when  he  struck  the  limit.  Told  that  he  was  not 
to  enter  Manila  with  his  army,  though  he  was  posed 
as  our  friend,  he  knew  enough  to  be  sure  that  was  not 
his  time  to  fight  the  Americans,  and  he  yielded,  and 
waited  and  watched  and  worked  for  himself.-  Ordered 
not  to  draw  military  lines  around  our  army  and  give 
himself  the  style  of  besieging  us,  he  desisted  for  a few 
weeks,  when  he  saw  our  peace  policy  allowed  him  to  go 
on  with  his  haughty  schemes,  and  wait  for  a better 
chance,  and  he  crowded  our  soldiers  harder  than  ever. 
He  demanded  the  Malacanan  Palace  for  his  own,  but 
retired  when  superior  force  was  up  against  him.  He 
agreed  with  McKinley  and  Merritt  when  he  saw  he 
must,  that  it  would  be  a mistake  to  undertake  “joint 
occupation.’'  That  phrase  was  only  a subterfuge,  for 
his  meaning  was  to  wipe  out  the  American  army  with 
the  help  of  the  Spaniards.  He  ordered  the  pure  water 
turned  on  in  Manila  when  Merritt  was  about  to  use 
military  force  to  compel  him.  He  found  bull-carts  and 
bamboo  for  Anderson  when  that  officer  was  about  to 
send  out  foragers  and  take  what  was  wanted  forcibly, 
paying  for  it,  but  seizing  it. 

He  yields  to  irresistible  force  in  his  proclamation  of 
surrender,  that  his  people — his  “O,  My  Beloved  Peo- 
ple !” — may  have  peace.  Pie  can  not  help  it,  and  gives 
up.  He  respects  force — the  only  thing  he  does  respect — 
and  he  is  intelligent  enough  to  despise  the  flatterers, 
though  he  is  fond  of  flattery,  and  misunderstands  it. 
His  correspondence  shows  that.  He  should  not  have 
flatteries,  but  force,  for  our  sake  and  his  sake.  He  never 
knew  anything  about  ballots,  but  the  long-range  rifle- 
ball  and  the  keen  bayonet  and  the  far  sweeping  of  the 


Captured  Documents. 


411 


artillery  he  comprehended.  An  Asiatic  knows  when  he 
is  whipped,  and  thinks  it  the  part  of  wisdom  to  yield 
to  fate — this  in  a degree  not  known  in  Europe,  America, 
Australia,  or  Africa. 

We  are  a great  Asiatic  Power — the  Great  American  ‘ 
Power — a World  Power — and  we  have  taught  Agui- 
naldo  the  lesson  in  the  only  way  in  which  he  would  or 
could  receive  instruction.  The  Philippines  are  our  pos- 
session. We  could  not  rid  ourselves  of  the  responsi- 
bility of  victory.  The  Filipinos  are  our  pupils,  to  be 
taught  self-government,  and  we  have  to  take  plenty  of 
time  to  it,  and  we  are  to  judge  of  their  scholarship  and 
mark  their  progress  with  the  deepest  interest,  recog- 
nizing it  with  satisfaction.  We  could  not  champion 
Aguinaldo  as  a nation,  for  he  was  a fake  nation,  and  as 
a power  he  was  our  creature,  and  the  references  were  to 
our  sovereignty.  Events  have  spoken,  and  will  have 
it  their  own  way.  Aguinaldo  officially  recognized  him- 
self. It  was  all  that  could  be  done  for  him,  and  he  did 
it  himself.  His  office  is  gone,  and  as  an  unofficial  per- 
son he  recognized  us.  If  he  does  not  inhale  the  idea 
that  he  has  a party  in  the  States,  and  under  the  Consti- 
tution being  annexed  by  treaty,  is  eligible  to  the  Presi- 
dency, he  may  be  a useful  inhabitant  of  a Territory,  to 
be  considered  by  us  in  quantity  and  quality  as  we  con- 
sider New  Mexico,  Alaska,  Arizona,  Hawaii,  and  the 
Aleutians. 

The  captured  documents  clear  the  mysteries  from 
the  Oriental  air  for  us;  enable  us  to  know  who  were  and 
are  our  friends  and  foes.  We  fear  no  one,  and  shall  be 
good  to  ourselves  and  to  others  as  always.  We  have 
got  the  hang  of  self-government — we  keep  the  school- 
house  of  it,  are  masters  in  it,  and  can  afford  to  be  just 


412 


Captured  Documents. 


and  generous,  to  maintain  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in 
America,  and  to  keep  Tycoons  off  our  possessions  in 
Asian  islands.  Aguinaldo’s  submission  will  make  peace, 
and  we  should  soon  have  had  peace  without  him.  We 
shall  know  how  to  keep  our  promises,  and  not  to  accept 
the  presumptions  of  others  as  our  obligations.  Our 
policy  in  the  Philippines  has  been  broad  and  straight, 
and  we  stand  squarely  there,  let  the  winds  blow  as  they 
may  from  the  quarters  of  the  globe.  We  shall  teach 
ourselves,  studying  the  character  of  Aguinaldo,  how  to 
educate  him  to  give  compensation  for  the  costly  sacri- 
fices he  has  caused;  and  we  should  deal  with  him  accord- 
ing to  his  deeds;  and  knowing  we  have  a giant’s 
strength,  know  also  ‘‘it  is  tyrannous  to  use  it  like  a 
giant;”  and  so  apply  the  wise  Lincoln’s  golden  words  to 
the  Archipelago,  for  which  we  have  all  the  titles  of  war 
and  peace,  “With  malice  toward  none,  and  charity 
for  all.” 

The  Aguinaldo  proclamation  is  a “captured  docu- 
ment,” for  it  comes  from  a prisoner  of  war,  and  con- 
firms the  history  other  papers  have  made  known.  There 
are  other  documents,  doubtless,  of  like  consequence, 
and  now  will  be  clouds  of  witnesses  for  the  truth — that 
the  policy  of  our  country  in  the  Philippines  was  right 
all  the  while,  and  is  crowned  by  a victory  that  is  com- 
plete and  auspicious.  And,  whether  Republicans  or 
Democrats,  no  matter  in  what  generation  our  ancestors 
came  to  our  country — whether  we  are  between  the  two 
great  oceans  of  the  world,  or  the  islands  of  either — we 
are  all  Americans,  and,  when  the  drum  beats  and  the 
flag  flies,  march  all  one  way,  and  that  the  way  that  glory 
guards  and  honor  guides. 


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This  Tetter,  written  by  Aguinardo  in  the 
Tagalog  diatect,  his  native  tongue,  to  Theodoro 
Sandico,  contains  the  statement  he  does  not  weed 

UNDERSTAND  THE  SPANISH  LANGUAGE.  IT  RELATES  TO 

Mabini,  who  had  the  reputation  of  being  the 
“brains  of  the  Aguinaldo  Government,”  and  is 

NOW  A PARALYTIC.  ThE  ORIGINAL  IS  IN  THE  War  DE- 
PARTMENT, AND  PHOTOGRAPHED,  BY  PERMISSION,  FOR 

THIS  BOOK.  The  official  translation  of  this  let- 
ter IS  IN  Chapter  XII,  Page  132. 


Cincinnati,  May  i,  1901. 


MURAT  HALSTEAD. 


APPENDIX 


27 


417 


translation  of  preliminary  draft  of 

TREATY  OF  BIAC-NA-BATO. 

Note. — The  corrections  *and  changes  found  in  the  orig- 
inal in  pencil  are  given  in  the  translation  in  red  ink. 
The  changes  are,  except  where  otherwise  noted,  in  the 
handwriting  of  P.  A.  Paterno.  It  is  evident  that  he,  as 
representing  the  Spanish  Captain  - General,  refused  to 
agree  to  the  clauses  stricken  out,  which  is  done  in  pencil, 
evidently  the  same  pencil  of  Paterno’s  changes. 

J.  R.  M.  T. 


The  Translator’s  note  is  given  as  written,  but  we  dis- 
tinguish the  Spanish  corrections  of  the  Aguinaldo  and 
Paterno  papers  by  printing  the  words  omitted  in  italics. 
The  changes  made  in  pages  423,  424,  425,  426,  are  signifi- 
cant. Every  attempt  to  use  the  name  of  Aguinaldo  as 
relating  to  political  power  is  stricken  out.  The  title 
“President”  is  in  all  cases  removed.  The  paragraphs  in 
pages  425,  426,  that  were  red-inked,  leave  the  action  as 
an  undertaking  “for  revenue  only.” 


418 


THK  MYSTERY  OF  THE  TREATY  OF 
BIAC-NA-BATO. 


‘ The  name  Biac-na-Bato  is  Tagalog,  and  means  Split- 
Rock.  It  is  the  stronghold  of  the  insurgents  of  ’96  in 
the  isle  of  Euzon,  to  which  they  resorted  when  they  had 
been  driven  out  of  the  Province  of  Cavite,  where  the 
insurrection  that  gave  distinction  to  Aguinaldo  originated. 
The  papers  following  are  of  the  captured  documents  that 
are  in  the  archives  of  the  War  Department,  and  they  are 
of  very  great  interest  to  all  who  desire  to  know  thor- 
oughly and  perfectly  the  character  of  the  Aguinaldo  group 
who  made  the  arrangement  with  the  Spaniards,  Pedro 
Paterno  being  the  arbitrator.  This  distinguished  Filipino 
appears  to  have  been  the  originator  of  the  idea  of  the 
negotiations,  which  were  planned  on  his  part  and  that  of 
Aguinaldo,  to  secure  some  recognition  by  the  Spanish 
Government  as  a political  organization  and  force ; in  other 
words,  Paterno  and  Aguinaldo  made  the  same  effort  there 
that  subsequently  characterized  so  many  of  their  proceed- 
ings to  secure,  in  some  shape,  from  somebody,  recognition 
as  the  representatives  of  a Filipino  Republic.  It  is  to  be 
remarked  that  while  there  is  a great  deal  of  talk  about  a 
treaty  growing  out  of  this  negotiation,  there  is  not  known 
or  acknowledged  to  be  anywhere  a copy  of  that  instrument. 
The  probability  is  there  was  no  treaty,  and  the  face  of  the 
papers  exhibited  below  indicate  that.  They  show  that, 
though  Paterno  drew  up  an  elaborate  document  for  the 
Spaniards  to  consent  to,  declaring  Aguinaldo  to  be  the 
President  of  an  Insurgent  Republic,  the  Spaniard  who  ran 
over  the  document  with  his  red  lead  pencil  marked  out 
everything  of  that  nature,  and  confined  the  negotiation 
expressly  to  the  surrender  of  arms,  the  abandonment 

419 


420 


Appendix. 


of  the  insurrection  by  those  engaged  in  it,  and  the  pro- 
visions for  the  payment  of  money  which  was  made  by 
express  stipulation  a personal  matter.  In  other  words, 
this  paper  proves  that  the  treaty  referred  to  with  so  much 
pomp  by  the  Aguinaldo  party  was  a mere  bargain  and 
sale  agreement,  and  a completely  dishonorable  matter  all 
the  way  through.  It  was,  as  Consul  Williams  said  it  was 
in  his  first  statement  about  it,  a. cash  bribe,  and  nothing 
else;  and  it  settles  the  question  of  the  dishonesty  on  both 
sides,  and  the  extreme  presumption  of  Aguinaldo  and  his 
Filipino  associates  in  the  affectation  of  nationality.  In 
these  papers  are  given  the  respective  dates  of  the  progress 
of  the  transaction  and  the  departure  of  the  insurgents, 
who  had  agreed  to  be  deported  simply  because  they  were 
paid  to  go  out  of  the  country,  and  they  could  afford  to  go, 
for  they  managed  to  get  nearly  a thousand  dollars  for  each 
of  the  guns  that  they  gave  up,  the  only  specifications  of 
the  guns  being  that  there  were  225  of  them,  and  the  first 
payment  was  for  $200,000. 


Appendix. 


421 


331376-A.  G.  O. 

N 

RDS:WAS. 

SENOR  DON  EMIEIO  AGUINALDO, 

CHIEF  OF  THE  REVOEUTIONARY  ARMY  OF  THE 
PHIEIPPINES. 

The  undersigned  has  the  honor  to  present  himself 
unexpectedly  in  your  Headquarters  in  Biac-na-Bato,  and 
states  that  he  does  so  impelled  only  by  his  vehement  love 
for  the  country  in  which  he  was  born,  to  explain  the 
many  reasons  why  the  hostilities  caused  by  the  revolution 
ought  to  stop,  as  to  attain  at  present  the  whole  of  the 
desires  which  are  sought  to  carry  into  effect,  it  would  be 
necessary  to  first  ruin  the  Filipino  People,  and  whoever 
boasts  that  he  loves  that  people  should  remember  that 
the  Spanish  Government  holds  in  suspense  the  longed-for 
reforms  solely  because  those  very  men  continue  to  bear 
arms. 

In  truth,  on  various  occasions  I have  heard  the  Gov- 
ernor-General of  the  Philippines  lament  this  suspension  as 
he  is  very  desirious  of  establishing  and  unfolding  during 
his  command  a new  series  of  reforms  bound  to  give  satis- 
faction to  the  country,  and  if  they  are  not  everything 
which  has  been  asked,  it  is  because  it  is  impossible  to  root 
out  in  one  day  that  which  has  endured  for  more  than  three 
centuries. 

I have  also  repeatedly  heard  the  Most  Excellent  Senor 
Marques  de  Estrella  state  that  understanding  as  nobody 
else  could,  his  obligations  he  had  placed  himself  at  the 
head  of  the  brigade  which  took  the  last  trenches  of  Cavite 
so  that  he  could  have  the  right  to  pardon  without  any 
limitation ; on  account  of  which  he  dictated  the  proclama- 
tion of  the  17th  of  last  May  and  amplified  it  extensively  in 


422 


Appendix. 


applying  it  to  others,  raising  all  the  embargoes  and  even 
holding  his  arms  open  to  receive  deserters  themselves. 

Having  then,  reforms  and  true  pardon,  I permit  myself 
to  counsel  that  a truce  is  advisable  for  the  unfolding  of  the 
generous  propositions  and  proposals  of  reform  which  now 
animate  the  Spanish  Government  represented  in  the  Phil- 
ippines by  the  very  noble  and  fatherly  Most  Excellent 
Senor  Don  Fernando  Primo  de  Rivera,  and  in  the  Penin- 
sula by  the  great  and  liberal  statesman,  Most  Excellent 
Don  Segismundo  Moret  y Predergast,  author,  in  1870,  of  the 
order  of  the  abolishment  of  the  religious  sects,  of  the  crea- 
tion of  the  Philippine  Institute,  of  the  reforms  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  Manila,  and  so  many  beneficent  plans  for  the 
country  directed  toward  giving  representation  in  the  Span- 
ish Cortes  to  the  Archipelago  and  to  liberate  this  people 
from  the  powerful  dominion  of  the  religious  orders. 

Such  are  the  reasons  which  prompt  me  to  present 
myself  spontaneously  at  these  headquarters  and  I submit 
them  to  the  high  consideration  of  Your  Excellency  so  that 
you  may  deign  to  accept  them  for  the  termination  of  this 
fratricidal  struggle  by  a convention  of  peace  which  is 
bound  to  assure  the  prosperity  of  our  beloved  country. 

Biac-na-Bato,  9th  August,  1897. 

(Signed)  PEDRO  A.  PATERNO. 

I certify  that  I believe  this  translation  to  be  correct. 

JOHN  R.  M.  TAYLOR, 

Captain  14th  Infantry. 

In  charge  of  Insurgent  Records. 


Manila,  P.  I.,  July  6,  1900. 


Taken  back  from  Paterno  (Aguinaldo’s  hand) 


Appendix. 


423 


The  Excellent  Senor  Don  Pedro  Alejandrino  Paterno, 
having  unexpectedly  appeared  in  the  Mountain  of  Biac- 

before  me 

na-Bato  on  the  9th  of  August,  1897,  in  the  Headquarters  oj 
the  President  of  the  Philippine  Republic^  stating  that  he 
presented  himself  impelled  solely  by  his  vehement  love  for 
the  country  in  which  he  was  born,  to  state  the  many  rea- 

our 

sons  there  were  why  we  should  lay  down  arms,  contenting 
ourselves  with  a portion  of  the  amount  which  we  asked 
for,  since  in  order  to  gain  at  present  all  of  our  desires 
it  would  be  necessary  first  to  ruin  the  Filipino  People,  and 
those  who  consider  themselves  lovers  of  that  country  must 
remember  that  the  Spanish  Government  is  holding  in  sus- 
pense its  carrying  out  of  the  reforms  solely  because  we  are 
in  arms.  That  the  said  Senor  Paterno  has  on  several  occa- 
sions heard  the  Governor  General  of  the  Philippines  regret 
this  suspension,  as  he  is  anxious  to  plant  and  bring  to  com- 
pletion during  his  command  a new  series  of  reforms  intended 
to  satisfy  the  country,  and  if  they  are  not  all  that  which 
wc  ask  for  it  is  solely  for  the  reason  that  in  a day  it  is  not 
possible  to  extirpate  what  has  been  taking  root  for  more 
than  three  centuries.  That  also  many  times  he  heard  the 
Excellent  Senor  Marques  de  Estrella  say  that,  knowing 
his  duty  better  than  anybody  else,  he  had  placed  himself 
in  front  of  the  Brigades  which  took  the  last  trenches  in 
Cavite  in  order  that  he  might  have  the  right  of  pardon 
without  ^ny  limitation  whatever;  on  account  of  which  he 
dictated  the  proclamation  of  the  17th  of  May  last,  and 
extended  its  provisions  fully  to  all  persons,  taking  off  all 
restrictions  and  even  holding  his  arms  wide  open  to  wel- 
come even  deserters  themselves. 

As  reforms  then  and  actual  forgiveness  are  promised, 
Senor  Paterno  advises  us  to  restrain  our  warlike  ardor  and 
give  an  opportunity  to  the  General’s  desires  for  reform 


424 


Appendix. 


which  animate  the  Spanish  Government  represented  by 
the  very  noble  and  paternal  and  most  Excellent  Senor  Don 
Fernando  Primo  de  Rivera. 

On  account  of  these  various  other  considerations,  not 
connected  with  the  field  of  battle,  and  influenced  by  the 
undeniable  authority  exercised  by  Senor  Paterno  in  ques- 
tions concerning  the  Filipines  he  has  pre- 

sented himself  before  my  presence  as  willing  to  guarantee 
this  negotiation  by  his  own  life  so  valued  by  all  Filipinos. 

Chief  of  the 

The  undersigned,  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  President  of 
Revolutionary"  Army 

the  Filipine  Republic,  names  the  Excellent  Senor  Don  Pedro 
enter  into  harmonious  relations 
A.  Paterno,  as  arbitrator  to  sign  a peace  the  Spanish 
Government  giving  him  full  powers  to  determine,  fix  and 
receive  the  total  sum  of  the  funds  or  values  which  the 
Spanish  Government  grants  us  and  to  distribute  them  ac- 
cording to  his  knowledge  and  sense  of  equity,  everywhere 
recognized,  not  only  to  those  w"ho  have,  taken  up  arms 
but  also  to  those  who  without  having  taken  part  in  the 
suffering  from  the  consequences  of  the  war 
campaign,  are  compromised  with  us  and  who  are  now  en- 
dangered by  this  present  convention  of  peace  on  account  of 
their  obligations  and  interests. 

before  me 

Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno  has  solemnly  sworn  to  the  Coun- 
cil of  the  President  to  reveal  no  secret  of  the  revolution,  at 
any  time  or  place  under  pain  of  loss  of  life  and  honor, 
promising  to  overcome,  if  the  Spanish  Government  aids 

to  the  execution  of  his  pacific 
him,  all  obstacles  opposed  to  the  due  execution  of  contracts, 
intentions  and  negotiations 

payment  of  money  and  other  obligations  contracted. 

These  difficulties  once  overcome  and  the  resources  or 


Appendix. 


425 


values  trusted  to,  the  said  Senor  Paterno  having  been 

according  to  his  instructions 
secured,  they  having  been  deposited  m his  own  hands^  and 
after  we  have  sent  our  certificates  that  the  total  amount 
of  the  funds  are  in  the  custody  of  Senor  Paterno  of  our 
free  will,  we  shall  turn  over  all  the  arms  which  we  pos- 
sess to  the  person  designated  by  the  Captain  General  and 
General-in-Chief  of  the  Filipine  Army,  Don  Fernando 
Primo  de  Rivera  asking  him  for  amnesty.  The  President 
and  his  Cabinet  consider  that  this  action  on  their  part  is 
worth  000, 000  pesos. 

We  commit  our  existence  and  that  of  our  families  and 
also  of  all  of  those  who  have  taken  part  in  the  present 'rev- 
olution to  the  very  noble  and  generous  instincts  of  the 
Marques  de  Estrella,  Grandee  of  Spain,  hoping  from  his 
paternal  forethought  the  ^ sums  necessary  for  us  to  live 
free  in  our  towns  under  the  protection  of  the  Spanish 
authorities  in  our  towns  where  our  property  has  been  de- 
stroyed, or  in  foreign  parts  where  we  shall  have  to  set  up 
our  hearths. 

In  exchange  for  such  protectioyi  from  his  Excellence^  the 
Governor  General  of  the  Philippines^  we  promise  to  re-estab- 
lish order  and  defend  the  peace  m the  Philippines  during  the 
three  commg  years  until  September,  igoo,  during  which 
period  we  hope  the  desire  political,  ecclesiastical,  civil,  admin- 
istrative and  ecojiomical  reforms,  of  which  the  principal,  are 
the  followmg,  will  be  carried  out : 

/.  Expulsion  of  the  religious  orders  or  at  least  regula- 
tions forbidding  them  to  live  together  hi  c'loisters. 

II.  Representation  of  the  Philippines  in  the  Spanish 
Cortes. 

III.  Application  of  true  justice  In  the  Philippines  equal 
for  the  Indian  and  the  Spaniard.  The  same  laws  in  Spain 
and  the  Philippines.  The  Indians  to  have  a share  in  the 
higher  offices  of  the  civil  administration. 


Accepted  and  agreed  to 

Difficulties  (In  a 3d  handwriting  in  red  pencil) 


426 


Appendix. 


IV.  Change  of  the  laws  governing  property,  upon  taxes 
and  the  holding  of  Church  benefices  in  favor  of  the  Indian. 

V.  Proclamation  of  the  individual  rights  of  the.  Indian, 
as,  for  example,  his  liberty  to  combine  with  others  in  asso- 
ciations, and  the  liberty  of  the  press. 

The  President  takes  into  consideration  the  spirit  and  the 
letter  of  this  writing  to  preserit  it  to  the  General  Assembly ; 
which  he  hopes  will  approve  ity  but  it  is  his  duty  to  state  that 
without  the  approbation  of  this  Assembly,  which  will  be  called 
together  as  soon  as  possible,  the  President  of  the  Filipino 
Republic  can  7iot  put  it  in  effect. 

As  a preliminary  base  for  the  harmony  and  the  definite 
peace  betwee^t  the  President  and  the  Spatiish  Government, 
the  President,  who  has  the  honor  to  sign  this  paper,  will 
issue  a General  Order  suspending  all  forivard  7novements  of 
the  Revolutionary  Ar77ty  of  the  Isla7id  of  Luzon,  as  soon  as  he 
receives  the  necessary  supply  of  ratio7is  to  permit  them  to 
remain  statio7ied  m the  mountains  havmg  no  relatio7is  with 
the  cities  aud  towns  during  the  period  of  convocation  and 
action  of  the  General  Assembly. 

And  to  prove  this  to  be  the  truth,  I sign.  Rubricate, 
and  seal  with  our  accustomed  seal,  in  Biac-na-Bato. 

(Signed)  BMILK)  AGUINALDO. 

SEAL 

of 

President  of 
Filipine  Republic. 

Entered  in  the  proper  book  No.  4. 

(Signed)  MARIANO  EEANERA. 

Seal  of  the 

Commanding  General 
Centre  of  Luzon. 

(Signed)  M.  NATIVIDAD. 

I certify  that  I believe  this  translation  to  be  correct. 

Maniea,  P.  I.,  July  5,  1900. 

Captain  14th  Infantry. 

In  charge  of  Insurgent  Records. 


ACT  OF  AGREEMENT  ADOPTED  FOR  THE 
PACIFICATION  OF  THE  ISEAND  OF  EUZON. 


In  the  Royal  Palace  of  Malacanan,  residence  of  the  Ex- 
cellent Senor  Captain  General  of  the  National  Armies  Don 
Fernando  Primo  de  Rivera  y Sobremente,  Marques  de  Es- 
trella, Governor  and  Captain  General  of  the  Filipine  Islands 
and  General  in  Chief  of  its  army,  said  Excellent  Senor  be- 
ing in  private  audience  on  the  15th  of  November,  1897, 
which  the  Excellent  Senor  Don  Pedro  Alejandro  Paterno, 
Knight,  Grand  Cross  of  the  Royal  American  Order  of  Isa- 
bel de  Catholic  Advocate,  and  resident  of  the  City  of  Ma- 
nila, who  states  as  follows : 

That  inspired  by  his  ardent  love  of  the  Spanish  Father- 
land  and  of  the  soil  of  the  Philippines  on  which  he  was 
born,  and  convinced  of  the  magnanimous  sentiments  of 
the  nation  and  of  the  Government,  sentiments  so  magnan- 
imously shown  in  the  conduct  followed  by  the  present 
Governor-General  of  the  Archipelago;  he  has  proposed 
then,  himself  to  co-operate  in  the  re-establishment  of  peace 
utilizing  the  influence  which  he  exerts  among  his  country- 
men, since  this  influence  of  his  is  something  thoroughly 
well  established ; that  in  order  to  attain  this  end,  he  had  a 
conference  with  the  principal  leaders  of  the  Rebellion  in 
their  own  camp  where  exhorted  them  to  lay  down  their 
arms  and  to  subject  themselves  to  the  laws  for  the  good  of 
the  country  and  the  improvement  of  the  condition  of  their 
followers  and  of  their  own  material  interests,  that  his  ex- 
hortations and  labors  have  not  been  sterile,  since  at  the 
end  of  a long  discussion,  the  leaders  above  mentioned, 
inspired  by  the  same  idea  of  peace  and  with  reawakened 
love  of  their  country,  informed  him,  that  they  realized 
that  the  state  of  war  retards  the  inauguration  of  benefi- 

427 


428 


Appendix. 


cent  reforms  in  place  of  hastening  them  and  placing  full 
confidence  in  the  liberal  and  generous  spirit  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  his  Majesty  of  his  illustrious  representatives 
in  these  islands,  that  his  efforts  have  been  constantly 
directed  against  the  inveterate  abuses  and  ills  which  op- 
press the  Filipino  People,  and  they  are  now  ready  to  cease 
their  hostile  attitude  and  to  co-operate  with  all  their 
power  and  ability  in  the  re-establishment  of  peace  and  that 
in  obedience  to  the  pacific  and  conciliatory  desires  the  said 
leaders  have  conferred  upon  Don  Pedro  Alejandro  Paterno, 
here  present,  the  ample  powers  which  he  exhibits  signed 
on  the  5th  of  last  November  in  the  Mountain  of  Biac-na- 
Bato  by  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  Supreme  Chief  of  the  In- 
surgents in  arms  and  by  the  other  leaders,  Don  Mariano 
Llanera,  and  Don  Baldomero  Aguinaldo,  his  subordinates, 
powers  which  designate  him  as  the  arbiter  and  which  give 
him  full  authority  to  negotiate  an  agreement  providing  for 
the  submission  of  those  who  still  maintain  a hostile  atti- 
tude against  the  power  of  the  State. 

The  Excellent  Senor  Captain  General  Don  Fernando 
Primo  de  Rivera  having  thoroughly  understood  the  nature 
of  the  mission  undertaken  by  the  Excellent  Senor  Don 
Pedro  Alejandro  Paterno,  in  accordance  with  the  powers 
signed  by  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  Don  Mariano  Llanera 
and  Don  Baldomero  Aguinaldo  in  which  it  is  stated  that 
the  said  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  assumes  the  position  of 
full  and  absolute  representative  of  those  who  fight  against 
the  laws  established  in  the  Philippines,  such  being  the 
position  conferred  upon  him  by  an  assembly  composed  of 
individuals  taking  part  in  the  Rebellion  and  by  the  organ- 
ization created  by  the  same  for  the  conduct  of  the  govern- 
ment, the  said  Excellent  Captain  General  having  stated 
that  he  congratulated  himself  upon  the  attitude  adopted 
by  Senor  Paterno  and  on  account  of  the  tendencies  and 


Appendix. 


429 


proposals  of  those  represented  by  Senor  Paterno  stated 
that  he  considered  worthy  of  gratitude  and  praise  the  serv- 
ices rendered  by  that  gentleman  for  the  establishment  of 
peace,  and  that  he  was  animated  by  the  same  desires  him- 
self, as  he  had  shown  in  his  proclamations  amnesty  and  in 
a large  number  of  orders  and  decisions,  he  was  accordingly 
ready  to  facilitate  any  steps  taken  toward  the  pacification, 
being  ready  to  renounce  the  laurels  of  victory  in  the  com- 
ing campaign  to  avoid  the  shedding  of  blood  and  any  rea- 
son for  enduring  hatreds  and  rancors  between  those  who, 
having  the  same  God  and  the  same  Fatherland,  ought  to 
live  in  fraternal  concord  and  a community  of  interests  and 
of  affections. 

The  Excellent  Senor  General  in  Chief  having  received 
with  benevolence  the  propositions  formulated  by  Senor 
Paterno,  the  latter  stated  the  chief  desire  of  those  whom 
he  represented  was  to  submit,  that  the  future  of  those  who 
lay  down  their  arms  on  the  altars  of  the  country  should  be 
free  from  any  penalty  for  the  past  and  that  they  should  be 
supplied  with  the  sums  indispensable  to  their  continued 
existence  in  the  territory  of  the  Nation  or  in  foreign  parts ; 
and  considering  these  desires  attainable  and  others  unac- 
ceptable, both  members  of  the  conference  having  consid- 
ered the  matter  with  a thoroughness  and  from  the  lofty 
point  of  view  which  so  difficult  and  important  matter  re- 
quires, the  Excellent  Captain  General  Don  Fernando  de 
Rivera  y Sobremente,  exercising  the  authority  with  which 
he  is  invested  and  the  full  and  unlimited  power  which 
the  government  of  his  Majesty  has  conferred  upon  him, 
and  the  Excellent  Senor  Don  Pedro  Alejandro  Paterno,  in 
the  name  and  as  representative  of  the  Leader  of  the  In- 
surgents in  Arms  and  of  the  other  two  leaders  who  signed 
the  powers  delivered  to  him,  which  he  has  shown,  agree  to 
end  the  conflict  which  at  present  afflicts  with  desolation 


430 


Appendix. 


and  with  blood  certain  regions  of  the  Island  of  Luzon; 
the  agreement  being  comprised  in  the  following  clauses: 

I Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  in  his  quality  as  Su- 

preme Leader  of  those  in  the  Island  of  Luzon  now  waging 
open  hostilities  against  their  legitimate  government  and 
Don  Baldomero  Aguinaldo  and  Don  Mariano  Llanera  who 
also  exercise  important  commands  in  the  forces  mentioned 
are  to  cease  their  hostile  attitude,  surrender  their  arms 
that  they  are  using  against  their  Fatherland,  and  are  to 
surrender  to  the  legitimate  authorities  claiming  their  rights 
as  Spanish  Filipino  citizens  which  they  desire  to  presence. 
As  a consequence  of  this  surrender  they  obligate  them- 
selves to  cause  the  surrender  of  such  individuals  as  ac- 
tually follow  them  and  those  who  recognize  them  as  Lead- 
ers and  obey  their  orders. 

II.  The  surrender  of  arms  will  take  place  in  accord- 
ance with  an  inventory  on  the  day  of , at  the 

hour  and  place 

which  will  be  decided  upon,  the  Militar^^  Commander  des- 
ignated for  this  purpose  by  the  Excellent  Senor  General 
in  Chief  is  to  take  charge  of  the  same. 

III.  The  surrender  of  the  individuals  referred  to  will 
take  place  as  far  as  concerns  the  leaders  of  bands  or  allied 
troops  with  the  formalities  and  at  the  time  and  place  to  be 
determined  upon  hereafter,  each  person  surrendering  him- 
self to  receive  at  the  time  of  surrender  a passport  or  pass 
which  he  needs  to  travel  freely  to  the  place  where  he 
wants  to  go.  Spaniards,  foreigners  and  deserters  from  the 
Army  will  not  enjoy  this  privilege,  but  will  remain  in  the 
hands  of  the  Military  Authorities,  their  cases  to  be  dis- 
posed of  as  provided  in  the  fifth  and  sixth  paragraphs. 

IV.  All  those  who  avail  themselves  of  the  provision  of 
this  act  vdll  stand  free  from  any  penalty  they  have  incurred 
from  the  offense  of  rebellion  and  kindred  crimes,  the  Ex- 
cellent Senor  General  in  Chief  binding  himself  to  concede 


Appendix. 


431 


a general  amnesty  covering  such  offenses  and  to  authorize 
the  persons  surrendering  themselves  to  freely  choose  a resi- 
dence in  whatever  portion  of  the  Spanish  territory  or  of 
foreign  parts  which  they  desire.  This  clause  is  not  to  be 
construed  as  conflicting  with  the  provisions  of  the  fifth 
and  sixth  clauses  of  the  present  act. 

V.  The  deserters  of  the  Army  who  avail  themselves 
of  this  act  will  be  pardoned  from  any  penalty,  but  will 
have  to  serve  as  soldiers  in  a disciplinary  corps  for  the 
period  which  remained  of  their  enlistment  at  the  date  of 
their  desertion. 

VI.  The  Spaniards  or  Americans  and  foreigners  who 
present  themselves  claiming  the  benefit  of  this  act  will  be 
comprised  in  the  general  pardon,  but  will  be  expelled 
from  the  Philippine  Islands. 

VII.  The  parties  or  bands  which  do  not  recognize  the 
leadership  of  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  nor  obey  his  orders 
who  claim  the  benefits  of  this  act  will  obtain  them  in  full 
if  they  surrender  themselves  before  the  date  set  down. 

VIII.  The  parties  and  bands  which  do  not  surrender 
before  the  date  mentioned  in  the  preceding  paragraph  will 
be  pursued  and  treated  as  subject  to  the  present  laws  cov- 
ering such  cases  or  as  parties  of  robbers  and  assassins  if  on 
account  of  their  organization  the  character  of  their  leaders 
or  their  own  acts  they  appear  to  deserve  such  a descrip- 
tion. Nor  will  the  benefits  stated  accrue  to  those  who 
surrender  themselves  immediately  before  they  are  to  be 
attacked  or  during  the  pursuit  following  an  action. 

IX.  The  Excellent  Senor  General  in  Chief  will  provide 
the  necessary  means  for  supporting  the  lives  of  those  who 
surrender  themselves  before  the  date  given  in  the  second 
paragraph  in  view  of  the  painful  situation  to  which  the 
war  has  reduced  them,  but  he  will  negotiate  only  with 
Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  through  the  Excellent  Senor  Don 
Pedro  Alejandro  Paterno. 


432 


Appendix. 


X.  And  in  case  that  an}"  of  the  preceding  paragraphs 
are  violated  the  provisions  of  the  whole  act  will  remain 
null. 

In  testimony  of  which  the  Excellent  Senor  The  Cap- 
tain General  Don  Fernando  Primo  de  Rivera,  in  the  name 
of  and  as  representative  of  the  Government  of  His  Majesty 
and  the  Excellent  Senor  Don  Pedro  Alejandro  Paterno  in 
the  name  of  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  bind  themselves  to  ex- 
ecute the  provisions  of  this  act  and  sign  it.  Three  copies 
of  which  are  to  be  drawn  up,  one  to  be  forwarded  to  the 
Minister  of  War,  one  will  remain  in  the  office  of  the  Cap- 
tain General  of  the  Philippines  for  reference  and  for  exe- 
cution, the  other  will  be  given  to  the  arbiter  the  Excellent 
Senor  Don  Pedro  Alejandro  Paterno,  the  said  gentleman 
stating  in  the  name  of  those  whom  he  represents  that 
they  confidently  expect  that  on  account  of  the  foresight  of 
the  Government  of  his  Majesty  that  it  will  take  into  con- 
sideration and  satisfy  the  desire  of  the  Filipino  People  in 
order  to  assure  them  the  peace  and  well  being  which  they 
deserv^e. 

I certify  that  I believe  this  translation  to  be  correct. 

JOHN  R.  M.  TAYLOR, 

Captain  14th  Infantry, 

In  charge  of  Insurgent  Records. 

Manila,  P.  I.,  July  7,  1900. 


/ 


PROGRAMME. 


Day 

i8th  Nov. 


20 th  Nov. 


7th  Dec. 


8th  Dec. 


8th  Dec. 
(Afternoon.) 


MAY  GOD  GUIDE  TO  GLORY. 

Departure  of  Don  Jose  Salvador  for  Biac-na- 
Bato  with  the  reply  of  the  conference  with  the 
Governor  General  and  with  the  passes  for  the 
insurgents  in  general. 

Sending  out  the  orders  of  pacification,  from 
Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  to  all  his  barracks  scat- 
tered throughout  various  provinces. 

Arrival  of  Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno  at  Biac-na- 
Bato  with  Don  Miguel  Primo  de  Rivera  and 
General  Tejeiro  or  General  Moret,  being  guests 
in  the  Government  house,  in  company  with  the 
family  of  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  Don  Artemio 
Ricarte,  Don  Jose  Salvadoe  Natividad,  Don  Ysa- 
belo  Artacho  and  other  chiefs  of  rank  in  the 
insurrection. 

Surrender  of  arms  of  the  immediate  com- 
mand of  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  to  the  Spanish 
Government  in  some  place  between  Biac-na- 
Bato  and  San  Miguel  de  Mayunio. 

Simultaneously  the  Spanish  Government  will 
give  to  Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno  to  give  it  in  turn 
to  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  the  sum  of  six  hun- 
dred thousand  pesos  to  distribute  them  among 
the  insurgents.^ 

Arrival  of  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  and  other 
Insurgent  Chiefs  with  Don  P.  A.  Paterno  at 
San  Miguel  de  Mayumo. 

433 


28 


434 


Appendix. 


loth  Dec. 

15th  Dec. 

19th  Dec. 


From  the  20th 
to  the  31st  Dec. 

1st  Jan. 

2d  Jan. 


Departure  at  Manila  of  Don  E.  Aguinaldo 
and  companions. 

Arrival  of  the  mentioned  gentlemen  to  for- 
eign parts. 

Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  will  telegraph  to  the 
Insurgent  chief  which  shall  have  remained  in 
Biac-na-Bato  to  prove  to  the  Generals  Primo  de 
Rivera  and  Tejeiro  that  they  can  abandon,  if 
they  should  so  prefer,  the  Government  house  at 
Biac-na-Bato. 

Surrender  of  arms  of  the'  other  remaining 
commands  of  the  insurrection. 

The  “Te  Deum”  will  be  sung  in  the  Cathe- 
dral and  the  decree  of  general  amnesty  will  be 
promulgated. 

To  Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno  two  checks  or 
notes  will  be  given,  one  at  four  months’  date 
for  value  of  100,000  pesos,  and  another  of  six 
months’  date  for  value  of  100,000  pesos,  which 
constitute  the  2d  and  3d  payments. 

Interlineations — Don  Isabelo  Artacho — it  is 
good.  Blotted — que  constituye — it  is  not  good. 

Biac-na-Bato,  15th  November,  1897. 


(Signed)  EMILIO  AGUINALDO. 

(Sgd)  MARIANO  LLANERA. 

(Sgd)  BALDEMERO  AGUINALDO.^ 

(Signed)  PEDRO  A.  PATERNO. 


I certify  that  I believe  this  translation  to  be 
correct. 

JOHN  R.  M.  TAYLOR. 

Captain  14th  Infantry, 

. In  charge  of  Insurgent  Records. 


Manila,  P.  I.,  July  6,  1900. 


WAS.  331376  A.  G.  O. 
N 


PROGRAM. 


14th  Dec. 


16th  Dec. 


23d  Dec. 


24th  Dec. 


25th  Dec. 


Departure  of  Don  Ysabelo  Artacho  with  the 
approval  of  the  Ex-Sr.  Governor  General  of  the 
Convention  of  Peace. 

Issue  of  the  orders  proclaiming  peace  to  all 
his  troops  in  the  various  provinces  by  Don 
Emilio  Aguinaldo. 

Departure  of  S.  Miguel  de  Mayumo  of  the 
Excellent  Senor  Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno  with  the 
Excellent  Senores  Generals  Chief  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  Don  Celestine  Fernandez  Tejeiro  and 
Don  Ricardo  Moret,  an  adjutant,  two  staff  offi- 
cers and  Lieutenant  Colonel  of  Infantry  Don 
Miguel  Primo  de  Ribera. 

Arrival  at  Biac-na-Bato  of  the  most  Excellent 
Senores  Generals  Tejeiro  and  Moret,  Adjutant 
and  two  aids  who  will  be  met  in  the  road  by 
Don  Ysabelo  Artacho  and  Don  Jose  Salvador 
Natividad. 

Departure  of  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo  and  his 
companions  with  Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno  and 
Don  Miguel  Primo  de  Rivera  for  Lingayan, 
where  the  Spanish  Government  will  have  a mer- 
chant Steamer  to  take  them  to  Hong  Kong,  the 
gentlemen  going  aboard  may  take  their  revolv- 
ers and  the  two  rifles  asked  for  by  Don  Emilio 
Aguinaldo.  On  the  departure  of  these  gentle- 
men from  Biac-na-Bato  the  Spanish  Government 
will  give,  by  Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno,  to  Balde- 
mero  Aguinaldo  a letter  payable  to  the  order  of 
435 


436 


Appendix. 


25th  Dec. 
[Continued^ 


27th  Dec. 


the  Spanish-Filipino  Bank  upon  some  Bank  in 
Hong  Kong  for  the  sum  of  $400,000  dollars  the 
cost  of  the  exchange  being  charged  to  the  Span- 
ish Government. 

The  above  mentioned  gentlemen  having  left 
the  port  of  Lingayan  for  Hong  Kong  and  hav- 
ing arrived  at  Hong  Kong,  Don  Kmilio  Agui- 
naldo  will  telegraph  to  Don  Artemio  Ricarte  in 
order  that  he  may  carry  out  the  following:  First, 
the  turning  in  of  the  arms  and  munitions  inven- 
toried ; Second,  the  carrying  out  of  the  order  of 
Aguinaldo,  given  before  his  departure  from 
these  islands,  for  the  turning  in  of  all  arms  re- 
maining in  the  hands  of  the  various  groups  of 
Insurgents  scattered  in  various  provinces.  Third, 
that  he  may  notify  General  Tejeiro  and  other 
gentlemen  who  remain  in  Biac-na-Bato  that  they 
may  abandon  their  residences  in  said  town.  As 
soon  as  the  225  fire  arms,  2,382  cartridges,  and 
20  pieces  of  ordnance,  and  2 sabers  are  turned 
in  to  the  Spanish  Government  at  Biac-na-Bato, 
these  are  the  officially  inventoried  articles,  Don 
Artemio  Ricarte  will  notify  Don  Emilio  Agui- 
naldo in  cypher  in  order  that  he  may  draw  upon 
or  cash  the  letter  of  exchange  for  400,000  dol- 
lars guaranteed  by  the  Government  of  the  Fil- 
ipines  and  the  Captain  General  will  notify  Don 
Miguel  Primo  de  Rivera  and  Don  Pedro  A. 
Paterno  that  he  has  received  the  arms  mentioned. 

General  Tejeiro  and  Don  Artemio  Ricarte 
will  distribute  passes  and  guarantees  to  the  in- 
surgents permitting  them  to  go  where  they 
see  fit. 

As  soon  as  men  and  arms  have  come  in,  sur- 
rendered to  amount  to  over  700,  half  at  least  of 
the  arms  being  modern  ones,  Don  Pedro  A. 


Appendix. 


437 


27th  Dec. 
{Continued}; 


Paterno  will  be  given  two  checks  for  the  same 
sums,  one  for  $200,000  and  the  other  for  a like 
amount  which  will  be  good  when  the  Te  Deum 
is  sung  and  the  general  amnesty  proclaimed 
which  will  be  just  as  soon  as  peace  reigns  in 
the  Filipines;  the  existence  of  bands  of  Tuli- 
sanes  (armed  robbers)  will  not  be  considered  as 
a bar  to  this. 

The  surrender  of  the  arms,  when  the  225 
and  other  articles  mentioned  have  been  verified, 
will  be  to  any  body  of  troops,  and  will  be  re- 
corded in  triplicate  receipts,  one  for  the  Gov- 
ernor General,  one  for  Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno 
and  the  third  for  Don  Artemio  Ricarte  as  to 
whom  the  Governor  General  will  give  the  nec- 
essary instructions. 

This  program  is  the  same  as  the  original 
project  by  the  Excellent  Sr.  Don  Pedro  A.  Pa- 
terno, and  the  insignificant  variations  from  it 
whose  explanations  accompany  them  are  made 
in  agreement  with  the  said  gentlemen  who 
signs  it  at  Manila,  14th  December,  1897,  with 
the  General  in  Chief.  The  Captain  General 
Fernando  Primo  de  Rivera,  The  Arbitrator — 
Don  Pedro  A.  Paterno.  There  is  a seal  which 
is  incribed:  “Office  of  the  Captain  General  of 
the  Filipines.  Headquarters  of  the  General 
Staff.”  There  are  two  signatures,  Fernando 
Primo  de  Rivera  and  Pedro  A.  Paterno. 

A COPY. 

I certify  that  I believe  this  translation  to  be 
correct. 

JOHN  R.  M.  TAYLOR, 

Captain  14th  Infantry, 

In  charge  of  Insurgent  Records, 
Manila,  P.  I.,  July  6,  1900, 


A b bcrfi-  : , , -- ; , 


3 903 


BOSTON  COLLEGE 


020  86347 


